This new edition represents a wide-ranging and up-to-date critical introduction to the psychology of Carl Jung, one of the founders of psychoanalysis. Including two new essays and thorough revisions of most of the original chapters, it constitutes a radical new assessment of his legacy. Andrew Samuels’s introduction succinctly articulates the challenges facing the Jungian community. The fifteen essays set Jung in the context of his own time, outline the current practice and theory of Jungian psychology, and show how Jungians continue to question and evolve his thinking and to contribute to current debate about modern culture and psychoanalysis. The volume includes a full chronology of Jung’s life and work, extensively revised and up-to-date bibliographies, a case study, and a glossary. It is an indispensable reference tool for both students and specialists, written by an international team of Jungian analysts and scholars from various disciplines.
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When we wrote the Preface to the first edition of this volume, at the end of the twentieth century, we were hoping that the psychology of C. G. Jung and his followers would provide new insights and guidance for mental health professionals and society at large as we moved into a new millennium. We hoped that analytical psychology would bring greater awareness of the necessity for human collaboration in the midst of the environmental crises on the horizon, acknowledging that diversity and conflict are part of human relationships. At that time it seemed realistic to think that post-modernism and multiculturalism, as well as challenges to conventional assumptions about gender and its expressions, would be our central concerns over the next decade. We thought that Jung and his followers could offer valuable insights and ideas about those concerns and developments.

Now, a decade later, it is almost hard to imagine the optimism that was in the air at the end of the last century. Now, we face religious wars and terrorism all over the world, in an atmosphere of human cruelty and horror that seems a throwback to barbarian times. Who would have thought that we would see videos on TV of masked men parading with weapons, young Americans torturing blindfolded prisoners, beheadings of journalists and other innocent people, and an unjust and misguided war consuming civilian and military people in a fog of suffering, revenge, and ignorance? The darkness of this new century seems almost beyond expression.

Are the ideas of Jung and Jungians still useful in such dire circumstances? We believe they are. More than any other modern psychologist, Jung understood that religion would always be with us. He wrote and spoke about a religious or moral “instinct.” He believed that people deeply need to locate themselves in a context of meaning that is larger than their individual identities. He was sure that our sciences, no matter how comprehensive and precise, would not satisfy the human imagination when it comes to understanding our purpose here, why we suffer, or how we can keep faith in
our everyday lives. Additionally, Jung thought the human personality was fired by unconscious and unknown desires, often dominated by what he called the “shadow” – an inferior, unadapted, childish, and grandiose aspect of our unconscious life. Jung might not have been shocked that Islamic terrorists attacked the World Trade Center in New York City in 2001 because he would have seen the envy and hatred aimed at the USA in some way reflecting its shadow as a powerful, wealthy, and dominant nation.

In his 1938 Terry Lectures on Psychology and Religion, at Yale University, Jung said,

There is no civilized country nowadays where the lower strata of the population are not in a state of unrest and dissent. In a number of European nations such a condition is overtaking the upper strata, too. This state of affairs is the demonstration of our psychological problem on a gigantic scale. In as much as collectivities are mere accumulations of individuals, their problems are also accumulations of individual problems. One set of people identifies with the superior man and cannot descend, and the other set identifies itself with the inferior man and wants to reach the surface. (1938: 95)

Jung believed that problems like the ones we are facing now will never be solved by legislation, wars, or even large-scale social movements. He said that our most troubling and cruel human problems are “only solved by a general change of attitude. And the change does not begin with propaganda and mass meetings, or with violence. It begins with a change in individuals ... and only the accumulation of such individual changes will produce a collective solution” (1938: 95).

And so, we introduce this new edition of The Cambridge Companion to Jung with the hope that Jungian thought and psychology can contribute a way of looking at individual change that might ease or alleviate the miseries that human beings are currently bringing upon themselves the world over. Given the scale of environmental and human destruction that we face, investing ourselves in individual change – with its ripple effects outward from relationship to relationship – seems more sane and promising than feeling sure that we possess a mass solution or ideal that we can readily impose on others. In the midst of educated people attempting solutions like globalization of the economy, grassroot movements for each specialized concern, wars to instill democracy, and drugs and pills to change any bad mood, there is an appealing simplicity in working with our own self-awareness to affect those with whom we have relationships (personal and professional) to increase good dialogue and open-mindedness in order to discover new ideas from our differences. Perhaps in the future, people will be able to sit down and talk with each other about their differences of belief
rather than kill for them. Perhaps analytical psychology can provide some inspiration for that hope.

In the past decade there have been many changes in the broader field of psychoanalysis. On the promising side, Relational Psychoanalysis has been named and developed as a gathering together of different kinds of psychoanalysts who think about development and psychotherapy in a way that attempts to account for more than one brain, mind, or psyche. Spawned from feminism, attachment studies, and gender studies, as well as philosophy and psychoanalysis, this approach is often dubbed a “two-person” psychology, although more than two people might be involved. Relational Psychoanalysts may label themselves intersubjectivist, interpersonal, object relational, or simply Relational. Jungians are very much counted among them. In the last decade the International Association for Relational Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy was founded to offer programs and a journal that welcomed clinical and theoretical developments of a relational perspective, no matter the training background of an analyst. Several of the essays in this volume express a relational perspective. Another exciting development has been the founding of the International Association of Jungian Studies (IAJS), in 2003, to serve as a forum in which analysts and academics interested in Jung’s legacy can meet. Its first successful conference was held in the summer of 2006.

On the troubling side, there have been large-scale cultural and medical movements to discredit any form of psychoanalysis or depth psychology. Biological psychiatry, the pharmaceutical industry, and insurance companies have banded together to undermine therapeutic interventions that take more than a brief period of time. These groups demand that psychotherapy be “evidence-based” in order to be considered effective. While it is impossible to review this history in detail here, we want to acknowledge that analytical psychology has promise and stumbling blocks for developing scientific and empirical justification of its effectiveness. Before giving an account of these, we would note that this demand for evidence has not emerged from a strictly scientific or ethical concern to offer effective psychotherapy. The medical industry has increasingly wanted shorter, less relational kinds of mental health treatment to reduce costs and increase profits. Establishing “evidence” of effectiveness has been oriented more by marketplace concerns than by humanistic or compassionate ones. Because of many factors, but especially because depth psychotherapies are not profit-making on any large scale, it has been extremely difficult for analytic training programs or institutions to fund studies of outcome and process in long-term psychotherapy or analysis. Some such studies have been done, showing positive results for long-term treatments. More imaginative
approaches to research will have to be developed over the next decade if analytical psychology is going to survive as a form of mental health practice.

Jung himself was a scientist and enjoyed doing research, as evidenced by his early association experiments and his later comparative studies of symbols. There are now a number of academic institutions, in several countries, that offer graduate programs in analytical psychology and have the requisite set-up to conduct at least correlational or factor-analytic studies. Quantitative and qualitative studies of symbolic, dream, and other imagery have been undertaken in these programs, although there have been fewer studies of clinical effectiveness. We expect that the coming decade will see research development that includes reports from both clinicians and their patients about what is effective and what is not.

Finally, in this past decade, at least two definitive biographies of Jung (Bair 2003; Shamdasani 2003) were published. They have provided many more reliable details and facts about Jung’s professional and personal development than were previously available. They have also sparked new accusations and debates about Jung’s contributions and biographical research on them. Sadly, some of the differences of opinions and views over these and other topics have created problematic schisms, divisiveness, and suspicion in the world of analytic psychology, rather than dialogue and discovery. We hope that this new volume, bringing together contributors with diverse and varied views, will foster a renewed spirit of respectful debate so that our own tendencies to become dogmatic, defensive, or narrow-minded will not interfere with our ability to sit down and talk about our differences. If analytical psychology is to contribute to a greater spirit of collaboration and sharing, as well as individual development, then it has to start at home.

This new volume brings a great many changes and revisions that take account of the developments that have occurred over the past decade. We invited all of our contributors to rethink their topics a decade later and to revise what they felt needed to be changed. Most were glad of this opportunity to carefully reformulate and update their arguments in the light of both new tendencies in the field and their own changed perspectives. Many of these have made very substantial changes to their chapters, including updating their bibliographies. We are especially grateful to Andrew Samuels, Claire Douglas, Sherry Salman, Michael Vannoy Adams, Hester McFarland Solomon, Elio Frattaroli, Lawrence Alschuler, and Ann Belford Ulanov, all of whom have made such thoroughgoing revisions that they have in effect produced new essays that recontextualize their respective fields for a new century. Others have been able to achieve much the same
with more modest revisions. Only a few, whether because they have retired or for other personal reasons, felt unable to revise their work. We thank them all, some for the care and the time that went into their major revisions, and others for their continuing good wishes. We, the editors, have written new essays for this new edition.

Because we believe that our earlier Preface did an adequate job both of placing Jung’s accomplishments within the larger framework of psychology and psychoanalysis and outlining the scope of the volume, we have retained it below.

From the 1997 Preface

It was inevitable that a volume like this should appear before the end of the twentieth century. For the discoveries of Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung, who was one of the founders of psychoanalysis, constitute one of the most significant expressions of our time. Many of his ideas anticipate the intellectual and sociocultural concerns of our current “post-modern” period. Decentered selves, multiple realities, the function of symbols, the primacy of human interpretation (as our only means of knowing “reality”), the importance of adult development, spiritual self-discovery, and the necessity of multicultural perspectives are all to be found in Jung’s writings.

And yet, it must be conceded that the enthusiastic accolades for his bold and prescient ideas have been tarnished by wide-ranging allegations against him. At a personal level, he has been accused of cultish mysticism, sexism, racism, anti-Semitism, and professional misconduct. With regard to his ideas, his critics have repeatedly insisted that his approach is fuzzy, antiquated, and entrenched in culturally biased categories such as “masculine” and “feminine” and nebulous concepts like the “Shadow” and the “Wise Old Man.” They have denounced his theories for their essentialism, elitism, stark individualism, biological reductionism, and naive reasoning about gender, race, and culture.

Even so, analysts and scholars who have taken a professional interest in Jung’s ideas have constantly insisted that his basic theories provide one of the most notable and influential contributions to the twentieth century. They firmly believe that his theories provide an invaluable means for deciphering not only the problems but also the challenges that confront us both as individuals and as members of our particular society/societies. They allow us to penetrate the multiple levels both of our own inner reality and of the world around us. And his ideas have had a marked influence on other disciplines, from anthropology and religious studies to literary criticism and cultural studies.
Such radically different assessments of Jung and his work stem in part from the fact that his followers and critics alike have been much too preoccupied with his personal life and presence. It cannot be sufficiently stressed that, whatever his ideas owe to his own psychological make-up, their value – or otherwise – must be established on their own merit. Everyone has failings, and Jung had his fair share of these. It is not the man, but his ideas and contribution that need to be reassessed. In 1916, he began to use the term “analytical psychology” to describe his individual form of psychoanalysis. It is time that the focus shifted to the evaluation of Jung’s legacy.

Since Jung’s death in 1961, those interested in analytical psychology – including practitioners in clinical, literary, theological, and sociocultural fields – have responded to the charges leveled against him and, in doing so, have radically revised many of his basic ideas. One hears too often the blanket label “Jungian” used to describe any idea whose origins can be traced to him. This is misleading. It is still insufficiently appreciated that “Jungian” studies are not an orthodoxy. The theory of “analytical psychology” has come a long way in the last thirty years.

For some time now, there has been a need for a study that would highlight the originality, complexity, and farsightedness of analytical psychology and that would draw wider attention to the overall promise of some of Jung’s major discoveries. At the same time, it would be impossible to do this today without also referring to the achievements of those who have been in the forefront of recent developments in analytical psychology and who have made it the vital and pluralist discipline it now is.

This is the first study specifically designed to serve as a critical introduction to Jung’s work and to take into account how he has influenced both psychotherapy and other disciplines. It is divided into three main parts. The first section presents a scholarly account of Jung’s own work. The second examines the major trends that have evolved in post-Jungian clinical practice. The third evaluates the influence and contributions of Jung and post-Jungians in a range of contemporary debates. More than anything else, this volume seeks to affirm that analytical psychology is a lively, questioning, pluralist, and continually evolving development within psychoanalysis. It is currently engaged in healthy revisions of Jung’s original theories, and in exploring new ideas and methods not only for psychotherapy, but also for the study of a wide range of other disciplines, from mythology to religion, and from gender studies to literature and politics.

We editors asked our contributors the question “How do you evaluate the ideas of Jung and post-Jungians in terms of contemporary preoccupations with post-modernism, with gender, race, culture, and with the current findings in your own field of study or practice?” This volume gives priority
to identifying which aspects of analytical psychology should move with us into the next millennium, and why. One of us is a practicing Jungian analyst and psychological researcher (Young-Eisendrath); the other teaches English literature at a university (Dawson). We have both considered seriously the attacks on Jung and responded to them not only as responsible scholars, but also as human beings daily engaged in making use of analytical psychology with real people. Our respect for – and our dedication to – Jung’s ideas have not blinded us to the fact that some of what he said and wrote, some of what he theorized clinically and culturally, needs revision. With this orientation and background, we appealed to our contributors to be not only thorough and alive in their topics, but also thoughtfully critical.

The second edition of The Cambridge Companion to Jung is a substantially new book. Most of its chapters have been thoroughly revised, references and bibliographies have been updated, and new concerns have been addressed.

Introduction

Jungian analyst Andrew Samuels has radically revised his Introduction in order to deal with the major changes that have swept through Jungian studies over the last decade. He begins by considering the possible causes for the “lingering doubt about the intellectual, scholarly, and ethical viability of taking an interest in Jung.” After briefly considering Jung’s break from Freud, he identifies and justifies his impressive list of Jung’s main contributions to psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. He follows this with a succinct overview of the work of the post-Jungians, which leads naturally into his revision of his own 1985 delineation of three different “schools” of – or, rather, emphases in – contemporary analytical psychology. He now argues that there are four more-or-less distinct schools: a fundamentalist, classical, developmental, and psychoanalytic school. And he finishes his essay with a brief but pertinent consideration of the problem with which he began: Jung’s reputation in academia.

Jung’s ideas and their context

This section presents Jung’s life and discoveries in the context of his personal and historical influences. It looks in particular at his relationship with Sigmund Freud and at the philosophical debate surrounding the problem of “universals” or originary principles (in Jung’s case, archetypes). The section opens with a rich historical account of major influences on Jung’s thinking by Jungian
analyst Claire Douglas. This is followed by a provocative psychoanalytic interpretation of the relationship between Freud and Jung written by a professor of psychology, Douglas Davis. Jungian analyst Sherry Salman then presents Jung’s major contributions to contemporary psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Showing how and why Jung was prescient, Salman gives a picture of Jung’s ideas in relation to current “object relations” theory and other personality and psychodynamic theories. Finally, philosopher and Jungian analyst Paul Kugler puts Jung’s major discoveries into the context of the post-modern debate, especially those issues that arise from the tension between deconstruction and essentialism. Kugler traces the evolution of “image” in the development of Western thought, showing how Jung’s approach resolves a basic dichotomy operating throughout Western philosophy.

Analytical psychology in practice
This section focuses especially on issues of clinical practice, particularly in regard to the plurality of analytical psychology in its three strains of classical, archetypal, and developmental. Jungian analyst David Hart, who studied with Jung in Zurich, opens with an engaging review of the major tenets of the classical approach, formerly known as the Zurich school. A director of a graduate program in psychoanalytic studies, Michael Vannoy Adams, then presents a historical and phenomenological account of the archetypal approach, showing how it has evolved its focus on the “imaginal.” Next, Jungian analyst Hester McFarland Solomon provides an in-depth theoretical and clinical analysis of the components of the developmental approach, formerly known as the London school.

These three chapters are followed by a chapter on the clinical understanding of transference and countertransference in Jung’s work and in post-Jungian practice, written by Jungian analyst Christopher Perry. A classically trained Freudian analyst, Elio Frattaroli, then examines the differences and common ground between Jungian and Freudian thought. This takes the form of an imaginary dialogue between a Jungian and a Freudian analyst about how the two streams of influence interface and separate in the contemporary practice and experience of psychoanalysis. For this new edition, he has written an extensive addendum.

The second part of the study concludes with an exciting experiment: the interpretation of a single case through the lenses of each of the three schools of analytical psychology. Jungian analysts John Beebe, Deldon Anne McNeely, and Rosemary Gordon give their respective views on how classical, archetypal, and developmental approaches would understand and work with a woman in her mid-forties who suffers from an eating disorder.
Analytical psychology in society

This section takes up broader cultural themes and shows how Jung and other contributors to analytical psychology have advanced understanding and studies in a number of fields. Several of these essays directly establish parameters for revising Jungian theory in the light of useful criticism of its potentially essentialist reasoning. Jungian analyst Polly Young-Eisendrath opens with a chapter that attempts to extend and refine the contemporary dialogue between Jungian psychology and Buddhism. She draws especially on a non-essentialist interpretation of Jung’s theory of psychological complexes (including the ego complex) to show how analytical psychology and Buddhism can complement each other in understanding and working clinically with the transformation of human suffering. This is followed by a chapter on mythology in which classics professor Joseph Russo applies a Jungian analysis to the character of Odysseus in order to reveal the nature of the hero as a trickster figure. Terence Dawson, who lectures on English and European literature, then takes a fresh look at Jung’s own essays in specifically literary criticism and uses these as a sounding board to measure the potential, the successes, and the failures of Jungian criticism. His objective is to illustrate the range of Jungian literary concerns and to signpost some of the challenges that face Jungian criticism today. Next, a professor of political science, Lawrence Alschuler, addresses the question of whether or not Jung’s psychology can produce an astute political analysis. In part, Alschuler answers this question by examining Jung’s own political psyche. And finally, Ann Belford Ulanov, a Jungian analyst and professor of Religious Studies, shows in her essay how and why Jung’s ideas have been seminal in shaping our contemporary spiritual search, and helping us cope with the breakdown of religious traditions in the West.

These topics are the subject of lively professional debate among the practitioners and consumers of analytical psychology, who include psychotherapists with markedly different backgrounds and academics from widely different disciplines, as well as their graduate and undergraduate students – indeed, it includes anyone interested in cultural history. Our intention has been to introduce the most recent views in analytical psychology in a sophisticated, engaging, and readily accessible fashion.

This volume presents a fundamentally new framework on analytical psychology. It has been purposely organized to be read in full or in part. Read through from start to finish, it tells a fascinating story of how analytical psychology covers a broad spectrum of activities and critical approaches, revealing multiple insights and layers of meaning. Each section, however, can stand on its own, and each essay is also complete in itself, even though
some of the later chapters assume an acquaintance with Jungian terms that are thoroughly and historically introduced in the first section. We very much hope that this volume will become a useful resource for future debate and study.

We warmly thank our contributors for sharing with us their original and engaging views, as well as the members of their respective “support groups” within and outside of analytical psychology. We are also grateful to Gustav Bovensiepen, Sonu Shamdasani, and David Tacey, who, for various reasons, were unable to contribute to the volume. We are very proud to have been a part of this project. The results wholly persuade us that, with its onward movement and revision of Jung’s ideas, analytical psychology has a major contribution to make to psychoanalysis over the coming decades.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For permission to quote from published sources, grateful acknowledgment is extended to:


Jung was a prolific writer, and the work listed in this chronological outline of his life is highly selective. The majority are articles that first appeared in psychiatric journals. The evolution of his reputation and influence grew from the various “collections” of his articles that began to be published from 1916. Dates are mostly those of original publication, usually in German, but titles are given in English translation.

1. Early years

1875  *July 26* Born in Kesswil, in the Canton of Thurgau, Switzerland. His father, Johann Paul Achilles Jung, is the Protestant clergyman in Kesswil; his mother, Emilie, née Preiswerk, is the daughter of a well-established Basel family

1879  Family moves to Klein-Hüningen, near Basel

1884  *July 17* Birth of sister, Johanna Gertrud (d. 1935)

1886  At the Basel Gymnasium

1888  Jung’s father becomes chaplain at the Friedmatt Mental Hospital in Basel

1895  *April 18* Enters Medical School, Basel University. A month later, becomes a member of the student society, the Zofingiaverein

1896  *January 28* Death of father
Between November 1896 and January 1899, gives five lectures to the Zofingia Society (*CW A*)

1898  Participates in group interested in the mediumistic capabilities of his fifteen-year-old cousin, Helene Preiswerk. His notes will form the basis of his subsequent dissertation (see 1902)
1900 Completes his medical studies; decides to become a psychiatrist; does his first period of military service

2. The young psychiatrist: at the Burghölzli

About two years after assuming his first post, Jung begins his experiments with “word association tests” (1902–1906). Patients are asked to give their immediate “association” to a stimulus word. The purpose is to reveal that even slight delays in responding to a particular word reveal an aspect of a “complex”: Jung was the first to use this term in its present sense. He continues developing his association test until 1909 and, intermittently, applies it to patients throughout his life. Variants of it are still used today. His findings draw him toward ideas being developed by Freud.

1900 December 11 Assumes duties as Assistant Staff Physician to Eugen Bleuler at the Burghölzli, the Psychiatric Hospital for the canton of Zurich, which was also the university’s research clinic

1902 Publication of his thesis, “On the Psychology and Pathology of So-Called Occult Phenomena” (CW 1). It anticipates some of his later ideas, notably, (a) that the unconscious is more “sensitive” than consciousness, (b) that a psychological disturbance has a teleological significance, and (c) that the unconscious spontaneously produces mythological material. To Paris, for the winter semester 1902–1903, to study theoretical psychopathology at the Salpêtrière under Pierre Janet

1903 February 14 Marries Emma Rauschenbach (1882–1955), the daughter of a wealthy industrialist from Schaffhausen

3. The psychoanalytic years

Jung’s meeting with the Austrian neurologist Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) – the founder of psychoanalysis – was undoubtedly the major event of his early years. Freud was the author of Studies in Hysteria (with Josef Breuer, 1895), which includes an account of the case of “Anna O”, The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, “Dora” (a case study), and Three Essays on Sexuality (all 1905). Psychoanalysis, a term he coined in 1896, refers to a method of treating patients by letting them talk freely and come to terms with their problems in the light of the analyst’s observations. Freud worked mostly with neurotic patients. The question facing Jung, who had quoted from The Interpretation of
Dreams in his thesis (publ. 1902), was, “Could psychoanalysis be used with equal success with the psychotic patients whom he attended at the Burghölzli?”

(a) Years of agreement

1903 Jung and Bleuler begin to seriously interest themselves in the ideas of Sigmund Freud: this represents the first step in the internationalization of psychoanalysis

1904 August 17 Sabina Spielrein (1885–1941), a young Russian woman, is interned at the Burghölzli: she is the first patient that Jung treats for hysteria using psychoanalytic techniques

December 26 Agatha, his first daughter, is born

1905 Promoted to Senior Staff Physician, Burghölzli

Appointed Privatdozent (= lecturer) in Psychiatry at the University of Zurich

Sabina Spielrein, still under Jung’s supervision, registers as a medical student at the University of Zurich; she graduates in 1911

1906 February 8 His second daughter, Anna, is born

“The Psychology of Dementia Praecox [i.e. schizophrenia]” (CW 3). This represents a major extension of Freud’s work

Begins corresponding with Freud, who lives in Vienna

Publication of a young American woman’s own account of her vivid fantasies (Miss Frank Miller, “Some Instances of Subconscious Creative Imagination”): Jung’s extended analysis of this article eventually brings about his separation from Freud, although whether Jung read the article before 1910, the earliest date he is known to have been working on it, is not known

1907 January 1 Freud, in a letter to Jung, describes him as “the ablest helper to have joined me thus far”

March 3 Jung visits Freud in Vienna. They quickly develop a close professional friendship. It very soon becomes clear that Freud thinks of Jung as his “heir”

1908 January 16 Lecture: “The Content of the Psychoses” (CW 3) Jung analyzes, and is analyzed by, Otto Gross

April 27 First Congress for Freudian Psychology (often called the “First International Psychoanalytic Congress”), in Salzburg

“The Freudian Theory of Hysteria” (CW 4)
Jung buys some land in Küsnacht, on the shore of the Lake of Zurich, and has a large, three-floor house built

November 28 Birth of his only son, Franz

1909

March publication of first number of the Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, the organ of the psychoanalytic movement: Jung is editor

Jung resigns from his position at the Burghölzli Psychiatric Hospital and moves to his new house in Küsnacht, where he lives for the rest of his life. He is now dependent on his private practice

Jung’s affair with Sabina Spielrein at its most intense from 1909 to 1910

September 6–11 In the USA, with Freud, at Clark University, Worcester, Mass.; on the 11th, they both receive honorary doctorates

Jung’s first recorded experiment with active imagination

October Writes to Freud: “Archeology or rather mythology has got me in its grip”: mythology absorbs him until the end of World War I

“The Significance of the Father in the Destiny of the Individual” (rev. 1949, CW 4)

1910

Late January Jung gives a lecture to science students: possibly his first public formulation of what later becomes his concept of the collective unconscious

March 30–31 Second International Congress of Psycho-Analysis, Nuremberg. He is appointed its Permanent President (resigns 1914)

Summer At the University of Zurich, gives first lecture course on “Introduction to Psychoanalysis”

“The Association Method” (CW 2)

September 20 His third daughter, Marianne, born

1911

August Publication of first part of “Symbols and Transformations of the Libido”: there is very little in this that departs from orthodox psychoanalysis of the time

August In Brussels, lectures on “Psychoanalysis of a Child”

Beginning of relationship with Toni Wolff

November 29 Sabina Spielrein reads her chapter “On Transformation” at Freud’s Vienna Society; the whole work, “Destruction as the Cause of Coming To Be” is published in the Jahrbuch in 1912: it anticipates both Freud’s “death wish” and Jung’s views on “transformation;” it was undoubtedly a major influence on both men; she became a Freudian analyst, continued corresponding with
Jung until the early 1920s, returned to Russia, and was probably shot by the Germans in July 1942

(b) Years of dissent

1912

“New Paths in Psychology” (CW 7)
February Jung finishes “The Sacrifice,” the final section of part two of “Symbols and Transformations of the Libido.” Freud is displeased with what Jung tells him of his findings; their correspondence begins to get more tense
February 25 Jung founds The Society for Psychoanalytic Endeavors, the first forum for debating his own distinct adaptation of psychoanalysis “Concerning Psychoanalysis” (CW 4)
September Lectures at Fordham University, New York: “The Theory of Psychoanalysis” sets out Jung’s departures from Freud: (a) the view that repression cannot explain all conditions; (b) that unconscious images can have a teleological significance; and (c) libido, which he called psychic energy, is not exclusively sexual
September Publication of part two of “Symbols and Transformations of the Libido,” in which Jung proposes that fantasies of incest have a symbolic rather than literal meaning

1913 Break with Freud

Freud is shaken by the split; Jung is devastated. The stress it occasions contributes to an almost complete nervous breakdown which had been threatening since late 1912, when he had begun to have vivid, catastrophic dreams and waking visions. He resigns from his post at the University of Zurich, ostensibly because his private practice had grown so large, but more probably owing to his state of health. In the midst of these difficulties, American philanthropists, Edith and Harold McCormick, settle in Zurich. She has analysis with Jung and is the first of several wealthy and very generous sponsors.

4. Beginnings of analytical psychology

For most of the First World War, Jung was wrestling with his own nervous exhaustion. He turns to Toni Wolff (who had been his patient from 1910 to 1913) to help him through this difficult period, which lasts until about 1919 (his close relationship with Toni Wolff continues until her death in 1953). While he produces relatively little new work, he does consolidate
some of his findings to date. He had difficulty deciding what to call his brand of psychoanalysis. Between 1913 and 1916, he calls it both “complex psychology” and “hermeneutical psychology” before finally deciding on “analytical psychology.”

1913  Publication of “The Theory of Psychoanalysis” (CW 4)  “General Aspects of Psychoanalysis” (CW 4)

1914  Resigns Presidency of International Congress of Psychoanalysis  Outbreak of World War I

1916  Founds the Psychological Club, Zurich: the McCormicks donate generous property, which gradually becomes a forum for visiting speakers from different disciplines as well as the forum for his own lecture-seminars  
His international standing is enhanced by two translations: Beatrice Hinkle’s translation of “Symbols and Transformations of the Libido” as Psychology of the Unconscious (CW B) and Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology, which includes Jung’s most important articles to date (CW 8)  
“The Structure of the Unconscious” (CW 7): first use of terms “personal unconscious,” “collective unconscious,” and “individuation”  
“The Transcendent Function” (CW 8)  
Begin to develop an interest in Gnostic writings, and, following a personal experience with active imagination, produces Seven Sermons to the Dead

1917  “On the Psychology of the Unconscious” (CW 7)

1918  Jung first identifies the Self as the goal of psychic development  
“The Role of the Unconscious” (CW 10)  
End of World War I  
Period of military service

1919  “Instinct and the Unconscious” (CW 8): first use of term “archetype”

5. Analytical psychology and individuation

In 1920, Jung was forty-five. He had come through a difficult “mid-life” crisis with a growing international reputation. During the next few years he traveled widely, mostly in order to visit “primitive” peoples. It was also during this period that he began to retire to Bollingen, a second home that he built for himself (see below).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Visits Algiers and Tunis</td>
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<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Publication of <em>Psychological Types</em> (<em>CW 6</em>), in which he develops his ideas about two “attitudes” (extraversion/introversion), and four “functions” (thinking/sensation and feeling/intuition); first extensive claim for Self as the goal of psychic development</td>
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<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Buys some isolated land on the shore of the Lake of Zurich, about twenty-five miles east of his home in Küsnacht and a mile from a hamlet called Bollingen</td>
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<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Death of Jung’s mother</td>
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<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Visits the United States, and travels with friends to visit Taos Pueblo, New Mexico. He is impressed by the simplicity of the Pueblo Indians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>March 23–July 16 In Zurich, he gives a course of sixteen lecture-seminars on “Analytical Psychology” (<em>CW Seminars 3</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Returns from Africa via Egypt</td>
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</tbody>
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(b) *Re-formulating the aims of analytical psychology*

Four characteristics of this period: (1) the first of several fruitful collaborations with someone working in a different discipline (Richard Wilhelm, who introduced him to Chinese alchemy); (2) arising from this, a growing
interest in *Western* alchemy; (3) the appearance of the first major study in English by an analyst influenced by Jung; (4) increasing use of “seminars” as a vehicle by which to communicate his ideas.

1927  
To Darmstadt, Germany, to lecture at Count Hermann Keyserling’s “School of Wisdom”
“*The Structure of the Psyche*” (*CW 8*)
“*Woman in Europe*” (*CW 10*)
“*Introduction*” to Frances Wickes, *The Inner World of Childhood* (rev. 1965), the first major work by an analyst inspired by Jung

1928  
“The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious” (*CW 7*)
“*On Psychic Energy*” (*CW 8*)
“The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man” (*CW 10*)
“The Significance of the Unconscious in Individual Education” (*CW 17*)

*November 7* Begins seminar on “Dream Analysis,” until June 25, 1930 (*CW Seminars 1*)
Publication of two further English translations that advance Jung’s standing in America and England: (1) *Contributions to Analytical Psychology* (New York and London), which includes a selection of most important recent articles, and (2) *Two Essays in Analytical Psychology* (*CW 7*)

1929  
“Commentary” on Richard Wilhelm’s translation of the Chinese classic *The Secret of the Golden Flower* (*CW 13*)
“Paracelsus” (*CW 15*), first of his essays on Western alchemy. He seeks the assistance of Marie-Louise von Franz, then a young student already fluent in Latin and Greek, and she continues to help him with his research into alchemy for the rest of his life

1930  
Becomes Vice-President of the General Medical Society for Psychotherapy
“The Stages of Life” (*CW 8*)
“Psychology and Literature” (*CW 15*)
In Zurich, begins two series of seminars: (1) “The Psychology of Individuation” (“The German Seminar”), from October 6, 1930 to October 10, 1931; and (2) “The Interpretation of Visions” (“The Visions Seminar”), from October 15, 1930 to March 21, 1934 (*CW Seminars 1*)

1931  
“Basic Postulates of Analytical Psychology” (*CW 8*)
“The Aims of Psychotherapy” (*CW 16*)
1932
“Psychotherapists or the Clergy” (CW 11)
“Sigmund Freud in His Historical Setting” (CW 15)
“Ulysses: A Monologue”
“Picasso”
Awarded Literary Prize by the City of Zurich
October 3–8 J. W. Hauer gives a seminar on Kundalini yoga at the Psychology Club, Zurich. Hauer had recently founded the German Faith Movement, which was designed to promote a religion/religious outlook rooted in “the biological and spiritual depths of the German nation,” as against Christianity, which he saw as too markedly Semitic
from October 12 Jung gives four weekly seminars on “A Psychological Commentary on Kundalini Yoga” (CW Seminars 1)

1933
Begins lecturing at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (ETH), Zurich
Attends first “Eranos” meeting at Ascona, Switzerland. Delivers paper on “A Study in the Process of Individuation” (CW 9.i). Eranos (Gk. = “shared feast”) was the name chosen by Rudolf Otto for annual meetings at the home of Frau Olga Froebel-Kapteyn, whose original purpose was to explore links between Western and Eastern thinking. From 1933, these meetings offered Jung an opportunity to discuss new ideas with a wide variety of other thinkers, including Heinrich Zimmer, Martin Buber, and others
Made President of the General Medical Society for Psychotherapy, which, soon after, comes under Nazi supervision
Becomes editor of its journal, the Zentralblatt für Psychotherapie und ihre Grenzgebiete, Leipzig (resigns 1939)
Modern Man in Search of a Soul (New York and London), another collection of recent articles: quickly becomes standard “introduction” to Jung’s ideas

6. Further ideas on archetypal images
Jung was fifty-eight in July 1933, the year the Nazis came to power. He was seventy when the war ended. These were tense and difficult times, even in neutral Switzerland. Jung chose to retain his post as President of the International General Medical Society for Psychotherapy after the Nazis had seized power and excluded Jewish members from the German chapter. Although he claimed that he made the decision in order to ensure that Jews were able to remain members of other chapters, and so continue to
participate in professional debates, many have questioned his judgment in failing to resign. Charges of anti-Semitism began to be leveled at him, even though his Jewish colleagues, friends, and students defended him. The rise of Nazism and the ensuing war form the background to the gradual elaboration of his theory of archetypal images.

*(a) While Europe drifts toward war*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td><em>October 20</em> Begins seminar on “Modern Psychology,” to July 12, 1935</td>
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</table>
| 1934 | Founds and becomes first President of International General Medical Society for Psychotherapy  
|      | *May 2* Begins seminar on “Nietzsche’s Zarathustra”: eighty-six sessions, lasting until February 15, 1939 (CW Seminars 2)  
|      | 2nd Eranos meeting: “Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious” (CW 9.i)  
|      | “A Review of the Complex Theory” (CW 8)  
|      | “The State of Psychotherapy Today” (CW 10)  
|      | “The Practical Use of Dream Analysis” (CW 16)  
|      | “The Development of the Personality” (CW 17) |
| 1935 | Appointed Professor at the ETH  
|      | Founds the Swiss Society for Practical Psychology  
|      | To Bad Nauheim, for 8th General Medical Congress for Psychotherapy, Presidential Address (CW 10)  
|      | “Psychological Commentary” on W. Y. Evans-Wentz (ed.), The Tibetan Book of the Dead (CW 11)  
|      | “Principles of Psychotherapy” (CW 16)  
| 1936 | “The Concept of the Collective Unconscious” (CW 9.i)  
|      | “Concerning the Archetypes, with Special Reference to the Anima Concept” (CW 9.i)  
|      | “Wotan” (CW 10)  
|      | “Yoga and the West” (CW 11)  
|      | 4th Eranos meeting: “Religious Ideas in Alchemy” (CW 12) |

1937
- 5th Eranos meeting: “The Visions of Zozimos” (CW 13)
- To United States, to give “Terry Lectures” at Yale University, published as Psychology and Religion (CW 11)
- To Copenhagen, for 9th International Medical Congress for Psychotherapy: Presidential Address (CW 10)
- To India, for fifth anniversary of University of Calcutta, at invitation of British Government of India

1938
- January Awarded Honorary Doctorates by the universities of Calcutta, Benares, and Allahabad: Jung unable to attend 6th Eranos meeting: “Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype” (CW 9.i)
- July 29–August 2 In Oxford, England, for 10th International Medical Congress for Psychotherapy: Presidential Address: “Views Held in Common by the Different Schools of Psychotherapy Represented at the Congress” (CW 10)
- Receives an honorary doctorate from the University of Oxford October 28 Begins seminar on “The Process of Individuation in Eastern Texts,” until June 23, 1939

1939
- May 15 Elected an Honorary Fellow of the Royal Society of Medicine, London

(b) During World War II

1939
- Outbreak of World War II
- Resigns editorship of the Zentralblatt für Psychotherapie und ihre Grenzgebiete
- 7th Eranos meeting: “Concerning Rebirth” (CW 9.i) Paul and Mary Mellon attend. Paul Mellon (b. 1907) was a wealthy young philanthropist and art-collector; his first wife, Mary (1904–1946), wanted to settle in Zurich to have analysis with Jung, to see whether it could
help her asthma. The subsequent generosity of the Mellons did much to help disseminate Jung’s ideas (see 1942, 1949)
“What Can India Teach Us?”
“Psychological Commentary” on The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation (CW 11)
“Foreword” to D. T. Suzuki, Introduction to Zen Buddhism (CW 11)
Begins seminar on “The Process of Individuation: The Exercitio Spiritualia of St. Ignatius of Loyola” (June 16, 1939 to March 8, 1940)

1940 The Integration of the Personality (New York and London), selection of recent articles
8th Eranos meeting: “A Psychological Approach to the Trinity” (CW 11)
“The Psychology of the Child Archetype” (CW 9.i)
November 8 Begins seminar on “The Process of Individuation in Alchemy: 1,” until February 28, 1941

To Ascona, for the 9th Eranos meeting: “Transformation Symbolism in the Mass” (CW 11)
“The Psychological Aspects of Kore” (CW 9.i)

1942 January 6 The Bollingen Foundation is established in New York and Washington D.C., with Mary Mellon as President: the editorial board includes Heinrich Zimmer and Edgar Wind
After nine years, resigns post at ETH
10th Eranos meeting: “The Spirit Mercurius” (CW 13)
“Paracelsus as a Spiritual Phenomenon” (CW 13)

1943 Elected Honorary Member of Swiss Academy of Sciences
“The Psychology of Eastern Meditation” (CW 11)
“Psychotherapy and a Philosophy of Life” (CW 16)
“The Gifted Child” (CW 17)

1944 The University of Basel creates a chair in Medical Psychology for him; illness compels him to resign from the post the following year
Further health problems: suffers a broken foot; has a heart attack; has a series of visions
Psychology and Alchemy (CW 12), based on papers delivered at Eranos meetings of 1935 and 1936

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1945  In honor of his seventieth birthday, receives an honorary doctorate from the University of Geneva
13th Eranos meeting: “The Phenomenology of the Spirit in Fairytales” (CW 9.i)

(c) After the war

“After the Catastrophe” (CW 10)
“The Philosophical Tree” (CW 13)

1946  14th Eranos meeting: “The Spirit of Psychology,” revised as “On the Nature of the Psyche” (CW 8)
*Essays on Contemporary Events* (CW 10): collection of recent essays
“The Fight with the Shadow” (CW 10)
“The Psychology of the Transference” (CW 16)

1947  Begins to spend long periods at Bollingen

1948  April 24 Opening of the C. G. Jung Institute of Zurich (cf. CW 18)
It serves as a training center for would-be analysts, as well as a general lecture venue. In time, a great many other institutes have been founded, notably in the USA (e.g. New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles)
To Ascona, for 16th Eranos meeting “On the Self” (became ch. 4 of *Aion*, CW 9.ii)

1949  The first Bollingen Prize for Poetry is awarded to Ezra Pound

During the war, Pound, who was living in Italy, had broadcast Fascist propaganda. When Italy was liberated, he was detained in a cage near Pisa, where he wrote the first draft of his *Pisan Cantos*, before being repatriated to the USA, where he was to stand trial for treason. But, in December 1945, he was committed to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital for the insane, where he translated Confucius and entertained literary visitors. The award to a traitor and a lunatic created a politico-literary furor, into which Jung’s name was dragged as a Fascist sympathizer. The result was that, on August 19, Congress passed a ruling forbidding its Library to award any more prizes. Yale University Library quickly assumed responsibility for the Prize (which, in 1950, was awarded to Wallace Stevens), but the whole episode did a lot of damage, not least to Jung.
7. The late works

Jung was seventy-four at the time of the Bollingen Prize scandal. To his credit, he continued his research for *Aion* (1951) undeterred, and also began revising many of his earlier works.

1950 With K. Kerényi, *Essays on a Science of Mythology* (New York)/ *Introduction to a Science of Mythology* (London): it contains Jung’s two articles, on the archetypes of the “Child” (1940) and “Kore” (1941)
“Concerning Mandala Symbolism” (CW 9.i)
“Foreword” to the Chinese Classic, *The I Ching, or Book of Changes*, tr. and ed. Richard Wilhelm (CW 11)

1951 To Ascona, for 19th Eranos meeting: “On Synchronicity” (CW 8)
*Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self* (CW 9.ii)
“Fundamental Questions of Psychotherapy” (CW 16)

1952 “Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle” (CW 8)
*Answer to Job* (CW 11)
*Symbols of Transformation* (rev. from 1911 to 1912) (CW 5)

1953 The Bollingen Series begins publishing *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (until 1976, and *Seminars* still in course of publication)

1954 “On the Psychology of the Trickster Figure” in Paul Radin, *The Trickster: A Study in American Indian Mythology* (CW 9.i)
*Von den Wurzeln des Bewusstseins* (= From the Roots of Consciousness), new collection of essays; appears in German, but not in English

1955 With W. Pauli, *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche*: Jung’s contribution consisted of his essay on “Synchronicity” (1952)
In honor of his eightieth birthday, receives an honorary doctorate from the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Zurich *Mysterium Coniunctionis: An Inquiry into the Separation and Synthesis of Psychic Opposites in Alchemy* (CW 14). This is his final statement on alchemy
November 27 Death of Emma Jung

1956 “Why and How I Wrote my ‘Answer to Job’” (CW 11)

1957 *The Undiscovered Self* (CW 10)
Begins recounting his “memories” to Aniela Jaffé
August 5–8 Jung is filmed in four one-hour interviews with Richard I. Evans, a Professor of Psychology at the University of Houston (“The Houston Films”)

1958 Memories, Dreams, Reflections, German edition. It is now realized that this work, which used to be read as autobiography, is the product of very careful editing both by Jung and Jaffé Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth (CW 10)

1959 October 22 The “Face to Face” Interview, with John Freeman, BBC television

1960 Made Honorary Citizen of Küsnacht on his eighty-fifth birthday “Foreword” to Miguel Serrano, The Visits of the Queen of Sheba (Bombay and London: Asia Publishing House)

1961 June 6 After a brief illness, dies at his home in Küsnacht, Zurich


1964 “Approaching the Unconscious,” in Man and His Symbols, ed. C. G. Jung and, after his death, by M.-L. von Franz


NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POST-JUNGIAN FIELD

Introduction

In university settings, it is my habit to begin lectures on analytical psychology, especially to those not taking degrees in Jungian psychology, by asking those present to do a simple association exercise to the word “Jung.” I ask them to record the first three things that come to mind. From the (by now) 900+ responses, I have found that the most frequently cited theme, words, concepts, or images have (in order) to do with (a) Freud, (b) psychoanalysis, and (c) the Freud–Jung split. The next most frequently cited association concerns (d) Jung’s anti-Semitism and alleged Nazi sympathies. Other matters raised include (e) archetypes, (f) mysticism/philosophy/religion, and (g) animus and anima.

Obviously, this is not properly empirical research. But if we “associate to” the associations, we can see that there is a lingering doubt about the intellectual, scholarly, and ethical viability of taking an interest in Jung. Even so, in these pages, I shall argue that there is more to the question of Jung and Freud’s psychoanalysis than the oft-repeated story of two wrestling men.

Over the past decade, there has been increasing clinical and academic interest in analytical psychology in non-Jungian circles, in spite of the fact that its core texts are not effectively represented on official reading lists and curriculum descriptions. Outside of this interest, though, Jung is mentioned primarily as an important schismatic in the history of psychoanalysis and not as a contributor worthy of sustained and systematic study in his own right. Although many psychoanalysts pass over his name in silence, many therapists – and not just Jungian – have “discovered” Jung to have been a major contributor to what appears now as cutting-edge new developments in clinical work. In this chapter, I shall suggest that Jung’s ideas merit a place in their own right in general clinical training in psychotherapy and in the contemporary academy. I shall also explain how I see the overall shape of the post-Jungian field via two classifications of the field into schools of
analytical psychology. The first of these summarizes the proposal I made back in 1985 in *Jung and the Post-Jungians*; the second is more contemporary and more provocative.

The “Jung” problem

It is impossible to make this argument without first exploring the cultural and intellectual contexts in which it is mounted. Until recently, Jung has been “banished comprehensively” from academic life, borrow a phrase used by the distinguished psychologist Liam Hudson (1983) in a review of a collection of Jung’s writings. Let us try to understand why it is so.

First, the secret “committee” set up by Freud and Jones in 1912 to defend the cause of “true” psychoanalysis spent a good deal of time and energy on disparaging Jung. The fall-out from this historical moment has taken a very long time to evaporate and has meant that Jung’s ideas have been slow to penetrate psychoanalytic circles and hence have not been welcomed in the academy whose preferred depth psychology – certainly in the humanities and social sciences – has been Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalysis.

Second, Jung’s anti-Semitic writings and misguided involvements in the professional politics of psychotherapy in Germany in the 1930s have, understandably in my view, made it almost impossible for Holocaust-aware psychologists – both Jewish and non-Jewish – to generate a positive attitude to his theories. Some portions of the early Jungian community refused to acknowledge that there was any substance to the charges held against him, and even withheld information that they deemed unsuitable for the public domain. Such evasions only served to prolong a problem which must be faced squarely. Present-day Jungians are now addressing the issue, and assessing it both in the context of his time and in relation to his work as a whole.\(^1\)

Third, Jung’s attitudes to women, blacks, so-called “primitive” cultures, and so forth are now outmoded and unacceptable. It is not sufficient to assert that he intended them to be taken metaphorically – not least because this may not have been how he intended his writing to be taken! We can now see how Jung converted prejudice into theory, and translated his perception of what was current into something supposed to be eternally valid. Here, too, it has turned out to be the work of the post-Jungians that has discovered these mistakes and contradictions and corrected Jung’s faulty or amateur methods. When these corrections are made, one can see that Jung had a remarkable capacity to intuit the themes and areas with which late twentieth-century and early twenty-first-century psychology would be concerned: gender; race; nationalism; cultural analysis; the perseverance, reappearance, and socio-political power of religious mentality in
an apparently irreligious epoch; the unending search for meaning – all of these have turned out to be the problematics with which psychology has had to concern itself. Recognizing the soundness of Jung’s intuitive vision facilitates a more interested but no less critical return to his texts. This is what is meant by “post-Jungian”: correction of Jung’s work and also critical distance from it.

Jung and Freud

The break in relations between Jung and Freud is usually presented in introductory, and even in more advanced texts, as stemming from a father–son power struggle and Jung’s inability to come to terms with what is involved in human psychosexuality. On the surface of the Oedipus myth, the father’s son-complex is not nearly as easy to access as the son’s father-complex. It is tempting to forget Laius’ infanticidal impulses and so we do not see much analysis-at-a-distance of Freud’s motives. And yet I believe that Freud’s actions and intentions toward Jung played at least as large a role as did Jung’s toward Freud in bringing about their split and subsequent rivalry.

As far as Jung’s angle on sexuality is concerned, the fact that much of the content of his 1912 breakaway book Wandlungen und Symbolen der Libido – originally translated as Psychology of the Unconscious (CW B) – concerns an interpretation of the incest motif and of incest fantasy is usually overlooked. The book is highly pertinent to an understanding of family process and the way in which events in the outer family cohere into what might be called an inner family. In other words, the book now called Symbols of Transformation (CW 5) is not an experience-distant text. It asks, How do humans grow, from a psychological point of view? It answers that they grow by internalizing – that is, “taking inside themselves” – qualities, attributes, and styles of life that they have not yet managed to master on their own. From where does this new stuff come? From the parents or other caretakers, of course. But how does it happen? Characteristic of the human sexual drive is the impossibility for any person to remain indifferent to another who is the recipient of sexual fantasy or the source of desire. Incest-fuelled desire is implicated in the kind of human love that healthy family process cannot do without. A degree of sexualized interest between parents and children that is not acted out – and which must remain on the level of incest fantasy – is necessary for the two individuals in a situation where each cannot avoid the other. “Kinship libido,” as Jung named this interest, is a necessity for internalizing the good experiences of early life.

This account of Jung’s early interest in family incest themes challenges the assumption of a vast difference between Jung and Freud’s foci. The
scene is then set for a linkage of Jungian ideas with other critically important psychoanalytic notions, such as Jean Laplanche’s (1989) theory of the centrality of seduction in early development. In a more clinical vein, Jung’s incest theory leads us to understand child sexual abuse as a damaging degeneration of a healthy and necessary engagement with “incest fantasy.” Situating child sexual abuse on a spectrum of expectable human behavior in this way helps to reduce the understandable moral panic that inhibits constructive thinking about the topic and opens the way for its troubling ubiquity to be investigated.

Jung’s contribution to psychoanalysis and psychotherapy

Most contemporary psychotherapists accept the idea that Freud’s ideas and theories undergird modern practices. However, post-Freudian psychoanalysis has gone on to revise, repudiate, and extend a great many of Freud’s seminal ideas. Ironically, as a result of these critiques, many positions of contemporary psychoanalysis are reminiscent of those taken by Jung in earlier years. This is not to say that Jung himself is responsible for what is most interesting about contemporary psychoanalysis, or that he worked these things out in as much detail as the psychoanalytic thinkers concerned. But, as Paul Roazen (1976, p. 272) has pointed out, “Few responsible figures in psychoanalysis would be disturbed today if an analyst were to present views identical to Jung’s in 1913.” To explicate this claim, I explain twelve vital psychoanalytic issues in which Jung can be seen as a precursor of recent developments of “post-Freudian” psychoanalysis. The list that follows culminates in an extended discussion of Jung’s pioneering role in what is now known as Relational Psychoanalysis.

(1) While Freud’s Oedipal psychology is father-centered and is not relevant to a period earlier than about the age of four, Jung provided a mother-based psychology in which influence is often traced back much earlier, even to pre-natal events. For this reason, he may be seen as a precursor of the work of Melanie Klein, of the British School of object relations theorists such as Fairbairn, Winnicott, Guntrip, and Balint, and, given the theory of archetypes (of which more in a moment), of Bowlby’s ethologically inspired work on attachment. Post-Jungians, such as Knox (2003) and Wilkinson (2006) have shown how Jungian archetypal theory anticipates and expands neuroscientific research into the centrality of early relationships. Jung’s theories are useful also for re-conceptualizing psychotherapy from a neuroscientific perspective.
In Freud’s view, the unconscious is created by repression, a personal process derived from lived experience. In Jung’s view, the unconscious has a collective base which means that innate structures greatly affect, and perhaps determine, its contents. Not only post-Jungians are concerned with such innate unconscious structures. In the work of psychoanalysts such as Klein, Lacan, Spitz, and Bowlby one finds the same emphasis on pre-structuralization of the unconscious. That the unconscious is structured like a language (Lacan’s view) could easily have been stated by Jung. A nuanced post-Jungian review of these ideas is Hogenson (2004).

Freud’s view of human psychology is a bleak one and, given the history of the twentieth century, it seems reasonable. But Jung’s early insistence that there is a creative, purposive, non-destructive core of the human psyche finds echoes and resonances in the work of psychoanalytic writers like Milner and Rycroft, and in Winnicott’s work on play. Similar links can be made with the great pioneers of humanistic psychology such as Rogers and Maslow. Jung’s argument that the psyche has knowledge of what is good for it, a capacity to regulate itself, and even to heal itself, takes us to the heart of contemporary expositions of the “true self” such as that found in Bollas’s recent work, to give only one example. Stein (1996) offers a good example of a post-Jungian perspective on meaning and purpose.

Jung’s attitude to psychological symptoms was that they should be looked at not exclusively in a causal-reductive manner but also in terms of their hidden meanings for the patient – even in terms of what the symptom is “for.” This anticipates the school of existential analysis and the work of some British psychoanalysts such as Rycroft and Home. Cambray (2004) offers a fascinating post-Jungian view of non-causal approaches to psychopathology.

In contemporary psychoanalysis, there has been a move away from what are called male-dominated, patriarchal, and phallocentric approaches; in psychology and psychotherapy alike, more attention is being paid to the “feminine” (whatever might be meant by this). In the past two decades, feminist psychoanalysis and psychotherapy have come into being. There is little doubt that Jung’s “feminine” is a man’s “feminine,” but parallels between feminist-influenced psychoanalysis and gender-sensitive Jungian and post-Jungian analytical psychology may be drawn (see Kast, 2006, for an up-to-date account of animus/anima theory).

The ego has been moved away from the center of the theoretical and the therapeutic projects of psychoanalysis. Lacan’s decentering of the ego exposes as delusive the fantasy of mastery and unification of the
personality, and Kohut’s working out of a bipolar self also extends well beyond the confines of rational, orderly ego-hood. The recognition of a non-ego integration of dissociated states is anticipated by Jung’s theory of Self: the totality of psychic processes, somehow “bigger” than ego and carrying humanity’s apparatus of aspiration and imagination. Corbett (1996) offers a well-researched and argued account of Jung’s notion of Self.

(7) The deposing of the ego has also created a space for what might be called “sub-personalities.” Jung’s theory of complexes, which he referred to as “splinter psyches,” fills out contemporary models of dissociation (Samuels, Shorter, and Plaut, 1986, pp. 33–35). We can compare Jung’s tendency to personify the inner divisions of the psyche with Winnicott’s true and false selves, and with Eric Berne’s “transactional analysis” wherein ego, id, and superego are understood as relatively autonomous. Guided fantasy, Gestalt work, and visualization would be scarcely conceivable without Jung’s contribution: “active imagination” describes a temporary suspension of ego control, a “dropping down” into the unconscious, and a careful notation of what one finds, whether by reflection or some kind of artistic self-expression.

(8) Many contemporary psychoanalysts hold a strong distinction between ideas like “mental health,” “sanity,” and “genitality,” on the one hand, and, on the other, the idea of “individuation.” The difference is between psychological norms of adaptation, themselves a microcosm of societal values, and an ethic which prizes individual variation more highly than adherence to the norm. Although Jung’s cultural values have sometimes been criticized as elitist, he is the great writer on individuation. Psychoanalytic writers on these themes include Winnicott, Milner, and Erikson. Fierz (1991) shows the relevance of these perspectives to contemporary psychiatry and psychotherapy.

(9) Jung was a psychiatrist and retained an interest in psychosis all his life. From his earliest clinical work with patients at the Burghölzli hospital in Zurich, he argued that schizophrenic phenomena have meanings which a sensitive therapist can elucidate. In this regard, he anticipates R. D. Laing and the anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s. Jung’s final position on schizophrenia, in 1958, was that there may be some kind of biochemical “toxin” involved in the serious psychoses that would suggest a genetic element. However, Jung felt that this genetic element would do no more than give an individual a predisposition with which life’s events would interact leading to a favorable or unfavorable outcome. Here, we see an anticipation of today’s psycho-bio-social approach to schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder.
Until recently very few psychoanalysts have created a whole-of-life psychology, one that would include the fulcrum events of mid-life, old age, and impending death. Jung did. Developmentalists like Levinson, as well as those who explore the psychology of death and dying (such as Kübler-Ross and Parkes), all acknowledge Jung’s very prescient contribution.

Finally, although Jung thought that children have distinct personalities from birth, his idea that problems in childhood may be traced to the “unlived psychological life of the parents” (CW 10, p. 25) anticipates many findings of family therapy.

This much longer concluding section concerns Jung’s approach to clinical work. Relational Psychoanalysis emphasizes a two-person psychology and intersubjective influences on unconscious relating. Historians of this relatively new and increasingly influential school have begun to acknowledge Jung as a pioneering influence (e.g. Altman, 2005). Ironically, however, there has been little direct contact between Relationalists and Jungians, probably due to the fallout from the Freud–Jung split. Contemporary post-Jungian analysts (e.g. Samuels et al., 2000) have little difficulty in resonating with many of the ideas and practices evolving within the tradition of relational psychoanalysis.

Jung asserted that analysis was a “dialectical process,” intending to highlight the fact that two people are involved in a relationship, that emotionally charged interactions between them are two-way, and that, in the deepest sense, they are to be conceived of as equals (CW 16, p. 8). Analysis, Jung goes on to say, is “an encounter, a discussion between two psychic wholes in which knowledge is used only as a tool.” The analyst is a “fellow participant in the analysis.” Jung’s focus was often on “the real relationship” (cf. the psychoanalytic text by Greenson, 1967), making his point in very challenging terms: “In reality everything depends on the man [sic] and little on the method” (CW 13, p. 7).

Jung’s perspectives have encouraged post-Jungian analysts to explore the extent to which they themselves are “wounded healers,” bringing their strengths and weaknesses to the therapy situation (see Samuels, 1985, pp. 173–206).

As early as 1929, Jung was arguing for the clinical usefulness of what has come to be called the “countertransference” – the analyst’s subjective response to the analysand. “You can exert no influence if you are not subject to influence,” he wrote, and “the countertransference is an important organ of information” (CW 16, pp. 70–72). Clinicians reading this chapter with a knowledge of psychoanalysis will know how contemporary psychoanalysis
has rejected Freud’s overly harsh assessment in 1910 (Freud, 1910, pp. 139–151) of the countertransference. Freud claimed it was “the analyst’s own complexes and internal resistances” and hence as something to be got rid of. Jung is, in contradistinction, one of the important pioneers of the clinical use of countertransference, along with Heimann, Little, Mitchell, Winnicott, Sandler, Searles, Langs, and Casement.

The clinical interaction of analyst and analysand, once regarded as the analyst’s objective or neutral perceptions and the analysand’s subjective ones, is now regarded primarily as a mutually transforming interaction. The analyst’s personality and ethical position are no less involved in the process than his or her professional technique. The real relationship and the therapeutic alliance weave in and out of the transference/countertransference dynamics. The term for this is “intersubjectivity” and Jung’s alchemical model for the analytical process is an intersubjective one.3 In this area, Jung’s ideas share common ground with the diverse views of Atwood and Stolorow, Benjamin, Greenson, Kohut, Lomas, Mitchell, and Alice Miller.

Let me restate the intention of providing this catalogue raisonné of Jung’s role as a pioneering figure in contemporary psychotherapy. Recall that Jung has been called a charlatan and a markedly inferior thinker to Freud. It is by now reasonable to claim that it is clearly time that the disciplines of psychiatry, psychotherapy, and psychoanalysis recognized Jung’s valuable contributions. A major aim of this volume is to situate his ideas squarely within the mainstream of contemporary psychoanalysis without losing their specificity.

The post-Jungians

What does the term “post-Jungian” mean and what is the state of the field? Since Jung’s death in 1961 there has been an explosion of creative professional activity in analytical psychology. In 1985 (Samuels, 1985) I coined the term “post-Jungian.” I did not have post-modernism in mind at all. I was borrowing from a (then) well-known book called Freud and the Post-Freudians (Brown, 1961). I meant to indicate a connection to, and a critical distance from, Jung. The key word is “critical.” If I were to write my book again I would include “critical” in the title to emphasize the distance I intended alongside the overt membership of the Jungian world.

I needed to find a way of describing analytical psychology because the then current classifications were so problematic. People referred to two schools of analytical psychology as the “London” and “Zurich” schools after the cities of their origins. But geography was useless as a means of
classifying what was going on. Even in the 1980s, and certainly in the 1990s, there were London school analysts and Zurich school analysts all over the world who had never been anywhere near London or Zurich. Moreover, as there are four Jungian societies in the city of London, to refer to what goes on in all of them as “London” was inaccurate and, to some, offensive – for they display huge differences of outlook and practice, which is one reason why there are four of them.

Another belief that was prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s was that there was a divide between “symbolic” and “clinical” approaches to analytical psychology. This divide, as Zinkin (personal communication, 1983) wisely pointed out, was undermining of the field because no self-respecting Jungian was going to say that he or she did not work symbolically and no clinician could not be clinical! And so this troubling distinction needed to be amended into a useful set of categories. What I did in *Jung and the Post-Jungians* (Samuels, 1985) was to assume that all of the schools of analytical psychology knew about and made use of all the ideas and practices available through Jungian psychology. I emphasized key prioritizing and weighting within each of three rather different schools, which are connected by virtue of the fact that they are, to some degree, competitive with each other.

I admitted openly that the schools are creative fictions, that there is a huge amount of overlapping, and that in many respects it was the patients who had constructed the schools as much as the analysts.

To summarize: I sorted analytical psychology into three schools: (1) the *classical school*, consciously working in Jung’s tradition, with a focus on the self and individuation. I made the point that one should not equate classical with stuck or rigid. There can easily be evolutions within something classical; (2) the *developmental school*, which has a specific focus on the effects of infancy and childhood on the evolution of adult personality, and an equally stringent emphasis on the analysis of transference/countertransference dynamics in clinical work. The developmental school maintains a close relationship with object relations psychoanalysis (although the rapprochement is mostly one-way, with an indifference towards the Jungians); and (3) the *archetypal school* plays (in the most profound sense) with and explores images in therapy, paying the greatest respect to images just as they are without seeking an interpretive conclusion. The notion of *soul*, developed by the archetypal school, suggests the deepening that permits a mere event to become a significant experience.

This classification was, in fact, prompted by my own confusion as a then beginner in a field that seemed utterly chaotic and without maps, aids, or companions as the various groups fell out, split, and, in some cases, split.
again. I intended to indicate some connection to Jung and the traditions of thought and practice that had grown up around his name, and also some distance or differentiation. In order to delineate “post-Jungian” analytical psychology, I adopted a pluralistic methodology in which dispute rather than consensus would define the field. Analytical psychology could then be defined by the debates and arguments and not by the core of commonly agreed ideas. A post-Jungian could thus be interested in and energized by the various debates on the basis of clinical interests, intellectual exploration, or a combination of these.

My threefold classification arose from a detailed examination of statements and articles written by post-Jungians which had a self-defining intent. Such polemical articles reveal more clearly than most what the lines of disagreement are within the Jungian and post-Jungian community. I have suggested elsewhere (Samuels, 1989) that argument and competition are more often than not the case in psychoanalysis and depth psychology. The history of psychoanalysis, especially the new, revisionist histories now appearing, show this tendency rather clearly.

For example, the following comes from Gerhard Adler, whom I regard as an exponent of the classical school:

> We put the main emphasis on symbolic transformation. I would like to quote what Jung says in a letter to P. W. Martin (20/8/45): “... the main interest in my work is with the approach to the numinous ... but the fact is that the numinous is the real therapy.”

Next is an extract from an editorial introduction to a group of papers published in London by members of the developmental school:

> The recognition of transference as such was the first subject to become a central one for clinical preoccupation ... Then, as anxiety about this began to diminish with the acquisition of increased skill and experience, countertransference became a subject that could be tackled. Finally ... the transaction involved is most suitably termed transference/countertransference.

(Fordham et al., 1974, p. x)

And, finally, here is a statement from Hillman, speaking for the archetypal school of which he is the founder:

> At the most basic level of reality are fantasy images. These images are the primary activity of consciousness ... Images are the only reality we apprehend directly.

(Hillman, 1975, p. 174)

Arising from the process of competition and bargaining, weighting and prioritizing, those distinct and opposing claims should, we may imagine an analyst or therapist who can hold in mind all these views, be used in
different contexts or on different occasions with different patients. In other words, it is possible to regard the schools metaphorically, as presences potentially able to co-exist in the mind of any post-Jungian analyst. Moreover, we should bear in mind that there are now more than 2,500 Jungian analysts worldwide in twenty-eight countries and probably an additional 10,000 psychotherapists and counselors who are Jungian in orientation or heavily influenced by analytical psychology. Debates have been going on explicitly for fifty years and implicitly for perhaps seventy. Many practitioners will have by now internalized the debates themselves and feel perfectly capable of functioning as either a classical or a developmental or an archetypal analytical psychologist according to the needs of the individual analysand. Or the analyst may regard his or her orientation as primarily classical, for example, but with a flourishing developmental component, or some other combination.

A new classification of the schools of analytical psychology

The classification of the post-Jungian scene into the above three schools has been generally regarded as useful though, given the weddedness of Jungians to individualism as the highest value, the very existence of a classification has been experienced by some as irritating. After all, everyone is unique, aren’t they? To this unwitting provocation of the individualists, I will now add yet another classification of the field of analytical psychology into four schools.

The developmental and classical schools stand as they were in 1985. But the third school, the archetypal school, seems to me to have been integrated into the classical or even eliminated as a clinical perspective. However, as I see it, there are now two new schools to consider, each of which is an extremist version of one of the existing schools. The extremist version of the classical school I call the “fundamentalist school” and the extremist version of the developmental school I call the “psychoanalytic school.” The resultant four schools could be presented as a simple spectrum: fundamentalist–classical–developmental–psychoanalytic.

Like all fundamentalisms, Jungian fundamentalism desires to control who or what is in or out. Hence it tends to be stigmatizing. One hears this sometimes in assessment for training: “He or she is not psychologically minded,” it can be said. Or people or training candidates are typed, even stereotyped, according to Jungian typology in an authoritarian way. Intellectual women may be termed “animus-ridden.” As a fundamentalism, this form of analytical psychology attempts to be purist and above the marketplace, denying the financial or commercial aspect of doing therapy, and claiming a direct connection to the work and life of Jung. Jung is regarded
as a prophet, divinely inspired, and perhaps even a new religious leader. He is imitated in how he lived his life – sometimes called the “Jungian way.”

The positive aspect of Jungian fundamentalism is that there is something good and worthwhile in the idea of living in accord with psychological principles and striving for authenticity, perhaps against the odds in the contemporary world (cf. Christopher and Solomon, 2000). And yet, this kind of fundamentalism exaggerates and exploits our undeniable needs for order, pattern, meaning, and a presiding myth. Psychologies that express evanescent, shifting, anti-foundational, anti-essentialist, playful natures cannot find a place in the Jungian fundamentalist Weltanschauung. The fundamentalists – remaining pure – ignore everything else that is going on in psychotherapy and even in the worlds of ideas, politics, the arts, or religion.

On the other end of the spectrum, I would make a similar critique of the Jungian psychoanalytic school. I wish to emphasize that I am not against the use of psychoanalytic ideas and practices as I have indicated in my understanding of the developmental school. I am, however, deeply concerned about what can become an elimination of a Jungian perspective so that it seems not to exist. How has this come about? I think it has often been based on something exceedingly personal among Jungians who had earlier classical or developmental analyses that were not satisfying or transformative. Sometimes, these defects are attributed to the analysis having been insufficiently “psychoanalytic” – not enough attention paid to infancy and to transference. Their espousal of a Jungian merger with psychoanalysis may be based on anger and on a transferential idealization of the psychoanalyses many of them went on to have. We hear a massive congratulation to psychoanalysis for its possession of exquisite analytic skills as if Jungian analysts were utterly devoid of them.

These psychoanalytic Jungians overlook Jung’s clinical contributions and become alienated from their own birthright, displaying all the unsettling zeal of a convert. They seem to forget that clinical material comes alive, not because of theory, but because of the way in which meaning emerges in the therapeutic relationship, as past traumas and difficulties are recognized in the analysis.

Psychoanalytic Jungians elevate the analytic frame over the analytic relationship and emphasize the analytic process over the contents of the psyche that become manifest during such process. The therapeutic relationship becomes “mammocentric,” as I call it. It is understood mainly in terms of the infant–mother dyad; the mouth and the breast are regarded as an almost-exclusive paradigm for what is happening intersubjectively between the analytic couple reducing all other complex insights or wisdom to this one metaphor.
To reprise my argument: I believe that the classical and developmental schools have spawned extremist versions of themselves. For different reasons, I am very concerned about these extreme expressions of competition and debate within analytical psychology. The fundamentalists may undermine the field through their radical purity while the psychoanalytic Jungians erase the originality and refinement of Jung’s approach.

Jung in the academy

I conclude here by referring briefly to the situation regarding Jung in universities. Currently, in universities of many countries, there is a considerable interest in Jungian studies. Central to this is a historical reevaluation of the origins of Jung’s ideas and practices, and of the break with Freud. Literary and art criticism influenced by analytical psychology (even though still often based on somewhat mechanistic and out-of-date applications of Jungian theory) are beginning to flourish. Film studies are a particularly fertile discipline for Jungian thinking (see Hauke and Alister, 2001). Anthropological, social, and political studies explore Jung’s intuitions about directions for the future. Jung’s influence on religious studies continues, as it has for a long time.

In some universities, psychoanalytic studies are much more established, whereas Jungian studies are really just getting off the ground. There could be some advantages to being a generation behind: it might be possible – and I would stress the word “might” – for analytical psychology to avoid some of the damaging gaps between clinical work and academic applications.

If this kind of alienation is to be avoided in Jungian studies, then both the academic and the clinical camps will have to better interact with one another. A struggle between competing groups to “appropriate” analytical psychology is neither desirable nor necessary. Each side can learn from the other. In the last thirty years, analytical psychology has become a healthily pluralistic discipline, although burdened by the extremes of fundamentalist and psychoanalytic narrowness. It is time for it to become more consciously interdisciplinary and to actively claim its proper place in the larger sociocultural debates.

NOTES

1. See Samuels (1993) for a full discussion of my views on Jung’s anti-Semitism, his alleged collaboration with the Nazis, and the response of the Jungian community to the allegations.
2. See the Introduction to Samuels (ed.) (1989a) pp. 1–22 for a fuller account of Jung’s ideas about the “teleology” of symptoms and about psychopathology generally.


4. For my theory about pluralism in depth psychology, see Samuels, (1989).

5. Gerhard Adler, unpublished public statement at the time of a major institutional split in the Jungian world in London.

REFERENCES


I

CLAIRE DOUGLAS

The historical context of analytical psychology

Considered by many (e.g. Ellenberger, 1970; Bair, 2003; Papadopoulos, 2006) the most original, broadly educated, and philosophical of the depth psychologists, Jung inhabited a specific era whose scientific thought and popular culture formed the bedrock out of which analytical psychology developed. Analytical psychology has undergone a veritable renaissance of scholarship within the past ten years which cements Jung’s key position as a major figure in psychology and the history of ideas. Henri Ellenberger’s (1970) study of Jung remains pivotal as the most comprehensive about Jung’s life and theory but also about the rise of psychology and psychotherapy in general. Among the growing number of recent scholars, J. J. Clarke (1992) and B. Ulanov (1992) track the pivotal place Jung’s ideas occupied in the philosophical discourse of his time; W. L. Kelly (1991) considers Jung one of the four major contributors to contemporary knowledge of the unconscious; Moacanin (1986), Aziz (1990), Spiegelman (1985, 1987, 1991), and Clarke (1994) explore his relation to Eastern psychology and religious thought, while Hoeller (1989), May (1991), Segal (1992), and Charet (1993) trace his gnostic, alchemical, and European mystical roots. Sonu Shamdasani (2003) makes excellent use of much archival material that adds key scientific, socio-cultural, and philosophical material to Ellenberger’s classic work, while Deirdre Bair (2003) does the same for Jung’s life story. This chapter owes much to their scholarship.

Jung created his theories at a particular moment in history by synthesizing a wide variety of disciplines through the filter of his own personal psychology. This chapter will briefly look at analytical psychology’s heritage in Jung’s background and training, and then focus on his debt to Romantic philosophy and psychiatry, depth psychology, and alchemical, religious, and mystical thought.

Jung believed that all psychological theories reflect the personal history of their creators, declaring “our way of looking at things is conditioned by what we are” (CW 4, p. 335). He had grown up in the German-speaking
part of Switzerland during the final quarter of the nineteenth century. Though the rest of the world was in upheaval, torn by nationalistic and world wars throughout his life (1875–1961), Switzerland remained, at least on the surface, a strong, free, democratic, and peaceful federation successfully containing a diversity of languages and ethnic groups. Underneath this, however, swirled the competing interests of, and secret allegiances with, the outside world.

The relevance of Jung’s native country to the formation of his character has been pointed out, especially as it came through his father, a frugal, sensually restricted Protestant Baseler (van der Post, 1975; Hannah, 1976; Bair, 2003). Being a Swiss citizen gave Jung a sense of daily order and stability, but the austere, pragmatic, industrious Swiss character contrasts with another side of his character and with Switzerland’s flagrantly romantic topography (McPhee, 1984). Switzerland is a turbulent country geographically, with three broad river valleys divided by mountains climbing to 15,000 feet. More than a quarter of the land is under water in the form of glaciers, rivers, lakes, and countless waterfalls; 70 percent of the rest of the land, when Jung was growing up, was forest or productive woodland.

Analytical psychology, as well as Jung’s character, unites, or at least forms a confederation analogous to that of the bourgeois Swiss character and its romantic countryside. There is an overtly rational and enlightened side (which Jung, in his 1965 biography, called his Number One character) that carefully maps analytical psychology and presents its empirically grounded psychotherapeutic agenda. The second influence resembles the natural world of Switzerland with its interest in the psyche’s heights and depths (which may be compared with what Jung called his Number Two character). This second part is at home with the unconscious, the mysterious, and the hidden whether in hermetic science and religion, in the occult, or in fantasies and dreams. Jung’s own combination of these two aspects helped him explore the unconscious and create a visionary psychology while remaining scientifically grounded. The outward stability of the Swiss character, however, left many things unexamined both in Jung and in the nation at large. Analytical psychology still struggles to hold the tension of these competing undercurrents with different schools, or leanings, or even schisms, veering first to one side of the pole, then to the other (Samuels, 1985; Kirsch, 2004b).

Although Jung grew up in a rural backwater and his father was as an impoverished clergyman, his family came from well-educated and prosperous townspeople. His father’s father, a physician in Basel, had been a renowned poet, philosopher, and classical scholar, while Jung’s mother
came from a Basel family of noted theologians. Jung benefited from an education whose extent and thoroughness is rarely, if ever, encountered today. It was a comprehensive schooling in the Protestant theological tradition, in classical Greek and Latin literature, and in European history and philosophy.

Jung’s university teachers held an almost religious belief in the possibilities of positivistic science and faith in the scientific method. Positivism, as heir to the Enlightenment, focused on the power of reason, experimental science, and the study of general laws and hard facts. It gave a linear, forwardly progressing, and optimistic slant to history that could be traced back to the classical Aristotelian idea of science espoused by Wilhelm Wundt, the German father of the scientific method. It soon spread throughout contemporary thought, taking such divergent paths as Darwin’s theory of evolution, and its application to human behavior by the psychologists of the time, or Marx’s use of positivism in political economics (Boring, 1950; Papadopoulos, 2006). It was a philosophy deeply congruent with the Swiss national character.

Positivism gave Jung invaluable training in and respect for empirical science. Jung’s medical-psychiatric background is clearly revealed in his empirical research, his careful clinical observation and case histories, his skill in diagnosis, and his formulation of projective tests. This rigorous scientific attitude, key though it is, was not as congenial to him and to many of his fellow students as Romantic philosophy, a contrasting lens which reflected the geography of Switzerland and presented a dramatic, many-layered view of the world. Romanticism, instead of focusing on objective particulars, turned toward the irrational, toward inner, individual reality, and toward the exploration of the unknown and enigmatic whether in myth, ancient realms, exotic countries and peoples, hermetic religions, or altered mental states (Ellenberger, 1970; Gay, 1986). Romantic philosophy eschewed the linear in favor of circumambulation – contemplating an object from many different angles and perspectives. Romanticism preferred Platonic ideals to Aristotelian lists, and focused on unchanging ideal forms behind the rational world rather than worldly movement or the accumulation of data (Papadopoulos, 2006).

Historically, Romanticism can be traced from the pre-Socratic philosophers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, through Plato, to the Romanticism of the early nineteenth century and its revival at the end of that century. Plato hypothesized that there were certain primordial patterns (that Jung was later to call archetypes) of which humans are more or less defective shadows; among these patterns was an original, complete, and bisexual human being. In Jung’s youth, this ideal of original wholeness was
echoed in a Romantic belief in the unity of all nature. Yet, at the same time, the Romantics acutely felt their own separation from nature and longed for the ideal. Thus Romanticism gave voice to a transcendental yearning for lost Edens, for the unconscious, and for depth, emotions, and simplicity which, in turn, led to the study of the outer natural world and the soul within.

With the rise of Romanticism, men started not only to explore unknown continents and themselves, but also to look at and revalue what they considered their opposite – women – whom they endowed with the unconsciousness, irrationality, depth, and emotions forbidden to the “masculine” rational self. Claiming the objectivity of positivist science, many tended to cultivate theories that were based on sexual Romanticism instead. In these scientists’ and novelists’ imagination, women were the mysterious and fascinating “other,” a feminine origin whose fragile, Romantic vulnerability the masculine could not permit in itself; at the same time, women were also thought to possess mysterious psychic power, a power often reduced to the negative and the erotic. The actual increase in female power and demands for emancipation during the latter half of the nineteenth century served to increase the ambivalence and anxiety of men. Women in Europe and the United States were starting a concerted struggle to obtain education and independence (there were no women students at Swiss universities until the 1890s). As a medical student and as a philosopher, Jung was affected by this particular strain of Romantic imagination and its illusions about women. Like his fellow Romantics, Jung remained deeply drawn to the feminine, yet ambivalent about female power and authority. He acknowledged his own feminine side, studied it and the women around him through the blurred lens of Romanticism, and formulated his ideas about women accordingly (Gilbert and Gubar, 1980; Gay, 1984, 1986; Douglas, 1990, 1993, 2006; Bair, 2003).

Romantic science helped create new professions such as archeology, anthropology, and linguistics, as well as cross-cultural studies of myths, sagas, and fairy tales. All were viewed from a white, predominantly male, usually Protestant perspective that looked at other races and cultures with the same Romantic fascination and ambivalence with which it looked at women. This bias was a product of the culture and time out of which analytical psychology developed; today, it cries out for careful reevaluation and revision (see below and Morgan, 2004; Samuels, 2004; Singer and Kimbles, 2004). Interestingly, Jung considered a career as an archeologist, an Egyptologist, and a zoologist, before turning to medicine as a preferable way of supporting his newly widowed mother and young sister (Bennet, 1962; Bair, 2003).
Romantic science also led to an interest in human psychopathology and the paranormal. Jung’s reading of Krafft-Ebing’s study of psychopathology, with its intriguing case histories, opened the way to Jung’s specialization in psychiatry (Jung, 1965). Psychiatry provided a home ground for all the interpenetrating areas of his interests and a creative field for their synthesis. The strains of Positivism and Romanticism warred in Jung’s education and training but also produced a dialectical synthesis in which Jung could use the most advanced methods of reason and scientific accuracy to establish the reality of the irrational. Scientists of his time allowed themselves to explore the irrational outside themselves while secure within their own rationality and scientific objectivity. It was Jung’s romantic genius that allowed him to understand that humans, himself included, could be at one and the same time “western, modern, secular, civilized and sane – but also primitive, archaic, mythical and mad” (Roscher and Hillman, 1972, p. ix).

While Jung was formulating his own theories, positivist methodology joined with the Romantic search for new worlds to bring about an extraordinary flowering in German art and science that has been compared to the Golden Age of Greek philosophy (Dry, 1961). Germany became the center for an eruption of new ideas that fueled the search for human origins in archeology and anthropology; these discoveries were paralleled by the collecting and reinterpretation of Germanic epics and folk tales by people such as the brothers Grimm and Wagner. By the end of the nineteenth century, the mythopoetic, erotic, and dramatic elements of Romanticism became themes for popular literature and further spread the Romantic fascination with the irrational and with altered mental states. More lasting works inspired by Romanticism were written by Balzac, Hugo, Dickens, Poe, Dostoevsky, Maupassant, Nietzsche, Wilde, R. L. Stevenson, George du Maurier, and Proust. As a Swiss student, Jung spoke and read German, French, and English and so had access to these writers as well as to his own nation’s popular literature.

The end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth brought with them an era of unprecedented creativity. Jung’s enthusiasm echoed the ferment reverberating in the philosophy and science he was studying, in the newer psychological texts he found, in the novels he was reading, in discourse with his friends, and in finding himself one of the torchbearers of the synthesis of Empiricism and Romanticism. Jung’s brilliance and erudition need to be appreciated for their vital role in the creation of analytical psychology. So much of what was exhilaratingly novel then has since entered the Jungian canon. Perhaps Jung’s pioneering virtuosity survives best in the series of seminars he gave between 1925 and 1939 (Jung, 1928–30; 1930–34, 1932), where he regales his audience with
news of the new worlds of the psyche he is discovering and starting to map, with the psychological treasures he has found, and the astonishing cross-cultural parallels everywhere present (Douglas, 1997).

In these seminars and throughout the eighteen volumes of his collected works, Jung delightedly plays with ideas in Romantic exuberance. Jung’s vigorous and playful creativity is an essential part of analytical psychology that requires an equally vivid and imaginative response. Jung never wanted analytical psychology to become a body of dogma. He warned that his ideas were tentative at best and reflected the era in which he lived: “whatever happens in a given moment has inevitably the quality peculiar to that moment” (CW 11, p. 592). A large part of his experimental verve is lost on the less comprehensively educated, contemporary reader but was an essential part of Jung’s character and also very much in tune with the spirit of the time. As a true explorer, Jung understood both the ethical seriousness, and the limits, of what he knew; he wrote that as an innovator he had the disadvantages common to all pioneers:

one stumbles through unknown regions; one is led astray by analogies, forever losing the Ariadne thread; one is overwhelmed by new impressions and new possibilities; and the worst disadvantage of all is that the pioneer only knows afterwards what he should have known before. (CW 18, p. 521)

Tracing the specific major sources of analytical psychology from the vast body of Jung’s learning is a complicated task because it requires a knowledge of philosophy, psychology, history, art, and religion. The following is a brief synopsis of ideas from the Romantic philosophers who played a crucial role in the formation of Jung’s theories (see Ellenberger, 1970, 1993; Ulanov, 1992; Clarke, 1992; Shamdasani, 2003 for extensive source studies).

The theories of Kant, Goethe, Schiller, Hegel, and Nietzsche were especially influential in forming Jung’s own kind of theoretical model through dialectical logic and the play of opposites. Jung believed that life organized itself into fundamental polarities because “life, being an energetic process, needs the opposites, for without opposition there is, as we know, no energy” (CW 11, p. 197). He also saw that each polarity contained the seed of its opposite or stood in intimate relation to it. For Jung, both pairs of opposites – the Hegelian thesis and antithesis – are valued as valid points of view, as is the synthesis to which they both lead. There has been much discussion about Jung’s debt to Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and to Georg Wilhelm Hegel (1770–1831). Jung claimed to be a Kantian and wrote that “mentally my greatest adventure had been the study of Kant and Schopenhauer” (CW 18, p. 213). Surprisingly, he denied any debt to Hegel. However, Jung
made much use of Hegelian dialectics and often wrote of history and psychic development taking place through the play of opposites in which thesis met antithesis, producing a synthesis, a new third. His concept of the new third extended to Jung’s formulations about the role of the “transcendent function” in individuation. Jung also was allied to Hegel in their common belief in the divine within the individual self as well as in the reality of evil.

Jung often referred to Immanuel Kant as a precursor. Besides Kant’s interest in parapsychology which kindled Jung’s own, Jung credited Kant for the development of much of his own archetypal theory. This is because Kant, as a Platonist, felt that our perception of the world conformed to Platonic ideal forms. Kant argued that reality exists through our apperceptions which structure things according to basic forms. The way to any objective knowledge thus takes place through our own modes of cognition and through a priori, innate categories (Jarrett, 1981). Yet Kant also “introduced a distinction between things as they are experienced, which he terms phenomena, and things as they were in themselves, which he terms noumena” (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 169); Jung starts from archetypes and imagination and does believe in their objectivity as well as in the reality of the psyche. As a neo-Kantian, he enlarges Kantian thought by adding to it a sense of the reality of history and culture (Clarke, 1992). Archetypes, for example, are ideal forms that can never be known in their entirety, but they can be clothed in ways that make them visible and contemporary. Jung believed that: “Eternal truth needs a human language that alters with the spirit of the times ... only in a new form can [it] be understood anew” (CW 16, p. 196).

Jung had much more in common with Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) than with Kant: he had a special affinity with Goethe’s ideas and saw him as a predecessor (and even as a possible ancestor). Besides sharing Jung’s dualistic way of seeing the world, Goethe pondered the question of evil through images and symbols. Like Jung, he was concerned with the possibility of metamorphosis of self, and with the (masculine) self’s relation to the feminine. Jung often referred to Goethe’s masterpiece, Faust, where Goethe depicted Faust’s struggle with evil and his effort to maintain the tension of opposites within himself.

Jung’s ideas about the collective unconscious, its archetypes, especially the anima–animus syzygy, were inspired in part by F. W. von Schelling’s (1775–1854) impassioned philosophy of nature, his concept of the world-soul which unified spirit and nature, and his idea of the polarity of masculine and feminine attributes as well as our fundamental bisexuality. Von Schelling, like the other Romantic philosophers, stressed the dynamic interplay of the opposites in the evolution of consciousness.
Jung credited many of these philosophers, but claimed Carl Gustav Carus (1789–1869) and Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) as especially important precursors (Jung, 1965). Carus depicted the creative, autonomous, and healing function present in the unconscious. He saw the life of the psyche as a dynamic process in which consciousness and the unconscious are mutually compensatory and where dreams play a restorative role in psychic equilibrium. Carus also outlined a tripartite model of the unconscious—the general absolute, the partial absolute, and the relative—that prefigured Jung’s concepts of archetypal, collective, and personal unconscious.

Schopenhauer was the hero of Jung’s student days; his pessimistic angst reverberated within Jung’s own Romanticism (Jung, 1965 and CW A). Romantic angst made both men focus on the irrational in human psychology, as well as the role played by human will, repression and, in a supposedly civilized world, the still barbaric force of the instincts. Schopenhauer rejected Cartesian dualism in favor of a Romantic unified world view, though he described this unity as experienced through either of two polarities: blind “will” or “idea.” Schopenhauer, following Kant, believed in the absolute reality of evil. He emphasized the importance of the imaginal, of dreams, and of the unconscious in general. Schopenhauer synthesized and clarified the Romantic philosophers’ neo-Platonic view of basic primordial patterns which in turn inspired Jung’s theory of archetypes. Schopenhauer’s idea of the four functions, with thinking and feeling polarized, and introversion revalued, influenced Jung’s theory of typology as did their common forefather Friedrich Schiller’s (1759–1805) more extensive typology of poets and their poems (CW 6). Both Schopenhauer and Jung were deeply involved with ethical and moral issues and, especially in their later years, pondered the place of evil in the world and in human behavior. Both also studied Eastern philosophy; both shared a belief in the possibility, and necessity, of individuation.

Jung’s fellow townsman Jacob Bachofen (1815–1887) was a renowned scholar and historian interested in myths and the meaning of symbols, stressing their great religious and philosophical importance. In Bachofen’s monumental work Das Mutterrecht (1861; translated as The Law of Mothers), he postulated that human history evolved from an undifferentiated and polymorphous hetaeric period, to an ancient matriarchal time, to a time of destabilization, followed by the patriarchy and the repression of all memory of prior eras. Jung also hunted for matriarchal symbolism and accepted matriarchy as, at least, a stage in the development of consciousness. In his foreword to Erich Neumann’s (1954) The Origins and History of Consciousness—which loosely followed Bachofen—Jung wrote that the work grounded analytical psychology on a firm evolutionary base (CW 18,
Jung’s ideas about the feminine, especially in his later work on alchemy, often reflect Bachofen’s and Neumann’s Romantic idealism. Each had a life-long interest in ancient history and the feminine; each also felt that underneath all the vast array of cultural and societal differences there lay certain primordial, ever-repeating patterns.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) adopted Bachofen’s idea of the primacy of the matriarchy, but redefined the essence of matriarchy and patriarchy into a contrasting Dionysian and Apollonian dualism. Jung utilized both Bachofen and Nietzsche to mold his own sense of history and to elucidate his theory of archetypes. Nietzsche vividly understood life’s tragic ambiguity and the simultaneous presence of both good and evil in every human interaction. These apperceptions, in turn, profoundly influenced Jung’s ideas about the origin and evolution of civilization. Both men also looked to the future, believing that individual moral conscience was starting to evolve to a critical new point beyond the opposites of good and evil. Jung found inspiration in Nietzsche’s stress on the importance of dreams and fantasy as well as in the significance Nietzsche placed on creativity and play in healthy development. Other ideas of Nietzsche’s which influenced analytical psychology were Nietzsche’s portrayal of the ways sublimation and inhibition work within the psyche; his striking delineation of the power exerted by sexual and self-destructive instincts; and his courageous examination of the dark side of human nature, especially the way negativity and resentment shadowed behavior. Above all, Jung was affected by Nietzsche’s deep understanding of and willingness to confront and wrestle with the dark shadows and irrational forces beneath our civilized humanity, forces that Nietzsche extolled as the Dionysian and Jung described as part of the personal and collective shadow (Jung, 1934–39; Frey-Rohn, 1974). Nietzsche’s description of the shadow, the persona, the superman, and the wise old man were taken up by Jung as specific archetypal images.

Besides Romantic philosophy, the second major influence in the development of analytical psychology came from Jung’s debt to Romantic psychiatry and its historical antecedents. Among the more significant single ideas Jung adopted were J. C. A. Heinroth’s (1773–1843) emphasis on the role that guilt (or sin) plays in mental illness and the need for a treatment based on the particular individual rather than on theory; J. Guislain’s (1793–1856) belief that anxiety was a root cause of illness; K. W. Ideler’s (1795–1860) and Heinrich Neumann’s (1814–1884) conviction that un-gratified sexual impulses contribute to psychopathology. More important, though, is the placing of the analytical psychologist, him- or herself, not only in the neo-Platonic and Romantic camp, but also in the long procession of mental healers who honor, and work by means of, the influence of one
psyche on another (the transference/countertransference). This has been traced (e.g. Ellenberger, 1970 and Kelly, 1991) to a chain leading from early (and contemporary) shamanism, to priestly exorcism, through Anton Mesmer’s (1734–1815) theory of animal magnetism and some sort of magnetic fluid connecting the healer to the healed, to the early nineteenth-century use of hypnosis in therapy. The chain continued in the nineteenth century with Auguste Liebeault’s (1823–1904) and Hippolyte Bernheim’s (1840–1919) use of hypnotic suggestion and the doctor–patient rapport to bring about a cure.

Liebeault and Bernheim were the founders of the group of psychiatrists who became known as the School of Nancy in France, and whose followers spread the use of hypnotism to Germany, Austria, Russia, England, and the United States. The famous demonstrations of hypnosis that Jean-Martin Charcot (1835–1893) conducted at the Salpêtrière in Paris, on indigent women who had been diagnosed as hysteric, continued the chain; the demonstrations also showed how easily hypnosis could become unscientific through manipulation, experimenter bias, and a dramatic relish for well-rehearsed spectacles (Ellenberger, 1970).

As medical students, Freud studied for a term with Charcot when Jung spent a term studying with Pierre Janet (1859–1947). Janet was clearly no Romantic but influenced Jung through his classifications of the basic forms of mental disease, his focus on dual personality and fixed, obsessive, ideas, and his appreciation for neurotic patients’ need to let go and sink into their subconscious. Janet also may well be the father of the cathartic method for curing neurosis and he first defined the phenomena of dissociation and complexes (Ellenberger, 1970; Kelly, 1991). Janet’s example helped Jung’s already strong feeling of dedication and his appreciation for the pivotal importance of the doctor–patient relationship; these were elements which Jung stressed in his writing on psychotherapy and analysis. Janet influenced Jung as a clinician and as a depth psychologist to a much greater extent than did Freud (whose influence on Jung will be discussed in the following chapter).

Much of Jung’s reading during his university and medical school years concerned case histories of various forms of multiple personality, trance states, hysteria, and hypnosis – all demonstrating the involvement of one psyche with another and all part of Romantic psychiatry. Jung brought this interest into his course work and his lectures to his fellow students (CW A) as well as to his dissertation on his mediumistic cousin (Douglas, 1990). Soon after Jung finished his dissertation, he started work at the Burghölzli Psychiatric Hospital in Zurich, at the time a famous center for research on mental illness. Auguste Forel (1848–1931) had been its head and had
studied hypnosis with Bernheim; Forel taught this process to his successor, Eugen Bleuler (1857–1939), who was in charge of the hospital when Jung joined him as head resident. Jung lived at the Burghölzli from 1902 to 1909, intimately involved with the daily lives of his mentally aberrant patients. Bleuler and Jung both were reading Freud at this time and it was here that Jung’s researches first attracted Freud’s attention and the two men started a period of alliance and cross-fertilization that lasted from 1907 to 1913.

Jung’s book denoting his imminent break with Freud, Psychology of the Unconscious (CW B), later revised as Symbols of Transformation (CW 5), was influenced by Justinus Kerner’s (1786–1862) study of his psychic patient, the Seeress of Prevorst, and her mythopoetic abilities (Die Seherin von Prevorst, 1829); it was more directly inspired by Theodore Flournoy’s (1854–1920) studies of the mediums of Geneva, especially of a woman to whom he gave the pseudonym Helen Smith; Flournoy described her trance journeys in the book From India to the Planet Mars (1900) as examples of unconscious romances. Jung examined and amplified another imaginary saga, the notes sent to Flournoy by a Miss Frank Miller, as an introduction to his own theories of archetypes, complexes, and the unconscious which differed markedly from Freud’s. Although Jung, in a draft of his autobiography, explicitly acknowledges his debt to Flournoy, the latter’s influence on analytical psychology is being newly considered (e.g. Kerr, 1993; Shamdasani, 2003).

Thus the Romantic fascination with studies of possession, multiple personalities, seers, mediums, and trancers, as well as with shamans, exorcists, magnetizers, and hypnotic healers, all contributed to analytical psychology’s respect for the mythopoetic imagination and for ways of healing that tapped into the collective unconscious. Whether these healers used spells, psychototropic substances, incantations, prayer, psychic or magnetic power, caves, trees, banquettes, or tables, whether they healed individuals or groups, they all employed altered states of consciousness that linked one psyche to another and made use of the various ways healer and healed enter this vast, omnipresent, yet still mysterious collective world.

Jung’s scientific interest in parapsychological phenomena and the occult echoed these interests and was, at the time he was a student, a valid subject for scientific study In fact much of the original interest in depth psychology came from people involved in parapsychological investigation (Roazen, 1984). It also echoed his mother’s life-long interest in and experience with the paranormal. Jung wrote of his own links to this world in his autobiography (Jung, 1965); post-modern science is again taking up this examination, while new scholarship on Jung includes him as one of the pioneers in the serious study of psychic phenomena (e.g. Taylor, 1980,
1985, 1991, and 1996). Through his mother’s family, Jung was part of a group in Basel involved in spiritism and seances. Much of Jung’s outside reading during his student and university years was on the occult and the paranormal. In his autobiography, Jung tells of the psychic happenings he experienced as a boy, and of the ghost and folk stories he heard; as a student, he found these phenomena studied scientifically. After finding a book on spiritism during his first year in college, Jung went on to read all of the literature on the occult then available (1965, p. 99). In his autobiography, Jung mentions books on the paranormal in the German Romantic literature of the time as well as specifically alluding to Kerner’s, Swedenborg’s, Kant’s, and Schopenhauer’s studies. In an unpublished draft now in the Beinecke Library, Yale, Jung writes more extensively of his debt to Flournoy and especially to William James.

Jung brought this interest in psychic phenomena into his course work and his lectures to his fellow students, as well as into his dissertation (Ellenberger, 1970; Hillman, 1976; Charet, 1993). Through Jung’s dissertation, his case studies, his seminars, and his articles on synchronicity (see CW 8, pp. 417–531), the paranormal came into analytical psychology as one other form through which the collective unconscious and the personal unconscious may be broached. Yet, during an era when positivist science has been dominant, and in spite of Jung’s training and empirical scrupulosity, this openness to a larger possible world has made analytical psychology problematic and has led to Jung being too often dismissed as an unscientific and mystical thinker. Jung’s interest in and knowledge about parapsychology adds a rich though suspect edge to analytical psychology which demands attention congruent with the extended scope of scientific knowledge today.

Jung’s mother introduced him not only to the occult, but also to Eastern religions. In his autobiography, Jung recalls that in his early childhood, his mother read him stories about Eastern religions from a richly illustrated children’s book, Orbis Pictus; its illustrations of Brahma, Shiva, and Vishnu greatly attracted him (1965, p. 17). The Romantic philosophers Jung studied in his student years rekindled this interest as they were drawn to all things exotic and Asian. In his early writing, Jung tended to view the East through these philosophers’, especially Schopenhauer’s, descriptions of it; it is only later, as Jung’s knowledge of original sources deepened, that his view became more psychological and accurate (Coward, 1985; May, 1991; Clarke, 1994).

The shadow side of the Romantic philosophy of Jung’s time played itself out in the horrors of Nazi Germany and World War II. Jung, caught up in the ferment of his own thinking, for a time fell under the sway of a Romantic exultation with the irrational, and what Nietszche has termed the
Übermensch – the superior, heroic man. Jung noted its manifestation in Germany as a phenomenon but only gradually realized its consequences (e.g. “Wotan,” CW 10, 1936). Especially during the early and middle 1930s, a sometimes overt, sometimes hidden, cultural complex affected Jung’s work (Kirsch, 2004a). This included the at times solipsistic standpoint of the classically educated, European white man and brings with it a note of racism, a romanticizing both of the “primitive,” and of Indo-European religions (see especially Jung’s late 1920s and 1930s articles in CW 10: Civilization in Transition and Memories, Dreams, Reflections).


Hermann Keyserling, Richard Wilhelm, Heinrich Zimmer, and Jacob Wilhelm Hauer were some of the main sources for Jung’s adult knowledge about Eastern religion and philosophy (Shamdasani, 2003). In the early to middle 1930s, Jung relied on the Indologist Hauer for his understanding of the Bhagavad Gita and the Hindu system of Kundalini yoga. Hauer, described by the historian Pietikainen (2000) as the “noted National-Socialist scholar” interpreted the Bhagavad Gita to support his own, and National Socialism’s, romantic infatuation with violence, irrationality, sacrifice, and the heroic deed. Hauer’s markedly Germanic and hierarchical elucidation of Kundalini yoga gave Jung an erroneous idea about it. By the late 1930s Jung had severed contact with Hauer as Hauer’s Nazi sympathies became more apparent (Bair, 2003). However, neither The Psychology of Kundalini Yoga, nor how Jung uses Kundalini yoga in The Visions Seminar, despite Jung’s great psychological insights, are true to the originals which argue for a far more nuanced, meditative, and non-hierarchical complexity (Douglas, 1997).

As an adult, Jung had three guides and companions for his deepening interest in Eastern philosophy and religion. The first was Toni Wolff; her father had been a Sinologist and she had acquired her interest and knowledge of the East from him and from working with Jung as his library and research associate before she became an analyst herself. During the critical period after Jung’s break with Freud, Wolff helped Jung center himself partly through her familiarity with the philosophies of the East. Jung drew
comfort from discovering that his own turbulent inner imagery and his attempts to master them through drawing and active imagination directly paralleled some of the religious imagery and meditative techniques of Eastern philosophy. Jung’s book, *Psychological Types* (CW 6, 1921), reveals extensive knowledge of Hindu and Taoist primary and secondary texts and incorporates their understanding about the interplay of opposites.

The second influence was Jung’s friend Herman Keyserling, who founded the School of Wisdom at Darmstadt where Jung lectured in 1927. From then until Keyserling’s death in 1946, the two men kept up an active, though sometimes argumentative, correspondence as well as meeting to talk about religion and the East. Keyserling’s main focus was on the need for dialogue between proponents of Eastern and Western thought and the spiritual regeneration that could come from the synthesis of the two systems.

The third influence was Jung’s friendship and dialogue with Richard Wilhelm, a German scholar and missionary to China who translated classical Chinese texts such as the *I-Ching* and *The Secret of the Golden Flower* (Jung, 1929b). Jung wrote introductory commentaries for each book. These commentaries contain some of Jung’s most acute observations of the link between analytical psychology and the Eastern hermetic tradition (Spiegelman, 1985 and 1987; Kerr, 1993; Clarke, 1994; Shamdasani, 2003).

In his later writing, Jung pointed out the many ways that Eastern philosophy paralleled and informed analytical psychology. He studied the various Hindu yogic systems, especially Vedanta yoga, and the Buddhism of the Japanese Zen masters, the Chinese Taoists, and the Tantric Tibetans. In brief, he found that Eastern philosophy, like analytical psychology, validated the idea of the unconscious and gave further insight into it; it stressed the importance of inner rather than outer life; it tended to value completion rather than perfection; its concept of psychic integration was comparable to, and informed, his idea of individuation. All sought a way beyond the opposites through balance and harmony, and taught paths of self-discipline and self-realization through the withdrawal of projections and through yoga, meditation, and introspection, paths that were similar to a deep analytic process (Faber and Saayman, 1984; Moacanin, 1986; Spiegelman, 1991; Clarke, 1994). Jung used his knowledge of Eastern philosophy to place analytical psychology in a comparable context with the great philosophies of the East.

Analytical psychology values many of the same goals and achieves them in a decidedly Western but comparable way. In 1929, Jung wrote:

"I was completely ignorant of Chinese philosophy, and only later did my professional experience show me that in my technique I had been unconsciously..."
following that secret way which for centuries had been the preoccupation of the best minds of the East ... its content forms a living parallel to what takes place in the psychic development of my patients. (CW 13, p. 11)

Though Jung had known about alchemy since 1914, when Herbert Silberer had used Freudian theory to examine seventeenth-century alchemy, it was only after working on the commentary for *The Secret of the Golden Flower* (Jung, 1929b), a Chinese alchemical text, that Jung then took up the study of Medieval European alchemy; he soon started to collect these rare texts and built up a sizable collection. In his autobiography, Jung writes that alchemy was the precursor of his own psychology:

I had very soon seen that analytical psychology coincided in a most curious way with alchemy. The experiences of the alchemists were, in a sense, my experiences, and their world was my world. This was, of course, a momentous discovery: I had stumbled upon the historical counterpart of my psychology of the unconscious. The possibility of a comparison with alchemy, and the uninterrupted intellectual chain back to Gnosticism, gave substance to my psychology. When I pored over those old texts everything fell into place: the fantasy-images, the empirical material I had gathered in my practice, and the conclusions I had drawn from it. I now began to understand what these psychic contents meant when seen in historical perspective. (1965, p. 205)

In the latter part of his life, these alchemical texts and the early Gnostics increasingly interested Jung as he further developed analytical psychology; they took the place of the Romantic philosophers who had once inspired him. Jung believed that alchemy and analytical psychology belonged to the same branch of scholarly inquiry that, since antiquity, had been occupied with the discovery of unconscious processes.

Jung used the alchemists’ symbolic formulations as amplifications of his theories of projection and the individuation process. The alchemists worked in pairs, and through their approach to their material transformed it and themselves in much the same way that analysis works. The goal of alchemy was the birth of a new and complete form out of the old, a form which Jung found to be analogous to his concept of the Self (Rollins, 1983; Douglas, 1990).

Jung believed that alchemy was a bridge and link between modern psychology and the mystical Christian and Jewish traditions that led back to Gnosticism (1965, p. 201). In *Answer to Job* (1952b) and in Jung’s letters and conversations with his last great friend, Victor White (*The Jung–White Letters, 2007*), Jung further explores and clarifies his ideas on good and evil. He links his belief in the reality of evil as a thing in itself to the philosophers he studied in his youth and to Gnosticism. Jung studied the
belief systems of the Gnostics and placed analytical psychology firmly within their “hermetic” tradition. The Gnostics valued interiority and believed in the direct experience of inner truth and grace, emphasizing individual responsibility and the necessity for individual change. Gnostic theory rested on a vital dualism expressed most clearly in their conviction about the reality, power, and struggle between the opposites – whether masculine and feminine, good and evil, or conscious and unconscious. Both sides of the opposites needed to be reclaimed through the conflict between them. This dualism, in Jung’s view, contained a pull to restore a lost Platonic unity. Gnostics taught that the opposites can be united through a process of separation and integration at a higher level. Jung used gnostic myths and terms to further amplify his ideas about the conscious and unconscious psyche (Dry, 1961; Hoeller, 1989; Segal, 1992; Clarke, 1992).

Much of analytical psychology rests on a grounding in empirical science. Yet Jung placed his psychology historically, not only within the heritage of the Enlightenment tradition of the rational scientists who have dominated the scientific world for a large part of the twentieth century, but also within a far more subversive and revolutionary tradition. This rich and problematical history links the shamanic, the religious, and the mystical with modern knowledge of the mind. This tradition has always valued the imaginal; it stresses the continual need for exploration and inner development. It also appreciates the vital connective link between all beings.

This emphasis on individual responsibility and individual action, for the benefit of the collective, gives analytical psychology a secure place in a postmodern science of the mind, body, and soul.

In the last analysis, the essential thing is the life of the individual. This alone makes history, here alone do the great transformations first take place, and the whole future, the whole history of the world, ultimately spring as a gigantic summation from these hidden sources in individuals. In our most private and most subjective lives we are not only the passive witnesses of our age, and its sufferers, but also its makers. We make our own epoch. (CW 10, p. 149)

NOTES

1. *Erinnerungen, Träume, Gedanken* is the German title of Jung’s memoirs “recorded and edited by Aniela Jaffé” (1962, tr. as Memories, Dreams, Reflections, 1963/1965). At first regarded as Jung’s “autobiography,” it is now realized that the printed text was carefully “edited,” first by Jung and subsequently by Jaffé.

2. In therapeutic practice, Jung noted that problems often stem from an inability to entertain conflicting viewpoints. The “transcendent function” is the term that he used to describe the “factor” responsible for the (sometimes sudden) change in a
person’s attitude that results when the opposites can be held in balance and which allows the person to see things in a new and more integrated way. Individuation refers to the process by which an individual becomes all that the specific person is responsibly capable of being.

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Freud, Jung, and psychoanalysis

One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil.
And why, then, should you not pluck at my laurels?
You respect me; but how if one day your respect should tumble?
Take care that a falling statue does not strike you dead!
You had not yet sought yourselves when you found me.
Thus do all believers–.
Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves;
and only when you have all denied me will I return to you.
(Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, quoted Jung to Freud, 1912)

Freudian psychoanalysis, a related body of clinical technique, interpretive strategy, and developmental theory, was articulated piecemeal in dozens of publications by Sigmund Freud, spread over a period of forty-five years. The structure of Freud’s monumental twenty-three-volume corpus has been the subject of thousands of critical studies, and Freud is still one of the most popular subjects for biographers. Despite this wealth of writing, however, the effectiveness of Freud’s therapeutic methods and the adequacy of his theories remain subjects of animated debate.

This chapter is concerned with the status of Freud’s theorizing during his collaboration with Carl Jung, and with the mutual influence of each thinker on the other in the years following their estrangement. Jung’s seven-year discipleship with Freud was a turning point in his emergence as a distinctive thinker of world importance (Jung, 1963). At the beginning of his fascination with Freud in 1906, Jung was a thirty-one-year-old psychiatrist of unusual promise, with a gift for psychological research and a prestigious junior appointment at one of Europe’s major centers for treatment of psychotic disorders (Kerr, 1993). By the time of his break with Freud in 1913, Jung was internationally known for his original contributions to clinical psychology and for his forceful leadership of the psychoanalytic movement. He was also the author of the seminal work, *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido* (CW 5), that would define his independence from that movement.

In another sense, Jung never fully overcame his pivotal friendship with Freud. His subsequent work can be understood in part as an ongoing, if unanswered, discourse with Freud. The tensions in Jung’s relationship with Freud are, in retrospect, apparent from the first, and the drama of their
intimacy and inevitable mutual antipathy has taken on the character of tragedy, a modern iteration of the Oedipal myth, the prototype of father-son competition.

For his part, Sigmund Freud valued Jung as he did no other member of the psychoanalytic movement, pressed him quickly to assume the role of heir apparent, and revealed his (Freud’s) character to Jung in striking ways in years of impassioned friendship. Freud seems also both to have anticipated and to some extent to have precipitated the tensions that would undo the friendship and the professional collaboration. Those tensions concerned the role of sexuality in personality development and neurotic etiology – a topic about which Jung had been cautious from the first and about which Freud was to become increasingly dogmatic in the context of Jung’s defection.

The story of Jung and Freud is of crucial importance to an understanding of Freud and psychoanalysis. The theory of erotic and aggressive longings illustrated by the Freud–Jung relationship is, in my view, the key to understanding the importance of each man for the other.

Freud was fifty-one when the friendship began in 1907, Jung thirty-one. Despite the difference in ages, each man was at a turning point in his life. Jung was poised to act on his vaunting ambition, on the brink of developing a distinctive expression of his genius. Freud was in the process of consolidating the insights developed over the preceding decade and eager to foster (but not to manage actively) an international movement. The relationship allowed Freud to free psychoanalysis from his quarrelsome and unsatisfactory Vienna colleagues, to link it to the international reputation of the Burghölzli Psychiatric Clinic (via Bleuler) and to experimental psychology (through Jung’s studies of word association), and to articulate for a uniquely qualified interlocutor his ideas about the psychodynamics of culture and religion (Gay, 1988; Jones, 1955; Kerr, 1993). The relationship with Freud allowed Jung to broaden his perspective on the etiology and treatment of both neurosis and psychosis, and gave him a satisfying political role to play in the international psychoanalytic movement.

Freud’s tendency to interpret the actions (and inactions) of his colleagues in psychoanalytic terms had become well established by the time Jung met him in the year of Freud’s fiftieth birthday. In relation to Fliess, Ferenczi, and Jung, Freud played out conflicting elements of his own character in his exaggerated evaluation of each new follower’s quality, in overinvestment in the correspondence, in sensitivity to rejection, and finally in bitter anger at disloyalty. The decade of intimate friendship with Fliess in the 1890s displays most fully both the depth of Freud’s neurotic needs in friendship and the beauty of his creative intellect as he struggles to define himself (Masson,
It is in relation to Jung, however, that Freud’s ambivalences were played out most fully and explicitly in terms of his psychoanalytic theory and practice. Freud wrote for Fliess during the years of his self-creation, and for Jung in the years when his mature theory was being systematized. After Jung there was no equal merging of professional magnanimity and personal investment – and after Jung the core theory of psychoanalysis became reified around a libidinal orthodoxy regarding the role of sexuality in personality development, neurotic etiology, and culture.

Freud developed the theory of transference – the evocative patterns that we all carry with us, as templates for future interpersonal relationships, the residues of the most significant emotional attachments of our childhood. He himself created a profound transferential wake, in which most of those who became his associates found themselves awash. Indeed, the history of psychoanalysis both as a clinical specialty and as a field of scholarship gives ample evidence of the transferential hold Freud continues to exert on each of us. In the therapy Freudians would practice, seduction became the metaphor for the patient–doctor transference. The patient falls for an analyst, whose every move will be assimilated to the erotic and aggressive metaphors of the transference. Understanding the transference is then the key to recovery from the neurosis.

In the light of their personal correspondence and of recent studies of the concurrent clinical and family circumstances of each, it is clear that Freud and Jung were drawn together in part by unresolved personal needs – Freud’s for a male intimate to whom he could play out his need for an alter, and Jung’s for an idealizable father figure toward whom he could direct his powerful ambitious energy. These personal needs eventually proved deadly to the relationship, as Jung took on increased independence and a distinctive voice of his own and Freud interpreted this growth as Oedipal hostility. After their parting, each man would portray the other as prey to unanalyzed neurotic needs.

At the beginning of the friendship Freud was well known in the psychiatric and psychological communities as the author of an intriguing book on dreams and a controversial theory about the role of sexuality in neurosis. His most recent works – *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905a) and *Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria* (“Dora;” 1905b) – had emphatically stated and illustrated in detail his theories of the core role of eroticism in child development and of the sexual metalanguage of neurosis. Freud had claimed in the *Three Essays* that what the “pervert” compulsively does and the neurotic falls ill defending against, every human child both wishes and (within its infantile capacities) does.
Jung’s (July 1906) preface to his own publication “The Psychology of Dementia Praecox,” written just after his correspondence with Freud began, is prescient in its assessment of the points of stress along which the relationship would eventually split:

I can assure the reader that in the beginning I naturally entertained all the objections that are customarily made against Freud in the literature ... Fairness to Freud does not imply, as many fear, unqualified submission to a dogma; one can very well maintain an independent judgment. If I, for instance, acknowledge the complex mechanisms of dreams and hysteria, this does not mean that I attribute to the infantile sexual trauma the significance that Freud does. Still less does it mean that I place sexuality so predominantly in the foreground, or that I grant it the psychological universality which Freud, it seems, postulates in view of the admittedly enormous role which sexuality plays in the psyche. As for Freud’s therapy, it is at best but one of several possible methods, and perhaps does not always offer in practice what one expects from it in theory. (CW 3, pp. 3–4; Kerr, pp. 115–116)

Freud revealed at several points in his correspondence with Jung (a decade after the crucial events of 1897) how he had come to conceptualize himself. On 2 September 1907, he writes of his longing to tell Jung of his “long years of honorable but painful solitude, which began after I cast my first glance into the new world, about the indifference and incomprehension of my closest friends, about the terrifying moments when I myself thought I had gone astray and was wondering how I might still make my misled life useful to my family” (McGuire, 1974, p. 82). Freud’s imagery here, as he recalls his self-analysis a decade before and the completion of his dream book, suggests birth as well as a voyage of exploration.

Then on September 19 he sends Jung a portrait and a copy of his fiftieth birthday medallion. In his reply, on October 10, Jung expresses delight with the photograph and the medallion, then vents his anger with someone who had attacked psychoanalysis in an article. He describes the critic as “a superhysteric, stuffed with complexes from top to bottom” and then likens psychoanalysis to a coin. The man who had written badly of it is its “dismal face,” whilst he, in contrast, derives pleasure from the reverse or “under” side. It is a curious metaphor, suggestive that psychoanalysis is a private, even secret, activity. Freud, in his own characterization of his critics, makes an even more revealing slip:

[W]e know that they are poor devils, who on the one hand are afraid of giving offense, because that might jeopardize their careers, and on the other hand am [sic] paralyzed by fear of their own repressed material. (McGuire, 1974 p. 87)
He corrected the slip of “am” (bin) to “are” (sind) before sending, but both men, in their different ways, still tended to project their own “repressed material” onto their critics.

Freud seems to have responded immediately to Jung’s intellectual passion, his brilliance, and his originality — all qualities he missed in his Viennese disciples. Jung’s reading of Freud’s works was incisive, and he knew how to administer a compliment, as in a letter after Freud’s four-hour presentation of the “Rat Man” case to the 1908 First International Psychoanalytic Congress in Salzburg:

As to sentiments, I am still under the reverberating impact of your lecture, which seemed to me perfection itself. All the rest was simply padding, sterile twaddle in the darkness of inanity. (McGuire, 1974, p. 144)

Freud and Oedipus

During the late 1890s Freud developed most of the core concepts for his new psychology, as evidenced by his correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess, the Berlin physician who was his closest adult friend and who served as the confidant to whom Freud divulged his struggles to understand neurosis, dreams, traumatic memories, and the emergence of personality (Masson, 1985). Over the course of several years Freud transformed his theorizing about the sources and dynamics of neurotic anxiety from neurophysiological concern with actual predisposing and concurrent causes to interpretive investigation of fantasy and personal psychodynamics. Freud’s self-analysis following his father’s death in late 1896 led to an increased concern with dream interpretation and to an increasingly rich experience of mutual transferential involvement with patients (Anzieu, 1986; Davis, 1990; Salyard, 1994). At a theoretical level the major change in Freud’s thinking during this period involved a movement away from a causal model for the effects of childhood trauma in the formation of adult personality and neurosis — the so-called “seduction theory” — and toward psychoanalysis as an interpretive discipline in which the subjective meaning of experience — whether real or fanciful — is the basis for understanding (Davis, 1994).

In his 1899 paper, “Screen Memories,” Freud shows that apparent recall of early experiences may be determined by unconscious links between the memory and repressed wishes, rather than by actual events. Freud (writing as if about a male patient) demonstrates that one of the most poignant and persistent memories of his own childhood was a memory of a fantasied scene. The content of this false memory — playing in a field of flowers with his half-brother Emmanuel’s children John and Pauline — permitted Freud to
express privately both his felt need for an intimate male friend and the aggression that such a friendship would arouse:

I greeted my one-year-younger brother (who died after a few months) with adverse wishes and genuine childhood jealousy; and... his death left the germ of [self-]reproaches in me. I have also long known the companion of my misdeeds between the ages of one and two years; it is my nephew [John], a year older than myself... The two of us seem occasionally to have behaved cruelly to my niece, who was a year younger. This nephew and this younger brother have determined, then, what is neurotic, but also what is intense, in all my friendships. (Masson, 1985, p. 268)

Freud’s voluminous correspondence with Fliess (Masson, 1985), with Ferenczi (Brabant et al., 1993), and with Jung (McGuire, 1974) reveals his longing for a male confidant, his anxious concern that his correspondent respond to his letters quickly and fully, and his readiness to turn on a friend who doubted the core assumptions of Oedipal theory. The false memory Freud analyzed in 1899, of uniting with a boy to take flowers from a girl, is also revealing of the extent to which his relations with males would be mediated by shared interest in a female. Both his rivalry and his interest in a “third” female were to play themselves out in his relationship with Jung.

The degree to which Freud changed his mind about the seduction theory, and his reasons for doing so, have attracted a great deal of attention in recent years (Colman, 1994; Garcia, 1987; Hartke, 1994; Masson, 1984; Salyard, 1988, 1992, 1994). Most of these discussions have referred to Freud’s own stated reasons in a famous letter to Fliess from September 1897, eleven months after the death of his father. In one of the most striking passages from the Fliess correspondence, Freud reported his loss of conviction about his “seduction theory” (the idea that neuroses are based on sexual seduction or abuse by a caregiver) and articulated the reasons for his change of mind. In light of the careful scrutiny this letter has received in recent discussions of Freud (McGrath, 1986; Krüll, 1986; Balmary, 1982), it is rather surprising that the entire set of reasons Freud gave for abandoning this theory – dubbed his “neurotica” – has received little attention. Freud mentioned several motives for his change of mind, classed in groups.

The continual disappointment in my efforts to bring a single analysis to a real conclusion; the running away of people who for a period of time had been most gripped [by analysis]; the absence of the complete successes on which I had counted; the possibility of explaining to myself the partial successes in other ways, in the usual fashion – this was the first group. Then the surprise that in all cases, the father, not excluding my own (mein eigener nicht ausgeschlossen), had to be accused of being perverse – [and] the realization of the
unexpected frequency of hysteria, with precisely the same conditions pre-
vailing in each, whereas surely such widespread perversions against children
are not very probable. The [incidence] of perversion would have to be
immeasurably more frequent than the [resulting] hysteria because the illness,
after all, occurs only where there has been an accumulation of events and
and there is a contributory factor that weakens the defense. Then, third, the cer-
tain insight that there are no indications of reality in the unconscious, so that
one cannot distinguish between truth and fiction that has been cathexed with
affect. ( Accordingly, there would remain the solution that the sexual fantasy
invariably seizes upon the theme of the parents.) (Masson, 1985, p. 264)

Freud’s first set of reasons, that perverse acts against children might be
common, is epidemiological. The second – that fathers, including Freud’s
own, stand condemned – is Oedipal/psychoanalytic. The third, having to do
with the difficulty of establishing that any long-term memory is factual, is
the most telling. This theory of memory becomes the argument of his
brilliant short paper on “Screen Memories” two years later (Freud, 1899).

The practical impossibility of reliably distinguishing memory from wish in
the unconscious points directly to central issues in psychoanalysis: the need
for free association and extensive anamnesis in the context of a relationship
between analyst and patient that allows continued study of the role of
emotional needs in the memories and fantasies of each. In the psychoana-
lytic transference therapy Freud was beginning to practice by the time he
wrote The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1900), no particular memory
could be known with certainty. The web of connectedness that gradually
emerged from the collaboration of therapist and patient was believed to
reveal the salient aspects of the latter’s personality.

In a detailed analysis of Freud’s overdetermined involvement with the
Oedipus myth, Rudnytsky (1987) called attention to Freud’s consistent fail-
ure to mention the birth and death of his younger brother Julius at seemingly
appropriate junctures in his self-analysis. Only in the 1897 letter quoted
above, and in a letter dated November 24, 1912, to Ferenczi, in which he
explains his several fainting fits in the Park Hotel, does Freud mention that
such events must stem from an early experience with death. Freud’s reaction
to his brother’s sudden infant death made Freud himself an instance of his
own later theory of “Those Wrecked by Success” (Freud, 1916).

After his brother’s death, Freud too was “wrecked by success,” and left with
an uncanny dread of the omnipotence of his own wishes. His agitation on
receiving the medallion on his fiftieth birthday, when he again experienced in
reality the fulfillment of a “long-cherished wish,” becomes explicable when it
is seen as an unconscious reminder of the death of Julius.
By the same token, had it not happened that the death of Julius left in him the germ of “guilt,” or, more literally, the “germ of reproaches,” Freud would almost certainly not have responded with such “obstinate condolence” to the death of his father. In his unconscious mind, he must have believed that his patricidal wishes had caused his father’s death, just as he was responsible for that of Julius.

(Rudnytsky, 1987, p. 20)

The pattern of murderous rivalry and uncanny love Freud identified, as a man of forty, in his unconscious memories of Julius, became a template for his relations with male disciples (Colman, 1994; Hartke, 1994; Roustang, 1982).

Freudian correspondence

Freud was a prolific letter writer throughout his long life, and his rhetorical gifts often found their most vivid expression in his personal correspondence. Each of Freud’s relationships with a man in the early period of psychoanalysis is mediated by a woman. In this triangle, Freud’s possible homoerotic feelings for the man can be aroused and sublimated. Freud’s adolescent letters to his friend Silberstein, for example, testify to the extent to which his first romantic crush, on the pubescent Gisela Fluss, was in fact motivated in large measure by his fascination with her mother and her older brother (Boehlich, 1990). His later letters repeatedly illustrate this motif.

The publication of the first volume of the voluminous correspondence between Freud and Sandor Ferenczi, the Hungarian colleague with whom he maintained a twenty-five-year professional and personal relationship (Brabant et al., 1993), provides information about Freud’s personal and professional concerns during the crucial period of his relations with Jung. Ferenczi offered Freud his admiring friendship in January 1908 by requesting a meeting in Vienna to discuss ideas for a lecture on Freud’s theory of “actual neuroses” (with physical causes) and “psychoneuroses” (with psychological origins). Ferenczi was “eager to approach personally the professor whose teachings have occupied me constantly for over a year” (Brabant et al., 1993, p. 1). From the first, Ferenczi’s letters display a rather obsequious devotion to Freud’s personality and theories. Freud’s short note in response to Ferenczi’s request expressed regret at not being able on account of the illness of several family members to invite Ferenczi and his colleague Philip Stein to dinner, “as we were able to do in better times with Dr. Jung and Dr. Abraham” (Brabant et al., 1993, p. 2). A month later, in his second letter, Ferenczi refers to Freud as a “paranoid woman,” offers to contribute to Freud’s joke collection, and expresses his commitment to Freud’s psychosexual theory of the neuroses, affirming that it “should no longer be called a theory” (Brabant et al., 1993, p. 4) and closing with “kindest regards from your most obedient Dr. Ferenczi.”
Obedient Ferenczi was to prove himself over the long years of Freud’s patronage, until the end of his life when he suggested that his transference onto Freud had never been adequately analyzed, prompting Freud’s last methodological paper, “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (Freud, 1937).


Freud’s references to sublimated homosexual feeling as the key to male bonding is ubiquitous in both correspondences, but it is played out more systematically with Jung and more therapeutically with Ferenczi, who regularly attributes his anxieties about communicating with Freud to homoerotic issues. For his part, Jung admits in a remarkable letter early in the friendship in 1907 that his “boundless admiration” for Freud “both as a man and as a researcher” constantly evokes a “self-preservation complex,” which he explains as follows:

[M]y veneration for you has something of the character of a “religious” crush. Though it does not really bother me, I still feel it is disgusting and ridiculous because of its undeniable erotic undertone. This abominable feeling comes from the fact that as a boy I was the victim of a sexual assault by a man I once worshipped. (McGuire, 1974, p. 95)

Freud’s next letter, curiously, has been lost. The matter does not seem to have been explicitly raised again. Each time Jung might have felt seductively approached by Freud, however, he withdraws. Each time Freud might have felt attacked by Jung, he panics – in two instances, by fainting.

Freud’s relationship with Ferenczi seems to have allowed him to play a more supportive father with the infantile Hungarian than he could with the aggressive Swiss. In one letter, written after Freud and Ferenczi had traveled together to Italy in 1910, Freud complains to Jung about Ferenczi’s effeminate dependence:

My traveling companion is a dear fellow, but dreamy in a disturbing kind of way, and his attitude towards me is infantile. He never stops admiring me, which I don’t like, and is probably sharply critical of me in his unconscious when I am taking it easy. He has been too passive and receptive, letting everything be done for him like a woman, and I really haven’t got enough homosexuality in me to accept him as one. These trips arouse a great longing for a real woman. (McGuire, 1974, p. 353)
The three men had traveled together to the USA in 1909 so that Freud and Jung could take part in a symposium at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts. In the correspondence of Freud with each of the other men about plans for the trip and its aftermath, Jung seems the mature older brother and Ferenczi the dependent younger one. Both Jung’s and Freud’s remarks were well received by their elite audience of American psychologists, including G. Stanley Hall and William James (Rosenzweig, 1992) but, as we shall see, a return invitation to America was the occasion for the rupture of relations between Freud and Jung.

The eternal triangle

Throughout his life, Freud experienced competitive feelings for a woman whom he shared with a male intimate companion. The resulting male–female–male triangles usually brought Freud’s relationship with the male to a crisis. The prototype, in his own view, was Freud’s infantile lust for his mother – threatened when he was displaced from her breast by the birth of baby brother Julius, and eventuating in prototypical guilt when Julius seemed to succumb to Sigmund’s hatred by dying (Krull, 1986). The second instance, recovered by Freud in his analysis of the screen memory of playing in a meadow (Freud, 1899), involved his half-brother Emmanuel’s children, John and Pauline Freud. In this memory the aggressive and sexual elements were merged, as three-year-old Sigmund and four-year-old John threw Pauline to the ground and took her dandelions – “deflowered” her.

To illustrate Freud’s unconscious sexual fantasies, it is also useful to explore Freud’s collaboration with Josef Breuer on Studies in Hysteria, published in 1895. This volume produced the first detailed account of a “psychoanalytic” therapy directed at the alleviation of symptoms by recovery of repressed memories. The treatment by Breuer of Bertha Pappenheim (“Anna O.”) had been conducted by Breuer in the early 1880s and recounted to Freud when the latter was a medical student engaged to his future wife, Martha Bernays. Breuer was reluctant to publish the case fifteen years later, and Freud attributed this reluctance to unanalyzed erotic feelings Breuer had for his young female patient. The details of Breuer’s feelings are still in doubt (Hirschmüller, 1989), but the account Freud gave Ernest Jones and other psychoanalytic colleagues later suggests a fantasy identification with Breuer. Freud’s account, reported in Jones’s biography (Jones, 1953), suggested that Breuer’s guilt over his erotic feelings for Bertha brought the therapy to a premature close and led to an anxious renewal of the Breuer marriage in the birth of a daughter, Dora (Jones, 1953).
Freud’s own choice of the pseudonym “Dora” for his patient Ida Bauer suggests both his identification with Breuer and his obsession with exposing the erotic source of the patient’s symptoms, as Breuer had feared to do (Decker, 1982, 1991). Freud’s interpretation of his 1895 dream of “Irma’s Injection,” the exemplar to which he devotes a chapter in the Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1900), was produced when his friendship with Breuer was under great strain and his devotion to Fliess at its height. The dream casts Breuer (“Dr. M.”) as a bungling therapist who has missed the sexual cause of Irma’s neurosis, and Freud’s interpretation spares Fliess the accusation that the patient’s bleeding was caused by careless surgery (Davis, 1990; Masson, 1984).

Rudnytsky sets in apposition three of these Freudian triangles – with John and Pauline, with Wilhelm Fliess and Emma Eckstein (Freud’s patient on whose nose Fliess operated in 1895), and with Jung and Sabina Spielrein – and argues that this configuration affected Freud’s treatment of his adolescent patient “Dora” (Freud, 1905b). Freud’s fantasy alignment of himself with the would-be seducer (“Herr K.”) of his adolescent patient was the transition from the second to the third triangle (Rudnytsky, 1987, pp. 37–38). If one aligns Dora, surrounded by her father and “Herr K.,” with Sabina flanked by Jung and Freud, and with Emma in the hands of Fliess and Freud, and assimilates them all to Freud and John’s “defloration” of Pauline in childhood, the cumulative effect is powerful and disturbing (Rudnytsky, 1987, p. 38).

Sabina Spielrein

Jung’s controversial treatment of his young female patient Sabina Spielrein has been the subject of two books (Carotenuto, 1982; Kerr, 1993). It certainly appears that Jung was personally, and even erotically, involved with his patient both during and after his formal treatment of her. Much of the Freud–Jung–Spielrein correspondence, along with Spielrein’s fascinating and disturbing diary, was published in Carotenuto’s 1982 A Secret Symmetry, but Kerr’s book is the first thorough examination of her influence on both Jung and Freud. Spielrein was a severely disturbed young Russian Jewish woman who was treated by Jung in 1904 as a test case in psychoanalysis. She maintained an intimate friendship with Jung for many years, trained in psychoanalysis with Freud, corresponded with both men during the crucial years of their friendship and subsequent alienation, and influenced Russian clinical psychology in the 1920s and 1930s. Working from Spielrein’s diary, her correspondence with Freud, Jung’s correspondence
with Freud about her, and her own published papers, Kerr traces in detail Spielrein’s influence on both men’s theories.

At the time Jung’s correspondence with Freud began in 1906, Spielrein’s clinical material pertaining to anal eroticism seems to have convinced him of the importance of Freud’s assertions on the subject (Freud, 1905a; Kerr, 1993). Spielrein played an especially important role in Jung’s theory of the anima and in Freud’s theory of a destructive instinct. As he had with Fliess a decade earlier, Freud avoided criticizing Jung’s treatment of Spielrein even when there was reason to suspect that the therapy had miscarried badly. Spielrein’s diary reveals a fantasy of having a child (“Siegfried”) by Jung that Jung seems to have encouraged in therapy sessions even as he denied to Freud that the relationship was sexual (Carotenuto, 1982; McGuire, 1974).

Oedipus revisited

The last stage of the Freud–Jung friendship was characterized by each man’s preoccupation with the role of universal aggressive and erotic forces in childhood personality development. For Freud the result was a renewed commitment to orthodox Oedipal theory, while for Jung the result was his typology of individual differences that allowed him to validate different analytic approaches, encompassing Freud’s, Adler’s, and Jung’s own of sexual and aggressive feelings as they intersect with symbols of a collective unconscious. By 1911 the Freud–Jung correspondence is full of the problem of Adler’s and Stekel’s defections. Freud notes that he is “becoming steadily more impatient of Adler’s paranoia and longing for an occasion to throw him out . . . especially since seeing a performance of Oedipus Rex here – the tragedy of the ‘arranged libido’ ” (McGuire, 1974, p. 422). Referring to Adler as “Fliess redivivus,” Freud also notes that Stekel’s first name is Wilhelm, suggesting that both relationships evoked the ending of his friendship with Wilhelm Fliess in 1901, because of what Freud described as Fliess’s paranoia.

Like Ferenczi, Jung had lent a sympathetic ear in 1911 while Freud struggled to explain Schreber’s paranoia in terms of repressed homosexuality (Freud, 1911), but the sympathy was not reciprocated. Freud expressed confusion and distress at Jung’s attempts to explain his rationale for Transformations and Symbols of the Libido the following year. Even in the early days of Oedipal theory in the late 1890s, Freud had suggested to Fliess that our repressed Oedipal complex – universal as it was thought to be – will tend to result in our downplaying or omitting the role of infantile sexuality in later development. Such revisionist accounts will find favor with the public, Freud argued, since they leave each person’s repressions...
intact. Despite frequent assurances from Freud that neither Jung’s friendship nor his role in psychoanalysis could be in doubt, there is a growing sense of each man protesting too much. Subsequently, Jung’s increasing independence begins to arouse Freud’s avuncular concern and finally his hostility in the summer of 1912, as Jung discussed the lectures he was preparing for a second trip to America.

On his return in November, Jung sent Freud a letter, describing the enthusiasm with which his talks on psychoanalysis were received, and added:

Naturally I made room for those of my views which deviate in places from the hitherto existing conceptions, particularly in regard to the libido theory.

(McGuire, 1974, p. 515)

Freud’s reply immediately revealed the chill that was descending on the relationship:

Dear Dr. Jung:

I greet you on your return from America, no longer as affectionately as on the last occasion in Nuremberg – you have successfully broken me of that habit – but still with considerable sympathy, interest, and satisfaction at your personal success.

(McGuire, 1974, p. 517)

After repeated exchanges about the now-famous “Kreuzlingen gesture” – Jung’s hurt feelings that Freud did not arrange to meet him while visiting his colleague Binswanger in Kreuzlingen, Switzerland, and Freud’s hurt feelings that Jung did not show up – a confrontation occurs. Freud gets Jung to admit that he could have inferred the necessary details to appear, and Jung surprisingly recalls that he had been away that weekend. At lunch afterwards, Freud offers hearty and seemingly friendly criticism of Jung and then drops into a faint, in the same room where he had passed out prior to the 1909 trip to Clark University with Jung and Ferenczi. It was also the same room where he had quarreled with Fliess in 1901.

When Freud attempts shortly thereafter to interpret Jung’s slip that “even Adler’s and Stekel’s disciples don’t consider me one of theirs/yours,” Jung has had enough:

May I say a few words to you in earnest? I admit the ambivalence of my feelings towards you, but am inclined to take an honest and absolutely straightforward view of the situation. If you doubt my word, so much the worse for you. I would, however, point out that your technique of treating your pupils like patients is a blunder. In that way you produce either slavish sons or impudent puppies (Adler–Stekel and the whole insolent gang now throwing their weight about in Vienna). I am objective enough to see through your little trick. You go about sniffing out all the symptomatic actions in your
vicinity, thus reducing everyone to the level of sons and daughters who
blushingly admit the existence of their faults. Meanwhile you remain on top
as the father, sitting pretty. For sheer obsequiousness nobody dares to pluck
the prophet by the beard and inquire for once what you would say to a patient
with a tendency to analyze the analyst instead of himself. You would certainly
ask him: “who’s got the neurosis?” (McGuire, 1974, pp. 534–535)

Jung’s assault on Freud’s cherished assumptions is frontal. Freud projects
his hostility onto his disciples. Freud has never come to terms with his own
neurosis. Freud’s methods one-sidedly reduce motivation to sexual themes.
His self-understanding is flawed, and he is – in the case where it matters
most – no therapist. Freud brooded over his response to this letter and sent a
draft reply to Ferenczi for comment, speaking of his shame and anger at the
personal insult (Brabant et al., 1993), and finally suggested to Jung that they
end their personal relationship. Jung left his positions as head of the
movement and editor of its major journal the following year.

In Totem and Taboo (Freud, 1912–13), written while the bitterness of the
quarrel with Jung was fresh, Freud laid out an anthropological fantasy of
primal incest and parricide as justification for a proto-sociobiological the-
ory of the evolution of society. Jung was now, in Freud’s view, one of the
“primal horde,” the brother band (with Adler and Stekel) eager to devour
and replace the old man.

Jung’s account of Freud in subsequent writings carefully acknowledges the
seminal importance of dream interpretation and the role of the unconscious
in symptom formation. Jung, however, taking Freud’s emphasis on child-
hood sexuality as evidence of his one-sidedness, suggests the need for con-
comitant analysis of aggressive strivings (cf. Adler), and treats the Oedipus
complex as one among several universal myths in the psyche (CW 5; Jung,
1963). Much of Jung’s distinctive mission in the decades after Freud was to
affirm the creative and prospective, rather than the regressive and reduc-
tionistic, role of myth in each lifespan. Transformations and Symbols of the
Libido was reissued in several editions, and was finally substantially revised
in the last years of Jung’s life. At that time Jung noted that thirty-seven years
had not diminished the book’s problematic importance for him:

The whole thing came upon me like a landslide that cannot be stopped. The
urgency that lay behind it became clear to me only later: it was the explosion
of all those psychic contents that could find no room, no breathing space, in
the constricting atmosphere of Freudian psychology and its narrow out-
look. (Jung, 1956, p. xxiii)

When Jung joined psychoanalysis in 1907, it could plausibly claim to be a
radical new psychology, devised by Freud and consisting of several related
parts: a powerful hermeneutics (Freud, 1900), a revolutionary and partly empirical theory of personality development (Freud, 1905a), a novel therapeutic methodology (Freud, 1905b), and a rudimentary theory of cultural psychology (Freud, 1900). Freud’s work on dreams, neurotic etiology, and child development were becoming known beyond Vienna, and a psychoanalytic movement was about to form. When Jung left Freud and the International Psychoanalytic Association, both were players on a world stage and Jung was half-ready to launch a movement of his own. Freud’s political leadership of the psychoanalytic movement was vested in an orthodox bodyguard (Grosskurth, 1991) and for most of the next twenty-four years he remained in the background, tinkering with the peripheral concepts of his theories and watching jealously that no variant psychoanalysis abandoned the core premise of childhood sexuality. Freud’s ideas remained important to psychology for decades, and his notions regarding cultural evolution had wide influence in other disciplines, but classical psychoanalysis as a therapeutic movement became reified around theories of sexual and aggressive drives, and its most original and fertile new hypotheses were developed by practitioners who in one way or another were considered “unorthodox.”

Ultimately the professional relationship foundered on arguments over “libido” and its transformations, that is, on the theory of motivational energy and of the relationship between conscious and unconscious phenomena. Behind this professional squabble lay the aggressive and erotic emotions evident in the letters. Had Freud and Jung sustained their relationship for a few more years, psychoanalytic history would have been very different. There might have been a complete and coherent account of the requirements for psychoanalytic therapy and training – and perhaps a clearer distinction between them (cf. Kerr, 1993). An adequate theory of female eroticism and gender might have had its beginnings (Kofman, 1985). The interplay of sexual and aggressive emotions in human development would have been addressed explicitly instead of being deflected into tendentious anthropological speculation, and the spiritual aspect of life would perhaps have found a place in theory and in therapy.

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Freud, Jung, and psychoanalysis


SHERRY SALMAN

The creative psyche: Jung’s major contributions

For Jung, the psyche was a many-splendored thing: fluid, multi-dimensional, alive, and capable of creative development. Having been Assistant Director of a psychiatric hospital, Jung was no stranger to disease, psychosis, and inertia. But he possessed a love for the orderly chaos of the psyche and a trust in its integrity, which both informed his conception of it, and shaped his psychoanalytic vision.

This chapter explores Jung’s major discoveries, the bedrock upon which his psychological vision rests and the ideas which continue to inform contemporary thought and practice: the prospective, emergent nature of psychological process; the subjective, individual path to objective awareness; and the creative use of imagination and unconscious material. Although Jung is infamous for having drawn on esoteric sources such as alchemy, actually he was prescient in terms of his post-modern view of the psyche.

Disturbed by the trend in which the scientific knowledge of matter was outstripping knowledge of the psyche, Jung noted that just as chemistry and astronomy had split off from their origins in alchemy and astrology, modern science was distancing itself from the study and understanding of the psychological universe. He foresaw the enormity of the discrepancy we face now: while cracking the genetic code and creating biological life we remain virtually ignorant about psychological life and our consequent ethical imperatives. Jung was drawn to symbol systems like astrology and alchemy because they were oriented toward a synthetic understanding of matter and psyche. He understood them as projections of humankind’s inner psychological processes, fantasies about the biological and physical world and symbolic representations of movements of collective consciousness. In alchemical thinking, for example, matter and psyche are not separated, and this is what appealed to Jung as a paradigm for understanding the human psyche in its relation to the world. In addition, these Mystery traditions, with their non-literal and multivalent language offered an opportunity to pull psychological discourse out of the reductive arena, and to introduce the possibility of transformation, over and above simple transmutation or sublimation of symptoms.
While rooted in those traditions that believed in the essential interrelatedness of psyche and matter, Jung’s orientation toward the psyche and the world differed from older animistic systems that embraced fusion, compulsion, and the baleful eye of fate. But it also diverged from modern rational views oriented toward separation from unconscious process and ego control over matter and psyche. Freud’s dictum “where id was there ego shall be” (Freud, 1933, p. 80) could not be further from Jung’s concept of the relationship between ego identity and unconscious process. Jung’s posture toward the psyche was “post-modern”: its central metaphor is *dialogue* between consciousness and unconscious process. This dialogue is dependent on both self-regulating feedback systems between autonomous unconscious phenomena and the ego’s development, as well as the imaginative and creative interplay between subject and object, psyche and matter. Both healing and meaning emerge out of these ongoing dialogues (Salman, 1999 and 2006). The medieval alchemists proclaimed “as above, so below”; contemporary analysts would add “as within, so without,” and vice versa. An important element of the Jungian view of psychological process is that it can offer a constructive contribution to the post-modern “deconstruction” of the subject–object dichotomy.

### Jung’s view of the psyche

At the heart of Jung’s view lies this vision of an interplay between intrapsychic, somatic, and interpersonal phenomena within the world, the analytic process, and last but not least, life. Jung referred to these living and inseparable relationships as deriving from an * unus mundus*, a term he borrowed from medieval philosophy meaning “one unitary world,” the primordial soup which contains all things:

Undoubtedly the idea of the * unus mundus* is founded on the assumption that the multiplicity of the empirical world rests on an underlying unity, and not that two or more fundamentally different worlds exist side by side or are mingled with one another. Rather, everything divided and different belongs to one and the same world, which is not the world of sense but a postulate whose probability is vouched for by the fact that until now no one has been able to discover a world in which the known laws of nature are invalid. That even the psychic world, which is so extraordinarily different from the physical world, does not have its roots outside the one cosmos is evident from the undeniable fact that causal connections exist between the psyche and the body which point to their underlying unitary nature . . . The background of our empirical world thus appears to be in fact a * unus mundus*. (CW 14, p. 538)
Recent discoveries in the biology of DNA echo this theme, for all animate life from a blade of grass to a human being is built from the same four components of genetic material, differing only by arrangement. At the time, Jung had found validation for the “unitary world” in a symbol which exists in every culture throughout history: the mandala or “magic circle,” signifying both undifferentiated unity and integrated wholeness.

In Jung’s (CW 14) unus mundus, the “potential world outside of time” (p. 505), everything is interconnected, and there is no difference between psychological and physical facts, nor between past, present, or future. This borderline state where time, space, and eternity are “held together” by the magic circle of the mandala, forms the backdrop for Jung’s most basic formulation about the structure and dynamics of the psyche: the existence of a collective unconscious, the reservoir of human experience both actual and potential, and its components, the archetypes. At this level of psychological process, certain things just “happen” to occur together (e.g. when I think of my long-lost friend, the telephone rings), and psychological significance is experienced synchronistically through meaningful coincidences (CW 8). Internal and external events are related by their subjective meaning. The I Ching, an ancient Chinese text which Jung often referenced, is an example of an attempt to codify both this kind of meaningful coincidence and its interplay with archetypal images. One outstanding feature of Jung’s approach was the value given to this kind of psychological process and the understanding that it never disappears, but remains the wellspring from which all else flows.

The ancients also imagined the unus mundus as dividing into parts, such as subject and object, in order to bring a state of potentiality into actuality. In analytic work, the recognition and integration of projections constitutes a considerable psychological achievement. But Jung also emphasized that these “parts,” once they are separated, have to be reunited into an integrated whole. Although the worlds of subject and object, conscious and unconscious, are necessarily divided for the sake of adaptation, they must be reunited for the sake of health, which for Jung meant wholeness. Jung referenced this potential unfolding of wholeness as the archetype of the Self, a symbolic image of the entirety of the psyche, not just the ego. Development toward it is part of the psyche’s individuation process. This emphasis on the synthesis of what had been previously discriminated between and divided constitutes a unique feature of the Jungian approach.

Jung’s image of psychological and clinical process incorporates the subject/object split but moves beyond it. He emphasized that from a psychological standpoint, only in the developmental phase of separation and discrimination is it meaningful and important to differentiate subject and
object as discrete entities. At subsequent levels of psychological process the relationship between subject and object, conscious and unconscious, can and should become reintegrated into a subjectively meaningful whole. This differentiation of the changing relationship between internal reality, external event, subject, object, conscious and unconscious, can make way for a similarly differentiated and unique clinical methodology, which Jung laid ground for in *The Psychology of the Transference* (CW 16).

Contrary to popular opinion, Jung was firmly anchored and innovative in clinical practice. For example, he eschewed the use of an analytic couch in favor of a face-to-face encounter. He was well aware that embodied transformation took place in an active, synthetic state of engagement, and focused his attention on those techniques (imagination and transference) which, similar to dreaming, induced such psychological states. He also took great pains to bring patients to full awareness of their present problems, and sought to help people face the challenges of everyday life. Historically, he was the first to emphasize the fact that development is arrested not only because of past trauma, but also from fear of taking necessary developmental steps, and modern Western society’s lack of adequate initiation rituals. He placed major emphasis not on repressed sexual desires, but on current life events as precipitants for regression into unconscious process which is experienced in both mental illness and analysis. The material from this regression was used to bring the patient back to both subjective and objective reality with a new and practical orientation.

Just as the reality of relationships and objects cannot be reduced to intrapsychic phenomena, Jung always maintained the fact of the reality of the psyche per se. Psychic phenomena are related to, but not reducible to other levels of experience, whether, for example, the biochemistry of the brain or one’s personal history and story. Psychological phenomena are autonomous, and should be investigated as they are experienced. For example, Jung saw the “soul” as a psychological fact, irrespective of scientific proof of its existence. Jung’s crucial observation was that psychological phenomena are as “real” in their own right as physical objects. They function autonomously with a life of their own, something which has been “rediscovered” recently in the phenomena of dissociative disorders. This implies that the unconscious can never be entirely repressed, exhausted, or emptied through reductive analysis. In fact, this would be disastrous for psychic health. Consequently, the dangers of being flooded by unconscious processes (= “engulfment,” “possession”) or identified with them (= “inflation”) are always present, and a kind of “madness” is always possible. Jung’s solution to this was a happier one than Freud’s: he conceived the relationship between ego and the rest of the psyche to be one of
continuous dialogue which is, by definition, a never-ending process. What changes is the nature of the conversation.

The trajectory of this conversation ranged from early formulations of the ego’s “fight with the dragon-mother of the unconscious” (CW 5), in which the ego gains a foothold out of its unconscious matrix, to later images of transformation in which the ego surrenders itself to a process of dismemberment and rebirth (CW 14). The core issue remains one of maintaining a dynamic tension and a flexible relationship between the ego and the rest of the psyche. Jungian analysis is not primarily concerned with making the unconscious conscious (an impossibility in Jung’s view), or merely analyzing past difficulties (a potential impasse), although both come into play. Rather, loosening the boundaries between conscious and unconscious contents generates new psychic energy from the emergent tension, which is available for psychological growth. Jung referred to this process as activation of the transcendent function (CW 8). He considered this the most significant factor in deep psychological work. The aim of analysis is solidifying this ability to be in dialogue with unconscious contents, which facilitates the creative integration of psychological experience, thus providing a way of dealing with future difficulties. One way to define the goal of analytic treatment is the well-functioning dialogue between ego identity and what lies beyond its margins. As the alchemists said, “the Goal is the Art.”

The subjective path to objective awareness

Jung was the first analyst to promote a “training analysis” as the sine qua non of analytic training. He felt that knowledge of oneself was entirely experiential: what the Gnostics called gnosis, an “inner knowing” gained through one’s own experience and understanding. This “inner knowing” is more than just information or the experience of being conscious. It includes the experience of meaning. Based on his own personal and clinical experience of the numinous in psychological life, Jung postulated a religious “instinct.” When this instinct to make meaning is blocked or conflicted, disease will result. Jung argued that the archetypal symbols which emerge from the unconscious are part of the psyche’s objective religious “meaning-making” instinct, but that these symbols will be experienced subjectively within each individual. For example, there is a human instinct to create an image of a godhead, the function of which is to symbolize our highest values and sense of meaning, but the content of this image varies both within cultures and individuals.

Jung’s work on subjectivity and objectivity led to his theory of psychological types (CW 6). This theory differentiated the universal components of
consciousness and delineated how these components work in different ways in different individuals. Jung described two basic modes of perception: introversion, where the psyche is oriented toward the internal world, and extraversion, where the psychic focus is on the external world. Within these perceptual modes, he described four properties of consciousness: thinking, feeling, intuition, and sensation. The modes of perception and the properties of consciousness are found combined in various ways, resulting in sixteen “typologies,” basic styles of consciousness, for example the “introverted intuitive thinking type” or the “extraverted sensate feeling” type.

The theory implies that there are various ways not only of apprehending but also of functioning in the world, an idea which has been assimilated into couples therapy and business management. The theory also suggests that different clinical “types” of patient may profit from different treatment modalities, e.g. cognitive–behavioral or art therapy. The understanding of both the objectivity of the psyche and the importance of one’s subjective experience of it inform the Jungian view of the analytic process the discovery of one’s personal history, unconscious dynamics and identification, one’s limitations, the attendant suffering and healing of unresolved complexes, and the emerging unknown. This personal material is considered to have a universal core which derives from the “objective psyche” or “collective unconscious,” which consists of archetypal dynamics common to all. Healing occurs when the individual psyche regresses into this deeper layer of psychological process. Rather than being an individual matter, the objective psyche reflects the universality of experience and the creation of meaning from this experience.

Since all individual experience has an archetypal core, issues from personal history and archetypal patterns are always interwoven, often needing first to be separated, and then linked back together. Analysis attempts to differentiate the defensive fantasies generated by complexes, which interfere with integration and reconstruction, from the trajectory of the psyche’s true imagination. Jung envisioned the entire process as parallel to the ancient initiation mythologem of the sun-hero who dies, journeys through dismemberment in the underworld, and is eventually resurrected. This mythologem expresses several fundamental themes which hold true in analysis: death–rebirth as the psychological trajectory; the healing/destructive aspects of introversion; the struggle with regressively charged libido; and the descent through personal psychology into the wellsprings of psychic energy, the objective psyche.

Jung’s theory of psychological process was not a “one size fits all” theory applied indiscriminately. Even so, Jung considered all subjective paths of
experience, all typologies, all complexes, to lead to an objective level of psychological process, composed of the archetypes. Like multi-faceted crystals, archetypes describe the content and behavior of the objective psyche. As psychosomatic “structures,” they are our innate capacity to apprehend, organize, and create experience. Archetypes are both biologically based patterns of behavior and the symbolic images of these patterns. As transpersonal structures, they are transcendental “essences” or quintessential distillates of imagination and meaning. Archetypes, with their ties to both subject and object, unfold simultaneously in both radical specificity and subjectivity (the intrapsychic, symbolic dimension), and in numerous embodied avenues of experience and expression, as living mythologems.

For example, the archetype of the “Great Mother” symbolizes much more than the experience and reality of one’s personal mother (Neumann, 1955). Although “mother” is a personal psychological, emotional, and cognitive experience which has cultural determinants, it also has an archetypal base, in that humans are “wired up” to recognize and participate in mothering and being mothered. This is expressed both biologically and in symbolic images such as the Great Goddess, Mother Church, the Fates, and Mother Nature. The experience of “mother” is always heavily influenced by this unconscious template, the Mother archetype, which comprises the innate capacity to apprehend and experience nurturance and deprivation, as well as the capacity to symbolize this experience. In many ways, D. W. Winnicott’s (1965, p. 145) formulation of the “good enough mother” relates to Jung’s formulation of the maternal archetype in that she is able to meet and mediate the child’s innate maternal archetypal image. She just has to be “good enough” to do that.

The postulate of the archetype helps explain the ubiquitous discrepancy between a child’s experience of “mother” and the actual mother. Jungian analysts take great care to differentiate the personal mother from the archetypal image of Mother. Therapeutic action in analysis ultimately resides in the latter, which is open to re-imagination, while the reality of personal history is not. Various archetypal themes move in and out of the “healing fictions” we create, and this process of reconstruction is indispensable for a healthy and evolving psyche.

The archetypes circumscribe how we relate to the world: they manifest as instincts and emotions, as the primordial images and symbols in dreams and mythology, and in patterns of behavior and experience. As impersonal and objective elements in the psyche, they reflect universal issues and serve to bridge the subject–object gap. The recognition of archetypes and how they function psychologically, including the personalization of symbolic archetypal
motifs (such as the fantasy that one’s mother is a witch or an angel) is a vital part of Jungian analysis. Of their ubiquity, Jung said:

Here there are many prejudices that still have to be overcome. Just as it is thought, for instance, that Mexican myths cannot possibly have anything to do with similar ideas found in Europe, so it is held to be a fantastic assumption that an educated modern man should dream of classical myth-motifs which are known only to a specialist. People still think that relationships like this are farfetched and therefore improbable. But they forget that the structure and function of the bodily organs are everywhere more or less the same, including those of the brain. And as the psyche is to a large extent dependent on this organ, presumably it will – at least in principle – everywhere produce the same forms. (CW 14, p. xix)

Many aspects of the archetype remain unconscious and function powerfully and autonomously. These are “psychoid” areas of the archetype that function as discrete centers of psychic energy coexisting with ego awareness. They may manifest in fusion states like projective identification or mystical illumination, or in psychosomatic conditions, such as the identity between infant and mother. When this level of an archetype is activated, there is an intensified energy field felt in the body, which Jung called “numinosity.” It can be transmitted by contagion to the whole environment with results as discrepant as mob psychology and faith healing.

By identifying the character of archetypes, their “all or nothing” affective impact, their impersonality, autonomy, and numinosity, Jung opened the way for understanding many dynamics of the borderline psyche: omnipotence, idealization, fusion, and separation-individuation struggles. Jung recognized that primary instinct and affect disturbances are healed at this deep level of psychological process. Here, the numinous power of the archetypes is felt. Nothing is yet separated, but nothing is sequentially connected either. Instead of connections and relationship there is substitution and affect. The part represents the whole and the whole represents the parts. One’s mother’s frailties are experienced through the lens of the Terrible Mother and her graces as the boon of the Great Goddess. Much analytic work is concerned with differentiating the personal from the archetypal, while at the same time reintegrating, via symbolization, the personal and archetypal experience.

Although archetypal images are very different from personal experience they never exist in a void: they are triggered, released, and experienced in an individual. The archetype proper is a skeleton which requires personal experience to flesh it out. The relationship between personal issues and archetypal motifs is paradoxical. An archetypal image should be analyzed
as symbolic and emergent, but also as expressed in actual experience. For example, when a patient is in the grip of an idealizing transference (Kohut, 1971) and the analyst is experienced as transcendentally positive and nurturing, the “Good” facet of the Mother archetype is constellated in the patient and projected onto the analyst. The healing agent is transpersonal, but is first experienced in personal terms. The symbol cannot heal without a body and a concrete life. As Jungian analyst Edward Whitmont (1982) puts it:

A lack of relation to the archetypal dimension results in spiritual impoverishment and a sense of meaninglessness in life. But insufficient anchoring and incarnating of the archetypal in the personal realm – that is, speculating about archetypal meaning rather than trying to discover this meaning through living concretely the prosaic and “trivial” problems and difficulties of everyday feelings and relationships, results in mere “head trips” and is the hallmark of narcissistic pathology. Then the symbol fails to heal and may, indeed, insulate analysands from the unconscious, rather than connect them to it.

(Whitmont, 1982, p. 344)

In addition to articulating the archetypal dimension of the psyche and one’s personal experience of it, Jung had ideas about psychological development which were prescient. Foremost was the exploration of the feminine archetype in mythology, and the importance accorded it in the psychological development of both sexes. Although influenced by culturally conventional thinking in some of his assumptions about appropriate gender development and behavior, Jung’s stunning accomplishment was to place women and the feminine aspects of the psyche on equal footing with men and the masculine. This challenged the entire structure of psychoanalytic and developmental theory, which was previously based on the ideal of a heroic autonomous individual, separated from the mother at all costs, as the model of psychological health. Qualities such as dependency, empathy, and female aggression had been devalued and pathologized. A woman was ipso facto an inferior man. Jung began a revisioning of the feminine archetype which resulted in incorporating “feminine” qualities as essential to mental health.

Jung called the “feminine” archetype within a man the anima, and the “masculine” within a woman the animus. Jung conceived them as akin to soul-images with their own psychic reality, symbolizing what is experienced as “other,” and needing to be related to as such. The anima/animus is the psychological image of the psychopomp or guide, which brings us into relation with the contents of the objective psyche. By postulating the archetypes of anima/animus Jung enlarged the picture of developmental
possibilities for both sexes, as well as opened the field for mature exploration of the phenomena of love.

Jung also saw psychological development continuing throughout the adult lifespan. He was the first to attempt an outline of the stages of life (CW 8), which has continued to inspire research. The potential for qualitative development throughout life adds a necessary compensating factor to childhood-based theories of development, and it is now accepted that personality is creatively synthesized by an ever-changing “narrative” which does not arise only in infancy or even in literal events.

But because of his belief that many roads lead to Rome, Jung was circumspect about a rigid archetypally based developmental theory. His discovery was of the existence of many subjective paths to objective maturity and awareness. Particular archetypal paradigms may influence individuals somewhat or not at all, and their use may be more relevant to various qualities of psychic function at different times. For example, the hero’s fight with the dragon (Neumann, 1954) is illustrative of the adolescent paranoid-schizoid psyche, while Celtic myths with their fluctuating Other-worlds are paradigmatic of deeper “borderline” types of psychological fields (Perera, 1990). The way towards wholeness takes a serpentine path, backwards and forwards, and in and out of various psychological dimensions.

The Jungian model and its dynamics

While the objectivity of experience is determined by the archetypes, its subjectivity is determined by the nature of one’s personal complexes. In many ways Jung was the father of “complex theory.” While testing normal subjects using a “word association test” in which subjects responded with their verbal associations to various stimulus words (CW 2), he confirmed the presence of internal unconscious distractions which interfered with associations to the test words. This research had great bearing on the status of psychoanalysis in the scientific community at that time, by yielding empirical indications that an “association” could be disturbed purely by something from within. He called these internal distractions “feeling-toned complexes of ideas,” complexes for short.

The word association test suggested the presence of many types of complexes, contradicting Freud’s claim for a core sexual complex. Jung also observed that these complexes were dissociable; they functioned as autonomous split-off contents, capable of forming separate personalities. Jung was keenly interested in these split-off contents, which was one reason he was initially taken with Freud’s notion of dissociated traumatic memories. But Jung never believed that dissociations were necessarily caused by
sexual trauma or by any trauma at all. For Jung the psyche was inherently
dissociative, with complexes and archetypal contents personified and
functioning autonomously as multiple fields of reality. He conceived of
numerous secondary selves, not merely unconscious drives and processes.
Jung’s original hypothesis is now being investigated vigorously in contem-
porary research on trauma, dissociative disorders, and multiple personality
disorders, where many of his ideas are being confirmed.

Jung’s thinking on the nature of dissociative phenomena was far-reach-
ing. In his doctoral dissertation, Jung (CW 1) first suggested that in some
cases the tendency to dissociate might be a positive mechanism. He had
studied his cousin, a spirit medium, and found that the personality of
her “spirit guide” was more integrated than that of the medium herself.
This “secondary” personality was superior to the primary one. From this
observation, Jung began to formulate a most important idea: the teleo-
logical orientation toward symptomology.

While Freud’s psychoanalysis was predominantly archeological, delving
into the ruins of the past, Jung’s was concerned with the present as it gave
rise to future development. He observed that the material surfacing from the
unconscious served to bring light to the ego’s limited awareness. He con-
sidered all unconscious imagery as potentially symbolic, functioning to
compensate or rectify the direction and contents of ego consciousness. The
symbol thus has a regulating function. The end result, purpose, or aim of a
symptom, complex, or defense mechanism is as important, if not more so,
than its initial causes. A symptom develops not “because of” prior history,
but “in order to” express unconscious process or accomplish a psychological
purpose. The clinical question is not reductive, but synthetic: “What is this
symptom doing and what is it for?” In the case of the medium whom Jung
(CW 1, p. 132) studied, her spirit guide was not reduced to a pathological
hysterical complex, but considered as “an independent existence as autono-
mous personality, seeking a middle way between extremes.” It was a numin-
ous element in her psyche capable of giving meaning and adaptive direction
to her life. Jung was arguing that a complex, rather than just repeating itself
or regulating current functioning, was also re-organizing the future.

The most serious form of emotional disease is not the existence of
complexes per se, but the breakdown of the psyche’s considerable self-
regulating capacities, such as the ability to rectify the current situation by
bringing into awareness dissociated complexes and archetypal material. But
how are these various dissociated pieces of the psyche organized? The
teleological view posits a psychological factor which Jung termed the Self,
by which he meant the psyche’s image of totality and wholeness, and its
movement toward formation and transformation.
The ancient and long obsolete idea of man as a microcosm contains a supreme psychological truth that has yet to be discovered. In former times this truth was projected upon the body, just as alchemy projected the unconscious psyche upon chemical substances. But it is altogether different when the microcosm is understood as that interior world whose inward nature is fleetingly glimpsed in the unconscious... And just as the cosmos is not a dissolving mass of particles, but rests in the unity of God’s embrace, so man must not dissolve into a whirl of warring possibilities and tendencies imposed on him by the unconscious, but must become the unity that embraces them all. (CW 16, p. 196)

The image of the Self, at the beginning of life, symbolizes the potential totality of the personality, but like a seed or genetic blueprint, it also develops over time. Jung elaborated his developmental perspective on the Self in his alchemical amplification of its journey from a chaotic massa confusa to the integrated lapis or Philosopher’s Stone which, by containing all contradictory opposites, symbolizes an ideal condition of wholeness and health (CW 14), a “dream of totality.” This condition is never fully realized, for the image of the Self represents the ordering and dis-ordering factor behind development throughout life, as well as a prospective force behind symptoms and symbols. Neither reified organic structures, nor “deified” transcendent superordinate structures, symbols of the Self are the psyche’s reflections of the continuous and emergent processes of psychological transformation. Jung’s postulate of the Self stands up well in the light of new scientific paradigms of emergent memory and meaning, as well as contemporary constructs such as psychological narrative, clinical reconstruction, and the mythopoesis of psychological experience and healing. A distinguishing feature of Jungian clinical methodology is that all diagnostic, prognostic, and developmental theories are organized with reference to the Self, as well as the ego. Although other depth psychologists have alluded to the importance of the notion of a “self” (Kohut, 1971; Khan 1974) only Jung’s original model truly relativized the ego, viewing it as vehicle, executor, or as temenos for the destiny and mystery factors of the Self (Salman, 1999).

Jung conceived the psyche as having many important structures and centers of gravity, concurrently self-regulating, dissociable, and striving towards wholeness. Since the psyche is dissociable by nature, its assimilation by the ego is a never-ending process. Jung perceived a yawning gulf between the ego and the unconscious, a gulf that is sometimes bridged but never eradicated, and his formulation included the idea of forever dissociated “irredeemable” pieces of psyche. But within this seemingly chaotic system there is also order: the Self, the force behind development and symptomology. The psyche’s two regulating mechanisms, dissociability and the Self, are two “opposites”
which, together with the creative imagination, comprise the basis of Jungian psychology. These factors have split up into different modes of discourse: the “classical school,” which emphasizes the directionality of the Self; the “archetypal school,” which focuses on imagination and the psyche’s dis-sociability; and the “developmental school” which highlights the process of ego individuation. Contemporary theorists are moving through this plurality into a position which mediates the complexity of a unified vision.

The creative and symbolic use of unconscious material
In his ongoing efforts to understand psychological transformation and the mechanisms of therapeutic action, Jung often privileged the imagination. In Jungian analysis, fantasies, dreams, symptomology, defenses, and resistance are all viewed in terms of their creative function and teleology. The assumption is that they reflect the psyche’s attempts to overcome obstacles, make meaning, and provide potential options for the future. Jung zeroed in on the mythopoetic capacity of the psyche to spin healing fictions, to re-transcribe memory and experience. For example, during a period of depression and anxiety a woman (whose case is discussed in Ch. 10) reported “I’d like to jump in a river.” The Jungian approach to this disturbing fantasy works to open up the interpretive field of the patient’s suicidal imagery. Its apparent “meaning” and purpose will be seen in the context of its underlying function and symbolism.

Jung’s view of most mental illness was that when the natural flow of libido (by which he meant psychic energy per se, not only sexual libido) is stopped due to one’s inability to meet internal or external difficulties, it regresses. This results in many forms of psychological and emotional illness. As it regresses, libido activates both past internalized images such as those of parents, and images from the objective psyche, symbolized in this case by a specific image of running water, a river. The fantasy of “jumping into a river” is the psyche’s image for an impending regression whose quality is “watery.” The questions asked as libido regresses and such potent symbols emerge are: “what is this for” and “where is it going?” This approach is called the synthetic and progressive method of interpretation, to differentiate it from a reductive, retrospective, and personalistic approach which considers only past history and personal experience. A specific combination of both methods is used in Jungian treatment.

Regression is a powerful event: it expresses the process of both illness and its potential cure. Libido needs to flow “backward,” to descend first into the memory of early relationships and events, and then into deeper wellsprings
of psychic energy. This ability to regress, in particular to go through and beyond childhood conflicts and trauma, is one of the psyche’s self-regulating mechanisms. Jung considered regression and introversion not only potentially adaptive, but the *sine qua non* of healing.

As libido regresses and turns inward during illness, images emerge from the unconscious, such as “jumping into a river.” These symbols are not censored or distorted, nor are they merely signs for something else. Freud had considered the function of symbol formation to be protection against unconscious infantile urges. Jung felt that the purpose of a symbol was to *transform libido from one level to another*, pointing the way toward future development. Symbols are living, emerging images, reflecting active psychological process and pregnant with meaning. They are capable of acting like *transformers of psychic energy*.

Symbols are the language of the archetype *par excellence*. They originate in the archaic layer of the psyche, where they are potentially healing, destructive, or prophetic. Symbolic images are genuine transformers of psychic energy because *a symbolic image evokes the totality of the archetype it reflects*. Images evoke the aim and motivation of instincts, creating links to affective experience which heals splits. Images give form to emotion and emotions give a living body to imagination; the expression of archetypal possibility is both poetic and dramatic.

But what eventually happens to the libido during regression? Jung observed the *spontaneous reversal of libido* which he called *enantiodromia*. This “return to the opposite” characterizes the nature of the libido’s flow and has been depicted in literature and mythology as the sun’s return from the belly of the night, the journey back from the center of the earth, or the poet’s ascent from Dante’s *Inferno*. This self-regulating mechanism may account for the spontaneous remission of depression and psychotic episodes, putting an end to regression. If it fails, regression becomes a very dangerous event, e.g. suicide.

When unconscious material is surfacing, the *specificity of the image* is the informing principle, i.e. a river is a river, not a censored sexual image. The unconscious has its own mythopoetic language, albeit foreign to conscious awareness. Jung (CW 5, p. 7) postulated “two kinds of thinking,” rational and non-rational, presaging later scientific discoveries of the two brain hemispheres and their different modes of processing information. The symbolizing, imagistic part of the mind works by analogy and correspondence rather than rational explanation. Jung felt that the tenacity and ubiquity of this type of thought indicated its “hard-wired” origins. The deeper the regression, the more one encountered it. This is why he interpreted modern fantasies in the light of archaic mythological motifs, a method called *archetypal amplification*.
For example, the fantasy of “jumping into a river” means much more than the patient’s personal associations to it. It carries with it all the archetypal imagery of moving water: water “solves” by dissolving and moistening obstructed libido. It represents flow versus fixity, immersion, containment, dissolution, and purification. Water relaxes the connections between things, which results in either death or renewal. The sacred rivers of the world – the Nile, the Ganges, the Jordan – are all thought to have healing and regenerative properties, and mythological rivers such as the Styx or the Lethe are connectors between life and death. In many myths, female deities make a river quest, looking for someone lost, or a part of themselves which must be retrieved: Psyche searches for Eros, Isis for Osiris.

Teleologically, the “suicidal” image symbolizes the need to dissolve things back into their constituent parts, to be swept away into the waters of the unconscious and purified, as a prelude to rebirth. Jung believed that from the standpoint of the Self, which sees the “big picture,” it is immaterial whether this takes the form of death or a renewed life. In either case one begins anew somewhere else. The ego sees it differently, however! Clinically, the crux of the matter is found where archetypal meaning and intent meet the patient’s personal experience, capacities, and history. Therapeutically, this image may also signal the dissolving waters of tears, grief, mourning, and a deluge of feeling. If the patient can withstand a therapeutic dissolution, the prognosis is excellent. On the other hand, if her ability to “go with the flow” of regressing libido is limited, the result may be stagnation, engulfment, or even suicide.

The method of archetypal amplification recognizes the limits of free association by placing emphasis on the specificity of the image, i.e. river, as having objective meaning as a universal symbol. The explication of symbols is capable of imparting meaning and therapeutic direction to a condition of meaninglessness and despair. Amplification of symbols in analysis – carrying as it does the currents of collective imagination, experience, and possibilities – provides more than an enhanced “high definition” transpersonal holding-environment. Amplification may open up new grooves in the psyche, creating new riverbeds for the flow of libido which can compete effectively with those etched by trauma, depression, or the fantasies of complexes (Salman, 2006). The song-like stories of amplification, their mythopoetic structure and appeal to the non-rational psyche, create an empathic resonance which reaches deeply into areas not accessed by intersubjective analysis or analysis of the transference. From the Jungian perspective, diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment are not only concerned with pathology as an isolated condition, but with opening the potential for dialogue and
assimilation, and the ways in which the psyche is managing its “moves” towards dissolution and wholeness.

Another way in which Jungian psychology approaches unconscious processes creatively is in its work with the experience of opposites in psychological life. This experience reflects the psychological fact that what is in the ego complex has a mirror “opposite” in the unconscious. A controlling ego will constellate disorder: a prince is also a frog. The psyche is not a perfect homogeneous entity. Disorderly frogs are usually pushed into the unconscious, forming a dissociated secondary personality which Jung called the shadow. Unless we bring such “opposites” into conscious awareness, further dissociation and illness will result.

Since conscious thinking strives for clarity and demands unequivocal decisions, it has constantly to free itself from counter-arguments and contrary tendencies, with the result that especially incompatible contents either remain totally unconscious or are habitually and assiduously overlooked. The more this is so, the more the unconscious will build up its counterposition.

This theory of opposites revisions our picture of mental health, and relativizes feelings of inferiority and pathology. Wholeness rather than perfection is the goal. Everyone has a shadow complex; it is “just so,” an archetypal given of the psyche. The shadow is never removed or completely assimilated by the ego; rather, there is an ethical imperative of acknowledging it and taking creative responsibility for it. Jung was firmly convinced that the way to psychological health and meaning was through the shadow. The demons, robbers, and nasty siblings who pursue us in dreams may be our secondary selves looking for a place at the table.

Although the problem of opposites is perennial, its articulation in psychological maturation is one of Jung’s major contributions. This problem obviously plays itself out in object relations, as the psyche initially projects the shadow and other complexes into interpersonal relationships, i.e. it is the other guy who is a frog. But Jung also turned our attention to the introverted arena: the relationships between the ego complex and the other complexes. Exploring these relationships is the mature work of psychotherapy. The projection and “re-collection” of shadow material forms the necessary basis of becoming conscious of interiority.

This struggle is part of the individuation process, the goal of which is not perfection, but wholeness. Within this model, adaptation to the collective culture is not the ultimate goal. In fact, this process, informed as it is by the mythopoetic psyche, often offers a subversive critique of social norms through the individual psyche’s ongoing deconstruction of both personal
and collective norms. Individuation is different from instinctive growth, regression, or general maturation. It is what the alchemists called the “opus contra naturam,” the work against nature. Although it is dependent on full development of the stages of life, including both an adaptation to society and an attainment of individuality, the crucial shift is from an idealized and collectively determined ego, to an individuating Self-oriented ego, the identity of which is both relativized and enhanced by the ongoing dialogue with subjective elements of shadow and complexes, and objective archetypal factors. Its yield is the wisdom of the wholeness of life, the good and the evil, the light and the dark, and amor fati: acceptance and love of one’s fate.

Conclusion

The Jungian model emphasizes individuation, a sense of personal and objective meaning, the creative imagination, and the interface between individual and collective development. Psychological health is a process of continuous psychic integration, always preceded by stages of dissociation, symbolized in the alchemical maxim “solve et coagula” (dissolve and coagulate). The purpose of analysis is to help redirect psychic energy toward development with the help of a symbolic experience of unconscious material. Jung’s major contributions were his insistence on the symbolic and creative function of unconscious material, the healing power of images and imagination, and the psyche’s prospective tendency toward regression during stress and growth. But he was adamant that there was nothing to be gained, and much to be lost, in the production of regressive material per se. In this he was ahead of his time, addressing problems of dependency, regression, and collusion which continue to undermine the value of contemporary psychotherapy.

Jung’s work opened up the traditional conceptual and interpretive field of psychoanalysis by exploring the objective field of archetypal dynamics. Issues that are being explored in the field today like “split-object” relations, magical thinking, borderline and pre-Oedipal dynamics, separation individuation struggles, dissociative disorders, and the early holding environment, all have their roots in the archetypal layer of the psyche. Much of what Jung spoke of as “synthetic-constructive” has begun to surface in contemporary psychoanalytic thinking. The stress Jung laid on the mythopoetic imagination as the vehicle of therapeutic action has found validation in the neuroscientific research on brain function and consciousness as emergent processes (Zabriskie, 2004; Hogenson, 2004).

Jung was prescient in his intuitions and observations about intersubjectivity, field phenomena, and the subject–object relationship. While his
method of dialogue between conscious and unconscious was initially conceived as an intrapsychic process, eventually (e.g. CW 16) it included a two-person perspective. We now understand that meaning and change are both created and discovered, both subjectively and objectively determined, and that all psychological experience exists in and emerges from a bi-directional field of inner–outer, self–other. These fields in turn, form the patterns of new psychological dynamics and structures.

Jung’s vision of psychological process included the idea of a “cultural unconscious” in distinction to the universal “collective unconscious.” Although fraught with perils of reductionism and parochialism, this formulation opened the way for analysis and synthetic understanding of cultures, nations, political affiliations, and religious identifications – a project which has barely begun and of which we are sorely in need (Singer and Kimbles, 2004).

Most important, Jung “depathologized” the archetypal and trans-personal aspects of the psyche by verifying their function as the creative matrix for the entire personality. Repression, fixation, identification, or denial of those aspects of psychological process, leads to the ills which modern society suffers. A sense of failure or depression in the face of the unavoidable adversities of life, and the consequent media-enhanced fascination with those who are identified with the archetypal psyche (e.g. religious fanatics and glamorous or power-hungry personalities), both plague our times. Jung pointed a way toward a more creative relationship with unconscious processes, and his personal devotion to this way is a beautifully rendered illustration of what may be discovered when the psyche meets itself.

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Psychic imaging: a bridge between subject and object

The psyche consists essentially of images.
(Jung, 1926, CW 8, p. 325)

A psychic entity can be a conscious content, that is it can be represented, only if it has the quality of an image.
(Jung, 1926, CW 8, p. 322)

Originary principles

Central to all the basic functions of the personality is the process of mental imaging. Without imaging, self-consciousness, speaking, writing, remembering, dreaming, art, culture – essentially what we call the human condition – would be impossible. Depth psychology developed out of the struggle to understand the process of imaging (e.g. dreams, associations, memories, and fantasies) and the role it plays in personality formation and the development of psychopathology. In attempting to account for the structuring of mental images and their effect on the personality, both Freud and Jung opted for some form of “universal.” Freud posited the existence of phylogenetic “schemata,” the Oedipus complex and its world of desire, whereas Jung opted for “archetypes.” While both subscribe to universals, the difference between the two theories resides in the particular originary principle each adopted.

Where Freud initiates his theoretical perspective by postulating a world of desire (eros) prior to any kind of experience, Jung’s originary principle is the world of images. Image is the world in which experience unfolds. Image constitutes experience. Image is psyche. For Jung the world of psychic reality is not a world of things. Neither is it a world of being. It is a world of image-as-such.

In this chapter, we will situate image and archetype historically, in an attempt to develop a psychological perspective on Jung’s foundational concepts and greater understanding of the problem of universals in relation to psychic images. Perhaps nothing in Western thought has appeared more necessary, and yet more problematic to our understanding of mental imaging, than the need for some kind of universal. Beginning with Plato’s metaphysical ideals and Aristotle’s material forms, to Descartes’s cogito, up through
Kant’s categories of pure reason and Jung’s archetypes, a long and complicated relationship has evolved between mental images and universals. Western thought has struggled with the question of whether or not there are universal principles upon which to found our concept of human nature. Are there particularly human attributes of the mind, such as reality, truth, self, god, reason, being, or image? And, if so, where are they located? To get some perspective on these questions and how they bear on Jung’s foundational concepts, we will turn to the history of imaging in Western thought.

**A brief history of image**

He is a thinker; that means, he knows how to make things simpler than they are. (Nietzsche, 1887/1974, sec. 189)

The idea of image is not something static, fixed, or eternal. Image is a fluid concept that has undergone many transformations over the centuries. To capture some of the subtle shifts and mutations in the concept, we will review its evolution from the early formulations of Greek philosophy, up through Medieval onto-theology and the birth of modernity, to the current debate over the status of image in post-modernism. The background material for this impressionistic history draws primarily from three sources: Frederick Copleston’s (1958) *A History of Philosophy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought*, by M. W. Bundy (1927), and especially Richard Kearney’s (1988) eloquent book *The Wake of the Imagination*.

The history of image in Western thought begins with Plato. In *The Republic*, Plato presents the allegory of the cave, a story that directly addresses the problem of image and its relation to self and reality. The allegory portrays humans as living in a cave of ignorance, prisoners trapped in a world of images. The inhabitants of the cave are only able to see the shadows cast on the wall by objects outside. Inevitably, they regard these shadows as real, and have no notions of the objects to which they actually refer. At last someone succeeds in escaping from the cave and rushes out into the light of the sun, into eternity, and for the first time sees real objects. They become aware of having been deceived by the shadows on the wall of the material world.

Briefly, Plato’s theory of image and knowledge works from the assumption of an a priori ideal (an archetype) located in eternity. While there are many chairs in the material world, there is only one “form” or “archetype” of a chair in eternity. The reflection of a chair in a mirror is only apparent
and not “real,” and so too are the various particular chairs in the material world only reflections, shadows of the “ideal” in eternity.

Plato views the material temporal world we live in as a copy, a secondary reflection in the mirror of materiality. Image, in turn, is a copy of the material world, which is itself a copy of its ideal located in eternity. The Platonic theory of images is informed by metaphors of “painting” and “figuring,” as, for example, in sculpting or creating an outer figure. Images were not conceived of as interior, but located external to the psyche.

Images, Plato suggests, are like a “drug” (a pharmakon) which may serve either as a remedy or a poison. The image functions as a remedy when it records human experience for posterity, preventing it from becoming lost in time. Image may also function as a poison, deceiving us into mistaking the copy for the original. Image poisons by assuming the status of an idol. For Plato, images are exterior reproductions of the material world, which is itself a replica of the eternal world. Images are copies of copies, not first principles.

Plato’s student, Aristotle, developed a different theory of image and shifted the area of inquiry from the metaphysical to the psychological. Aristotle locates image within the human and the source of the image is to be found in the material world, not eternity. Images for Aristotle are mental intermediaries between sensation and reason, a bridge between the inner world of the mind and the outer world of material reality. Several of the dominant metaphors Aristotle uses to portray the imaging process are “writing,” “draughtsmanship,” and “drawing.” Today we still use these metaphors when we speak of “drawing” a conclusion or “figuring” something out. Aristotle places primacy, however, not on image, but on sense data. Image is a reflection of sense data, not an origin.

Neither Plato nor Aristotle ever views imaging as an autonomous, originary process. For both, imagining remains largely a reproductive activity. Traces of Plato and Aristotle are found at the core of almost all subsequent Western theories of psychology. Either primacy is placed on sensation or primacy is placed on atemporal cognitive structures or a combination of the two as in Piaget’s epigenetic model. The common thread for both Plato and Aristotle is their view of psychic images as a second-hand reflection of some more “original” source located beyond the human condition. Imaging is a process of imitation, not creation.

The Medieval view of imaging

The reproductive view of imaging remained relatively intact throughout the neo-Platonic philosophies of Porphyry, Proclus, and Plotinus, as well as
up through the onto-theology of the Middle Ages. The Medieval view of imaging synthesized Hellenic ontology and biblical theology. This onto-theological alliance only served to deepen the distrust of images. From the theological side, there was the biblical condemnation of images as a transgression of the divine order of creation, and from the philosophical side, image was approached as a secondary copy of the original truth of being. Both the Judeo-Christian and the Greek traditions viewed imagining as a reproductive activity, reflecting some more “original” source of meaning beyond the human condition: god, or the forms, whether metaphysical (Plato) or physical (Aristotle).

The Medieval understanding of imaging as represented by Augustine, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas still conformed to the reproductive model of Plato and Aristotle. Throughout Medieval onto-theology, image is treated as a copy, referring to a more original reality beyond itself – to a divine ideal (god) located outside the human condition.

Richard of St. Victor, one of the more interesting writers of this period, portrays images as “borrowed clothing” or “vestments” used to clothe rational ideas. Images are viewed as psychic garments used to suit-up reason so as to make it more presentable to the general population. Especially cautious of images, Richard of St. Victor warns that if reason becomes too pleased with its “dress,” then imagination may adhere to reason like a skin. Were this to happen, we may mistake the artificial apparel of images for a natural possession. We are being warned not to confuse our unique nature with our images.

In Richard of St. Victor’s fantasy, notice how he fears that we may mistakenly take the image as our skin, our original nature, rather than as an artificial copy. In his fear, we already notice the emergence of a psychic ambivalence as to whether image is only artificial and reproductive, or whether it is an actual part of our genuine nature. The fear that image might be mistakenly experienced as part of our human nature, and not simply a vestment, reflects a growing uneasiness in Western thought as to the rightful place of psychic images in relation to human nature.

As the concept of image evolves in Western thought, it brings a certain instability to the intermediary position it has been forced to occupy for the past 1,000 years. The metaphysical order coming down from Plato and Aristotle has assumed certain primordial dualities: inner/outer, mind/body, reason/sensation, and spirit/matter. Image is always being located between these dualities. From the beginning of Greek philosophy these pairs have been laid in concrete, providing the foundation of Western metaphysics, and, unquestionably, have been assumed to support our thought structure.
As Western culture evolves out of Medieval onto-theology, on its course toward the Renaissance and the beginning of the modern world, these metaphysical structures begin to show signs of deterioration. Image, locked in between the fundamental dualities of Western metaphysics, slowly begins to undermine the foundation, endangering the very metaphysical order upon which such oppositions are built. The idea that image is simply a representation of some preexisting original, for example, reason, sensation, god, spirit, matter, form, and so on, is becoming less absolute. As we approach the Renaissance, no longer is it so certain whether the image is a garment we put on – or whether it is in fact our original skin!

The alchemists: some marginal figures

The Medieval view of image ultimately reflects its dual onto-theological nature, conforming to the fundamentally reproductive model of both its Judeo-Christian and its Hellenic roots. Image is still treated as a representation, a secondary mental image. As we move out of Medieval onto-theology, through the Scholasticism of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries toward the dawning of Renaissance humanism, a few figures just on the margins of mainstream Western thought begin to radically revise our notion of image. Paracelsus, Ficino, and Bruno develop a new vision of imaging as a creative, transformative, and originary power located within the human condition. Just as Copernicus inverted our cosmology in relation to the solar system, so too did the alchemists reverse the traditional theory of knowledge and image. The biblical, Greco-Roman, and Medieval systems of thought had located “reality” as a transcendental condition beyond human grasp – Plato’s “sun” beyond the temporal confines of the human cave. The alchemists and other hermetic philosophers of this period began to intuit the presence of a “sun” within the human universe, an inner light capable of originary powers. Paracelsus asks: “What else is imagination, if not the inner sun?” (Kearney, 1988).

Bruno, a sixteenth-century hermetic philosopher, dramatically revised the traditional reproductive view of image by going so far as to suggest that human imaging was the source of thought itself! This was, of course, an extremely radical idea at the time. For Bruno, imaging precedes and indeed creates reason. This theoretical formulation located the creative force now properly within the human condition, not in the divine or in eternal forms. These ideas were so radical in relation to the doctrines carried over from Scholastic and Medieval thought that they were condemned as heresy by the Church. Bruno’s punishment for placing imaging at the center of creativity and the human
condition was to be burnt at the stake. Several more centuries would need to pass before it would be safe to introduce into the mainstream of Western thought the idea of imaging as central to creativity and the human condition.

The alchemical writings of this period, appearing in the margins of Western thought, subtly begin a move beyond the metaphysics of transcendence, toward a psychology of human creativity. Up to this point, the act of creation had, for the most part, been attributed to an agency beyond the human. The typical Medieval portrait of Christ, for example, was not signed, thereby effacing the individuality of the painter and underscoring the primacy of divine creation. Bruno and other hermetic philosophers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries began to develop the heretical idea of locating the agency responsible for the act of creation within the human condition.

The birth of modernity

The next significant shift in our attitude toward imaging came with René Descartes in the seventeenth century. He was the first modern philosopher to make a decisive break with the dominant ideas of Scholasticism (thirteenth and fourteenth centuries). The ideas developed in his text Meditations (Descartes, 1642) are basic to the modern view of the world as being divided into subjects and objects. Working from the proposition “Cogito, ergo sum” – I think, therefore I am – Descartes established existence on the basis of the act of a knowing subject, not on a transcendent God, objective Matter, or Eternal forms. Descartes’s theory of the thinking subject signaled a major change in Western psychological understanding by locating the source of meaning, creativity, and truth within human subjectivity. The human mind is given priority over objective being or the divine.

The anthropocentric trend of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries appears also in the artistic realm with the emergence of “authors” creating novels, and in painting, self-portraiture begins to thrive as an instance of the new aesthetic of subjectivity. The Cartesian theory of the cogito (the thinking subject), contains the beginnings of the modern philosophical project to provide an anthropological foundation for metaphysics. No longer are ideal forms (Plato), matter (Aristotle), or god (onto-theology) at the center of our metaphysics. At the center Descartes locates the human subject. Descartes had cut the mind free from its moorings in either transcendental deities, external ideals, or the material world. The human subject was now a first principle capable of creating a sense of meaning, certainty, existence, and truth. Although Descartes and his followers opened the way to modern humanism, he continued to subscribe to the view of imaging as a reproductive activity.
Empiricism: toward an arbitrary fictionalism

The next significant shift in our concept of image came with the empiricism of David Hume (1711–1776). Following Descartes, Hume proposed to show that human knowledge could establish its own foundation without appealing to the metaphysical realm of deities or ideals, or to the physical realm of the material world. Once reason is detached from its metaphysical scaffolding, Hume was to discover that the very foundation of positivist rationalism is reduced to an arbitrary fictionalism.

While Hume set out as a supporter of Locke’s empiricist description of the mind as a blank slate, a *tabula rasa*, upon which the “faded impression of the senses” is written, he ended up with a radical fictionalism which threatened to destroy the very basis of rationalism. Kearney (1988) suggests that Hume pushed the reproductive view of image to its ultimate limits, declaring that all human knowledge was derived from the association of image-ideas and no longer needed to appeal to any metaphysical laws or transcendent entities.

The act of knowing was reduced by Hume to a series of psychological regularities which governed the associations between images: resemblance, contiguity, identity, and so on. While continuing to subscribe to the reproductive model of image as a mental copy of faded sensations, Hume maintains that this world of representations contained within the human subject, our inner art museum, is the only reality we can know. This troubling conclusion presented Hume with a dilemma: he found himself trapped within his solipsistic museum of mental images. The worlds of reason and of material reality are subjective representations, both fictions. The mental image no longer refers to some transcendent origin or truth, e.g. to an eternal ideal, god, the material world, or even the *cogito*. For Hume, the mental image is the only truth we can know and this means no truth at all, for he still subscribes to the correspondence theory of truth. If we cannot establish a correspondence between the image and a transcendent object, we cannot establish truth. We are left only with an arbitrary fictionalism which we must nevertheless hold on to as if it were real.

Hume, as with Plato earlier, now finds the human condition relating to the world through images. But the critical difference between the two is that Hume has no “transcendent” reality outside the dark cave of shadowy images. For Hume, these shadowy fictions do not refer to any transcendent forms which give them the value of truth and this seriously undermines the metaphysical scaffolding which for the past two thousand years has supported the edifice of reality. Hume’s account of psychic images results in the following difficulty: If the “world” we know is a collection of fictions
without any transcendent foundations, then all we can use to establish our sense of reality are subjective fictions – foundationless images. The disturbing conclusion that human understanding is dependent upon foundationless fictions led Hume to a philosophical crisis:

If we embrace this principle [the primacy of imaging] and condemn all refined reasoning, we run into the most manifest absurdities. If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely the human understanding. We have therefore, no choice but betwixt a false reason and none at all. For my part I know not what ought to be done in the present case. (Hume, 1976)

It is in this state of unfounded subjectivism and a deep distrust of psychic images that we find Western thought at the end of the Age of Reason. And it is in this skeptical atmosphere that eighteenth-century philosophy prepares for a revolution in the theory of mental images.

The liberation of imaging

In 1781, Kant stunned his colleagues by proclaiming the process of imaging (Einbildungskraft) to be the indispensable precondition of all knowledge. In the first edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, he demonstrated that both reason and sensation, the two primary terms in most theories of knowledge up to this point, were produced, not reproduced, by imaging. This radical shift was already underway with Hume and his arbitrary fictionalism, but for Hume, images were still reproductive and located within consciousness. Kant’s revolution turned on two important points: first, he reconceived of the process of imaging as productive as well as reproductive, and second, he located the synthetic categories and their process of imagining transcendent to reason. Platonic metaphysics had located the transcendental realm in eternity, beyond reach of the human mind. Kant, struggling with the arbitrary fictionalism resulting from dispensing with all transcendent foundations, established a new ground within the human mind, but transcendent to the knowing subject. Two hundred years earlier, a similar view of images had led to Bruno being burnt at the stake. Kant’s extraordinary formulation turned the entire hierarchy of traditional epistemology on its head by demonstrating that pure reason could not arrive at the objects of experience except through the finite limits established by imaging. All knowledge is subject to the finitude of human subjectivity. Simply put: Imaging is the indispensable precondition of all knowledge.

After Kant, psychic images could no longer be denied a central place in modern theories of knowledge, art, existence, and psychology. With this epistemological shift, mental image ceases to be viewed as a copy, or a copy
of a copy, and now assumes the role of ultimate origin and creator of meaning and of our sense of existence and reality. The act of imaging creates our consciousness which then provides the illumination of our world.

The relation between reason and image has come a long way since early Greek thought. As we enter the nineteenth century a more peaceful rapport between the two begins to be established. Kant’s liberation of image led in the nineteenth century to the spawning of powerful new movements in art and philosophy. In England, the new Romanticism celebrated the liberation of image from the grip of reason in the works of Blake, Shelley, Byron, Coleridge, and Keats. The celebration continued as well in France through the works of Baudelaire, Hugo, and Nerval. And in philosophy, German idealism developed in the writings of Fichte and Schelling with a focus on our newly found creative powers of imaging. Each movement re-emphasized the importance of image in the human condition, but like so many new movements, the emphasis went too far. Confronted with the industrial revolution and its devastation of nature, the mechanization of society through the development of technologies, and the exploitation of the individual by unbridled capitalism, the idealistic vision of Romantic humanism gave way to a more sober, down-to-earth sense of the synthetic powers of imaging in the existential views of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.

Image and archetype in depth psychology

I am indeed convinced that creative imagination is the only primordial phenomenon accessible to us, the real Ground of the psyche, the only immediate reality.  

(Jung, a letter, January 1929)

As we enter the twentieth century, one hundred years after Kant, another transformation in our concept of image is about to occur. Freud had already begun to explore the recesses of the human mind through an analysis of psychic images. Dreams, fantasies, and associations were carefully examined in an attempt to understand how psychic images are involved in personality development, psychopathology, and our experience of the past, present, and future. While these were new and puzzling questions for psychiatry and depth psychology, the problem of imaging was by no means new to anyone familiar with the history of Western thought. Freud and Jung took remarkably different attitudes toward philosophy. Where Freud intentionally avoided reading philosophical texts, Jung immersed himself in the history of ideas. The first three hundred pages of *Psychological Types* (1921), a book written by Jung during the period when he was formulating
his concepts of image and archetype, reads like a history of Western thought. During this period immediately following his theoretical dispute with Freud over the primacy of desire in psychic life, Jung began to formulate his own vision of depth psychology. Rather than adopt Freud’s view of mental images as representatives of instincts, Jung opted, instead, to approach imaging as a primary phenomenon, an *autonomous activity of the psyche*, capable of both production and reproduction. Earlier, Kant had revolutionized philosophy, counteracting Hume’s arbitrary fictionalism by establishing imaging as a ground within the human mind, but transcendent to the knowing subject. Kant’s categories (time, space, number, and so on) provided the a priori structures necessary for reason itself. Jung extended the subtle implications of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* to the realm of depth psychology, positing archetypes as the a priori categories of the human psyche.

One could also describe these forms as categories analogous to the logical categories which are always and everywhere present as the basic postulates of reason. Only, in the case of our “forms,” we are not dealing with categories of reason but categories of the imagination . . . The original structural components of the psyche are of no less surprising a uniformity than are those of the body. The archetypes are, so to speak, organs of the prerational psyche. They are eternally inherited forms and ideas which have no specific content. Their specific content only appears in the course of the individual’s life, when personal experience is taken up in precisely these forms. (CW 11, pp. 517–518)

Kant’s view of image remained within consciousness, assuming that the shadowy forms we see in the enigmatic world before us have been created by the synthetic categories of the knowing subject. Jung, following Freud, expanded the notion of “the human subject” to also include unconscious psychic processes and referred to this more inclusive conception of personality as the *psyche*. The human psyche has its own categories analogous to the logical categories of reason. These structures have to do with particularly human activities associated with mothering, fathering, birth and rebirth, self-representation, identity, aging, and so on. Contents of personal experiences are archetypally structured in particularly human ways and might be compared to the stomach in relation to food. The unconscious is always empty, the psychic “stomach” to the food (personal experience) passing through it. The specific content of conscious experience is “metabolized,” archetypally structured, according to the categories of the human psyche which makes the experience meaningful for ourselves and others. Without these shared psychic structures, inter-subjective communication through image and word would be, at best, very limited.
Psychic reality

Jung regarded the psyche, with its capacity to create images, as a mediating agency between the conscious world of the ego and the world of objects (both inner and outer):

A third, mediating standpoint is needed. *Esse in intellectu* lacks tangible reality, *esse in re* lacks mind. Idea and thing come together, however, in the human psyche, which holds the balance between them. What would the idea amount to if the psyche did not provide its living value? What would the thing be worth if the psyche withheld from it the determining force of the sense-impression? What indeed is reality if it is not a reality in ourselves, an *esse in anima*? Living reality is the product neither of the actual, objective behavior of things nor of the formulated idea exclusively, but rather of the combination of both in the living psychological process, through *esse in anima*. (CW 6, para. 77)

Freud had defined psychic images as mental copies of instincts, while Jung formulated a radically new view of images as the very source of our sense of psychic reality. No longer is reality located in god, eternal ideals, or matter, for Jung now places the experience of reality within the human condition as a function of psychic imaging:

The psyche creates reality every day. The only expression I can use for this activity is *fantasy* ... Fantasy, therefore, seems to me the clearest expression of the specific activity of the psyche. It is, pre-eminently ... [a] creative activity. (CW 6, pp. 51–52)

The inner *and* outer worlds of an individual come together in psychic images, giving the person a vital sense of a living connection to both worlds. “Fantasy it was and ever is which fashions the bridge between the irreconcilable claims of subject and object” (CW 6, p. 52). The experience of reality is a product of the psyche’s capacity to image. It is not an external being (god, ideal forms, or matter), but, rather, the “essence” of being human. Subjectively, reality is experienced as “out there,” because its originary principle is located “in the beyond,” transcendent to the ego’s subjectivity. With this ontological shift, mental image ceases to be viewed as a copy, or a copy of a copy, and now assumes, following Kant, the role of ultimate origin and creator of meaning and of our sense of existence and reality.

Post-structuralism and the linguistic turn

As we approached the end of the twentieth century, the debate over the role of imaging continued to flourish, but with a new twist. In the last fifty years a revolution had occurred in philosophy with a shift in focus from the role
of image to the role of language in human understanding. The new continental philosophers, especially Derrida and Foucault, developed a radical critique of Western thought focusing on the age-old problem of establishing a ground, an originary principle, for the act of interpretation. Historically we had used such metaphysical universals as truth, reality, self, center, unity, origin, archetype, or even author, to ground the act of interpretation. The new twist Derrida brought to this old problem revolves around making explicit the language-locked nature of all verbal acts of interpretation. Derrida attempted to demonstrate that the very metaphysical “universals” that Western thought used to ground the act of interpretation are not eternal structures (e.g. archetypes), but rather linguistic by-products resulting from a representational (reproductive) theory of language. Just as the reproductive view of image requires a more primary reality to copy, so does a reproductive theory of language assume a more primary presence beyond the linguistic term. Any such “transcendental” term is a fiction, for no linguistic concept is exempt from the metaphorical status of language. No mode of discourse, not even language, can be literally literal.

This post-modern critique of Western epistemology led to the conclusion that all theories of knowledge are housed in language and work through figures of speech which render them ambiguous and indeterminate. The reader of any text is suspended between the literal and metaphoric significances of the text’s “root” metaphors, unable to choose between the term’s various meanings, and thus thrown into the dizzying semantic indeterminacy of the text.

Derrida’s deconstruction of the linguistic foundations of Western theories of knowledge is a logical extension of Hume’s empiricist critique of imaging. Just as Hume pushed the reproductive view of image to its ultimate limits by forgoing any appeal to transcendent foundations, so did Derrida push the reproductive theory of language to its ultimate limits. Eliminating any appeal to transcendent entities (universals), Derrida focuses, instead, on linguistic metonymy (the relation between words), rather than referentiality. How words are “curated” becomes the primary point of reference, rather than the word’s relation to the author (hence, “the death of the author”), or some other transcendent object of reference. Dismantling the metaphysical scaffolding of language results, for Derrida, in the same troubling dilemma Hume had encountered earlier. Once we dispense with linguistic referentiality (the implicit assumption in the “reproductive” metaphor) we find ourselves trapped in the solipsism of language – unable to transgress the text. The Derridian text no longer refers to some transcendent origin, meaning, or truth, and consequently deconstruction finds itself caught in a post-modern version of Hume’s arbitrary fictionalism.
A bridge to the sublime

If transcendent terms, such as universals, are dispensed with as mere fictions by many of the post-structural approaches, then the “reality” of elements of human nature shared inter-subjectively is called into question. Concern about the “existence” of shared human properties is an old philosophical issue, one that dominated Medieval onto-theology in the form of the debate between nominalism and realism. The nominalist argued that there is no connection between words and things (referents), while the realist treated language as signifying a reality beyond itself. This old debate, which has re-emerged as a result of the post-structural critique of referentiality in language, is expressed today in the following terms: “constructionist versus universalist” coupled with “difference versus sameness.” Advocates of deconstruction, a post-modern form of nominalism, typically appeal to the sociological, the historical, or the inter-subjective categories to demonstrate that universal attributes are constructed through language in time, rather than given as metaphysical realities. But in the process, they frequently, albeit implicitly, universalize their “root” metaphors: “the social,” “the historical,” or “the inter-subjective.” Even if the hallmark of universalizing, the definite article, is removed, or singular nouns are pluralized, some degree of universalizing is still involved as the price of linguistic formulation.¹

Jungian psychology’s approach to psychic imaging provides a useful alternative to the current opposing positions of deconstruction and universalism (essentialism). By placing imaging as the mediator between subject and object, Jung opened up a new understanding of imaging and its role in creating our sense of psychic reality. His formulation of psychic image as a bridge between ideas and things comes after an extended discussion of the Medieval debate between nominalism and realism. Jung formulates his view of imaging as a mediating third position, esse in anima, between what today would be called deconstruction and universalism. Psychic images point beyond themselves to both the “historical particulars” of the world around us and the “essences” and “universals” of the mind and metaphysics.² Psychic images signify something that consciousness and its narcissism cannot quite grasp, the as yet unknown depths, transcendent to subjectivity. And this depth is to be found in both the world of objects and the world of ideas, history and eternity. What the image signifies cannot precisely be determined, either by appeal to a difference or universal. While the significance of the image cannot precisely be defined, it does, however, induce consciousness to think beyond itself, not by an appeal to divinities nor to history, but to a knowing that cannot be designated a priori. Perhaps the most important function psychic images perform is to aid the individual in
transcending conscious knowledge. Psychic images provide a bridge to the sublime, pointing toward something unknown, beyond subjectivity.

NOTES

1. A closer examination of the universalism/sameness – constructivism/difference opposition reveals that they are not as dichotomous as initially thought. While “universalism” and “sameness” are often grouped together as one pair and “constructivism” and “difference” another, upon closer analysis this ideal pairing fails to hold in practice. For example, any specification of a group simultaneously argues for difference from other groups and sameness within the specified group. The grouping “women” requires both difference from other groups (e.g. men, animals, etc.) and sameness within the group specified (ignoring sexual preference, race, class, and so on). Whether difference or sameness is accentuated seems to be a matter of focus: to predicate some attribute of the category “human being” necessarily foregrounds commonality, whereas to do so with “Asian-Americans” will contrast them (for the moment) both with the white American majority and with other minority groups. How we construe the markings of sameness or difference will vary enormously, in part according to our relation to the group being designated and also according to whether we believe the markings are constructed or given, i.e. universal (Fuss, 1989).

The current critique of universals has become so excessive and politicized that many writers have lost sight of the deeper issues being debated. Today in the American academy the skeptical wing of post-modernism, particularly influenced by deconstruction, has tended to homogenize and condemn any universalist position (e.g. humanism) as implying an oppressive metaphysical homogeneity, while treating formulations of constructed heterogeneity as emancipatory. In practice, however, it is very difficult to contain these binary terms and to align them consistently with either progressive or reactionary values. Caution would be advised when employing the opposition constructionist/essentialist as a taxonomic device because it results in deceptive and oversimplified typologies.

2. While we may never be able to eliminate essentialism, it may be psychologically helpful to differentiate forms of essentialism. John Locke made the useful distinction between “real” versus “nominal” essence. The former is equated with the irreducible and unchanging nature of a thing, while the latter signifies a linguistic convenience, a classificatory fiction used to categorize and to label. Real essences are discovered, while nominal essences are produced. If we translate this distinction into Jungian psychology, we might say that psychic imaging produces nominal essences.

REFERENCES


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The classical Jungian school

Why classical?

My training at the C. G. Jung Institute in Zurich began in 1948, in the second semester of its existence. Virtually all of the teachers and analysts were, or had been, in analysis with Jung himself, so his discoveries and reflections were coming to us with convincing authority. And beyond this, Jung’s method, such as the attitude of respect, found a deep assent in my soul. I can label as “classical” a form of Jungian psychoanalysis which sees the analytic work as one of ongoing mutual discovery, making conscious the unconscious life and progressively releasing a person from meaninglessness and compulsion. The “classical” approach relies on a spirit of dialogue between conscious and unconscious, as well as between the two analytic partners. It therefore also regards the conscious ego as uniquely indispensable to the whole process, in contrast to the “archetypal” school, for which the ego is one of many autonomous archetypal entities. And in contrast to the “developmental” school, the “classical” school defines development not so much by years of age or even by psychological stages, as by an individual’s attainment of that conscious Self which is hers or his alone to realize. This position will, I hope, become clearer in the course of this chapter, as will one or two of my own reservations concerning that classical theory and practice which I encountered, so to speak, in their pristine form.

The inner world

To be a “classical” Jungian analyst means, not so much to follow and repeat the terminology of Jung, as to embrace the general method of analysis which Jung introduced. This involves, above all, respect for what is encountered; respect for what is unknown, for what is unexpected, for what is unheard of. When Jung reminded himself, before he began to consider a patient’s dream, “I have no idea what this dream is all about,” he was
clearing his mind of presuppositions and assumptions which might under-
mine this essential respect. While I was a student in Zurich, during one of
the periodic meetings which were held between Jung and the diploma
candidates, I once had the chance to question him about this procedure of
his. I asked him, “Professor Jung, when you say you have no idea what a
dream is all about – is that apotropaic?” He nodded and said, “Oh, yes.”
That is, his profession of ignorance was designed to ward off the demons of
arrogance and superior knowledge.

The attitude of respect implies that the unconscious, out of which dreams
arise, is to be taken seriously, and allowed to emerge just as it is. Thus the
dream is not, as Freud maintained, a cover for a repressed wish, disguised so
as to find its way into expression; it is a statement of fact, of the way things
are in the psychic household. Its tendency is to furnish to consciousness a
picture of the psychological state that has been overlooked or disregarded.
Hence it is an invaluable tool for understanding and diagnosis.

Jung’s view of religion, and of the religious attitude, shows a similar
position of respect. Religion is seen as a careful consideration of superior
powers and, thus, as a recognition of and respect for what is spiritually and
psychologically dominant within individual consciousness. This means,
above all, the powers within the unconscious, as revealed and sensed
through dreams, imagination, feelings, or intuition. It is this world \textit{within}
that needs to be heeded and respected, if the individual is to find a sound
and healthy psychological development.

The reason for this emphasis on the inner world is that it is the way to
claim or reclaim our true nature. Although we seem to be governed by
external powers – beginning with our parents, whose domination of our
development is of course enormous – the \textit{true} “dominants” of psychological
and spiritual life are centers of energy and imagery working on us from
within, and projected onto the world around us. Thus, for instance, the
mother acquires her peculiar force and influence on one’s life not primarily
from a particular woman but from the vast storehouse of inherited human
experience of “mother” – that is, from what Jung calls the mother archet-
type. The archetype, then, is a potential of psychic energy inherent in all the
typically human life experiences, and activated in unique focus in each
individual life. These forces will be modified according to the infinite var-
ieties of experience – appearing in what Jung calls complexes – but their
energy and power derive from the archetype itself.

What is actually going on within the psyche is first met in projected form,
as if it were all actually “out there.” Projection pulls us into the world, so
convincingly that it is easy to think that we are totally shaped by that world.
Jung insists, however, that we do not begin life as a \textit{tabula rasa}, a clean slate
The classical Jungian school

to be written on by what is outside us. Rather the newborn child emerges from the beginning as a distinct and unique personality with her or his own definite ways of meeting and responding to experience. This view is borne out in Jung’s theory of psychological types. The introvert and the extravert are two radically different ways of meeting and judging experience – the one with primary reference to internal reactions and values, the other to those of the external world – yet they are conceived to be directions innate in each individual. So are the so-called functions of consciousness: thinking as against feeling (functions of judgment); and sensation as against intuition (functions of perception). These inherent attitudes and functions can be suppressed and distorted in response to cultural or environmental pressures, but the result then is a less than satisfactory development and flowering of the individual’s true nature. The true nature is a given, a definite potential from birth.

The process of individuation

It follows from this understanding of the personality that the attitude of respect for what appears, as we spoke of it above, must apply to our work as analysts with persons in analysis. We view what emerges in the client – whether in dreams, behavior, or even symptoms – as efforts of this unique personality to come into realization. As the basis and underpinning of this process, Jung assumes the existence of a “Self,” that is, of a unified whole of which the conscious ego is only one essential part. The rest is comprised of an unconscious, limitless and unknowable by definition, which makes itself “known” in all kinds of ways – by dreams, hunches, behavior, even accidents and synchronistic events. Since the total personality is seeking to come to realization and consciousness, it may be assumed – and is often borne out by experience – that the Self is the great regulator and promoter of psychological wholeness. For instance, it is clear when one works with dreams that they regularly find a way to provide balance, support, and correction to the particular conscious attitude of the dreamer. This undeniable “compensatory” function provided by the Self proves its role as the central guiding force in an ongoing urge to realize the individual’s potential.

What, then, is this wholeness that is the aim of psychological work? It is the fullest possible consciousness of all that comprises one’s own personality, and it is approached in the steady, honest, and demanding self-discipline that Jung calls the process of individuation. Since, as we have implied, whatever is unconscious within us is first encountered in projection, the process involves the withdrawal of projection and the assimilation of its content into that conscious being where it belongs – our own. It involves the ever-growing admission of who we really are.
“Admission” is an apt word, for what is involved are its two meanings: both “confessing” and “letting in.” What we acknowledge in the course of individuation is first and foremost that unwelcome side of our nature that Jung calls the shadow. This is made up of all of the personal tendencies, motives, and characteristics that we have barred from consciousness, whether deliberately or not. It is, of course, typically projected onto other people; but if we look and listen honestly, we will also learn about it, and thus about ourselves, from our dreams, from self-reflection, and (last but not least) from the responses of others. The admission of the shadow is the *sine qua non* of individuation. It forms the only secure base from which analytical work can proceed, for the shadow is the ground of reality and the counterbalance to illusion and inflation. This is especially so in a Jungian analysis, because of the powerful and compelling nature of the imagery that it requires a patient to confront. Indeed, Jung regards inflation – that is, unconscious “identification” with an image encountered in one’s dreams or other unconscious products – as an inevitable consequence of the conscious ego’s initial apprehension of the reality of the Self. Alternately, the opposite may occur. Unless the ego is strong enough to retain its own identity in the face of an experience of the Self, it may not only be “taken over” by the Self, but held by it for good. Jung referred to this phenomenon as “possession,” that is, when the ego is, so to speak, invaded by an archetypal figure.

For this reason, although in his account of the individuation process Jung makes the shadow the first step of the work, it is clear to me that the acknowledgment of the shadow must be a continuous process throughout one’s life. Not only does this help to guarantee stability and even sanity, but, as the work proceeds, repressed or denied shadow elements tend to emerge more and more into the light of day – as if encouraged by the growing conscious attitude of acceptance and honesty. And besides this is the fundamental fact that the psyche seeks wholeness: that the unconscious is working constantly to find admission and assimilation into conscious life. The axiom “Truth will out” applies nowhere more vividly than to the life of the psyche.

It is on the basis of a healthy relationship between ego and shadow that the greater “depths” of the psyche can be safely explored. Whereas in typical experience the shadow will be encountered as bearing the same sex as the conscious personality, there exists at another psychic level a contrasexual archetype, designated by Jung as the anima (in the man) or the animus (in the woman). These “inner” figures are conceived as having a life and distinct personality of their own, derived in part from the archetype of the feminine or the masculine, and in part from the individual’s own life.
experience of woman or man, respectively, beginning with mother or father. They inhabit the unconscious depths as a compensation for the attitude of consciousness and a way of rounding out its one-sided experience, whether this be of a man or of a woman.

Naturally, anima and animus are first met in projected form. Their archetypal nature gives them the numinous and fateful quality that accounts for the overwhelming and compelling force that accompanies falling in love. For example, a man who falls in love at first sight might experience a real woman as some kind of goddess and invest her with inhuman power, either positive or negative. A conscious awareness of this inner force can often occur at the same time as the discovery of one’s own contrasexual image. Jung describes the case of a man, in emotional conflict with his wife, who suddenly turns inward and asks “himself,” “Why are you interfering with my relationships?” To his surprise, he gets an answer. A female voice within him begins to tell him about himself and about her need to be related to.

This can very often occur during “active imagination,” the name Jung gave to a method of experiencing one’s own unconscious while awake. The individual deliberately lowers his or her threshold of consciousness, often by concentrating on a scene from a recent dream, until the unconscious spontaneously produces a fantasy (which might or might not be related to the dream in question). In contrast to a day-dream, which is often dictated by conscious wish-fulfillment, active imagination is characterized by its entirely autonomous nature. The contact, in active imagination, with the anima – or, in the case of a woman, with the animus – is a hallmark of Jungian therapy, with its emphasis on withdrawing projections and taking responsibility for one’s own psychic life as fully as possible.

Not only are these inner personalities often projected onto others (whether real or imaginary “others”), but they can also “take over” the conscious individual, particularly in moments of stress. A man “possessed” by his anima can become, so to speak, an “inferior woman,” that is, moody, sulky, and irrational. In similar fashion, a woman suffering from animus possession can react and behave like an “inferior man,” that is, she can become hard-driving, insistent, and super-logical. It seems to be Jung’s typical view that, in a relationship, the man’s negative anima is brought into action by the prior eruption of the woman’s negative animus – as though in general the conflict of the two were caused by the latter. In my view, this is a serious misreading of the problem, in spite of Jung’s pioneering elucidation of it. The anima of the man in this form – passive, sulking, withdrawn, and so on – is just as effective and primary a cause of the conflict as is the animus.
of the woman, as we know from studies of passive-aggressiveness with all its subtleties and disguises. To claim that the man is the “victim” of the woman’s animus is itself a passively aggressive attack. It is felt as such by the woman, and thus serves to fuel the conflict between them. In such cases, the procedure mentioned above, in which a man turns to his authentic anima (just as a woman can turn to her authentic animus), seems to offer a constructive way out.

Since originally writing the above, I have been alerted to the phenomenon of androcentrism, that is, the unconscious assumption that the male, rather than the female, is the center of meaning, importance, and authority in our public and collective lives. This assumption has been examined and challenged by a number of feminist scholars. One of them, Demaris Wehr, in her book *Jung and Feminism*, shows how androcentrism reveals itself in Jung by his making male experience primary and deriving female experience from his own projection of it. For example, Jung, after the discovery of his own anima, went on to assume the existence of a corresponding male presence within the woman, that is, the animus. Although confirmed by some women, this assumption of gender balance within the psyche does not leave enough room for women’s own self-discovery.

Jung regards these vital figures, animus and anima, as mediators to the unconscious world. It is therefore crucial to come to terms with them. For although the anima can be bewitching, deceptive, and frustrating, she leads a man into life in the truest sense – into his emotional and passionate life, into genuine self-discovery, and ultimately into experience of the Self, which is the “sense” beyond all the apparent “nonsense” of her often capricious appearing influence. But here, as in all the work of individuation, the key is to effect a conscious relationship with this life within the psyche – not to be simply at its mercy but to see and acknowledge it for what it is, and to give it its due. Again we have the requirement of respect for the forces that work within us. Jung was fond of saying that we are “not master within our own house:” one’s conscious ego is not in charge of one’s life. Insofar as it believes that it is, it will, in fact, be at the mercy of that unadmitted unconscious with all its archetypal power.

Reinforcing a purely external image of oneself is the “mask” known as the “persona” – the personality which, wittingly or unwittingly, one presents to the world. This external picture can be, and often is, vastly different from the inner reality of the person, with his or her hidden emotions, attitudes, and conflicts. The persona is an essential and unavoidable means of adapting to and living in the human world; but if the image it presents is too far removed from the person within, there will be a fundamental instability – manifested, for instance, in a man who plays a controlling
“masculine” role in his job but gives way to the anima’s possession in his intimate relationships. Jung notes, in fact, that persona and anima often stand in a compensatory relation to each other, as if striking a psychological balance of opposites – and bearing out the principle that the psyche finds “wholeness” at any cost. It is important to add, however, that true wholeness is achieved not by any psychic structure which occurs unconsciously, but rather (as we have shown) only in the context of becoming conscious of those conflicting elements which make up the psyche.

The conflict of opposites

For Jung, conflict is not only inherent in the human psychological make-up, but essential to psychological growth. Given the opposing tendencies and directions we have already considered, it is obvious that the work of becoming conscious will mean withstanding conflict. A simple but major example would be the often experienced conflict between “head” and “heart,” or thinking and feeling. Each of these opposite poles may have validity, and the conflict can appear insoluble. In such a situation, the truly life-enhancing way is to endure, as consciously as possible, the tension of these opposites – suppressing neither the one nor the other but holding them unresolved. Out of this painful but honest work, energy will finally recede from the conflict itself and sink into the unconscious and out of that source will emerge a totally unexpected solution, what Jung called a “symbol,” which will contribute a new unified direction doing justice to both sides of the original conflict.

The symbol, therefore, is not the product of rational thought, nor can it ever be fully explained. It has the quality of conscious and unconscious worlds together and is a moving force in psychological and spiritual development. Any image or idea can function as a symbol in individual or collective life, as it can also lose its symbolic force and become a mere “sign,” standing for something that is fully known. For instance, the Christian cross is traditionally a genuine symbol, whereas a cross posted at an intersection in the road is simply a sign. The one depicts a reality that cannot be fully explained; the other is immediately understood.

The human psyche not only spontaneously produces images which depict these inherent opposites within (the cross being one of them), but also discovers ways in which apparently conflicting symbolic content can be contained in a single structure. From the East Jung borrowed the term mandala to designate such an image, a circle that could contain all sides of psychic life in a complexio oppositorum. The reconciliation of opposites was a major concern of Jung’s and a frequent theme of his work, since, as
we have seen, the primary human tendency is to identify with one psychic quality and project its opposite onto other people – the source of much of the enmity that has always plagued communities and nations. Very few individuals, in Jung’s view, take responsibility for their shadow sides or have any real idea of the tragedy and loss that can result from the shadow’s projection. And for Jung it is only in the individual that the growth of consciousness can occur, and thus only there that a promise exists of improving the lot of mankind.

The reconciliation of opposites and the transformative power of the symbol find their analogue in another field which deeply occupied Jung: the study of Medieval alchemy. Since the essence of the work of alchemy was the transformation of substances within a hermetic, or closed, vessel, it is easy to see how Jung perceived in the work the very picture of bringing into consciousness the disparate elements of the psyche, holding these within a psychic container and letting the “heat” of this union give rise to a symbolic transformation. Jung actually regarded the work of the alchemists as essentially a depiction of psychic processes, which they understood to be material – that is, as a projection of these inner processes onto matter. The alchemical vessel thus becomes in reality the inner psychic structure enduring the tension of opposites and experiencing the emergence of a wholly new – that is, symbolic – resolution, expressed in the imagery of finer, more precious substance distilled from the gross and chaotic material that begins the work.

That the work of wholeness is involved in alchemical symbolism is shown by the constant conjunction of opposites in its imagery: the marriage of sun and moon, of fire and water, of king and queen. This last conjunction forms the basis of Jung’s study of the inner processes of the transference, that mysterious and unique relationship that undergirds the work of individuation as it proceeds in analysis. The transference, for Jung, is not a one-sided affair, nor is it merely the projection of parental images from the client onto the analyst. It is not even all that combined with the analyst’s projections onto the client. It is, rather, a truly symbolic event in which both persons are changed, an inner “marriage” leading, as one would expect, to a new, third being, comprising both individuals and yet transcending them.

Perhaps it was the very depth and mystery of the transference that led most of us in the early days of Jungian work to ignore it – that is, simply to assume its power and efficacy because we knew that a transformative process was in the works. In any case, in my own training in Zurich, transference was never discussed in any practical or clinical terms; the analytic relationship was assumed to be the very ground from which consciousness, and therefore an emerging transformation into wholeness, could take place.
But just so too was the psyche of the individual: at all times, whether in analysis or out of it, through introspection and self-awareness the process of individuation went forward. And any event – “inner” or “outer” – was seen as “grist for the mill” of this process. As if to remind me that all of life was the psychological training ground, my training analyst once said to me as we contemplated a break in our sessions: “The most important things happen on vacation.”

The practical significance of the unexpected

There is a principle here to which I have always adhered, and which could be described as respect for the significance of the unexpected. The principle assumes that life itself has a meaning which needs to be contemplated, and that the rational mind may easily attempt to control and dictate meaning and thereby lose it. Jung was expressing this principle at one of our students’ meetings at his home when a student spoke of a certain psychological state and then asked him: “Professor Jung, what is the statistical probability of this state occurring?” Jung’s reply was, “Well, you know, as soon as you start talking about statistics, psychology goes out the window.”

The unexpected is what gets a chance to emerge in analytic work when a client comes into the session with no “agenda” and announces, “I just have absolutely nothing to talk about today.” At this point in my career, I am able to rejoice inwardly at this statement; at one time it would have made me very anxious. I rejoice because I am certain that something unexpectedly meaningful has at least an opportunity to surface. And that, one way or another, is what generally happens.

So the process of individuation could be defined as life lived consciously – not as simple a matter as it sounds. Not only our rational minds, but habits of thought and action contribute to the general unconsciousness in which life can be lived. For Jung, to be unconscious was perhaps the greatest evil, and he meant “unconscious” in a specific sense: unconscious of our own unconscious. There is where consciousness needed to focus; otherwise life was lived irresponsibly and even meaninglessly, and Jung felt that a life without meaning was the most unbearable of all.

To illustrate how individuation can proceed in a very individual way and by way of paying heed to the unexpected, I should like to cite a case that I worked with for some years. This was a man of middle age, a writer who had recently, in the course of our work, become aware that he had a serious problem of passive-aggressive behavior. This actually went back to his infancy (as is usually the case), to a combination of abuse and neglect which had left him abnormally compliant while consumed with silent rage. He felt
himself to be pretty much the victim of others and took secret revenge, often quite unconsciously.

This man was on vacation far away from home and from analysis, in fact on a trek in the mountains of Nepal, when a decisive event occurred. He was resting on a mountain pass over an abyss when there walked by him a Sherpa carrying an immense load of baggage. My client had a sudden, almost overpowering urge to push this little man off the pass and into the abyss. He struggled with the temptation and the moment passed: the Sherpa went by. But he was left with a shattering realization of what he could actually do to another person, not merely, as before, of what others were always doing to him. That is, in the first place his shadow became a reality to him in a way that he had never experienced before. And in the second place, he had a new and vivid sense of himself as the agent of his life and not merely as a reactive victim. After all, the Sherpa had done nothing to him whatsoever.

His unexpected education did not stop there. A few nights later, while still on the trek, he had a dream. He found himself approaching a square, fenced-in enclosure, perhaps twenty feet on each side, in the center of which was coiled a huge, erect cobra, weaving ominously from side to side. He then discovered, outside the enclosure, a large hunk of raw red meat, such as is fed to the tigers in a zoo. He took a large piece of the meat and threw it in over the cobra’s head, so that it had to turn away from him to go after it.

It was only then that the dreamer noticed that within the enclosure, in the rear right corner and hidden from the cobra by a white wooden shield, crouched a man who was closely monitoring the cobra and carefully regulating its feeding. The dreamer knew then that he ought not to have thrown in the meat – that all was being correctly done by this person in charge and that he had interfered too impulsively, thereby upsetting the balance.

For him, the cobra had to do with the unpredictable danger that people often feel within themselves insofar as they have not made peace with their aggressive feelings. The dreamer’s first impulse was to avert the danger to himself (by throwing the meat over the cobra’s head), that is, to try to pacify his feared aggression while also diverting it somewhere else. This reflected what he would often do in actual life: be as conciliatory as possible while making any aggressive impulse appear to be far removed from himself.

All this, however, was now shown to be unnecessary, for, as the dream revealed, there was actually a superior power in charge of the dangerous cobra. A man was crouched concealed from it but in a state of constant awareness, regulating its feeding and in no way subject to the impulses of the dreamer’s frightened and reactive ego. This new figure the dreamer
understood to represent the Self, which Jung defines as the center and source of psychic wholeness and regulator of psychic balance. Controlled by the Self, this terrifying creature stayed in its place – not through force, but through careful watching and attention. In fact the role of the hidden man was a true paradigm for the conscious care which is always needed in the work of individuation: not reactive but steadily and persistently active in its attention to whatever goes on in the unconscious life. That kind of regular attention can turn apparent inner chaos into a sense of order and inner relatedness.

The understanding that this man now had, of a superior and reliable power within, gradually relieved him of much of the false burden of responsibility that typically accompanies a severely intimidated ego. For although he had always blamed others’ aggression for his problems, he had secretly been terrified of his own and therefore most intent on denying it. Now, having seen it face to face – first in his impulse on the mountainside and then in his dream – he had also been privileged to learn a truly revolutionary fact: there is a power beyond any conscious devising which functions to contain and control psychic life. And this power needs to be known and acknowledged – the ego needs to bow to the Self – as our dreamer was able to do by way of this healing dream.

**The ultimate goal**

In a general way the whole development of an individual’s life is seen by Jung as a gradual emergence out of the ego’s control and into the realm of the Self – out of merely personal values and into those of more impersonal and collective meaning. The first half of life is normally devoted to establishing a secure base in the world: education, profession, family, a personal identity. But at mid-life that crisis threatens whose ubiquity and importance Jung helped to clarify in the public mind. It is at bottom a spiritual crisis, the challenge to seek and to discover the meaning of life. To meet this challenge, none of the tools of the first half of life are adequate. It is not a question of further conquests or acquisitions; it is more a question of exploration of the soul, for its own sake, letting go of the familiar demands of the ego to be fed and gratified. Therefore it is often felt as a loss, and is often powerfully resisted; and yet the psyche, with its own powerful demand to be realized, will persist in confronting consciousness with new and unheard-of views of life’s meaning and possibilities. It is here that Jung sees the real work of individuation beginning, for from this point on, everything depends on the broadening of consciousness. Without a real sense that this change carries the true meaning of one’s life, and a willingness to take on the inner voyage
of discovery, one can fall into despair and a repetitive existence, which in effect only marks time until the end. The challenge of the second half of life is to prepare for death in a questioning, seeking, and conscious way, accepting both the pain of disillusionment and the wonder of growth into ever new views of spiritual and psychological reality.

This does not by any means suggest that Jungian analysis or the work of individuation is reserved solely for the second half of life. Many younger people, myself included, have found new meaning and purpose in life through the direct inspiration and guidance of Jung. What it does emphasize is that individuation is a spiritual undertaking. It is the conscious response to an instinct not recognized in biological thought, an innate and powerful drive toward spiritual realization and ultimate meaning. As such, it involves the whole person, who, in the process of emerging into wholeness, is progressively transformed – not into something different, but into the true Self: out of its potential and into its reality. Whoever, in any age or condition, is prepared to heed and respond to this spiritual and fundamentally human drive, is prepared for the process of individuation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Jung on archetypes and archetypal images

Although Jung named his school of thought “analytical psychology,” he might with equal justification have called it “archetypal psychology.” No other term is more basic to Jungian analysis than “archetype”; yet no other term has been the source of so much definitional confusion. Part of the reason is that Jung defined “archetype” in different ways at different times. Sometimes, he spoke of archetypes as if they were images. Sometimes, he distinguished more precisely between archetypes as unconscious forms devoid of any specific content and archetypal images as the conscious contents of those forms.

Both Freud and Jung acknowledged the existence of archetypes, which Freud called phylogenetic “schemata” (1918/1955), or phylogenetic “prototypes” (1927/1961). Philosophically, Freud and Jung were neo-Kantian structuralists who believed that hereditary categories of the psyche imaginatively inform human experience in typical or schematic ways. Freud (1918/1955) alludes to Kant when he says that the phylogenetic schemata are comparable to “the categories of philosophy” because they “are concerned with the business of ‘placing’ the impressions derived from actual experience.” He states that the Oedipus complex is “one of them” – evidently one among many – “the best known” of the schemata. He describes the circumstances under which a schema may exert a dominant influence over experience:

Wherever experiences fail to fit in with the hereditary schema, they become remodelled in the imagination – a process which might very profitably be followed out in detail. It is precisely such cases that are calculated to convince us of the independent existence of the schema. We are often able to see the schema triumphing over the experience of the individual. (p. 119)

According to Jung (1976/1977), the Oedipus complex “was the first archetype Freud discovered, the first and only one.” He asserts that Freud believed that the Oedipus complex “was the archetype,” when, in fact, “there
are many such archetypes” (Jung, 1946/1977 pp. 288–289). Like Freud, Jung (CW 11, pp. 517–518) contends that archetypes are “categories analogous to the logical categories which are always and everywhere present as the basic postulates of reason,” except that they are “categories of the imagination.”

Many non-Jungians erroneously believe that what Jung means by archetypes are innate ideas. Jung expressly repudiates any such notion. Archetypes are purely formal, categorical, ideational potentialities that must be actualized experientially. According to Jung (CW 10), they are only “innate possibilities of ideas.” He explicitly says that archetypes are “similar to the Kantian categories.” Although archetypes “do not produce any contents of themselves, they give definite form to contents that have already been acquired” through experience (CW 10, pp. 10–11). Jung (CW 15, p. 81) insists that archetypes do not determine the content of experience but constrain the form of it, “within certain categories.” Archetypes are a collective inheritance of general, abstract forms that structure the personal acquisition of particular, concrete contents. “It is necessary to point out once more,” Jung says (CW 9.i, p. 79), “that archetypes are not determined as regards their content, but only as regards their form and then only to a very limited degree.” An archetype “is determined as to its content only when it has become conscious and is therefore filled out with the material of conscious experience.” By contents, Jung means images. Archetypes, as forms, are merely possibilities of images. What is consciously experienced – and then imaged – is unconsciously informed by archetypes. A content, or image, has an archetypal, or typical, form.

A specific example may clarify the distinction between archetypes and archetypal images. If Herman Melville had never been in a position to acquire any direct or indirect experience of a whale, he could never have written Moby-Dick. Melville could not have inherited that specific image. He might, however, have written a great American novel about the archetypal, or typical, experience of being (or feeling) psychically engulfed (“swallowed” or “devoured”) and then imaged that same form through another, very different content. Jung (CW 5, p. 419) says that the “Jonah-and-the-Whale” complex has “any number of variants, for instance the witch who eats children, the wolf, the ogre, the dragon, and so on.” The archetype is an abstract theme (engulfment), and the archetypal images (whale, witch, wolf, ogre, dragon, etc.) are concrete variations on that theme.

James Hillman and archetypal psychology

What is now known as the school of “archetypal psychology” was founded by James Hillman with a number of other Jungians in Zurich in the late
1960s and early 1970s. The school arose in reaction against what they regarded as unnecessary metaphysical assumptions in Jung and the complacent, rote application of Jungian tenets. Hillman prefers to regard archetypal psychology not as a “school” but as a “direction” or an “approach” (personal communication, 9 September 1994). Archetypal psychology is a post-Jungian psychology (Samuels, 1985), a critical elaboration of Jungian theory and practice after Jung. Post-Jungian psychology has been “taken seriously over the last thirty years,” Christopher Hauke (2000, p. 8) says, “largely due to the work of the American Jungian analyst James Hillman.” Although there are now many archetypal psychologists, Hillman remains the most prominent among them.

The archetypal school rejects the noun “archetype,” even as it retains the adjective “archetypal.” For Hillman (1983), the distinction between archetypes and archetypal images, which Jung regards as comparable, respectively, to Kantian noumena and phenomena, is untenable. According to him, all that individuals ever encounter psychically are images – that is, phenomena. Hillman is a phenomenologist or an imagist: “I’m simply following the imagistic, the phenomenological way: take a thing for what it is and let it talk” (p. 14). For the archetypal school, there are no archetypes as such – no neo-Kantian categories, or noumena. There are only phenomena, or images, that may be archetypal.

For Hillman, the archetypal is not a category but a consideration – a perspectival operation that an individual may perform on any image. Thus Hillman (1977, pp. 82–83) says that “any image may be considered archetypal.” The archetypal is “a move one makes rather than a thing that is.” To consider an image archetypal is to regard it as such, from a certain perspective, to endow it operationally with typicality – or, as Hillman prefers to say, with “value.” Thus, perspectively, an individual may “archetypalize” any image. Merely considering it so makes it so – or, as Hillman (1975/1979) says, merely capitalizing it makes it so – as in the “Sunburnt Girl” (p. 63). In effect, the archetypal school embraces what Jung tries (never, he admits, entirely with success) to avoid – that is, what he (CW 9.i, p. 59) calls “metaphysical concretism.” Jung says that “any attempt at graphic description” of an archetype inevitably succumbs to metaphysical concretism “up to a point,” because the qualitative aspect “in which it appears necessarily clings to it, so that it cannot be described at all except in terms of its specific phenomenology.” Concrete descriptive qualities cling quite obviously to an archetype like the Great Mother (less evidently to an archetype like the Anima, which is more abstract) – as they also do to the Sunburnt Girl. Most Jungians would be reluctant to dignify the Sunburnt Girl as equal in status to the Great Mother – or even to regard the image as “archetypal” at all.
When Hillman capitalizes the Sunburnt Girl, he considers the image archetypal, typical, or valuable. He does not posit or infer the metaphysical existence of archetypes prior to the images. For archetypal psychologists, any and every image, even the most apparently banal, can be considered archetypal.

This post-Jungian, post-structuralist usage of the term “archetypal” is controversial. Most Jungians retain the term “archetype” and continue to define it as Jung did. One Jungian analyst, V. Walter Odajnyk (1984), criticizes Hillman for adopting the name “archetypal psychology.” According to Odajnyk, Hillman should simply have called the school “imaginal psychology” to avoid unnecessary terminological ambiguity. “Archetypal psychology,” Odajnyk (1984, p. 43) says, “sounds as though it were based on the Jungian archetypes, when in fact it isn’t.” This criticism is cogent to Jungians who remain strict structuralists. It is unpersuasive to archetypal psychologists, for they believe that the archetypal, or the typical, is in the eye of the imaginer – or in the imagination’s eye. In a sense, the archetypal is in the eye of the beholder – the subject who beholds an image – but it is also, in another sense, in the eye of the imagination, a transcendent dimension that archetypal psychologists regard as ultimately irreducible to any faculty immanent in the subject.

Re-visioning psychology and sticking to the image

The imagination’s eye is a decisive image for Hillman, who would revise – or, as he says, “re-vision” – Jungian analysis. Hillman’s Terry Lectures at Yale University in 1972 were published under the title Re-Visioning Psychology. For archetypal psychologists, analysis is not only a “talking cure” but also a “seeing cure,” which values the visual at least as much as the verbal. Insight has been a dominant image in analysis since Freud (or since the blindness of Oedipus), but Hillman (1975, p. 136) has emphasized not “seeing in” but “seeing through,” by which he means the ability of the imagination’s eye to see through the literal to the metaphorical. Revisioning is deliteralizing (or metaphorizing) reality. According to Hillman, the purpose of analysis is not to make the unconscious conscious, the id ego, or the ego self but to make the literal metaphorical, the real “imaginal.” The objective is not to induce individuals to be more realistic (as in the Freudian “reality principle”) but to enable them to appreciate that “imagination is reality” (Avens, 1980) and that reality is imagination: that what seems most literally “real” is, in fact, an image with potentially profound metaphorical implications.

Hillman employs “imaginal psychology” as a synonym for “archetypal psychology.” Since for Hillman imagination is reality, he prefers “imaginal”
to “imaginary,” which pejoratively connotes “unreal.” He adopts the term “imaginal” from Henry Corbin (1972), an eminent scholar of Islam. According to Hillman, the imaginal is just as real as (or even more immediately real than) any external reality. This position is identical to the attitude that Jung stipulated for the practice of “active imagination,” the deliberate induction of imaginative activity in the unconscious. To activate the imagination, to imagine actively, requires the individual to regard the images that emerge as if they were autonomous and equal in ontological status to external reality. Hillman applies this method to all images, not only those that arise in active imagination. Imaginal psychology is based on what Adams (2004) calls the “fantasy principle.”

The motto of imaginal psychology is “stick to the image,” an injunction that Hillman (1975/1979) attributes to Rafael Lopez-Pedraza (p. 194). Evidently, this dictum derives inspiration from Jung (CW 16, p. 149), who says, “To understand the dream’s meaning I must stick as close as possible to the dream images.” Sticking to the image is adhering to the phenomenon (rather than, say, free associating to it, as Freud suggests). For Freud, the image is not what it manifestly appears to be. It is latently something else. For Jung and for Hillman, the image is precisely what it appears to be – and nothing else. To express what it intends, the psyche selects an especially apt image from all of the images available in the experience of the individual in order to serve a quite specific metaphorical purpose. In imaginal psychology, the technique of analysis entails the proliferation of images, strict adherence to these phenomena, and the specification of descriptive qualities and implicit metaphors. The method evokes more and more images and encourages the individual to stick attentively to these phenomena as they emerge, in order to provide qualitative descriptions of them and then elaborate the metaphorical implications in them. As an analyst, an imaginal psychologist must be an imagist, a phenomenologist, and a metaphorician.

Image, object, subject

Imaginal psychology is not an object relations psychology. For Hillman, images are not reducible in any sense to objects in external reality. The imagination is not secondary and derivative but primary and constitutive. An image does not necessarily derive from, refer to, or correspond accurately or exhaustively with an object in external reality. There may, in fact, be no object at all. As the imaginal psychologist Patricia Berry (1982, p. 57) says: “With imagination any question of objective referent is irrelevant. The imaginal is quite real in its own way, but never because it corresponds to
something outer.” For imaginal psychologists, the discrepancy between image and object is simply an ineliminable fact of human existence.

Jung (CW 6) advocates a similar position when he discusses psychic images, or “imagos” and what he calls interpretation on the subjective level. Ontologically, he asserts that “the psychic image of an object is never exactly like the object.” Epistemologically, he contends that subjective factors condition the image and “render a correct knowledge of the object extraordinarily difficult.” As a consequence, he says, “it is essential that the imago should not be assumed to be identical with the object.” Instead, it is always advisable “to regard it as an image of the subjective relation to the object.” The object merely serves as a convenient “vehicle” to convey subjective factors (CW 6, pp. 472–473). For example, when Jung interprets a dream on the subjective level, he regards the images in the dream not as references to objects in external reality but as correlatives of aspects of the personality of the dreamer, the subject.

Hillman (1975/1979) protests against what he considers an inordinate emphasis on subjectivity. He does not believe that the incongruity between image and object is merely a function of subjective factors. Just as imaginal psychologists do not reduce images to objects in external reality, neither do they reduce them to aspects of the personality of the subject. For Hillman, the imagination is truly autonomous, transcendent to the subject. He supplements the subjective level with a transsubjective level. This notion is, of course, also incipient in Jung, who distinguishes the personal unconscious from the collective, or transpersonal, unconscious. Occasionally, Jung (CW 7, p. 98) employs the expression “transsubjective” in just this sense. According to Hillman, subjectivity is problematic because it is so possessive. The subject tends naively to believe that all images belong to it because they apparently originate in it. For Hillman (1983/2004a), however, these images come to and through the subject from the imagination – from what he calls the “mundus imaginalis,” the transsubjective dimension of the imagination (p. 15).

Relativization versus compensation

For Jung, the purpose of analysis is the individuation of the ego in relation to the self (or the “Self,” as most Jungians prefer to capitalize it in order to stipulate it as an archetype). Fundamental to this process is what Jung (CW 6) calls “compensation.” According to Jung, the function of the unconscious is to pose alternative perspectives that compensate the partial, prejudicial, defective, maladaptive, or dysfunctional attitudes of the ego. In this process, not only what is repressed or dissociated but also what is ignored or
neglected by the ego is compensated by the unconscious. The unconscious redresses what the ego either excludes or omits from consideration. Analysis thus provides an opportunity for the integration of the psyche – through the compensation of the ego by the unconscious and the individuation of the ego in relation to the self.

In contrast to Jung, Hillman considers the purpose of analysis to be the “relativization” of the ego by the imagination. The imagination relativizes, or radically decenters, the ego – demonstrates that the ego, too, is an image, neither the only one nor the most important one but merely one among many equally important ones. For example, when the ego appears as an image in dreams or in active imagination, it tends immodestly, even arrogantly, to presume that it is the whole (or at least the center) of the psyche, when it is actually only one part of it. To demonstrate the relativity of all images is, in effect, to humble (not humiliate) the ego. It is to expose the conceits of the ego. From this perspective, the objective of analysis is not the integration of the psyche (through the compensation of the ego by the unconscious and the individuation of the ego in relation to the self) but the relativization of the ego (through the differentiation of the imagination). In this respect, imaginal psychology is most definitely not an ego psychology. According to Hillman (1983, p. 17), it does not strive to “strengthen” the ego but seeks, in a sense, to “weaken” it – to debunk the pretensions of the ego.

**Imagination against interpretation**

Many images that appear in dreams or in active imagination are personifications. Jung (1963) recounts how two personifications, whom he named Elijah and Salome, appeared to him in active imagination. According to Jung, the images personified two archetypes: the Wise Old Man (Logos) and the Anima (Eros). He immediately reduces these personifications to a priori categories. Then, however, he expresses an important reservation: “One might say that the two figures are personifications of Logos and Eros. But such a definition would be excessively intellectual. It is more meaningful to let the figures be what they were for me at the time – namely, events and experiences” (Jung, 1963, p. 182). Rather than intellectualize the personifications, Jung says that he prefers to experience them as they are – that is, he regards them as if they were real persons. He engages them in conversation, in the dialogical process that the imaginal psychologist Mary Watkins (1986) beautifully describes in *Invisible Guests: The Development of Imaginal Dialogues*. In *Waking Dreams* (1976/1984), Watkins presents a comprehensive history of imaginative techniques – prominent among them active imagination.
There are thus two tendencies in Jung – the one, intellectual; the other, experiential. Hillman consistently emphasizes the latter over the former. He does so because he regards concepts as too general, too abstract, in contrast to images (among them, personifications), which are particular and concrete. The phenomenological method of imaginal psychology is not an interpretative, or “hermeneutic,” method. According to Hillman (1983), hermeneutics is ineluctably reductionistic. He defines interpretation as a conceptualization of the imagination. That is, interpretation entails the reduction of particular images to general concepts (for example, the reduction of a concrete image of a woman in a dream to the abstract concept of the Anima). For Hillman (1983, p. 51), interpretation does not stick to the image but interferes with the intrinsic “intelligibility of phenomena.” He is by no means alone in this advocacy of phenomenology rather than hermeneutics. For example, the cultural critic Susan Sontag (1967) is also “against interpretation,” for exactly the same reason that Hillman is – because it is an intellectualization of experience – what she calls “the revenge of the intellect upon the world” (Sontag, 1967, p. 7). In short, Hillman is not a hermeneut but an imagist, or phenomenologist, who sticks to the image, adheres to the phenomenon, and adamantly refuses to interpret it, or reduce it to a concept.

For example, in contrast to Jung (CW 9.i, p. 18), who says, “Water is the commonest symbol for the unconscious.” Hillman (1975/1979) cautions against the interpretation of “bodies of water in dreams, e.g., bathtubs, swimming pools, oceans, as ‘the unconscious’” (p. 18). He urges individuals to attend phenomenologically to “the kind of water in a dream” (p. 152) – that is, to the specificity of concrete images. A hermeneutic psychology reduces plural waters, different concrete images (bathtubs, swimming pools, oceans), to a singular “water” and then to an abstract concept, the “unconscious.” Imaginal psychology values the particularity of all images over the generality of any concept. In contrast to Freud (1933/1964), who says that analysis reclaims land (the ego) from the sea (the id), Hillman is no Dutch boy who keeps a finger in the dike but an analyst who prefers to experience the Zuider Zee imaginally rather than intellectualize it conceptually, or interpret it reductionistically. Waters in dreams or in active imagination may be as different as rivers are from puddles. These waters may be deep or shallow; they may be transparent or opaque; they may be clean or dirty; they may flow or stagnate; they may evaporate, condense, precipitate; they may be liquid, solid, or gaseous. The descriptive qualities that they exhibit are so incredibly diverse as to be potentially infinite – as are the metaphorical implications.
Multiplicity

For Hillman (1975), the most egregious perpetrator of Jungian reductionism is Erich Neumann, who reduces a vast multiplicity of concrete images of females to a unity, the abstract concept of the Great Mother (or the feminine). Such an operation is a grossly arbitrary procedure that reduces significant differences to a specious identity. It is not only Jungians but also Freudians who perpetrate such a facile reduction. Hillman (1975, p. 8) says: “If long things are penises for Freudians, dark things are shadows for Jungians.” It is not just that (as Freud might say) a long thing is sometimes just a long thing – or a dark thing sometimes just a dark thing. It is that there are many very different long and dark “things” – that is, many very different images – and they are not reducible to one identical concept. In the philosophical controversy over the one-and-the-many, imaginal psychology values multiplicity over unity. It is Lopez-Pedraza (1971, p. 214) who most succinctly articulates this position. He reverses the usual formulation that unity contains multiplicity and proposes, instead, that “the many contains the unity of the one without losing the possibilities of the many.”

Imaginal psychologists believe that the personality is fundamentally multiple, rather than unitary. In a sense, there is no personality – only personifications, which, when analysts regard them as if they were real persons, assume the status of autonomous personalities. When Hillman espouses the relativity of all personifications, he might appear irresponsibly to condone multiple personality disorder (or “dissociative identity disorder,” as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual now renames it). Hillman (1983/2004a) does, in fact, say: “Multiple personality is humanity in its natural condition.” To regard the multiplicity of personality either as a psychiatric aberration or as a failure in the integration of “partial personalities” is simply evidence of a cultural prejudice that erroneously identifies one partial personality, the ego, with the personality as such (p. 62). The definition of multiple personality disorder implies that the personifications have been literalized rather than metaphorized and that the imagination has been dissociated rather than differentiated. It is not only imaginal psychologists who emphasize personifications. The object relations psychologist W. R. D. Fairbairn (1931/1990) presents a case in which an individual dreams five personifications: the “mischievous boy,” the “I,” and the “critic” (which Fairbairn associates, respectively, with the id, ego, and superego), as well as the “little girl” and the “martyr.” Although Fairbairn says that multiple personality disorder is the result of an extreme identification with personifications, he also says, very like Hillman, that
such personifications are so prevalent in analysis that they “must be regarded, not only as characteristic, but as compatible with normality” (Fairbairn, 1931/1990, pp. 217–219).

Polytheism versus monotheism

Consistent with this emphasis on multiplicity, Hillman (1971/1981) advocates a polytheistic rather than a monotheistic psychology. According to Hillman, religion (or theology) influences psychology. Historically, the three monotheistic religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – have systematically repressed the polytheistic religions. Not only have Judaism and Christianity privileged one god over many gods (and goddesses), which they have disparaged as demons, but they have also privileged an abstract conceptualization of that one god. Islam has been just as intolerant: one god, no images. For Hillman (1983), Christianity has had an especially deleterious impact on psychology. He criticizes fundamentalist Christianity in particular, for it has been most puritanical and iconoclastic. Because fundamentalism has regarded the image literally rather than metaphorically, it has condemned all imagism as idolatry. Among practitioners of imaginal psychology, David L. Miller, a professor of religion, has most cogently elaborated the polytheistic perspective in *The New Polytheism: Rebirth of the Gods and Goddesses* (1974/1981).

From the perspective of imaginal psychology, one reason that ego psychology seems so attractive is because it is so compatible with the tenets of monotheistic religion. It is a monistic psychology that values a unitary, abstract concept, the ego, over multiple, concrete images. In contrast, imaginal psychology is polytheistic (or pluralistic) in orientation. It is not a religion but strictly a psychology. It does not worship the gods and goddesses. It regards them metaphorically, as Jung (CW 10, p. 185) did – as “personifications of psychic forces.” According to Jung (CW 13), the gods and goddesses appear as “phobias, obsessions and so forth,” “neurotic symptoms,” or “diseases.” As he says, “Zeus no longer rules Olympus but rather the solar plexus, and produces curious specimens for the doctor’s consulting room, or disorders the brains of politicians and journalists who unwittingly let loose psychic epidemics on the world” (CW 13, p. 37). Almost all of the examples that imaginal psychologists cite of gods and goddesses are Greek. They justify, or rationalize, this selectivity on the basis that analysis is historically European in origin and that the Greek gods and goddesses are uniquely dominant in that particular continental context. For imaginal psychology to aspire to a comprehensive multicultural psychology adequate to contemporary concerns about ethnic diversity, however, it will
eventually have to include a vast, polytheistic array of gods and goddesses from the entire, global pantheon.

**Mythology**

Historically, analysis has had a special interest in mythology. In contrast to Freudian analysis, imaginal psychology does not employ myths simply for confirmatory purposes. For Freud, the Oedipus myth is important because he believes that it independently confirms the discovery – and the theoretical truth – of the Oedipus complex. Freud regards the complex as primary, the myth as secondary. Imaginal psychology reverses this order of priority. For example, Hillman (1975/1979) says that “Narcissism does not account for Narcissus” (p. 221n.). It is a fallacy to reduce the Narcissus myth to a “Narcissus complex” – or to a “narcissistic personality disorder.” Nosologically, Hillman (1983, p. 81) says, narcissism confounds “autoerotic subjectivism with one of the most important and powerful myths of the imagination.” Imaginal psychology expresses a definite preference for “literary” over “scientific” modes of discourse. According to Hillman (1975, p. xi), the very basis of the psyche is “poetic” – or mythopoetic.

Hillman is critical, however, of what Jung calls the “hero myth.” What is so potentially dangerous about this myth is the tendency of the ego to identify with the hero and thus to act out the hero’s role in an aggressive and violent fashion. In contrast to what Hillman (1975/1979) calls the “imaginal ego” (p. 102) – an ego that would modestly acknowledge that it is merely one image among many other equally important images – the “heroic ego” arrogantly assumes the dominant role and relegates all other images to subordinate roles. Other images exist to serve the purposes of the heroic ego, which may then dispense with them or dispose of them through aggression and violence. The heroic ego, Hillman says, “insists on a reality that it can grapple with, aim an arrow at, or bash with a club,” because it “literalizes the imaginal” (p. 115). In this account, Hillman is culpable of the same reductionism that he criticizes in others, for “hero” is just an abstract concept, not a concrete image. Different heroes have different styles. They are not all identical. Some are notably non-aggressive and non-violent. As Joseph Campbell (1949) says, the hero has a thousand different faces.

Hillman (1989/1991) is most impressive when he revisits the Oedipus myth in order to re-vision it. According to him, the Oedipus myth unconsciously informs the very method of analysis. There is an “Oedipus method” as well as an Oedipus complex. Hillman is not the only analyst who has criticized the methodological implications of the Oedipus myth. For example,
the self-psychologist Heinz Kohut (1981/1991) maintains that, to the extent that analysis aspires to be more than merely an abnormal psychology, the Oedipus myth is methodologically inadequate. He wonders what analysis would have been like had it been founded on another father–son myth – for example, the Odysseus–Telemachus myth – rather than the Laius–Oedipus myth. If Freud had based analysis on a Telemachus complex rather than the Oedipus complex, Kohut argues, the method of analysis would have been radically different. According to Kohut, it is the intergenerational continuity between father and son that “is normal and human, and not intergenerational strife, and mutual wishes to kill and destroy – however frequently and even ubiquitously, we may be able to find traces of those pathological disintegration products of which traditional analysis has made us think as a normal developmental phase, a normal experience of the child” (Kohut, 1981/1991, p. 563).

Hillman (1989/1991), however, is a much more radical critic of the Oedipus myth in traditional psychoanalytic theory and practice than Kohut. For him, the difficulty is that the Oedipus myth has been the one and only myth, or at least the most important one, that analysts have employed for purposes of interpretation. According to Hillman, the myth demonstrates that blindness results from the literalistic pursuit of insight. Analysis has been a blind-lead-the-blind method. The analyst, a Tiresias who has attained insight after he has been blinded, imparts insight to an Oedipus, the analysand, who is then blinded. This one myth has afforded analysis only one mode of inquiry: the method of heroic insight that leads to blindness. Hillman argues that if analysis were to employ other myths in addition to the Oedipus myth, many different myths with many different motifs – for example, Eros and Psyche (“love”), Zeus and Hera (“generativity and marriage”), Icarus and Daedalus (“flying and crafting”), Ares (“combat, anger, and destruction”), Pygmalion (“mimesis where art becomes life through desire”), Hermes, Aphrodite, Persephone, or Dionysus – then the methods of analysis would be very different and much truer to the diversity of human experience (Hillman, 1989/1991, pp. 139–140). The imaginal psychologist Ginette Paris in Pagan Meditations (1986) and Pagan Grace (1990) is perhaps the most eloquent exponent of this methodological differentiation.

Wolfgang Giegerich (1999) has criticized the mythological basis of imaginal psychology. Rather than a psychology of the image based on myth, Giegerich advocates a psychology of the soul based on “logic” (in the distinctively Hegelian philosophical sense of the word). He asserts that the world of modern electronic and information technology – with the computer, internet, and cyberspace – is radically different from the world of
ancient mythology. “In order to do justice to our modern world,” Giegerich (1999, p. 175) contends, “we cannot fall back on any ancient mythological figures or patterns.” He maintains that a psychology based on mythology is obsolete. Giegerich says that “the very point of ‘the modern ego’ (as well as of science) is to have fundamentally broken with myth as such, that is, with the entire level of consciousness on which truly mythic experience was feasible” (Giegerich, 1999, p. 219). Adams (2001) argues, however, that the “gods” and “goddesses” are alive and well, that contemporary psychic reality remains a mythic reality, and that the unconscious is fundamentally a “mythological unconscious.”

Soul-in-the-world and soul-making

Imaginal psychology is a soul psychology rather than an ego psychology. As Hillman (1964, p. 46) employs the term “soul,” it is “a deliberately ambiguous concept” that defies denotational definition. “Soul,” of course, is evocative of numerous religious and cultural contexts. Hillman (1983, p. 128) notes that African-Americans introduced the word “soul” into popular culture. In imaginal psychology, however, the term has a number of quite specific connotations, the most important of which are perhaps vulnerability, melancholy, and profundity. Hillman (1983, p. 18) rejects the strong, manic, superficial ego and advocates a soul that acknowledges the weak, depressive, and deep. “The soul,” he says, “isn’t given, it has to be made.” To that effect, Hillman (1975, p. ix) quotes Keats: “Call the world if you please, ‘The vale of Soul-making.’ Then you will find out the use of the world.” This is an allusion to the neo-Platonic “world-soul,” or anima mundi, which Hillman translates as “soul-in-the-world.” The making of soul in the world entails a deepening of experience, in which the ego is put down and kept down. Rather than an ego that descends to unconscious depths only in order to be individuated in relation to the self and then ascends to the conscious surface, Hillman advocates an ego that descends to imaginal depths – and stays there – in order to be animated into a soul. Like Jung, Hillman emphasizes that “anima” means “soul.” In this respect, the purpose of analysis is not individuation but animation. The imaginal psychologist Thomas Moore has popularized this soul psychology in Care of the Soul (1992) and Soul Mates (1994), as has Hillman in The Soul’s Code (1996).

Imaginal psychology emphasizes that not only individuals have souls but that the world has soul – or that material objects in the world have soul. In contrast to the subject–object dualism of Descartes, who asserts that only human “beings” have souls, Hillman (1983) contends – he means it
metaphorically, of course – that nonhuman “things” also have souls. In effect, imaginal psychology is an “animistic” psychology. In contrast to the conventional notion that the world is just so much “dead” matter, that material objects (not only natural but also cultural, or artifactual, objects) are inanimate, Hillman (1983, p. 132) insists that they are animate, or “alive.” He means that not only individuals but also objects have a certain “subjectivity,” that things have a certain “being.” According to Hillman, the world is not dead, but neither is it well: it is alive but sick. It is the deadening (rather than enlivening, ensouling, or animating) attitude of Cartesian subject–object dualism toward the world that has sickened it. Rather than only analyze individuals, Hillman recommends that imaginal psychology analyze the world, or the material objects in it, as if they, too, were subjects. From this perspective, the world needs therapy at least as much as individuals do. Imaginal psychology has thus become an “environmental” or “ecological” psychology. Analysts have tended to ignore or neglect what Harold F. Searles (1960) calls the “nonhuman environment.” An exception to this rule is the imaginal psychologist Michael Perlman, who addresses the issue in The Power of Trees: The Reforesting of the Soul (1994).

Social and political activism

Imaginal psychology summons individuals to engage the world and to assume social and political responsibility. One of the most important essays that Hillman has written is on an apparently intractable social and political issue: the bias of white supremacy. Hillman (1986, p. 29) argues that dilemmas presumably due to “ethnic bigotry,” although not impossible to alter, are “fundamentally difficult to modify” because the very notion of supremacy is “archetypally inherent in whiteness itself.” He cites ethnographic evidence from Africa to demonstrate transculturally that not only whites but also blacks tend to regard the colors “white” and “black” as, respectively, superior (or good) and inferior (or bad). In On Human Diversity (1993), the cultural critic Tzvetan Todorov also suggests that racism may persist, in part, “for reasons that have to do with universal symbolism: white–black, light–dark, day–night pairings seem to exist and function in all cultures, with the first term of each pair generally preferred” (Todorov, 1993, p. 95). Both Hillman and Todorov wonder why racism seems so obstinately resistant to serious social and political efforts to eradicate it, and they offer a similar explanation: the unconscious projection of an archetypal, or universal, factor – a valuation about color (white–light–day in opposition to black–dark–night) onto people. According to Hillman, the problem is that racists are literalists who irrationally confuse physical
reality with psychic reality and misapply the white–black color opposition for prejudicial and discriminatory purposes. In order effectively to address this difficulty and to ameliorate racism, he argues that it will be necessary to re-vision (deliteralize, or metaphorize) the spurious oppositional logic that white supremacists employ. From this perspective, racism is a failure of the imagination – an especially pernicious example of the fallacy of literalism. Adams directly engages the issue of racism in the white–black sense in *The Multicultural Imagination: “Race,” Color, and the Unconscious* (1996).

Robert Bosnak is perhaps the most socially and politically active of the imaginal psychologists. In *Christopher’s Dreams: Dreaming and Living with AIDS* (1989/1997), he has interpreted the entire dream journal of a client who suffered and died from the human immunodeficiency virus. He has organized three international conferences on the theme of “Facing Apocalypse” – the first, on nuclear war (Andrews et al., 1987); the second, on environmental catastrophe; the third, on charisma and holy war. In *The Sacrament of Abortion* (1992), Paris has also applied imaginal psychology to a contemporary social and political issue. War may well be the ultimate social and political issue. Hillman has published an important essay (1987) and a book (2004b) on the “love of war”, an attitude that countenances war and romanticizes it as both heroic and perfectly normal, with terrible consequences.

**Post-structuralism, post-modernism**

Imaginal psychology is a post-structuralist, post-modernist school that has important affinities with both the semiotic psychology of Jacques Lacan and the deconstructive philosophy of Jacques Derrida. Both Hillman and Lacan abhor ego psychology, and they both radically decenter the ego. The “imaginary” of Lacan is similar to (although by no means identical with) the “imaginal” of Hillman. Paul Kugler (1982/2002, 1987) asserts that Lacan’s “imaginary” is also similar to Jung’s “imago.” Adams (1985/1992) contends that what Hillman means by “re-visioning” is comparable to what Derrida means by “deconstructing.” Both Hillman and Derrida criticize the metaphysical logic that opposes image (or signifier) to concept (or signified) and that privileges the latter over the former.

**The institutionalization of archetypal psychology**

Although there are Jung Institutes that train and certify analysts to practice professionally, there is no “Hillman Institute.” Spring Publications, a press that Hillman owns, has published many books in archetypal psychology. It
has now begun publishing the “Uniform Edition of the Writings of James Hillman.” For many years, it also published *Spring*, a journal of archetypal psychology. That journal is now published by a different press, Spring Journal Books. The London Convivium for Archetypal Studies published a number of issues of *Sphinx: A Journal for Archetypal Psychology and the Arts*. A “Festival of Archetypal Psychology in Honor of James Hillman” was held at Notre Dame University in 1992. The Pacifica Graduate Institute in Santa Barbara features archetypal psychology prominently in degree programs in clinical psychology, depth psychology, and mythological studies and has established an archive that contains the manuscripts, letters, and other papers of Hillman. The Dallas Institute of Humanities and Culture also emphasizes archetypal psychology in the programs that it offers.

Archetypal psychology has been in existence for less than half a century, but in that time it has performed an important service. It has provided a critical “re-visionist” perspective on Jungian analysis. Perhaps the most significant contribution of archetypal psychology is the emphasis on the imagination, both culturally and clinically. In this regard, archetypal psychology has revised the very image of traditional Jungian analysis.

REFERENCES


The archetypal school


Introduction

Analytical psychology as elaborated by Jung and his immediate followers did not focus on the depth psychological aspects of early infant and childhood development. Freud and his followers made the imaginative leap required to link the two pivotal areas of analytic investigation – the early stages of development and how such states of mind may manifest in adult patients, on the one hand, and the nature and varieties of transference and countertransference in the analytic relationship, on the other – and to include them in psychoanalytic theory. Analytical psychology was slow to follow suit, despite Jung’s early and continued insistence on the importance of the relationship between analyst and patient, and his study of the *Rosarium* (*CW* 16) as a way of understanding the vicissitudes of the analytic couple.

For Jung and the group that had formed around him, the rich and attractive field of creative and symbolic activity and collective and cultural pursuits appeared to be more engaging. Nevertheless, in certain respects it could be said that creative psychic activity, as well as its destructive and distressing aspects, could be located within two pivotal areas of investigation, and could be seen rightfully to belong to the examination of the relationship between primary process (that is, the earlier, more primitive mental processes with infantile foundations) and the later secondary mental processes.

The lack of a clinical and theoretical tradition of early infantile mental states and the vicissitudes of transference and countertransference phenomena left analytical psychology impoverished in an important way. This would need to be rectified if analytical psychology was to go on developing as a credible professional and clinical endeavor. Jung’s considerable contributions to understanding the prospective functioning of the psyche, including the self, were in danger of becoming limited because of the lack of grounding in historical and genetic (i.e. early-life) mental activity.
In London in the decades after World War II, vigorous psychoanalytic debate was taking place regarding the impact of early infantile states of mind on the adult patient, how these were discernible in the analytical relationship, and the transference and countertransference.

At the same time as psychoanalytic understanding of these areas deepened, certain analytical psychologists in London, in particular Dr. Michael Fordham, became increasingly aware of the necessity of integrating Jung’s valued prospective approach to working with the unconscious psyche with a need to ground such work in an understanding of those primitive states of affect and mentation by which the infant and child made its experiences comprehensible to itself.

There was also a recognition of the need to protect the analytic space by maintaining a boundaried and safe frame within which to explore these mental contents in adult patients so that the patient could safely regress, when appropriate, to whatever depth of the psyche he or she was able, or needed, in order for transformation and growth to occur.

The historical context

Although Jung did not focus the major portion of his researches on a detailed understanding of infantile states of mind, the popularly held view that Jung was completely uninterested in childhood mental activity will need to be re-examined in light of the forthcoming publication of the previously unpublished *Children’s Dream Seminar* (in press). Jung did not generally consider that the child had an identity separate from the unconscious of his or her parents. Equally, he was not especially interested in studying the manifestations of early experiences within the transference of the patient to the analyst. He considered these the proper subject of the reductive approach of psychoanalysis, to be used when it was appropriate to locate and address the sources of a patient’s present neurotic conflict and symptoms in his early childhood conflicts.

However, Jung was interested in formulating a model of the mind that was concerned with those higher states of mental functioning which included thinking, creativity, and the symbolic attitude. He focused a large proportion of his psychological inquiry on the second half of life during which, he believed, these aspects were most likely to manifest. He devoted much of his own creative energy to the exploration of some of the most developed cultural and scientific endeavors throughout the centuries. His emphasis on myths, dreams, and artistic creations, as well as his extensive knowledge of alchemical texts and his interest in the new physics, appears to have drawn him away from the study of childhood development, which
seemed to fall more within the purview of psychoanalysis with its emphasis on analyzing back to the sources of mental activity. It was almost as if, like the popes of old in face of the globe as it was then, Freud and Jung had divided up the map of the human psyche, with Freud and his followers concentrating on its depths, and the exploration of the early childhood developmental stages, while Jung and his followers focused on its heights, and the functioning of the more mature states of mind, including those creative and artistic states responsible for the invention of the finest cultural, spiritual, and scientific pursuits of mankind.

This division of the psyche could be understood to have arisen because of the different philosophical attitudes that informed Freud’s and Jung’s approaches. Freud’s psychoanalysis was based on the reductive method that sought to provide a detailed account of the development of the personality from its earliest sources in childhood. Psychoanalytic understanding of early development was based on a view that a reconstruction of the psyche was possible through a careful decoding of the manifest contents of psychological functioning back to the hidden or latent content. The manifest content was understood as representing a compromise between unconscious pressures arising, on the one hand, from repressed libidinal (i.e. psychologically derived) impulses and, on the other, from the demands of the internalized objects, especially the parental superego. The aim of psychoanalysis was to decode the evidence from the manifest level to reveal the latent repressed and hidden contents in order to bring them to light and into consciousness. The psychoanalyst’s task was to disclose, via interpretation, the real motives and intentions hidden within the individual’s communications, an epistemological approach. This has been called the “hermeneutics of suspicion” by the philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1967), because it does not accept at face value the conscious motivation or intention but proposes instead that embedded within any conscious mental content is an unconscious compromise between the oppositional demands of id and superego.

By contrast, Jung’s philosophical approach was based on a teleological understanding of the psyche, whereby all psychological events, including even the most severe symptoms, were considered to have purpose and meaning. Instead of being viewed as solely the repressed and disguised material of unconscious infantile conflict, they could also be the means by which the psyche had achieved the best available solution to date to the problem that had confronted it. At the same time, they could act as the starting point for further growth and development. Furthermore, the meaning of such symptoms was accessible to consciousness through the analytic method of interpretation, association, and amplification. Jung’s approach included an
understanding of the contribution of early experiences in the development of the personality, based on the historical accumulation of the individual’s conscious and unconscious experiences and the interplay of this personal history with the archetypal contents of the collective unconscious. He was interested in the processes of integration and synthesis of these aspects, through the innate resources of the individual for creative and symbolic activity.

Jung’s exploration of the bases of personality took a different tack from that followed early on by Freud in his understanding of the stages of personality development. Although Jung always acknowledged the importance of the psychoanalytic understanding of the early stages of childhood development, his interest was not in examining them through the regression of the patient in the presence of the analyst. Instead, he developed an understanding of the bases of human personality via his own inquiry into the deep psychological structures of the psyche, which he conceived of as the archetypes of the collective unconscious. He revealed that archetypes were expressed through certain universal images and symbols. These deep structures, laid down through the ages and existing in each individual from birth, were understood by Jung to be directly connected to and an influence on the most developed, sophisticated, and evolved of human artistic and cultural creations. At the same time, he thought of these deep structures as being the source of the crudest, most primitive and violent feelings and behaviors of which human beings were capable.

Jung initially culled the information for his core clinical inquiry through his main patient group: adult patients with severe psychiatric disorders, including those in psychotic states. He also drew on his own self-analysis. Jung’s career began with patients whose symptoms and pathologies arose from the most primitive levels of functioning of the combined psyche–soma system. His examination of their disturbed communications was tantamount to an inquiry into the earliest disorders of experiencing, feeling, thinking, and relating. Through his work with these mentally ill psychiatric patients, as well as through his own dramatic and disturbing self-analysis, Jung studied the sources and roots of the personality via the various psychopathologies, expressed in archetypal images of the collective unconscious. These earliest disturbances are now often thought of as the pathologies of the self, belonging to the core of the personality, situated developmentally earlier than the more neurotic disorders that Freud examined when he began the psychoanalytic inquiry.

Increasingly, however, among certain Jungian clinicians and theoreticians, there arose a recognition that the treatments of adult patients and children were impeded by the lack of a tradition of understanding and closely
analyzing the structure and dynamics of infantile states of mind and how these might be manifested in the transference and the countertransference. There was disquiet lest the Jungian emphasis on the more developed, differentiated, creative, and symbolic states of mind avoided the exploration of the more difficult primitive material that could emerge in those states of regression so often encountered in the consulting room. In some training institutions, the lack of a coherent theoretical understanding of early mental states was felt to be a deficit. The need to develop such an understanding that was also consistent with the broad Jungian *opus* was felt urgently by a number of clinicians.

It was quite natural that this led some Jungians to turn to psychoanalysis to gain a clearer picture of the infantile mind. Jung had always insisted on the importance of locating the roots of the libido in the earliest psychosexual stages. This included Freud’s important understanding that the experiences of the infant and toddler were organized chronologically according to the libidinal zones – oral, anal, urethral, phallic, genital. Indeed, this acknowledgment is found as early as 1912 in *Symbols of Transformation* (*CW* 5), the work that would herald the cessation of his collaboration with Freud. But, as we have seen, Jung’s own interests lay elsewhere, and this meant that the Jungian inquiry tended to bypass the developmental phases of early childhood.

It happened that a number of outstanding clinicians and theoreticians, including Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, Wilfred Bion, Donald Winnicott, and John Bowlby, were based in London and published major contributions during the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and later. Klein, Bion, and Winnicott became central figures in the development of the “object relations school” which grew up within the British Psycho-Analytical Society during those decades and has continued to develop thereafter. There are several diverse theoretical strands within the object relations school, and many other theoreticians and clinicians of note subsequently have made important contributions to the field. However, the main theoretical bifurcation centers on whether the infant or child is driven to gratify basic instinctual impulses, which are represented mentally by personifications of body parts, or whether the infant or child is essentially motivated to seek out another, a caregiver in the first instance, with whom to have a relationship in order to fulfill its basic needs, including the need to have human contact and communication in order to learn and grow, as well as to be protected and nurtured.

Whatever the sources of disagreement, the main tenet shared across the various strands of the object relations school is a view of the infant not as primarily driven by instincts, as originally formulated by Freud’s economic theory, a kind of “scientific biology of the mind” (Kohon, 1986), but rather...
as possessing from birth a basic capacity to relate to its important caregivers, or objects, as they were called. The term “object” was used originally in psychoanalysis to denote another person who was the object of an instinctual impulse. It was used by the object relations theorists in two distinct ways:

1. to denote a set of motivations attributed by the infant or child as belonging to the other, usually the caregiver, but in fact defined by and located in the particular libidinal impulses that were active at the moment internally within the infant or child, or
2. to denote the person in the infant or child’s environment, again usually the caregiver, with whom the child sought to relate.

Patently, each could overlap and the boundaries between the internal and external experiences of objects would blur. This would be particularly apparent when trying to describe the experience of the patient. Klein was able to bridge the two views by proposing that in the unconscious phantasies of the infant or small child, as well as in the infantile phantasies of adults, there was a dynamic relationship between the self and the other, or the object, which was represented internally as motivated by impulses that in fact reflected the instinctual drives (oral, anal, urethral, and so on) of the self. For example, the object might be experienced by the infant as the mother’s breast (and then technically it would be called a “part object,” that is, a part of the mother’s body). However, the quality of the experiences with the real person determined whether the infant accumulated overall a more positive or more negative relationship with the important others and their internal counterparts, with direct implications for subsequent emotional and intellectual development.

Klein held the view that the infant was liable to attribute to the other motivations which, in fact, were experienced internally to the infant, as expressions of instinctual impulses. The question whether the experience of the object should be viewed as that with a real person in the real caregiving situation, or whether it should be conceived of as solely an internal representation of the infant’s own instinctual repertoire, became the focus of heated theoretical debate and controversy.

At the same time, in London, during the decades when object relations theory was being developed, Dr. Michael Fordham and some of his colleagues trained as Jungian analysts and founded the Society of Analytical Psychology, where they established analytic training for those working with adults and, later, for those working with children. They read with interest the innovative psychoanalytic contributions and began researches that sought to elaborate a coherent theory of infantile development consistent with the Jungian tradition, while able to benefit from and to some extent
incorporate the relevant new object relations findings and techniques, in particular those pertaining to early infantile development and the transfer-ence and countertransference. Closer scrutiny of these theoretical developments will allow a greater appreciation of why there was so much interest among certain Jungians in these areas of psychoanalytic inquiry.

**Klein, Winnicott, Bion: London Object Relations**

Certain Jungian clinicians found the Kleinian development to be the most approachable of the psychoanalytic investigations into early mental life. Klein’s conception of body- or instinct-based experiences as the root of all psychological contents and processes echoed the findings of Jung concerning the existence of deep psychological structures, which were grounded in instinctual experiences and represented mentally via archetypal images. In this way, Jung’s investigations could be linked to the reductive view of the psyche insofar as he examined, as did Klein, the earliest phases of mental life back to its very roots, to the earliest mental representations of instinctual experiences. Jung called these mental images of instinct or body-based experiences “archetypal images,” whereas Klein called them “part objects.” Despite the difference in language, they both referred to the early relationships of the self with the internal representations of the different functioning capacities of the caregiver. For example, in Jung’s language this was expressed as the experience of the dual aspects of the mother (the “Great Mother” or the “Devouring Mother”), while in Klein’s language it was expressed as the experience of the “good” and “bad breast,” such that the self was understood to experience the mother/breast (or, indeed, the analyst) as loving, nurturing, available, or poisonous, attacking, withholding, or empty, unexciting, or depressed. Thus, the quality of the experience that the self has in relation to the functioning of the other toward itself was of vital importance.

At the same time, Jung’s concept also refers to the spontaneous occurrence and presence of archetypal imagery as a function of the self as it develops over time, throughout the whole life-span, thereby able to generate new meanings that can carry the self forward creatively into the future, with the potential to tap into a universal cultural and imaginal reservoir. In this sense, the concept is richer and more complex than Klein’s concept of part objects, which essentially refers to the early world of the “paranoid/schizoid” position, prior to the achievement of whole object constancy in the “depressive” position.

Jung, in his work with psychotic adults, and Klein, in her work with the pre-Oedipal child, investigated essentially the same area of the psyche: that
which had not yet reached the later, Oedipal stages of early childhood development in which both good (protective, supportive, or nurturing) and bad (frustrating, aggressive, or limited) aspects of the same person could both be kept in mind. The gradual achievement of the capacity to relate to both good and bad aspects of a caregiver was described by Jung as the “integration and synthesis of the opposites.” Kleinians used the term “whole object” to express this capacity to have the knowledge of ambivalent feelings toward the caregiver. For both theories, this achievement could never be consistently available, but would always vacillate between greater or lesser capacities.

Both Jung and Klein proposed the existence of deep innate mental structures which directly link to and serve as vehicles for the earliest biological and instinctual experiences of the infant, expressed in terms of archetypal figures (Jung) or parts of objects (Klein). Both understood that the experiences that arise through these deep structures are mediated by real experiences of the environment, via the quality of nurturing and rearing made available. The attraction to Klein, especially for those Jungians who wished to incorporate the analysis of infantile material into their clinical practice, was the solid foundation in work with children applied to the understanding of the activity of early mental states in the experiences of adult patients.

Klein had also made a pivotal clinical contribution through the development of her play technique (Klein, 1920, 1955): an adaptation and application of traditional psychoanalytic technique to the treatment of very young children. She evolved methods of analyzing children through observing their play, enabling her to make substantial contributions to understanding early infantile states of mind. She inferred from her analytic work the states and processes whereby the infant and child organized their perceptions and experiences, both mental and physical, in terms of motivated impulses relating to body areas or parts located either internally or in the caregiver (usually, at first, the mother).

The aim of this early mental organization, according to Klein, was to protect the emerging self from the dangers posed by states of excessive emotion, such as rage, hatred, anxiety, and other forms of mental disintegration. Klein later thought that these intensely negative states would be directed back at the self if caregivers were incapable or inadequate in responding to them. Klein called these destructive impulses an innate death instinct. To protect itself against the ravages of such powerful emotions, the child would activate what were called primitive defenses (Klein, 1946). Just as the infant or young child is not sufficiently physically developed to carry out complex, integrative, and adaptive activities at the physical level, so too
the mental apparatus of the infant is not sufficiently evolved to manage by itself those tasks of thinking, perceiving, and emotional sifting and sorting adequate for its self-protection. In order to organize these mental and physical impressions, the infant would typically seek to establish by itself a rudimentary mental organization, especially if left by and large without adequate care. The processes by which this organization took place included such mental activities as splitting, idealization, and identification.

Jungians were accustomed to conceive of certain unintegrated mental states as the split aspects of the archetype, and used the concept of compensation to denote the psyche’s natural tendency to hold opposites in relation to each other. Klein’s findings through her clinical work with children appealed to some Jungians who sought to bring an understanding of early mental states and processes more directly into their clinical practice.

Klein showed that, depending on various factors, the good or bad experiences were felt by the infant to be located either internally or externally, through processes of identification such as projection and introjection. Hence, if the infant felt the source of the good feeling to be within, then the bad would be projected into and identified with the environmental caregiver, or parts of the caregiver, such as the breast. However, the bad feeling could be relocated (or “re-introjected,” in Kleinian language) within the self through further identificatory processes. These would be experienced as persecutory feelings, and would result in further splitting of good and bad feelings, leading to ever more projecting and reintrojecting activity. The quality of the environmental responses to these dramatic states, along with the infant’s own capacities for self-regulation, would determine his or her tendency toward normal and adaptive or pathological and maladaptive development. In Klein’s terms, this meant greater or lesser control and mastery over the death instinct, the instinct which seeks to destroy the good parts of the self.

In the Jungian model, the concept of enantiodromia is suggestive of a sudden collapse from one state into its opposite under certain conditions. Also, the term “shadow” is often used to denote those negative aspects of the self which are disavowed and therefore projected onto another.

Klein developed the notion of the paranoid/schizoid position to describe what happens when the infant is overwhelmed by feelings of possible annihilation of the integrity of the self as a psyche/soma system. The consequent anxiety that the self will be flooded by negative affects results in aggressive impulses toward the source of the bad feeling, wherever it is felt to reside. The death instinct was thus understood as the experience of aggressive impulses directed inwardly. Destructive, envious aspects of the self could become split off from the caring, loving aspects of self with the
resultant fear that the source of goodness had been destroyed. The defence against such an overwhelming negative experience was the splitting of the self or the splitting of the caregiver into only good or only bad characteristics, as demonstrated in Figure 7.1.

Klein elaborated a subsequent developmental phase, called the depressive position, in which the infant could experience feelings of remorse and concern about the effects of its aggressive attacks upon the internal representation of the caregiver or the real external caregiver. This occurred when the infant achieved the realization that its love and hatred were directed toward the same person. Experiencing the person as a whole brought unconscious feelings of ambivalence and an impulse to repair the damaged other, based on unconscious guilt.

Klein’s emphasis on affects as experienced in relation to the important functions of caregivers, or objects, in relation to the self led to her being considered as a founder of the British object relations school. Just as Jung conceived the archetypal images as figures, in personified form, innate to the psyche, giving mental representation to affect-laden instinctual experiences, so Klein thought of the internal representation of important caregivers, or parts of their bodies such as the breast, as the source of affects. The child’s experiences of the real caregivers were considered by Klein to be secondary to the innate conceptions and experiences that the child had in relation to that aspect of the caregiver that the child was relating to instinctually at any particular moment in its development.

A basic tenet of Jung’s theoretical approach concerned the importance of the quality of environmental mediation of early experience. This had a parallel in the understanding of the importance of the quality of interaction in the consulting room between the patient and the analyst. Jung had written extensively on certain aspects of the transference and countertransference, both in the clinical context (CW 16) as well as through the examination of alchemical imagery (CW 14). However, Jung had not studied in depth the infantile content in the relations between patient and analyst.

Many London Jungians found Winnicott’s clinical approach to the complex and sensitive relationship between infant and mother, and between
patient and analyst, particularly compatible with their own analytic prac-
tice, as summed up in his famous phrase:

“There is no such thing as a baby” meaning that if you set out to describe a
baby, you will find you are describing a baby and someone. A baby cannot exist
alone, but is essentially part of a relationship . . . (Winnicott, 1964, p. 88)

This denotes the importance that Winnicott gave to what happens at the
interface between the self and the other, between the experience of personal
creativity and of relatedness, in what he called “the third area.” By this he
meant that there is an area of experience which is neither internal nor
external, but rather a “potential space” between, for example, the infant
and mother, in which a shared and meaningful reality is created over time, a
position already emphasized by Jung.

Winnicott was especially interested in the crucial role of play and illusion
in the development of the self and its capacity for imagination and cre-
ativity. He thought that it was through the spontaneous gestures of play
that the sense of self developed in relation to another. In a typically para-
doxical formulation, Winnicott put forward the view that the true self of
the individual, the sense of uniqueness and being real, happened through
moments of illusion, where the inner world met and engaged with the outer
world, and where the boundaries between the two were blurred. Thus, the
infant’s illusion that he or she creates the breast because it appears at the
moment it is hallucinated. Similarly, when the experience of the archetypal
image, in Jung’s language, occurs simultaneously with the experience of the
real object, there is a match. The mother is “good enough” to meet her
infant’s omnipotent needs. If the infant’s spontaneous gesture is not met by
an empathic response on the part of the mother, perhaps of her own
depressive or anxious needs, then it is possible that the infant will experi-
ence a disruption in the sense of its developing self. If such negative
experiences accumulate disproportionately over time, the infant will erect
self-defenses through excessive adaptation to these external pressures. A
false self is thereby created to deal with the external world, while the true
self is protected from annihilation or fragmentation.

Winnicott shared Jung’s teleological view of human nature. His basic
premise was that, given a “good enough environment,” the infant and child
would have every chance to develop, grow, and be creative, despite inevitable
failures and frustrations in environmental provision. This view recognized
that, in large part, the infant’s physical and psychological protection was
dependent on the capacities of its caregivers.

As theory and clinical practice developed and interdeveloped in the middle
decades of the century in London, the status of such concepts as internal and
external objects became increasingly crucial. The contributions of Wilfred Bion were of particular interest to Jungians who focused much of their clinical attention on issues pertaining to the intersubjectivity of patient and analyst. Bion showed how early forms of communication based on “projective identification” could be understood as normal forms of empathic processes between infant and caregiver. Projective identification was a term used especially by Kleinians to denote an aggressive attempt to force a part of the self into another in order to take over or control an aspect of the other’s thinking or behaving, particularly in relation to the self. Bion emphasized the benign aspect of this in the infant–mother dyad where the mother could contain and detoxify often explosive physical or emotional states in the infant through her empathic responses.

Bion’s contributions made available new ways of thinking about certain aspects of the transference and countertransference whereby the analyst could experience him- or herself as responding or behaving toward the patient in a manner that reflected the projected content of the patient’s inner world. In later formulations, Bion conceived of projective identification in dynamic, intrapsychic terms, where parts of the self were seen as behaving in autonomous ways. For example, unwanted aspects of the self could be projected into external objects, then identified with and re-introjected as persecuting or damaging agents. Just as Jung’s work with psychotic patients had led him to formulate the notion of autonomous complexes, Bion’s work (Bion, 1957) with psychotic processes in his patients led him to devise a theory of internal objects as split-off aspects of the self that acquire a life of their own. Through a process of containment, whereby the caregiver receives and adapts to the mental contents projected by the infant, these elements are made available for further transformations.

Relatedness in the analytic setting: transference and countertransference

The theoretical elaboration of subtle and pre-verbal forms of communication from the earliest days of the infant’s life, based on the vicissitudes in the capacity for relatedness of both the infant as much as the caretaker, was increasingly understood to apply to analytic technique itself, and to the clinical role of the analyst’s countertransference in response to his patient’s primitive, non-verbal communications. Again, this area of psychoanalytic investigation was proximate to the Jungian interest in the states of participation mystique, in which the self, or parts of the self, are in states of identity with another. In psychoanalysis, this is termed “projective identification,” and is involved in the varieties and vicissitudes of the analyst’s and the patient’s mutual and reciprocal relationship. Variations in
empathy or negativity, and closeness or separation, in relation to the patient, were understood to be communications between analyst and patient. The analyst was no longer a neutral mirror whose technique of “free-floating attention” was used to ensure non-involvement in the patient’s inner world. Now it was considered an important part of technique that the analyst be available enough to be affected by the patient, but not in an abusive, impinging way. The valuable clinical information gleaned from the availability of both patient and analyst to these channels of communication echoed Jung’s early belief that the analyst had to be changed by the relationship with the patient in order for therapy to be effective for a patient. (CW 16, para. 163)

It was as if those Jungians interested in developmental understanding had found clinical and theoretical corroboration of Jung’s dual emphasis on the innate structures represented by the archetypal images and the central importance of the intensive and ongoing relationship between patient and analyst as it changed over time. At the same time, they found a developmental theory based on careful clinical observation and experience that seemed to have been missing in the Jungian opus, namely an understanding of early infantile states of mind and how they impact on the analytical relationship.

Winnicott had written convincingly about the link between the understanding of early infantile states of mind and analytic practice with deeply disturbed and regressed adult patients. He stated that adult patients treated intensively on the couch can:

... teach the analyst more about early infancy than can be learned from direct observation of infants, and more than can be learned from contact with mothers who are involved with infants. At the same time, clinical contact with the normal and the abnormal experiences of the infant–mother relationship influences the analyst’s analytic theory since what happens in the transference (in the regressed phase of some of these patients) is a form of infant–mother relationship. (Winnicott, 1965, p. 141)

Winnicott thought that the blurring of the self–object boundary led to transformations in the development of the self in the “transitional space” between the infant and mother, as well as between the patient and analyst. The infant’s experience of the transitional object as both “created and found” is similar to the patient’s experience of the well-timed interpretation which happens at the very moment of it being “realized” by the patient. Winnicott called this the mirroring capacity of the analyst, which, like that of the good caregiver, enables the growth of self in relation to the object. With the benefit of Daniel Stern’s major contribution to infant psychological
development (1985), analysts might be more inclined to use the vocabulary of “attunement” to indicate the importance of the quality of the match between both. The studies of Trevarthen (1984) in Scotland, and the work of other recent researchers, have indicated that, well before speech begins to develop, “pre-speech” exchanges between mother and infant which possess rhythm and pitch form a kind of “pre-music” dialogue between them which ensures interpersonal communication from birth onwards. Similarly, many other research findings indicate how attuned the infant is in many aspects of sense perception, thus allowing it to take in stimulation from and to interact proactively with its caregivers (see Alvarez, 1992, for a useful review of this research and its relevance to psychoanalytic theorizing).

The large body of research concerning the capacities of very young children to respond to stimuli from the environment well before the development of any speech facility, and to actively engage in relating to their caregivers in effective ways that do not require speech, indicates the significance of nonverbal communication in the consulting room. With the current understanding of the breadth and depth of these interactive capacities of the neonate, and possibly also of the fetus (see Piontelli, 1987, for intriguing evidence of the fetus’s capacity for learning and interaction within the intrauterine environment), there is every reason to believe that a significant proportion of the interaction in the consulting room includes both verbal and non-verbal exchanges. Infant observation has corroborated this view.

**Infant observation**

A tradition of infant–mother observational studies grew up in London from the late 1940s onwards: at the Tavistock Clinic from 1948, and at the Institute of Psycho-Analysis from 1960 (Bick, 1964). These studies provided regular close and detailed observations over a period from birth to more than two years. The one-hour observations take place weekly in the infant’s home with mother, and sometimes father and other siblings and caregivers. The observations are followed by weekly small group seminars in which the observations are discussed. The seminar format ensures that a number of infants are closely monitored and discussed by each of the groups.

Dr. Michael Fordham, the founder of the Developmental School, who was a child psychiatrist experienced in child analytic work, joined such a group, led by Gianna Henry from the Tavistock Clinic, in the early 1970s (Fordham, 1993). Subsequently, further groups were organized at the Society of Analytical Psychology, and in the Jungian analytic training of the British Association of Psychotherapists, where a two-year infant
observation became a requirement for training candidates and a pre-clinical M.Sc. degree in Human Development included a major infant observation component. These detailed observations and the discussions that take place around them have contributed to the development of Fordham’s theory on Jung’s notion of the self and its unfolding over the lifetime of the individual.

A culture of careful and non-intrusive observation was developed in which the scientific method was applied in an atmosphere that accepted that there were inevitable constraints in formulating theories concerning pre-verbal mental states. An important aspect of observing an infant in a non-active, non-intrusive way is the development within the observer of heightened sensitivity to information contained in non-verbal communications. This benefits the later capacities of the analyst to develop countertransference responsiveness, which had become recognized as an essential tool in the patient–analyst interaction.

**Fordham’s model**

Fordham’s theory has evolved over time and comprises several different elements which derive from his clinical experience and observational researches. The relevance to Fordham’s model concerning early object relations and the pathologies of the self, as well as the knowledge gleaned from the growing number of infant observations and concurrent seminars, allowed an expertise in childhood development to be established within Jungian psychological inquiry.

This expertise included the recognition of the importance of the subtle communications between patient and analyst that contribute to an enriched use of the countertransference in understanding early states of mind, and the close scrutiny of the changing transference and countertransference modalities within the treatment of the patient, even within one session and certainly over a long and intensive analytic treatment. To these elements Fordham contributed his own remarkable innovations of clinical and theoretical understanding that formed the foundations of what is now often referred to as the “Developmental School” of analytical psychology (Samuels, 1985). Although Fordham would not separate his developmental theory from other aspects of the Jungian tradition, especially the archetypal, there is no doubt that he introduced a new strand in Jungian theorizing that was grounded in intensive clinical work with very young children and the observation of infants, and was influenced by the object relations view of the importance of the earliest interactions with the infant’s caregivers. Fordham demonstrated the theoretical viability of integrating Jung’s interest in the origins and development of the self, including the many archetypal
configurations, with his own careful observations of how the young mind develops. In so doing, his achievement has been:

to give Jungians their childhood and a way of thinking about it and analysing it – not as one aspect of the archetypal relationship, but as the basis for the analysis of the transference within archetypal forms . . . [Thereby] he has shown how the psyche oscillates between states of mind – sometimes mature, sometimes immature – which continue with greater or lesser strength throughout the life of the individual. (Astor, 1995)

Through deductions from his clinical work, Fordham showed that the concept of the self, as first described by Jung, could be revised and grounded in infant development by positing a primary self, or original integrate. This primary integrate comprises the original psychosomatic unity of the infant, its unique identity. Through a series of encounters with the environment, initiated either from within or from without, called “deintegrations,” the individual gradually develops a history of experiences which, in successive “reintegrations,” build up over time to comprise the unique self of that individual. This is a phenomenological view of the self as an active instigator as well as a receiver of experience, which links both biological and psychological experience. The individuation process occurs through the dynamic adaptations that the self makes to its own activities both within itself and within its environment.

Fordham’s model describes how the self deintegrates through contact with the environment and subsequently reintegrates the experience through sleep, reflection, or other forms of mental digestion in order to develop and grow. Put more concretely, a part of the infant’s self is energized from within to meet an external situation, perhaps because it is hungry (it cries) or because the caregiver has come into its field (the mother smiles and talks to the infant). This kind of interchange, which in the early days happens most often between the infant and its mother or other important caregivers, is imbued with a variety of qualitative experiences – for example, there might be a good feed, with a sympathetic or attentive mother, or a disrupted one, or one in which the mother might be emotionally absent. The quality of the experience is reintegrated into the self, with resultant modifications in the structure and repertoire of the self, thus leading to ego development, as the ego is the most important deintegrate of the self. Fordham’s model ensures that infant development is understood as having physical, mental, and emotional content, where the self is actively engaged in its own formation and the realization of its own potential over time, while adapting itself to what the environment and particularly the caregivers offer in terms of the variety, quality, and content of experience.
Fordham’s achievement is to have integrated Jung’s pivotal concepts of the self and of the prospective nature and function of the psyche with a view of the psyche–soma development of the infant and child, at the same time demonstrating how this has a direct bearing on the understanding of what happens in the consulting room between patient and analyst and within each of them.

Fordham’s approach has been enriched by psychoanalytic contributions concerning the impact of early infantile states of mind on the experience between the adult patient and the analyst in the ever-changing and developing transference and countertransference situation. Astor (1995) has pointed out that Fordham’s understanding is linked to Jung’s view that:

the instability of the mind gives rise to fierce struggles internally, principally against negative forces of mindlessness, cynicism, and all their derivatives and perverse clothings. Throughout these struggles the beauty of the continuity of the self, of what Jung called the “prospective” nature of the psyche, with its capacity to heal itself, can carry forward the interested enquirer who does not give up the struggle. Fordham’s legacy is to have shown us, through his example and published work, that the self in its unifying characteristics can transcend what seem to be opposite forces and that, while it is engaged in this struggle, it is “exceedingly disruptive” both destructively and creatively. (Astor, 1995)

Jung was not interested in the various modalities of the infantile transference, but he did study early states of mind in his work with adult psychotics. Fordham showed how, in the transference, the energy previously directed into the symptom could be focused on, or transferred to, the person of the analyst (Fordham, 1957). Fordham brought together Jung’s emphasis on the “actual situation of the patient,” the here-and-now situation, and the clinical understanding of the transference of early childhood material into the analytic relationship, by examining the meaning of the constituent elements of the contemporary neurotic conflict of the patient.

If, however, the actual situation be defined as the totality of the present causes and the conflicts associated with them, then the genetic (historical) causes are brought into the picture in as much as they are still active in the present as contributing to the conflicts there manifested.

(Fordham, 1957, p. 82, cited in Astor, 1995)

The analysis of the transference is reductive, in the sense of analyzing psychological conflicts found in the here-and-now relationship between patient and analyst back to their childhood causes. The aim is to thereby simplify apparently complex structures back to their basic foundations. Fordham, with his long experience of working clinically with children, recognized that children could both receive projections from their parents.
and project their own affects into their parents, and he equally understood
that this process could also happen between patient and analyst. Thus,
Fordham, and those influenced by his work, began to place increasing
importance on the analysis of the transference through the use of the couch.
This enabled greater clarification and elucidation of the contents of complex
mental structures and their historical or genetic location within the patient’s
psyche.

At the same time, Fordham placed great value on Jung’s view of the
importance of the analyst’s availability to the patient’s inner world via a state
of mutual unconsciousness (CW 16, para. 364). He therefore increasingly
allowed himself to be affected by the relationship with the patient. This
experience could be thought of as a partial identification, whereby the ana-
lyst deintegrates in relation to the patient in order to better understand the
patient’s inner world. Fordham (1957) called this process of heightened
availability on the part of the analyst to projective and identificatory pro-
cesses from the patient’s unconscious the syntonic transference/counter-
transference. It involved:

... simply listening to and watching the patient to hear and see what comes
out of the self in relation to the patient’s activities, and then reacting. This
would appear to involve deintegrating; it is as if what is put at the disposal of
patients are parts of the analyst which are spontaneously responding to the
patient in the way he needs; yet these parts are manifestations of the self.
(Fordham, 1957, p. 97, cited in Astor, 1995)

Naturally, this capacity of the analyst would only be effective and useful
if the “affective stability of the analyst is maintained” (Fordham, 1957,
cited in Astor, 1995). Later he was to understand that what he had termed
“syntonic countertransference” was in fact parts of the patient that he had
projectively identified with. As such they belonged to the interaction
between patient and analyst and were therefore qualitatively different from
countertransference phenomena as usually conceived.

Jung’s recognition of the need for the analyst to be influenced by the patient
and the reciprocal nature of the treatment relationship is well documented
(for example, CW 16, para. 163 and CW 16, para. 285). The danger arose
if the analyst was available to the patient in a personal way that impeded the
patient’s freedom to explore his or her inner world with safety and without
undue impingement from the analyst. In grounding analytic treatment in the
understanding of the infantile transference, Fordham guarded against the
possible disavowal by the analyst of the analytic attitude through emphasis on
a certain kind of mutuality in the consulting room, which could run the risk
of being an abuse of the patient who was in a dependent relationship to the
analyst. The subjective openness of the analyst to unconscious communications from the patient did not imply equality in the analytic relationship. The analytic attitude was fostered by protecting the patient from undue self-revelations on the part of the analyst, thereby leaving the patient’s fantasies about the analyst available to be understood and be used as potential material for the patient’s inner transformation.

Many Jungians have found Fordham’s model helpful in showing how, through a process of deintegration and reintegration, the psyche accrues depth and identity over time. Equally, the model shows how impediments to this process may occur, when either inner or outer impingements interfere with healthy development, so that pathological or maladaptive states of mind result.

Recent developments

Jean Knox, a London trained Jungian analyst, has applied the evidence from the cognitive and neural sciences to help understand Jung’s notion of the archetypes as emerging from the deep organizing unconscious (Knox, 2003). Drawing on insights from attachment theory (e.g. Bowlby, 1988) regarding the importance of interpersonal relationships in the internal world of the child, Knox offers a model, based on scientific findings regarding the interaction between genetic potential and environmental influence that demonstrates the emergent self-organization of the brain. In particular, she argues that archetypes are “emergent structures resulting from a developing interaction between genes and environment that is unique for each person” (Knox, 2003, p. 8). For Knox, archetypes are image schema which provide the initial scaffolding for processes that organize and pattern experience, building over time as the child interacts with its environment.

Another Jungian analyst, Margaret Wilkinson, has also contributed to the growing interest in how recent findings from developmental and affective neurosciences can enrich and be enriched by Jungian analytic understanding of early cognitive and emotional development (Wilkinson, 2006). Drawing on the pivotal research findings in psychoneurobiology of Allan Schore (e.g. Schore 1996) and other leading researchers, she develops a particularly Jungian perspective on the link between neurological models of the brain and psychological models of the mind, including their implications for the clinical encounter between patient and analyst. Wilkinson shows that the development of the right hemisphere neural networks implicated in the higher cognitive and affective foundations result from the earliest emotional interactions between infant and carer. This has crucial relevance for the differential understanding and treatment of psychopathological
states often encountered in the consulting room, particularly in relation to
deficits arising from physical and emotional relational dysfunction and
trauma.

Wilkinson states that “in the infant the optimum development of circuits
in the prefrontal cortex, the early development of mind, is dependent on the
quality of the earliest experiences, with significant consequences for the
emotional growth of the young mind.” (Wilkinson, 2006, p. 8). In an earlier
paper (Solomon, 2000), I argued that an important implication of this
“system of reciprocal mutual influences” (Schore, 1996, p. 60), in which
both caregiver and infant are proactive and the quality of attunement
between them has a direct impact on the maturation of those cortical and
subcortical limbic areas that will eventually mediate socio-affective func-
tions, is that the infant thus participates directly in the formation of its own
neural structures in the development of its brain.

This crucial, scientifically based understanding of the participation of the
young child in the development of the neural structures underlying those
higher order levels of brain and mind functioning is especially appropriate
in linking with Jungian theories of the self and may be the source of those
processes of psychological growth and transformation that Jungians call
“individuation.” Indeed, we might even speculate that it is the infant’s
capacity to contribute to its own neurological development, a process that
recurs during adolescence and later in life, which underpins the psycho-
logical unfolding that Jung elaborated in his concept of the “transcendent
function” (CW 8).

Conclusion
This chapter has sought to offer an understanding of the theoretical and
clinical situation of analytical psychology in England which gave rise to the
so-called “Developmental School.” It is by necessity an overview which has
not included the contributions of many psychoanalysts and analytical
psychologists, both in England and elsewhere, who have made advances in
the theory of the development of infantile states of mind, and in the theory
of the pivotal role of the transference and countertransference in analytic
practice.

It is of course ironic that, in the field of depth psychology, the great
traditions of Freud and Jung have been kept apart by history, personal
philosophies, and professional politics. Seen as a whole, the movement of a
conjoint analytic tradition comprising psychoanalysis and analytical
psychology together might offer, despite whatever real differences may
exist, a more inclusive and potentially more creative arena in which fruitful
formulations in the broad area of depth psychology, in general, and the content and processes of the self, in particular, may take place.

NOTES
1. The specialized spelling of “phantasy” was used by Melanie Klein from the time of her early pioneering work in the analysis of children. Susan Isaacs formulated the notion of “unconscious phantasy” in 1943, in a paper given during the Controversial Discussions held at the British Psycho-Analytical Society (Isaacs, 1948). Unconscious phantasy is the mental representation of instinctual impulses, the psychological correlate of the individual’s biological nature, and is present from birth. Unconscious phantasy is differentiated from conscious fantasy, which is more like daydreaming, or wish fulfillment, a consciously available mental content.

2. The paranoid/schizoid position refers to early states of mental functioning prior to the development of the depressive position. In the paranoid/schizoid position, the child’s relationship to its objects, or caregivers, is characterized by defensive processes such as splitting and projection in order to manage a particular quality of persecutory anxiety, so that the object is alternatively experienced as either all good or all bad, and is perceived as a “part object,” such as a “good breast” or a “bad breast.” The depressive position is achieved when these parts are brought together into a more realistic perception of a “whole object,” toward whom the child experiences feelings of guilt and wishes for reparation. Throughout life, there is a progressive alternation between these positions, according to the various anxieties and defenses aroused by the psyche’s need for self-protection.

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Jung’s writings are peppered by seemingly throwaway comments and assertions that have contributed to Jungian analysis earning the reputation of being a psychodynamic therapy that does not concern itself much with the transference. For example:

I personally am always glad when there is only a mild transference or when it is practically unnoticeable. (CW 16, pp. 172–173)

When taken out of context, such statements can easily undermine the strength of an arc of development in Jung’s treatment of the transference which spans fifty years. Already in 1913, alluding to the transference, Jung wrote:

Thanks to his personal feeling, Freud was able to discover wherein lay the therapeutic effect of psychoanalysis. (CW 4, p. 190)

And toward the end of his life he is quite adamant when he states:

The main problem of medical psychotherapy is the transference. In this matter Freud and I were in complete agreement. (Jung 1963, p. 203)

Where Jung and Freud were very much in disagreement was in their views on countertransference, which Freud regarded as an unwelcome interference in the analyst’s receptivity to communications from the patient. This interference occurred when the patient activated unconscious conflicts in the analyst which had the effect of making the analyst want to counter the patient, in the sense of warding the patient off. Freud’s approach was to insist on the analyst recognizing and overcoming countertransference, a conviction which led him to apologize to his analysand, Ferenczi, for his failure to suppress countertransference intrusions (Freud, 1910).

Jung certainly recognized the dangers of countertransference, which can manifest themselves in “unconscious infection” and “the illness being transferred to the doctor” (CW 16, p. 176). It was this recognition that
underscored Jung’s initiative in pioneering compulsory training analysis for would-be analysts. But whilst being alert to the potentially deleterious effects of countertransference, Jung also characteristically opened himself to the gradual realization that countertransference is “a highly important organ of information” for the analyst. In 1929 he wrote:

You can exert no influence if you are not susceptible to influence ... The patient influences [the analyst] unconsciously ... One of the best known symptoms of this kind is the countertransference evoked by the transference.

(CW 16, p. 176)

This makes clear Jung’s view that the analytic relationship is one in which both parties are mutually involved in a dialectical process. Both patients and analysts are partners in a deep, dynamic interchange to which analysts bring their whole personality, training, and experience. Into the empty space that initially exists between the two parties there emerge the phenomena of transference and countertransference, an inextricably linked field of interaction that encompasses two people, two psyches; a field of interaction that becomes a major focus of the therapeutic endeavor.

In this chapter, I shall trace the development of Jung’s thinking on transference–countertransference, paying special attention to his amplification of the alchemical metaphor. I shall also describe the diverse developments amongst post-Jungians in the understanding of countertransference.

Transference

Jung’s propositions about transference can be broken down into five basic tenets, which are open to question and research:

1. transference is a fact of life;
2. transference needs to be differentiated from the “real” relationship between patient and analyst;
3. transference is a form of projection;
4. transference has an archetypal as well as a personal (infantile) dimension;
5. transference is in the service of individuation beyond the therapeutic encounter.

Transference as a fact of life

At the end of a day, it is possible to set aside a time to reflect upon the various meetings/encounters that have taken place over the last few hours. I use the terms “meetings/encounters” advisedly, since I am trying to make the point that there is an area in between in which we are not quite sure
which, if either, has happened. The connection breeds doubt, a word which comes from the Latin word *dubium*, meaning “of two minds.” The “other” is *the* other, or *another*. We are faced with a paradox. The first generates quite intense feelings, perhaps of longing, love, expectancy, fear, submission, etc.; the second heralds in other possibilities of imagination, fascination, and attraction or repulsion. Both contain within them feelings of familiarity and unfamiliarity; but the one is like stepping into a river in full spate and being carried away by the current; and the other is more like bathing in a still, shallow pool. One is fraught with imaginably unimaginable excitement and dread; the other is a dip into the confines of a well-defined container – like a bath – the effects of which can be dried off as part of continuing with ordinary life.

Recall, if you can, your first experience of falling in love. Along with all the rest of us you will probably have undergone a quite specific process, the sort of process that Jung underwent in relation to his wife, to the “anima,” to Toni Wolff, and possibly to others. I can summarize it as follows: one’s free-floating attention unconsciously scans the environment in search of a missing part of oneself and/or the other; it alights with unconscious accuracy on a person whose outward appearance seems to fit the internal/external image of the “other”; there is a compelling, often mutual attraction, and an instant feeling of fit; the first separation occurs, and in its wake there is a deep feeling of loss – not only of the other but also of oneself, or a part of oneself; then, over time reconnections are negotiated, and these lead, bit by bit, to disappointment and disillusionment. And one is back at the beginning – that space between “the” other and another where creative interaction can take place. Loss and possibility cohabit. In other words, transference–countertransference at least demands reflection.

You will notice that I am taking transference out of the consulting room because I cannot find any disagreement with Jung when he wrote:

> in reality it is a perfectly natural phenomenon that can happen to [the doctor] just as it can happen to the teacher, the clergyman, the general practitioner, and – last but not least – the husband. (CW 16, p. 172)

**Transference and the “real” relationship**

When analyst and patient first meet each other for a mutual assessment, it is likely that both relate for some of the time in a way that is transference-driven. But for much of the session both relate to each other as adult to adult. The patient scrutinizes the analyst’s persona and professionalism; clues about the analyst’s personality are sought in the location of the
consulting room and more specifically in its layout and contents. And the way the analyst conducts the interview is informative of professionalism, commitment, sensitivity, and empathy.

The analyst is not only engaged in trying to make deep contact with the patient’s suffering but is also mapping out the patient’s strengths and capacity to meet the practical and emotional demands of analysis. These latter include the willingness of the patient to persevere with the analysis when the going gets rough and feelings of hate, rage, or disappointment fill the analytic space. As Jung says:

“Ars requirit totum hominem,” we read in an old treatise. This is in the highest degree true of psychotherapeutic work. (CW 16, p. 199)

And it refers to both patient and analyst. This aspect of the relationship has come to be known as the “therapeutic alliance,” an alliance made between the conscious, adult parts of both parties principally in the service of the patient’s developing field of consciousness and expansion of conscious choice through the analytic process.

**Transference is a form of projection**

Whilst the psychoanalysts originally thought of transference as a displacement (Greenson, 1967, p. 152), Jung envisaged it as:

a specific form of the more general process of projection … a general psychological mechanism that carries over subjective contents of any kind into the object … is never a voluntary act … is of an emotional and compulsory nature … forms a link, a sort of dynamic relationship between the subject and the object. (CW 18, pp. 136–138)

The form is specific because the regularity and constancy of the analytic relationship and the setting tends to evoke and magnify both the process and the contents. An interesting feature of Jung’s definition is the phrase “into the object.” Projection elsewhere in his writing is thought of as a process of throwing something onto someone or something else, just as a projector throws an image onto a blank screen. This definition seems to foreshadow, although it does not make explicit, Klein’s notion of projective identification. This idea can be supported by Jung saying a little earlier in the same lecture at the Tavistock Clinic:

Speaking about the transference … One generally means by it an awkward hanging-on, an adhesive sort of relationship … the carrying over from one form into another. (CW 18, p. 136)
Within the transference, any aspect of the patient can be projected onto or into the analyst. Feelings, ideas, impulses, needs, fantasies, and images are all subject to this involuntary act. At first, many of these contents tend to be of an infantile nature. But as the analytic relationship grows and deepens, patients become less concerned with themselves and more preoccupied with the Self. This takes place as the result of working on the personal transference and the withdrawal of projections, of affects, impulses, and other psychic contents that the patient needs for unashamed living.

Transference has an archetypal dimension

Once these personal contents have been re-owned, Jung noted that:

The personal relationship to me seems to have ceased; the picture shows an impersonal natural process. (CW 9.i, p. 294)

For example, a much unloved and abused man had settled into analysis after a long period of testing his female analyst’s commitment and steadiness. A strong negative transference had prevailed featuring intense fear, shame, anger, and hostility. The analyst had patiently and painstakingly worked to understand and interpret her patient’s negativistic attitude with the good outcome that the patient was beginning to experience feelings of longing, fondness, and love. These were then distanced through a process of sexualization, which needed further reductive analysis of the relationship with his mother before a more synthetic, teleological approach could be introduced. At that point, the projection of the contrasexual image, the anima, could be reintrojected, enabling the patient to connect at a deeper level to his need for relationship with his Self as an inner source of love and security.

In discussing the archetypal transference Jung wrote:

It goes without saying that the projection of these impersonal images . . . has to be withdrawn. But you merely dissolve the act of projection; you should not, and really cannot dissolve its contents . . . The fact that they are impersonal contents is just the reason for projecting them; one feels they do not belong to one’s subjective mind, they must be located somewhere outside one’s own ego, and, for lack of a suitable form, a human object is made their receptacle. (CW 18, p. 161)

In terms of technique, then, it becomes clear that ideally the analyst has to use both objective and subjective, as well as reductive and synthetic interpretations. Both are in the service of individuation. Objective/reductive
interpretations form the essence of Jung’s second and third stages of therapy – elucidation and education; subjective/synthetic interventions constitute the work of the fourth stage, that of transformation. These are not exclusive of one another but, rather, form a labyrinthine spiral on which the infantile and the archetypal are encountered and re-encountered again and again both during and after analysis.

Transference in the service of individuation

As Fordham (1978) has pointed out, the emergence of the archetypal projections can form a watershed in an analysis. Those analysts well-versed in mythology and other amplificatory material can take it upon themselves to “educate” the patient, and to work under the illusion that the personal transference has been dissolved. Others may simply take it upon themselves to bear witness to “the impersonal natural process.” Yet others, wary of being wafted into lofty spiritual realms at the expense of losing touch with the instinctual, will adhere perhaps too closely to the infantile transference. But there is a middle path, that of thinking of the transference as a bridge to reality (CW 4, pp. 190–191), which entails the patient coming to relate to the analyst as he actually is and the patient discovering that:

his own unique personality has value, that he has been accepted for what he is, and that he has it in him to adapt himself to the demands of life. (CW 16, p. 137)

Jung’s understanding of the transference

In 1913, Jung was already acknowledging the infantile, personal transference and the process whereby the imagos of the parents were projected onto the analyst. He positively connoted this process, seeing in it a potential for the patient to separate from the family of origin, however erroneous the analyst, amongst others, might consider the chosen path. He soon realized that the analyst’s maturity and personality were of great importance and, with this in mind, began to advocate training analysis (CW 16, p. 137).

At about the same time, Jung was in correspondence with Dr. Loy. These letters stress the importance of sexualized transference acting as a means of achieving deeper empathy as a means toward greater “individualization”; Jung also, at this time, saw the seeds of growth in the negative as well as the positive transference.

Then there is a gap of eight years, during which Jung’s thinking seems to have developed along important lines. In “The Therapeutic Value of Abreaction” (CW 16), Jung proposed that the intensity of the transference
is inversely related to the degree of understanding between analyst and patient. Jung attacks the exclusive use of reductive analysis and suggests the addition of a teleological point of view. The transference is goal-seeking, the goal being the withdrawal of projections by both parties, particularly the patient. And great emphasis is laid on the personality of the analyst.

By 1926, in Two Essays on Analytical Psychology (CW 7), Jung was exploring the question of what happens to psychic energy when it is freed from the personal transference. He concluded that it reappeared as a: \[\text{a transpersonal control point} \ldots \text{I cannot call it anything else} - \text{a guiding function and step by step gathered to itself all the former personal over-valuations.} \]

(CW 7, p. 131)

This is a clear statement that he saw transference as a dynamic with its own in-built propulsion toward individuation.

It was in an alchemical text, Rosarium Philosophorum, that Jung found a visual amplification of transference, individuation, and the unfolding of the dialectic between the unconscious of the analyst and that of the patient. Jung’s commentary on the text and the ten woodcuts is extremely complex and difficult, drawing as it does on alchemy, mythology, anthropology, and so on. I shall attempt to condense it. Before doing so, I shall briefly examine Jung’s diagram, which I have modified for the sake of simplicity. The diagram depicts what Jung calls the “counter-crossing transference relationships ... the marriage quaternio” (CW 16, p. 222) (figure 8.1).

Line 1 refers to the conscious real relationship between analyst and patient and represents the therapeutic alliance. Line 2 is the unconscious relationship, which is characterized by projective and introjective identification. Line 3 is the analyst’s relationship with his/her unconscious, an internal communication channel that should, because of the training analysis and experience, be less blocked than that of the patient, represented by line 4.
Line 5 signifies the patient’s need for the analyst’s ego, and a channel for the patient’s projection; and the analyst’s conscious attempt to understand the unconscious of the patient. Line 6 is the analyst’s line for projection onto the patient, and the patient’s conscious access to the unconscious of the analyst.

In the woodcuts of the *Rosarium Philosophorum*, Jung saw illustrated a love story, the incestuous relationship between king and queen, brother and sister, conscious and unconscious, masculine and feminine. For Jung, the woodcuts illustrated developments within and beyond the transference of the individuation process. It is perhaps no accident that he chose the *Rosarium* to elucidate his thesis, since it is one of the few alchemical texts in which projection is made onto another person rather than onto chemical substances alone.

Of central importance throughout the woodcuts is the depiction of the *vas mirabile*, the “miraculous [i.e. alchemical] retort” within which the process of mutual transformation takes place.

The *vas bene clausum* (well-sealed vessel) is a precautionary measure very frequently mentioned in alchemy, and is the equivalent of the magic circle. In both cases the idea is to protect what is within from the intrusion and admixture of what is without, as well as to prevent it from escaping. (CW 12, p. 167)

The *vas* appears mainly as a bath containing the water of the unconscious, and represents the container in which the *prima materia* (= “first matter,” in sense of “essential being”) of analyst and patient, masculine and feminine, conscious and unconscious are transformed so as to produce the goal of individuation – the *lapis philosophorum* (“philosophical stone”) – that is, self-realization or individuation. The container refers to the analytic setting and to the analyst’s interventions which are required to keep the heat at a level of anxiety optimal to the patient’s self-discovery and the analyst’s development both as an analyst and as a human being.

At this point, the interested reader is referred to “The Psychology of the Transference” (CW 16), in which the woodcuts are reproduced. Their abstruse nature invites contemplation over years, partly because we are summoned directly into the realms of symbolic incest, which so often feels as if it could become actual; but the very agent of transformation lies in the capacity and the necessity within both parties of the analytic endeavor to live through and come to symbolize the sexuality of the erotic (Eros) and the compassion of charity (the ancient Greek for which is *agape*).

In Picture 1, the “Mercurial Fountain,” we see a fountain fed from below and above – the conscious and unconscious aspects of the relationship between analyst and patient, who in terms of analysis, are relatively impersonal.
Both may think of each other as virginal, dangerous, and life-giving. And all three contain some truth. Both are embarking on an unknown journey, and both have their resistances. The two parties can be transformed by Mercurius, the tricky one, he who abides at the threshold (of change); but there is a warning of which all analysts will take note in their assessment:

No fountain and no water has my like
I make both rich and poor men whole or sick
For deadly can I be and poisonous.

The fountain, the source, can therefore be the wellspring of psychic life, but Jung also likens it to the foetus spagyricus (“alchemical foetus”): that is, in developmental terms, to a neonatal state from which a new insight will grow. In this first woodcut, we also see the masculine and feminine portrayed as sun and moon, leitmotifs which permeate the series. This has often caused confusion, particularly in cases where the analyst and patient are of the same sex. We cannot take Jung concretely here. Rather we are left to explicate for ourselves the complexities arising from the admixture of different biological and psychological contrasexual combinations, as well as different attitude and function types. We, like him, have to struggle with the greatest possible confusion. Hetero/homosexual feelings, impulses, and fantasies need to blossom; that is, to be symbolized so as to be lived through.

In Picture 2, we are introduced to the protagonist and antagonist of the narrative: the king and queen, who are now more clearly related to sun and moon, brother and sister. They are in touch, but in a sinister (left-handed) way, a pathway often associated with the unconscious and, hence, with the beginnings of projective/introjective identification implied by line 2 of our diagram. I am referring to the dangers of boundarylessness, and the point at which the relationship can take off into lofty spirituality or the enactment of incest. Guarding against these dual dangers is the figure of the dove, that creature which returned to Noah with evidence that the flooding of the unconscious was now over. Here the mundus imaginalis (a “world of images”) is constellated (Samuels, 1989), where the tension between actual and symbolic incest is held, worked through, and transformed. Analyst and patient fall “in love” with each other; but there is no symmetry. In the analyst is evoked the image of the child-within-the-patient, who has therapeutic needs. The patient is put into a more difficult position because he or she is beginning to know about the analyst’s deficits. And it is these, when insisted upon by the patient, that help the analyst to review and reflect upon mistakes.

These begin to appear in Picture 3 (figure 8.2), the “Naked Truth,” which symbolizes both analyst and patient denuded of their personae. For example, the analyst might give the “wrong” bill to a patient or double-book an
appointment. The patient may get “lost” on the journey to the session. Shadow elements from both parties creep in, and Sol and Luna grasp each other indirectly through and across the two branches, already depicted in Picture 2 where one end of each is left in mid air. Analyst and patient are cornered at one time or another; essentially this is the beginning of total honesty in trying to discover, acknowledge, and work toward forgiveness (a long-term aim) of the shortcomings that both parties bring to the analytic quest, and toward self-forgiveness.

Picture 3 is a challenge to both parties to continue through the process of mutual transformation, watched over and impregnated by the dove, the Holy Spirit which unifies (possibly a reference to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity). Here we are into the realm of faith in the third that issues from
the two – faith in the analytic relationship. From the analyst’s side, this comes from the training analysis; the patient, on the other hand, is beginning to reside with discomfort in the area between the actual and the symbolic – between actual touching and feeling touched by the analyst’s symbolic touch. The union must therefore be symbolic rather than actual despite the passionate intensity of the affect between the two parties. Jung offers a reminder:

Incest symbolizes union with one’s own being, it means individuation or becoming a self ... it exerts an unholy fascination. \(\text{\textit{(CW 16, p. 218)}}\)

The alchemists were, in part, in revolt against the sexual asceticism of the Christian Middle Ages. They seem to have known about the age-old longing of lovers to immerse naked with one another in water – to fuse. And so, in Picture 4, “Immersion in the Bath,” the couple sit rather demurely, still joined together symbolically. Sol looks quite relaxed (a false position for the analyst) and Luna looks shyly towards her partner’s genital area. The ends of both wands are limp, but the potentially erotic nature of the coniunctio (“union”) is immanent. And it is generally thought that the water in the bath represents the unconscious – a state of fusion, known nowadays as projective identification. But Jung adds an interesting note:

I do not, of course, mean the synthesis or identification of two individuals, but the conscious union of the ego with everything that has been projected into the “you.” \(\text{\textit{(CW 16, p. 245, n. 16); my italics)}}\)

And the Holy Spirit maintains his vigilance – presumably a function projected onto or into the analyst but, sometimes, alas, the patient. Imagine this scenario: the patient comes out for a session, and talks. Apparently disjointed fragments of narrative, like a news broadcast, ensue. The analyst is lost and disturbed by “unknowingness.” Feeling that no meaningful contact has been made in the session, the analyst pats the shoulder of the patient as the latter leaves the consulting room and says: “See you tomorrow.” The patient instantly “knows” that the symbolic attitude has been lost and is filled with despair and longing. The initiation of baptism into symbolism has been lost, and the patient has been left with tantalization.

Any thought that Picture 5, the “Coniunctio Sive Coitus” (“love-making or sex”), is an invitation to sexual enactment is dispelled by Picture 5a (figure 8.3), in which the incestuous couple are seen with wings despite the fact that the water refers “to the boiling solution in which the two substances unite” \(\text{\textit{(CW 16, p. 250)}}\). The tension between spirit and instinct is held throughout the series, although it takes different forms. Notice also that the left hand reappears, Sol’s tentatively exploring Luna’s breast, and
Luna’s travelling toward her lover’s penis. Whilst he looks at her, she is looking out, beyond the couple. For what? I wonder, and Jung answers:

let no day pass without humbly remembering that everything has still to be learned. (CW 16, p. 255)

What Jung says exactly portrays the states of mind of the couple who are deeply in love and (I would add in the therapeutic relationship) in hate. The honeymoon of idealization is at an end; the frustration of the longing to be connected is at its height. Analyst and patient seethe under the guise of fermentation: a loving, loathing concoction that leads to a temporary state of death. Death, Picture 6: it is stated that:

Here King and Queen are lying dead  
In great distress the soul is sped.

The vas mirabile has become a sort of sarcophagus, a word which means “flesh-devouring,” a projection of the death-dealing aspects of the Great
Mother, and an image conjured up to us by the coffin. The flow of the Mercurial fountain of Picture 1 is at a standstill. And yet, the picture’s title suggests conception through rotting – putrefaction. This is the darkest time, the time of despair, disillusionment, envious attacks; the time when Eros and Superego are at daggers drawn, and there seems no way forward. This, in alchemical treatises, is called the *nigredo*, the blackening. One has to have faith in the regenerative capacities of compost through long periods of apparent inertia, inactivity, and, most importantly, despair. Faith in the process, faith in the relationship, the analyst’s faith in method/technique have to be counterbalanced, to my mind, at this stage by an absorption into total doubt, which, clinically, is usually enunciated by the patient as abandonment or psychotic relating, the latter of which is sometimes of the analyst’s making. There occurs empathic failing, which ultimately can be therapeutic; but its therapeutic efficacy rests upon the analyst’s persistent self-analysis, aided by the patient’s cues.

Picture 7, not surprisingly, is a paradox. The “Ascent of the Soul” is juxtaposed with being impregnated. The longed-for deathly state of fusion veils the realization that projective identification leads inevitably to loss of soul, not egolessness but a loss of the experience of I-Thou, Ego-Self, conscious-unconscious relatedness. There are one body, two heads, and a *homunculus* up in the clouds. This may lead either to a continuation along the path of individuation or to psychotic disintegration/dissociation/splitting. The *vas mirabile* has been swiveled slightly to the left, and its right extremities are shaded – at a deeply unconscious level. We can think of this as denial of difference – and the projection of hope and separation, split off into an analytic child – such as an idea, or a Messianic interpretation.

Picture 8 is subtitled “Mundificatio” (the “making of the world”) – a profound allusion to the primal scene. We could call it “coming back to earth,” but this is a process which is beyond and outside the conscious egos of both participants. What was black now slowly becomes white; the *nigredo* of despair and loss of soul are now followed by the falling of the heavenly dew, which prepares the soil of the analytic relationship for the return of soul, transformed. To get in touch with this process bodily, take a walk through the mist, and dwell in the sensation of being soaked to the skin without immediate realization.

The feet of the couple have been transferred from the extreme left of the *vas* (its sinister, dark side) to a more centrally positioned place. The legs are in a position to open equilaterally; and whilst Luna continues to look outside and beyond the *vas*, Sol looks up at the falling dew, the divine, the numinous. At this stage, the analyst relies even more on the powers of Logos (interpretation) and Agapaic Eros (compassion). The two were never disjoined,
but they can now be put together in a statement from the analyst which conveys an understanding of the need to suffer through relinquished enchantment, with its deepest joys, sadnesses, and intense frustrations.

“Animae jubilatio” means “the joy of the soul.” It is the title above Picture 9, which is also called “The Return of the Soul.” Analysts tend to be more familiar in the early stages of analysis with pain, suffering, and sorrow than with joy. But it is this very feeling that accompanies the patient’s gradual process of self-discovery that had as its origins the feeling of tentative enjoyment of immersing in the bath:

Yet, although the power of the unconscious is feared as something sinister, this feeling is only partially justified by the facts, since we also know that the unconscious is capable of producing beneficial effects. The kind of effect it will have depends to a large extent on the attitude of the conscious mind.

But hope has to be balanced. The celestial/chthonic dimensions of Picture 1 are revisited in Picture 9. Notice the two birds (analyst and patient?), apparently addressing one another. One is on terra firma; the other, emerging – or sinking – Materia and spiritus, body and soul. Once again, analyst and patient are caught between the opposites, where the coincidentia oppositorum (“meeting of opposites”) leads to the growing awareness that it is “the body that gives bounds to the personality” (CW 16, p. 294). In clinical practice, for example, we can think of the schizoid personality, who, for so much of the time, tends to oscillate between feeling disembodied (depersonalized) or trapped, often with bad feelings, inside the body, or the mother’s body. The one is agoraphobic; the other is claustrophobic. Hence the tendency for the schizoid person to dwell at the threshold. The task is to facilitate embodiment.

And so to Picture 10 (figure 8.4). The corvex, the raven, looks upon the scene – the representative of death! In another version, there is a Pelican, an icon of Christ, pecking at itself in order to feed its young. The hermaphrodite, mythically, sexually, and spiritually a sophisticated version of the androgyne, is born from the unio mystica (“sacred/secret union”), looking toward right and left (conscious and unconscious), and firmly standing on the moon, the lunatic, which is looking upward and into the genital area, which is enfolded in her crescent. Both patient and analyst have traveled further along the path of individuation; both have been transformed by the work. The patient it is hoped, has introjected the analyst as a helpful figure, and has internalized the analytic relationship, which will continue to act as a positive, potent inner resource, particularly during difficult times. The analyst likewise has enlarged and deepened his or her clinical experience and expertise, and has changed primarily as a result of his or her mistakes and failings.
To conclude this section, I can do no better than to quote Jung:

The transference phenomenon is without doubt one of the most important syndromes in the process of individuation; its wealth of meanings goes far beyond mere personal likes and dislikes. By virtue of its collective contents and symbols it transcends the individual personality. . .  

(CW 16, p. 323)

**Post-Jungian developments**

In terms of the elucidation of the transference, contemporary Jungians owe much to Michael Fordham, whose work has had as its primary thrust the tracing of the transference to “its roots in infancy and childhood in a way that is congruent with Jung’s formulation” (Fordham, 1957). A further
development lies in his pioneering work with the delusional transference, where the “as if” components of the relationship become temporarily lost (Fordham, 1974), and the patient reverses the analyst–patient relationship in such a way that the analyst feels that he or she is the patient. Confusion reigns, and it becomes vital for the analyst to hang on to the analytic stance as a way of keeping in touch with and relating to the hidden healthy aspects of the patient.

This approach is echoed by Perry in his work with psychotic patients, which illustrates the need for therapists to immerse themselves in the psychotic/delusional transference so that there can be a commingling of personal and collective transference elements, the interpretation of which lead to “a shift from concerns of power and prestige to ones of lovingness and social harmony” (Perry, 1953). This theme is taken up by Ledermann (1982) in her work with deeply wounded narcissistic personalities, and by Redfearn (1978) in his work with schizoid and psychotic personalities.

A middle position between a classical approach and that of those who adhere to the “Jung–Klein” hybrid is taken by Peters (1991), who sees the transference as a libidinal attachment to the analyst and/or to a figure in the patient’s external world. He advises that relentless and mechanical interpretation of the transference to the analyst can become an imposition on the patient, and so, by implication, can result in the patient’s pathological compliance with the analyst’s method. I may be overstating his case if I suggest that this sort of mechanistic approach acts as a contributor to interminable and addictive analyses.

Of central importance to the work of the alchemists was a bridged split, that between the laboratorium (“work-place”), in which their experiments took place, and the oratorium (“place for discourse”), which provided a psychic and physical space for reflection and meditation on the work of transformation. The oratorium has come to be the internal or external temenos (“sacred space”) of supervision, in which the analyst “looks over and overlooks” (super-videt) his/her subjective experience of the patient. This subjective experience has come to be called the “countertransference,” and it can range from the neurotic countering of the transference by the analyst to the processing of information about the patient through constant self-analysis of the analyst’s subjectivity. It is to this reciprocal dimension of the analytic relationship that I now turn.

Countertransference

Unlike Freud, Jung left us with remarkably few examples of how he actually worked. But he does seem to have been the first analyst to have recognized
the therapeutic and anti-therapeutic potential in countertransference. His early insistence on “training analysis” sprang from his belief that analysts could only accompany their patients as far as they had themselves reached in their quest for self-realization. This standpoint, however, seems no longer entirely valid. Its invalidity rests on the supposition that the analyst can potentially empathize and identify with any psychic content within a patient. For example, it is possible to work with victims of catastrophes without having experienced the same actual catastrophe. What is important is that the analyst can be in touch and relate to his/her own internal per- secutor/victim complex. What is more likely to limit the analyst is the vertex, or point of view, from which the dialectic is viewed. This is why I included the analyst’s external world and training body in the diagram of the transference. Analysts can also act as containers for apparently incomprehensible aspects of their patients whilst the latter gain distance and the advantage of objectivity. Furthermore, analysts can act as companions and witnesses to experiences unknown to themselves, but always waiting in the wings of the theater of life. Nonetheless, Jung was alert to the dangers of blind spots in the analyst, and to the hazards of mutual psychic infection and contagion. And again and again, in different ways, he stresses the importance of the analyst’s personality as “one of the main factors in the cure” (CW 4, p. 260).

In contrasting his methods with those of Freud, Jung wrote about the necessity of the patient’s illness being transferred into the personality of the analyst, and of the necessity of the analyst being open to this process. The analyst “quite literally ‘takes over’ the sufferings of [the] patient and shares them” (CW 16, p. 172). It is through this process that the personalities of both parties are transformed. It is, therefore, expected that the analyst will have very strong reactions to the patient, and these might include physical illness as well as exposure to the “overpowering contents of the unconscious” which might become a source of fascination (CW 16, p. 176).

In his later writings on countertransference, Jung draws on the myth of Asklepios, the “wounded healer.” It is the analyst’s suffering which is the essentially curative factor. And he goes so far as to say: “Unless both doctor and patient become a problem to each other, no solution is found” (Jung, 1963, p. 142). But it has been left to the post-Jungians across the globe to explore and fill in the lacunae left by Jung in his writings on countertransference. Post-Jungian developments can be summed up in Machtiger’s assertion that “It is the analyst’s reaction in the countertransference that is the essential therapeutic factor in analysis” (Machtiger, 1982). What she means here is that the analyst must interpret and make use of his or her subjective responses and fantasies in making sense of the analysand’s material
and experiences. The skill and competence of the analyst in using this countertransference will determine, in large part, the success or failure of the analysis.

In 1955, Robert Moody wrote about his work with a child patient, during which he recognized that his unconscious had been at times activated in a way that he thought merited attention (Moody, 1955). At such times, he found himself relating and behaving in a way that was out of the ordinary in a therapeutic context, whilst simultaneously closely monitoring the interaction that was taking place at an unconscious level between himself and the child. Although wary of the possibility of a censorious reaction from some readers, Moody believed that:

As this material emerges within the reciprocal transference relationship, it can be handled in a way that is decisively – and sometimes rapidly – therapeutic.

(Moody, 1955, p. 52)

Plaut (1956) sought to differentiate the analyst’s responses in the face of personal and archetypal projections. The first, because of their proximity to consciousness, can be fairly readily reintegrated by the patient and will not unduly affect the analyst. But the second, because of their numinosity and powerful affect, pose a risk to the analyst of becoming identified with them and “incarnating” them. It then becomes important to contain the projection until the patient’s “ego becomes stronger, so he is able to notice the symbol concealed within the image” (Plaut, 1956, p. 159).

Articles by Strauss (1960), Davidson (1966), Gordon (1968), and Cannon (1968) may be grouped together since all these analysts are concerned from their different vertices with the playful use of transference–countertransference material in an encounter between ego consciousness and the unconscious, not unlike the method of active imagination.

Fordham’s thinking on “the reciprocal transference relationship” has spanned some forty years. In an early contribution, Fordham defines countertransference in a fairly classical way as “almost any unconscious behavior of the analyst” (Fordham, 1957). But later, he prefers to restrict the use of the term “countertransference” to refer to those times in analysis when “the interacting systems become obstructed”; in other words, when the analyst blocks the projections and projective identifications of the patient (Fordham, 1985, p. 150). Early on he distinguished two types of countertransference – the illusory and the syntonic. The first is thought to be neurotic and occurs when unconscious conflicts in relation to a person in the analyst’s past have been stirred up and are interfering with the therapeutic space. But the situation can be remedied through supervision and further self-analysis. Syntonic countertransference is a state in which the
therapist is empathically closely tuned in to the patient’s inner world and therefore could potentially experience aspects of the patient possibly before the patient is conscious of them. Fordham’s findings are synchronistic with those of Racker (1968), whose work on complementary and concordant countertransference was further explicated by Lambert (1981).

Three analysts have been concerned with the shadow aspects of countertransference – Guggenbühl-Craig, Groesbeck, and Lambert. The first two draw on Jung’s later references to the Wounded Healer. Guggenbühl-Craig warns of the dangers of inflation and splitting in members of the helping professions, whereby the “wounded” pole of the archetypal image gets projected onto and left with the patient, who in turn projects the “healer” pole onto the analyst (Guggenbühl-Craig, 1971). This theme is developed by Groesbeck (1975), who maintains that both analyst and patient need to withdraw these projections so that the inner healer is activated in the patient. Lambert sees the shadow of countertransference in the enactment of the talion law, where the patient’s attack is met by counter-attack, which greatly diminishes the patient’s trust and acts as a replay of previous damaging relationships. At such times, the analyst has lost empathy with the patient and is under the sway of a complementary countertransference, in which the analyst is identified with and behaving like the patient’s negative internal object(s) (Lambert, 1981).

Mario Jacoby’s work on transference–countertransference is innovative in that it introduces the notion of a spectrum of countertransference responses rather than a dichotomy of neurotic and non-neurotic. Jacoby (1984) has also incorporated Kohut’s ideas about “self-objects,” merging, mirroring, and idealizing transferences and their counterparts in the analyst; and he makes specific reference to the delusional countertransference, in which the analyst abdicates from his or her symbolic approach to the interactional field.

This field has been the subject of a research project carried out by Dieckmann and colleagues, who came up with the startling and yet not so startling conclusion that “the self constellates the synchronicity of fantasies in two persons” (Dieckmann, 1976, p. 28). This was reached by the analysts taking careful note of their own material, associative to that of their patients. This remarkable correspondence had as its shadow the growing realization that resistance is a shared problem between patient and analyst, and not the patient’s prerogative.

Dieckmann’s emphasis on synchronicity and the extended influence of the Self closely approximates Schwartz-Salant’s (1989) view that therapy is a process in which two people mutually constellate the unconscious. Schwartz-Salant’s approach to countertransference is highly idiosyncratic: it is based
on the development in both patient and analyst of a capacity to experience and participate in a shared, imaginal realm, which exists outside of space, time, and any notion of causality, and which manifests itself primarily in coniunctio imagery.

Goodheart (1984) has incorporated into Jungian thinking a model devised and refined by the psychoanalyst Robert Langs. The kernel of the Goodheart–Langs hybrid is a model of conscious, continuous internal supervision, whereby the validity of every analytic intervention is tested against the patient’s subsequent unconscious communications. These authors maintain that the patient is constantly seeking to correct the analyst, to keep him or her on course, so to speak. So emphasis is laid on the patient’s unconscious communication about analyst error, and this is particularly so when the analytic frame – the fee, time, place of meeting, and so on – is altered, a phenomenon which leads to the triggering of unconscious narrative in the patient. This approach, along with others, relies on the analyst carefully processing countertransference information simultaneously with the symbolic meaning of what the patient is unconsciously communicating.

Effectively acting as a bridge between Fordham, Lambert, and Racker, on the one hand, and Schwartz-Salant, on the other, Samuels (1985) has introduced the terms “reflective” and “embodied” countertransference, maintaining that the “analyst’s inner world is the via regia into the inner world of the patient.” Put another way, both analyst and patient contribute to and are part of a shared imaginal realm, in which bodily responses, feelings, and fantasies can be viewed imagistically. Reflective countertransference consists of the analyst’s experience of the patient’s internal state, such as a feeling of sadness, for example. Embodied countertransference is that state where the analyst experiences him- or herself as if he or she were a particular person or sub-personality from within the patient’s psyche. Samuels also pays special attention to the erotic transference–countertransference field, in effect grounding and embodying the lofty image of the “sacred marriage” to the extent that he states: “In order for psychological transformation to result from analytical interaction, that interaction must acquire and radiate something of an erotic nature” (Samuels, 1989, p. 187). His more recent contribution (Samuels, 1993) widens his view of countertransference and takes it into the arena of politics, where “a political valuing of a citizen’s subjectivity” is envisioned as the via regia to “the culture’s social reality” (Samuels, 1993, p. 28). This is quite revolutionary thinking, the implications of which are beyond this review.

In this section, I have tried to show how post-Jungians have built upon Jung’s pioneering work on the countertransference. Many of these developments have taken place alongside and been informed by the very
extensive literature that has been contributed by the psychoanalysts, starting with Paula Heimann’s (1950) seminal work and continuing up to the present day.

There remains an area of confusion between countertransference and projective identification. There appears to be a general consensus that the latter contributes to countertransference experience, but is not its sole content. Projective identification, which is the developmental precursor of empathy, is a primitive process, primarily a defense against separateness and, in Gordon’s view (1993, p. 216), is “the psychic equivalent of fusion.” Its aim is to transmit unassimilable contents of the psyche–soma into someone else, with the unconscious aims of communicating them, of controlling them and the other person, and of creating a state of merger with the other. Its normal variant can be thought of as a mode of communication, and its pathological variant as a mode of evacuation. It is closely related to Jung’s *participation mystique*, in which there is no differentiation between subject and object. Part of working through the countertransference lies precisely in achieving differentiation and trying to establish what belongs to whom in the analytic dyad.

The transference–countertransference dynamic is mainly a *mysterium coniunctionis*. And I would stress the word “mystery.” Sometimes, it is also a *mysterium disiunctionis* – enshrined in the memories of patients and analysts as some sort of misfit, mismatch, impasse, a deep failure of relationship. Then we can take heed of Jung, once more:

> The psychotherapist learns little or nothing from his successes, for they chiefly confirm him in his mistakes. But failures are priceless experiences, because they not only open the way to a better truth, but force us to modify our views and methods.  
> *(CW 16, p. 38)*

The persistent and consistent attention paid to the deep exchange between patient and analyst (the transference–countertransference dynamic) over the last third of a century following Jung’s death bears testimony, I think, to the shared quest amongst Jungian analysts, of whatever persuasion, of learning to process and understand the complexities and subtleties of the analytic encounter.

**REFERENCES**


Transference and countertransference

Me and my anima: through the dark glass of the Jungian/Freudian interface

The present day shows with appalling clarity how little able people are to let the other man’s argument count, although this capacity is a fundamental and indispensable condition for any human community. Everyone who proposes to come to terms with himself must reckon with this basic problem. For, to the degree that he does not admit the validity of the other person, he denies the “other” within himself the right to exist – and vice versa. The capacity for inner dialogue is a touchstone for outer objectivity.

(W. Blake, 1790)

When Polly Young-Eisendrath first asked me, sometime in 1995, to write this essay on the interface between analytical psychology and other psychoanalytic schools, it sounded like a daunting task and I doubted that I was qualified to undertake it. I equivocated, asking her what exactly she meant by “other psychoanalytic schools.” “Oh, you know,” she replied with an ambiguous smile, “hermeneutical approaches, object-relations theory, interpersonal psychology, the various ‘self’-psychologies, Kleinian theory, and your personal favorite, drive theory.” I felt an immediate sense of relief, born of a deep inner certitude that I would be utterly incapable of writing such an essay.

Well, to be honest, Polly didn’t actually say “and your personal favorite,” but it’s the sort of thing she might have said. We had been discussing such matters for ten years (1985–1995) in a weekly study group of psychologists and psychiatrists. It was a fascinatingly, sometimes frustratingly, diverse group, but we all shared two beliefs: first, that “the child is father of the man” – otherwise known (by academics) as the developmental perspective; and second, that the search for truth requires a dialectic of differing perspectives – otherwise known (by normal people) as the need to argue. True to that need, I’m sure everyone else in the group would have groaned in dismay at my misapplication of Wordsworth’s line. The idea that a child can father himself suggests that an individual is self-contained, has a private
line of development, and can be considered in isolation from the interpersonal matrix of family and society. “No, no!” my friends would have protested. “An individual is constituted by and develops in an interpersonal context, always in relation to an expanding world of others, starting with mother.” They would have tendentiously quoted Winnicott’s (1960) comment that there is no such thing as a baby, and smugly insisted that I should have said “the dyad is parent of the person.” Especially Polly, who was fond of arguing that an individual private self is a social fiction, the shared construct of a culture dominated by men who are terrified of relatedness.

Of course Polly would also have acknowledged that Jung’s central preoccupation and focus was nothing other than the development of a private self considered in isolation. She calls herself a Jungian, but she is an unorthodox, reconstructed one. And that’s the kind of Freudian she accuses me of being. I claim that the psychoanalytic process, in both its Jungian and Freudian evolution, is quintessentially a process of getting in touch with one’s private self, in its discernable distinctness from one’s socially constructed self. This is not what most Jungians think most Freudians believe or practice. Jung (1975) complained that Freud’s was a system of stereotyped reductive interpretations, aimed primarily at improved social adjustment, explaining everything in terms of an innate infantile disposition to perverse hedonism. That’s the prejudiced view Polly would have been implying had she actually said “and your personal favorite” before she said “drive theory.” She didn’t. I only imagined it, but once the words came spilling out onto my computer screen, I had to respond to them. Before long, I found that what I had originally intended as a brief personal introduction to the essay was turning into an extended imaginary dialogue between me and my image of Polly – a creative product of my deeply private self, filtered through years of social construction with Polly and my other friends in the study group.

I now had a decision to make. Should I “go with the flow” of my creative impulse and write the entire essay as an imaginary dialogue – a scene from my own inner drama – or should I opt for the more traditional academic presentation that readers would expect to find in a *Cambridge Companion*? I decided to compromise, going with the inner dialogue but adding the brief academic preamble which begins with the next paragraph. This was not unlike my strategy in the book I was then writing – *Healing the Soul in the Age of the Brain: Becoming Conscious in an Unconscious World* (2001) – in which I tried to weave the principles of psychoanalytic theory and practice into stories of my personal experiences as a clinician, philosopher, writer, and human being.

This chapter is intended to be read at two levels: the level of content and that of process, or form. At the level of content it is a discussion of similarities
and differences between Jungian and Freudian psychology. At the level of process it is a dramatic enactment, in the form of an inner dialogue, of the Jungian concept of the anima – more specifically of the relationship between a man (me) and his anima (my image of Polly). The anima is the unconscious female aspect of a man’s personality (the animus being the parallel unconscious male aspect of a woman’s), with which he is in perpetual conflict but must ultimately come to terms if he is to attain the level of maturity that Jung refers to as individuation.

The anima can be considered as a general form – an archetype – or as a particular embodiment of the archetype in an individual – a personal complex. An archetype is a psychological/motivational pattern inherent in the human nature of all people – “a typical basic form, of certain ever-recurring psychic experiences,” as Jung defined it (CW 6, p. 444). Its universal features are represented in myths (typical anima-myths being those of Eros and Psyche, Pluto and Persephone, Perseus and Medusa), which are distilled cultural expressions of archetypal motifs. But for any archetype, each individual will have his or her own particular version – a complex, that varies from one person to the next, depending on life experiences and constitutional factors. This complex is a stable attitudinal/emotional/motivational pattern within the overall personality of an individual.

In any relationship with a woman, a man will tend to project elements of his anima-complex, as an image, onto the woman – perceiving her through filtering lenses that reveal only those aspects of the real woman that conform to the unconscious prototype in his anima. This will lead to a subtle skewing of his attitudes and responses to her, based not on how she actually presents herself but on the anima-image he projects onto her (which affects his interpretation of how she presents herself). Thus in relating to a real woman a man is also trying to relate to the disowned female part of himself, dialectically working toward a higher level of integration within his conflicted self-experience. The famous “battle of the sexes,” owes its ubiquity to this fact (and to its parallel manifestation in women). It expresses in externalized form the inner conflict from which every man and woman suffers.

When the projection of the anima and subsequent battle with the “anima-bearer” happen in a patient’s relationship with his psychoanalyst (as sooner or later they always do) they constitute the transference.

Transference . . . is usually understood as the tendency to react to another person as if he or she were an emotionally important figure from childhood; the idea being that feelings about a person from the past (memory of which is being resisted) are “transferred” onto a person in the present . . . In addition, and more significantly, transference is the tendency to react to another person
as if he or she were an emotionally important but unconscious part of oneself. Here ... (w)e recognize in the other person something we cannot tolerate recognizing in ourselves, so that our feelings about something internal are “transferred” onto someone or something external ... The philosopher Kierkegaard identified this latter dimension of transference (without calling it that) as “an inverted image of the internal,” in which what is threatening to emerge into awareness from inside is experienced as something pressing in from outside. (Frattaroli, 2002, pp. 69–70)

When the analyst, who inevitably has a countertransference emotional response to this unconscious transference projection, is conscious enough of that response to be able to use it in a non-reactive, non-judgmental way toward a deeper empathic understanding of the patient, then what would otherwise become a transference–countertransference battle becomes instead a dialectical process of integration (individuation), that ends when the patient can say – à la Walt Kelly’s cartoon character Pogo – “We have met the anima, and she is us.”

In an imaginary dialogue like the one I am about to present, the “real” Polly won’t be there to process and respond to my transference projections, so her half of the dialogue – while it will bear some resemblance to the “real” Polly as I have known her – will reveal my projected anima-image more prominently than it would appear in a “real” conversation. Even such real conversations are largely imaginary, however, in that a man’s projection of his anima image tends to provoke a countertransference response in which the woman counterprojects her animus image, thereby enacting the man’s projected image and co-creating with him a battle of the sexes. (See Frattaroli, 2002, pp. 228 ff.)

Some readers may consider an interior dialogue or an interpersonal conversation, whether real or imaginary, too subjective and personally revealing a form in which to discuss general psychological principles. Yet it is actually the only form in which the phenomena these principles have been formulated to describe can actually be observed. In addition, it is more conducive to scientific objectivity than is traditional academic writing, which creates an illusion of objectivity by removing all reference to the subjectivity of the writer.

In fact, observations of inner experience cannot be divorced from the subjectivity of the observer, much like observations in nuclear physics, where an elementary particle cannot be clearly distinguished from the observer’s observational framework. Scientific objectivity in such situations – where the observer constitutes an important part of what is observed – requires a full description of the observational framework, which, for introspective/empathic observations, means the personality conflicts, foibles, and prejudices,
as well as the specific emotional reactions, that might have influenced what the observer was able to observe (Frattaroli, 2002, chaps. 7–8). So if I seem to reveal too much of myself in what follows, I do so intentionally. My purpose is to describe my own private experience of inner conflict (between me and my anima) in a way that allows the reader to assess for him- or herself the validity of my subjective observations and of the objective conclusions I draw from them. Remember that just because you don’t see the subjective determinants of a theory (as in the more usual academic presentation) doesn’t mean they aren’t there, or that they haven’t profoundly influenced, and perhaps distorted, the observations that are then taken as the objective basis for the theory.

“I’m definitely not your man – I mean person – Polly,” I replied. “I don’t know nearly enough about Jung to do a credible job on that kind of essay. And by the way, the only reason you think drive theory is my personal favorite is because it is your favorite target for attack. You probably don’t even notice yourself attacking because you do it so elegantly and deftly. You only notice me responding to your attack, because I do it clumsily, with passionate intensity. When you put down drive theory, I take it personally (speaking both for me and Freud) and I feel a natural compulsion to defend our honor. Nevertheless, as I have been trying to tell you for ten years, I don’t really think about instinctual drives when I think about patients. I think about disowned aspects of the self, or warded-off feelings, trying to push their way into awareness.”

“But Elio, that’s exactly why you should write this essay. [smiling sweetly] That way of thinking is just as Jungian as it is Freudian. So you see, you’ve already articulated the basis for your essay! And by the way, could you define what you mean by a ‘natural compulsion?’ It sounds suspiciously like an instinctual drive to me.”

“Well, sure it does [off-balance for a moment], and that’s my whole point about why drive theory makes sense. [recovering with a flourish] It’s very close to lived experience.”

“Elio, that is such an outlandish statement. I’m sure you don’t really mean it. [still smiling] You couldn’t possibly read Freud and come away with a sense that drive theory is experience-near. It is widely recognized that drive theory was Freud’s failed attempt to make clinical experience fit the Procrustean bed of nineteenth-century science. I can’t believe any analyst of any persuasion would claim that ‘libidinal cathexis’ is an experience-near concept.”

“Well, I don’t know about other analysts, but I do know that all I have to do is get into an argument with you, Polly, and I feel very near to my own
experience of driven-ness. [warming to the subject even while losing control of it] Remember that ‘cathexis’ is Strachey’s translation, not Freud’s term. And whether a concept is experience-near or not depends on how you interpret it. Take the idea of ‘dammed-up libido, spilling over into free-floating anxiety.’ You could be mean-spirited and call it hydraulic, even naively scientific, but to me it’s a perfectly good way of describing raw unscientific experience. If that’s too outlandish a thing to say, it only proves my point that you should get someone else to write the essay.”

“Oh no, I’m not falling for that one! [finally dropping that irritating Mona Lisa smile] That’s the first time in ten years I’ve heard you refer to ‘dammed-up libido,’ even as an unscientific metaphor. Whatever silly male-bonding loyalty you have to drive theory, I’m sure you will soon outgrow it, because you consistently talk in a very different language when you’re not trying to taunt me.”

“OK, OK. I was being provocative and misleading. The real truth is, no Freudian psychoanalyst nowadays uses the concepts of cathexis, instinctual discharge, or even libido, at all. They are history. They belong to Freud’s so-called economic theory (hydraulic if you like) of psychic energy, which was effectively destroyed through the combined work of Hartmann, Rapaport, and Jacobson in the 1950s (Apfelbaum, 1965).”

“Wait a minute. I thought those three especially used the economic model extensively in their writing.”

“Exactly. They elaborated the theory far beyond anything Freud ever would have done, pushing the concepts beyond the limits of their explanatory usefulness, to the point where it became obvious to everyone except themselves that the hydraulic model just didn’t work. No one really understood all that cathexis mumbo-jumbo. Of course, at the time everyone nodded sagely, but the next generation of analysts, especially Rapaport’s students George Klein (1969), Merton Gill (1976), and Robert Holt (1976), began to say loud and clear that this particular emperor had no clothes. I’ve always considered it ironic that Hartmann, Rapaport, and Jacobson became known as developers of ‘ego psychology,’ when what they were really doing was taking the ego-concept of Freud’s most progressive post-1920 theorizing and twisting it beyond all recognition, as you say, on the Procrustean bed of his most reductionistic pre-1900 theorizing. Their dogmatic elaboration of the weakest element in Freud’s thought was a thinly disguised expression of the disciple’s repressed death wish against the master: attempted murder by imitation, an unconsciously mocking caricature born of the fear of open disagreement. The real ego psychologists were people like Erikson (1950, 1959) and Waelder (1930, 1967), who didn’t go out of their way to announce their disagreement with Freud, but who had almost
no use at all for his economic model and its scientistic reductionism. They were loyal to Freud’s best thought, which was always experience-near, based on clinical experience, and synthetic, based on the theory of the self that was implicit in Freud’s original terminology for the ego-concept (das Ich, properly translated as the I, and das Über-Ich, or the I that stands above). The progressive synthetic thrust in Freud’s theorizing was present from the beginning, but was much more obvious after he replaced the concept of libido with that of Eros.”

“Wait a minute, that doesn’t sound like the Freud I know. I wasn’t aware that either Freud or his followers had ever done much to develop his concept of Eros, yet you’re talking about it as if it were the cornerstone of his mature thought. And another thing: I thought you believed passionately in drive theory. Yet now you’re telling me that Robert Waelder had no use for it? – the same Robert Waelder you always insist was the greatest Freudian thinker after Freud himself?”

“No, no, you misunderstand me, but now I see why we always end up arguing about drive theory. You are confusing it with libido theory. It was libido theory that Waelder had no use for, not drive theory. True, the two did go together originally. Freud conceptualized libido as the unique form of psychic energy corresponding to the sexual drive. But the concept of a sexual drive never depended on the concept of libido. This became evident in 1920 when Freud introduced his so-called dual-instinct theory. He added the new concept of a destructive/aggressive drive (death instinct) to that of a sexual drive but he didn’t add another form of energy to go with it. He didn’t officially discard the libido concept, but the much richer concept of Eros pretty much superseded it. Eros was no longer an energy concept, but rather a force or tendency, like Bergson’s élan vital. It paved the way for the 1923 structural theory of id–ego–superego (the I, the I, and the I that stands above), and for Freud’s revolutionary revision of anxiety theory in 1926. With this new metapsychology, based on Eros and the destructive/aggressive drive, it became much more natural to talk about the drives in an experience-near way, as the compelling motivational forces behind the emotions of love and hate.”

“OK, that doesn’t fully answer my question about Eros, but tell me, what’s your actual definition of a drive, and how different is it from Freud’s?”

“Well Freud talked about drive as a concept on the border between the psychological and the somatic, but his definition was fuzzy. Waelder (1960) emphasized that the real meaning of “drive” is contained in the connotations of Freud’s original German word, Trieb, which suggests a powerfully compelling force, both goal-directed and organically rooted in man’s physical nature. I would elaborate on that to say that a drive is a powerful
striving rooted in the psychobiological universals of human nature that expresses itself in the psychobiological particulars of unconscious fantasy.”

“Hmm. That sounds like a Jungian archetype. And what’s your definition of unconscious fantasy?”

“Unconscious fantasy is an interpersonal, emotionally charged, goal-directed scenario that a person is driven to enact behaviorally, while remaining unaware of it as a conscious feeling state or motivation. You could think of a drive as a kind of psychobiological template for an unconscious fantasy. The drives embody the basic organization of human nature. They determine the emotional charge, the motivational goals, and the adaptive purposes of unconscious fantasies and of the unconsciously driven behavior these fantasies generate.”

“This is really interesting. And where does your notion of unconscious fantasy come from? Because it sounds just like what Jung called a complex.”

“Well, the concept originated when Freud (1897a) concluded that his patients were suffering from repressed fantasies rather than repressed memories. He thought of unconscious fantasies as individual variations on the theme of the Oedipus complex. The concept was much more extensively developed by object-relations theorists, Melanie Klein and her followers (1948, 1952, 1957), Fairbairn (1954), and more recently Kernberg (1980) and Ogden (1990), who emphasize that the inner world is entirely structured in terms of fantasy configurations – not only the Oedipus complex, but the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position as well. I also like the writings of Arlow (1963, 1969), Lichtenstein (1961), and Stoller (1979, 1985) on unconscious fantasy, but I don’t know how relevant they are to Jung – because, frankly, I haven’t read enough Jung to be confident that I would know which nuances were relevant and which weren’t. Which is why it doesn’t make sense that you would want me to write about Jung for the Cambridge Companion.”

“Oh stop it, Elio. Even before you had read any Jung at all I told you you were more of a Jungian in your thinking than I was.”

“Hey, is it my fault that when I got in touch with my inner experience and tried to describe it, the description reminded you of Jung? Anyway, I achieved whatever Jungian perspective I’ve got through a completely orthodox Freudian analysis, while training in a very orthodox Freudian institute.”

“Oh sure, but you’ve told me you chose that institute because you wanted to be sure you knew the classical theory really well before you rebelled against it. You knew you would end up a heretic so you wanted your heresy to be an informed one, right? That’s why your understanding of the psychoanalytic process is so much like mine – because you rebelled, just as Jung
did, against the narrow Freudian model. So I’m afraid there’s no way you can call yourself an orthodox Freudian, Elio, whatever your analysis and your training were like!”

“No – not if you define orthodoxy in terms of the psychoanalysis of the 1950s. But there’s been a lot of evolution in the field since then. The definition of drive and unconscious fantasy I just gave you would be recognized as pristine in its orthodoxy today, even by older analysts who would have considered it alien 40 years ago. As far as what I may have told you about my need to rebel, that was my bitchy anima talking, before I recognized and claimed it in my personal analysis.”

“You reclaimed your anima in an orthodox Freudian analysis?”

“Well, I didn’t call it that. I called it getting in touch with my envy of femininity and my desire to be a woman. I recognized that my need to rebel was compulsive, based on the fact that embracing orthodoxy had the unconscious meaning to me of being a submissive woman.”

“I don’t know, Elio. Considering that yours is always the loudest dissenting voice in the study group, I don’t see you as having outgrown your compulsive need to rebel, or your defensive male sexism.”

“So I haven’t achieved perfect enlightenment. ‘So sue me’ … said the poor misunderstood doctor amiably.”

“Did you learn disavowal in your orthodox analysis too?”

“Yes, but I haven’t perfected it yet. Seriously Polly, I don’t think a person ever outgrows the tendency to feel driven, or stops acting out unconscious fantasies. Especially not under the kind of relentless provocation I get from you people in the study group! The goal of psychological integration should be that you notice yourself feeling driven, that you can catch yourself in the enactment of a fantasy. You can then recognize that there is another way of inner being, a disposition to a different sort of action, that you are fighting against even as you fight your apparently external dragon. But that doesn’t mean you should necessarily stop fighting the dragon. You know what William Blake said: ‘Without Contraries is no progression.’ ”

“Yes, in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell. And that’s just the kind of contrariness I want for The Cambridge Companion, Elio. You know what Heraclitus said: ‘War is the father of all.’ That was one of Jung’s favorite aphorisms.”

“Whoa, duelling allusions! Well then, if I’m really such a closet Jungian, why am I so uncertain whether I understand even basic terms like anima? I tried to read about it once but I couldn’t take all the mythology and decided I was better off consulting my own inner experience of femaleness. I understand that the mythology is actually supposed to represent inner experience, but it didn’t work that way for me. You know what Keats wrote
about negative capability, ‘when man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, and doubts without any irritable reaching after fact and reason’? Well I think Jung was sometimes guilty of an irritable reaching after myth!”

“Actually, if you’re in the right frame of mind, with a little ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ [touché], all those mythical references from different ages and cultures really can help expand your awareness of inner experience. On the other hand, I do think Jung sometimes piles on mythological references unnecessarily to make a point, to prove that certain experiences are universal, archetypal.”

“Right. So tell me again, what are archetypes and complexes?”

“Archetypes are basic organizing forms for expression of human instinctual-emotional responses in relationship. Complexes are integrated configurations of personal images, ideas, feelings, and actions that are organized around archetypes. I think of complexes as ‘affective schemata,’ like what you referred to as emotionally charged scenarios, that are habitually enacted in relationships and in dreams. They can be experienced as moods or fantasies or projections, and can also be expressed in symptoms.”

“Sounds pretty much like drives and unconscious fantasies to me. Is that the way Jung talked about them?”

“Well, I don’t think he would have disagreed with the way I said it, but he put much more emphasis on the ‘image,’ the mythic symbol that comes into consciousness through the work of active imagination. He initially thought of an archetype as an archaic image from the collective unconscious, and a complex as an individualized version of that primordial image, from the personal unconscious. Later, he revised his theory of archetype to be something like an innate releasing mechanism, an action potential. And complex came to be the particular affective organization of image and action developed by an individual. But you have to realize that for Jung a mythological image was not just a pictorial representation. It had all the connotations of driven-ness you were ascribing to a compelling, powerfully emotional, unconscious fantasy.”

“Like the Oedipus complex. That’s certainly a mythological image. In fact, don’t you think it was probably Freud’s discussion of Oedipus that got Jung interested in mythology in the first place?”

“Sure. Jung was only 25 and just graduating medical school in 1900 when he first read The Interpretation of Dreams, and he didn’t seriously begin to study mythology until 1909. By that time he was a key figure in Freud’s inner circle, and they were all writing about mythology.”

“Yeah, I guess Otto Rank’s The Myth of the Birth of the Hero came out in 1909. You know, although Freud had developed the Oedipal theory of neurosis as far back as an 1897 letter to Fliess (Freud, 1897b), he didn’t
officially call it the Oedipus complex until 1910, when his romance with Jung was at its peak. He must have decided to call it a complex in honor of Jung.”

“Could be. Of course you know that the two men ultimately split over their differing interpretations of the Oedipus complex and the meaning of incest.”

“Well, I know what Freud wrote about the split, which is that Jung denied the central importance of infantile sexuality.”

“Right. Jung believed in an expanded concept of libido as life energy, somewhat the way you described Freud’s concept of Eros as a life force. To Jung, the Oedipal desire of a five-year-old boy, while it does contain a current of infantile sexuality, is mostly about his dependence and his desire to possess the mother for her powerful protective factor. It is not a desire for actual incest, but for mother’s nurturing love and the sense of security that comes with it. Jung felt that this infantile dependency became sexualized only sometimes, and only much later, in the course of post-pubertal neurotic conflict. In adult neuroses, incestuous impulses do become activated, as a regressive retreat from the demand that mature sexual desire puts on the growing individual to break out of the parental orbit. But Jung argued that these incestuous impulses represent not only a pathological retreat from conflict but also an adaptive ‘falling back and regrouping,’ a necessary step toward resolving the conflict. Contrasting his position with Freud’s, Jung emphasized that neurosis embodies not only a regressive sexual purpose but a progressive developmental and spiritual one.”

“Well, the general idea that neurotic symptoms represent a progressive as well as a regressive purpose is quintessentially Freudian. And the idea of a developmental and spiritual progression, I would argue is also very much Freudian. As you know, I have written (Frattaroli, 1991, 2002, chap. 5) about psychoanalysis as a philosophy of the quest, which I think of in both developmental and spiritual terms. Libido theory notwithstanding, there was always a strong but implicit spiritual dimension in Freud’s theorizing. It became almost explicit in his concepts of Eros and of the superego.”

“That’s certainly not the way I’ve ever understood the superego, Elio. Didn’t Freud describe it as the internalization of parental restrictions and prohibitions? As I’ve understood it, Freud saw neurosis as an expression of the conflict between instinct and culture, with the superego representing culture; whereas Jung saw the conflict as an inherent tension between opposing forces within the self. Not instinct versus culture, but instinct versus spirit.”

“You’re only describing one aspect of the superego, what you might call a ‘superego complex’ as opposed to the 1 that stands above as an archetype.
You should really read Waelder on the superego (1930, 1960, 1965), or my own (Frattaroli, 1990) paper on Hamlet where I discuss Waelder’s approach. The idea of an Über-Ich, an I that stands above, originated in Freud’s thinking about psychotic delusions of being observed, which he took as a kind of perception of a self-observing agency within the self. Along with the I and the It, he then incorporated this agency into his tripartite model of the psyche, a modern counterpart to the rational/spiritual element in Plato’s tripartite soul (reason, will, appetite). So this instinct-versus-culture view of neurosis really represents a serious misunderstanding of the Freudian superego. The whole idea of the Oedipus complex is that conflict over sexual and aggressive strivings is inherent in human nature, not a function of cultural values. Sure Freud talked about the clash between instinct and culture, and the internalization of parental and cultural prohibitions, but why would anyone who was purely motivated by blind instinct bother to internalize something he or she was blindly opposed to? The ‘I that stands above’ is the part of the self that agrees with culture. It’s the part of the self that made culture in the first place!”

“Elio, when was the last time you read Civilization and its Discontents (Freud, 1930)? What in the world is it about if not the conflict between instinct and culture? You know, Jung isn’t the only person to reject Freudian theory as a philosophy of hedonism. You can hardly deny that Freud described human beings as infantile pleasure-seeking machines, programmed to seek immediate gratification of every impulse unless forced to delay, divert, or sublimate by the demands of a hostile and punitive society.”

“Polly, when was the last time you read Civilization and its Discontents (Freud, 1930)? Yes, I know it contains many references to the conflict between instinct and culture. But in the end Freud does a very Jungian thing and uses a myth to express the essence of that conflict in the origin of the superego. It’s the myth he made up himself in Totem and Taboo (Freud, 1913), about the primal brothers killing the primal father. Freud says that in that timeless epoch of the primal imagination there was as yet no individual superego and no cultural prohibition against killing the father. Both came into being at the same time through the great remorse the brothers felt after the deed. Freud states unequivocally that this remorse stemmed from the innate, unconditioned love of the sons for the father, just as the murder stemmed from their innate hatred, the other half of an archaic ambivalence. For Freud, the sense of guilt which is the foundation of civilization is an expression of that same ambivalence, the eternal struggle between the instinct of destruction and Eros. He didn’t go quite so far as to call that a conflict between instinct and spirit, but it amounts to the same thing.”
“You’re right, I had forgotten that part of his argument. So sue me! [with a real smile!] But still, would you really deny that the overwhelming impression Freud leaves you with is that of the irreconcilable opposition of instinct and culture?”

“Well no, I wouldn’t deny that. That’s what everyone comes away with when they read *Civilization and its Discontents*. And I’ll tell you why. That particular book is a good example of Freud’s own unresolved ambivalence between his old libido theory and his new dual-instinct theory. He keeps going back and forth between the old model and the new, mixing formulations about the economics of libidinal energy with discussions of Eros as if the two belonged together. But the fact is, Freud always viewed the economics of libido as determined by the constancy principle, which is completely antithetical to Eros. The constancy principle belongs not with Eros but with the death instinct, which Freud described as operating according to a “Nirvana principle.” In fact, the constancy principle and the Nirvana principle are two names for the same thing: the organism’s tendency to seek the lowest energy state through immediate discharge of all drive energy. That’s your Freudian philosophy of hedonism: a philosophy of the death instinct. Eros, on the other hand, belongs to Freud’s philosophy of the quest.”

“The death instinct is based on the same principle as the old libido theory!?”

“You got it. Somewhere or other Freud even acknowledges that the constancy principle and the Nirvana principle are one and the same, but he never acknowledged the uncomfortable implication that libido would then properly belong under the sign of the death instinct, not under the sign of Eros. It takes a very subtle and careful reading to detect how this confusion runs through *Civilization and its Discontents*, as it does through all Freud’s major works, even early ones, like chapter seven of *The Interpretation of Dreams*.”

“Wait. How could he have confused the two models at a time when only one of them existed?”

“Well during the first phase of his thinking the confusion was between two different senses he gave to the concept of libido, the one I’ve emphasized – a dammed-up sexual energy looking for a path to hedonistic discharge – and a more experience-near sense, as the force behind wishing, or an expanded sexuality that was a way of talking about love without admitting it – basically an early version of Eros.”

“That sounds more like Jung’s idea of libido.”

“Maybe so, but he could have gotten the idea from Freud, simply by distilling out half of Freud’s ambivalent usage of the term. You know I believe that with Freud, as with any great thinker, there was a creative
tension between two poles in his thinking: the *regressive* pole, in which he was constrained by familial attitudes and the dominating cultural assumptions he grew up with, and the *progressive* pole of his authentically original, ‘counter-cultural’ contribution. True creativity in general depends on the progressive, ‘antithetical’ element being strong enough to transcend the limitations of the old paradigm, but the process is never a clean one. In the end the great thinkers are all like Michelangelo’s ‘Prisoners,’ struggling nobly to break free from the constraining, inarticulate marble, but only partly succeeding. Freud is no exception.”

“Oh Elio, you’re such a romantic. But you have to admit you had to chip away a lot of inarticulate marble to find a quest philosophy in Freudian psychoanalysis!”

“Well actually, psychoanalysis contains two conflicting but complementary philosophies, one the quest philosophy of Eros, and the other the egoistic, hedonistic pleasure/pain philosophy of the libido theory (Frattaroli, 2002, chaps. 5, 14, 15). But I didn’t really come to the idea of the quest through reading Freud. It was much more through my personal experience of the psychoanalytic process, which I then took back to my reading of Freud and Waelder. Well, no. I’m forgetting my years with Bruno Bettelheim, as a teacher at the Sonia Shankman Orthogenic School (Frattaroli, 1992, 1994, 2002, chaps. 5–6). Bettelheim regularly talked and wrote (1967) about life as a kind of a quest, a continual striving for ever higher levels of integration through the resolution of inner conflict. The first chapter of *The Informed Heart* (1960) is titled ‘The Concordance of Opposites,’ by which he meant the pursuit of self-realization through a continual process of psychological integration within a basically irreconcilable conflict.”

“But that’s Jung’s idea. Sometimes he called it the *complexio oppositorum*, sometimes the *coniunctio oppositorum*, but he was talking about exactly the same thing as Bettelheim.”

“Well maybe so, but Bettelheim certainly thought of it as Freud’s idea. His psychoanalytic background was strictly Freudian, and I don’t think he knew much about Jung until he reviewed Carotenuto’s book about Jung and Sabina Spielrein in 1983. Erikson, too, was a Freudian, and he had an idea of the quest very much like Bettelheim’s. He described the life cycle as a progressive struggle toward wisdom and virtue, through a series of developmental crises organized around sets of oppositions: trust versus mistrust; autonomy versus shame and doubt; initiative versus guilt; industry versus inferiority; identity versus diffusion; intimacy versus isolation; generativity versus stagnation; integrity versus despair. I think it’s pretty clear that both Bettelheim and Erikson got their ideas of self-realization through an integration of opposites from Freud, not Jung. Freud may never have used the
term *coniunctio oppositorum*, but his dual-instinct theory strongly suggests the idea. It posits a conflicting combination of Eros and the death instinct in every piece of psychic life. By the way, Freud recognized that this theory had ancient philosophical parallels, not only with Plato’s Eros but with Empedocles’ universal dialectic of Love and Strife. I guess that’s a kind of archetype for the interpersonal dialectic of the psychoanalytic process. In that sense a quest philosophy is inherent in the psychoanalytic process, the goal being to integrate the opposing, ambivalent tendencies of Love and Strife through the ongoing dialectical experience of transference. That is the work of Eros: bringing together, integration, synthesis, love in the full Platonic sense of the term. So you could say that the spiritual source for Freud’s quest philosophy was in the original Greek quest philosophies, the philosophy of Eros from Plato’s *Symposium* and the dialectical dualism of Empedocles’ Love and Strife.”

“Which was very similar to the spiritual source for Jung’s philosophy of individuation, in Heraclitus. He too posited an eternally creative dialectic, in which the war of opposites is resolved in the harmony of the Logos.”

“So there really is a strong common theme between Freud and Jung. Think about Freud’s famous epigram for the psychoanalytic process: ‘Where id was there ego shall be.’ Wo Es war, soll Ich werden. Now consider the proper translation: ‘Where It was there shall I become.’ If you take Freud’s It as the psychobiological unknown, the unconscious realm of the drives, and the I, along with the I that stands above, as the self-reflective integrated self, evolving through its perpetual clash with the It, then don’t you come out with the same thing Heraclitus said? Clearly I didn’t get that idea from Jung, but from what you have said it sounds like that was pretty much his idea too.”

“That’s an understatement! It was the essence of his life’s work, starting well before he met Freud. That’s what his seminal concept of individuation is all about.

He saw individuation as the process of becoming an authentic integrated person, through a synthesis of opposites in the personality. It is the work of the transcendent function, which he wrote about first in 1916. I think of it as somewhat similar to Winnicott’s (1971) idea of ‘potential space’ – holding the tension of opposites until a new discovery or perspective emerges. And by the way, that’s where Jung’s different view of incest comes in. Like everything else, Jung understood individuation in terms of a symbol, in this case a symbolic internal ‘marriage’ between the conscious ‘ego complex’ and the unconscious complexes, the undiscovered self, especially the anima or animus. Well, a marriage with your own anima or animus is like incest, a marriage within the inner nuclear (Oedipal) family, so to
speak. So ultimately Jung came to see incestuous desires not as primarily sexual but as spiritual, a longing for inner unity, and he began to understand incest as a mystical symbol for the process of individuation.”

“And that idea of individuation is the cornerstone of Jung’s psychology?”

“Absolutely.”

“So in the end Jung really agreed with Freud that the Oedipus complex, at least the incestuous part of it, is the key to neurosis?”

“Well that’s certainly a Freudian way of putting it, emphasizing pathology rather than adaptation. Jung would have called it the key to growth. But it is absolutely true that he remained quite preoccupied with the issue of incest throughout his life. Incestuous images were central in his quasi-psychotic, quasi-mystical visions in the years immediately following his breakup with Freud, and in his mystical visions after his 1944 heart attack. In important works after 1944, Jung’s explicit program was a revisioning of Freud’s Oedipal complex as an archetype for the process of individuation. I’m thinking specifically of The Psychology of the Transference and his last major work Mysterium Coniunctionis, subtitled An Inquiry into the Separation and Synthesis of Psychic Opposites in Alchemy. Actually all Jung’s obscure works on alchemy are really about symbolic incest. Although, as we’ve been saying, the synthesis of psychic opposites is a valid and powerful concept even without alchemy, Jung had a strong need to conceptualize it as an alchemical incestuous union, producing an integrated self the way the ‘chemical marriage’ of the alchemists was supposed to produce gold. He also conceptualized the psychoanalytic relationship as a kind of symbolically enacted incestuous union, viewing the transference as an alchemical crucible from which the gold of individuation would emerge.”

“Yeah, well, considering his relationships with Sabina Spielrein and Toni Wolff, it looks like Jung had a bit of trouble discriminating where symbolism ends and sexual intercourse begins. Which, as a Freudian, I would argue proves pretty convincingly that he never really dealt with his down-and-dirty infantile sexual Oedipus complex. Instead he acted it out, all the while denying that the Oedipus complex in that sense even existed. As a feminist, don’t you think that all those grandiose ideas about alchemical incestuous symbolism begin to sound like a hollow rationalization for Jung’s unconscionable boundary violations as a therapist?”

“Well frankly, yes. But you know, Jung didn’t really deny the infantile sexual version of the Oedipus complex. He only insisted that it was a regressive sexualization of a complex that was not primarily sexual in its origin, similar to what Heinz Kohut thought. With that proviso, he did consider the Oedipus complex an important and necessary focus for the analysis of people in the first half of life. Still, I agree that Jung’s therapeutic
misconduct and his tendency to use women for narcissistic enhancement may have been connected to his unconscious Oedipus complex – and to a powerful mother complex, and to an unintegrated anima.”

“Would you agree too that his failure to come to terms with his Oedipus complex would have necessarily put a serious limitation on the degree of individuation he could achieve?”

“Sure, but Jung never denied that he had limitations. And let’s not get carried away. You obviously agree with what is essential in Jung’s theory of individuation. The fact that some aspects of that theory may have constituted a rationalization for him doesn’t make the theory incorrect.”

“Well, there must be something wrong with it! Didn’t Jung himself argue that every psychological theory has to have blind spots, based on the theorist’s particular personality limitations – the things he can’t see because they are part of his Shadow? So at the very least, there has to be something missing in Jung’s theory, as in any other theory. And what about the issue of his anti-Semitism?”

“Well that’s complicated. The C. G. Jung foundation held a conference on the subject in 1989, and the proceedings have been published (Maidenbaum and Martin, 1991). The overall consensus was that despite many examples of his non-prejudicial and empathic dealings with Jewish friends, colleagues, and patients, some of Jung’s ideas and actions did contain a current of anti-Semitism, reflecting his complicated experiences with Freud and Freudians, his religious upbringing, and the cultural climate of anti-Semitism that prevailed in Switzerland until after World War II. I guess that was part of Jung’s inarticulate marble that he couldn’t fully free himself from. There was an important unresolved difference of opinion at the conference though, about whether this personal failing of Jung translates to a deficiency in Jungian theory.”

“How could it not? It’s part of his Shadow so it would have to leave a blind spot, something missing, in his theory.”

“And Freud’s theory isn’t missing something?”

“Of course it is. As Jung pointed out many times, Freud was missing an appreciation of the spiritual dimension of experience. He admitted openly in the first section of Civilization and its Discontents that he had never experienced anything resembling the oceanic feeling of spiritual sensibility. That was definitely an area of unresolved neurotic conflict for him. I think spirituality fascinated him, but he was terrified of it. I’m sure he would have objected to the spiritual meanings I give to Eros and to his dictum ‘Where It was there shall I become.’ To me these are obvious, but to Freud they would have been disowned meanings. And in spite of what I have said about the importance of Eros and the quest philosophy, you’re right that Freud never
really established these as the psychoanalytic paradigm. So I’d be willing to say, Bettelheim and Erikson notwithstanding, that Freud’s theory was missing the concept of individuation. It was always implicit, became partly visible, but in the end remained fairly stuck in that old, inarticulate marble. So then, having admitted so much about my theory, let me ask you: what are you willing to admit your Jungian theory is missing? Perhaps the concept of the drives?”

“Well, yes and no. The archetypes are certainly related to the drives, but they don’t have the experience-near quality you claim drives do. The archetypes, like the drives, are the carriers of powerful emotion, but then Jung’s idea about powerful emotions was a bit dissociative. He argued that emotions, unlike feelings, literally put you beside yourself, as if you were possessed by another personality.”

“That is dissociative. How did he understand the feeling of anxiety that gets activated when a strong unconscious emotion threatens to assert itself?”

“He didn’t. Jung really had very little to say about anxiety.”

“Really! Well maybe that’s what’s missing. You know, anxiety was Freud’s central lifelong preoccupation, the way individuation was Jung’s. So maybe Jung’s mysticism was never a fully integrated experience. Maybe the reason it always had a psychotic-like aspect to it was because it also represented a flight from profound anxiety which he didn’t recognize as such, perhaps anxiety about his own destructiveness more than his own sexuality. He certainly never dealt with the destructive aspects of the Oedipus complex that he acted out in his exploitation of patients and in his anti-Semitism, both of which he then tried to rationalize through theoretical disputes with Freud.”

“Very plausible, but I must tell you that in daring to penetrate Jung’s shortcomings through a Freudian analysis, you’ve claimed mastery of several theories and proven yourself capable of writing the essay!”

“No way! I was just following your lead. So why don’t you write the essay! You’ve already written about Jung’s self psychology, and its parallels to Sullivan, Piaget, and object relations theory (Young-Eisendrath and Hall, 1991).”

“Yes, but I can’t write about Freud the way you can. Although I was thinking that maybe the progressive elements in Freud that you, Bettelheim, and Erikson have elaborated into a quest philosophy really got into his theory primarily through Jung’s influence. They all came after 1920, which would have given Freud five years to emotionally process the breakup with Jung and then use it to energize a major leap forward in his thinking. Certainly that’s what Jung did. He was pretty crazy for about four years
while processing the breakup with Freud, but came out of it with *Psychological Types* (1921), which began the most creative phase of his thinking. So maybe both Freud and Jung went through parallel mirror-image versions of the same process. Even though neither gave the other an ounce of credit for anything they wrote after 1913, maybe each spent the rest of his life trying to integrate the other’s contribution into his own new and improved theory.”

“Wow. War is the father of all indeed! But if the main task of individuation for a man is to integrate his anima, does that mean that Freud and Jung were anima figures for each other, even though both were men?”

“Well, probably. Men do tend to project their anima on any number of people, as needed, in their lives. And that combination of charismatic attraction and compulsive antagonism is pretty typical of a man’s struggle with his projected unintegrated anima.”

“So that’s what Heraclitus was talking about. But if war was the father, who was the mother?”

“Hmm. Are you thinking what I’m thinking?”

“Yes, but I wish I wasn’t. You mean Sabina Spielrein?”

“Yes, but why do you object? Does it bother you to think that a woman might have been responsible for both Freud’s and Jung’s most creative ideas?”

“No, I rather like that idea, which was Bettelheim’s (1983) by the way. What bothers me is John Kerr (1993), who proved Bettelheim’s thesis without intending to. He presented new material from Spielrein’s ‘transformation journal,’ a long 1907 letter to Jung in which she proposes that all mental life is governed by two fundamental tendencies, the power of the persistence of the complexes, and an instinct of transformation which seeks to transform the complexes. Spielrein reframed the idea in a 1912 publication, arguing that the sexual drive contains both an instinct of destruction and an instinct of transformation. There’s the origin of the psychoanalytic quest philosophy, both Freud’s dual-instinct theory and Jung’s theory of individuation! But Kerr doesn’t appreciate that evolution, so he misses the real importance of Spielrein’s idea. His not-too-hidden agenda is to discredit Jung, Freud, and the whole psychoanalytic method, which, unfortunately, he doesn’t understand either. He thinks that unless the method can be formulated in some kind of manual of interpretation, it shouldn’t be taken seriously. But the psychoanalytic method was never a technique of interpretation! It’s a technique of self-reflective awareness, a mode of attention to inner experience, within a relationship, in which the unconscious can become conscious with such clarity that it often requires very little interpretation. Kerr has no appreciation of this, or of the psychoanalytic process.
as a quest for self-realization. He thinks psychoanalysis is a hermeneutic exercise of theoretical interpretation. By the way, I absolutely refuse to write anything about hermeneutics. I hate drifting on a sea of self-referential signifiers with no hope of ever seeing the solid land of the signified. *Psychoanalysis is not about hermeneutics.* It’s about putting felt experience into words.”

“So say that in the essay! Look, Elio, I *need* an author for this chapter. I understand that you refuse to do anything resembling what I had in mind, and I can live with that – just as long as you’re somewhere in the vicinity of the topic. Believe me, I racked my brains for a week trying to think of anyone who could write this essay, and you were the only person I could think of.”

I was lost, captured: tantalized by and then (not unpleasantly) impaled on the thought that I was the last person in the world Polly would have considered, but the only person in the world she could think of to do the job. “That’s how women have always had their way with men,” I vaguely thought as I submitted to my fate. “OK, I’ll do it. I have no idea what, but I’m sure I’ll dream up something.”

**2007 Addendum**

Rereading this imaginary dialogue now, eleven years after I wrote it, I am struck by how passionate I was in defense of Freud’s drive theory because, in practice, I have always thought in terms of unconscious emotions rather than drives. I think about inner conflict, not in terms of defense against a drive, but defense against a disturbing unconscious emotion that is threatening to become conscious. This is in keeping with Freud’s very first theory of unconscious motivation (1893), which referred to what he later called the pressure of dammed up libido as “strangulated affect.” It is also consistent with Sylvan Tompkins’s theory (1962, 1963) – now widely accepted by psychoanalysts – that the driven-ness of motivation comes from emotions, not drives (even the sexual drive getting its ‘oomph’ primarily from the emotions associated with it).

So why then the passionate defense of a theory I never actually used? In retrospect, I can see it was partly a rhetorical device to highlight the issue I really care about: the centrality of inner conflict in mental illness and in human experience generally. It was to explain inner conflict, after all, that Freud developed drive theory in the first place. And although Jung had a different explanation for it, he agreed with Freud that inner conflict was the phenomenon that needed explaining. In creating the argument between Polly and me over drive theory, I wanted to highlight this fundamental area
of agreement, which has not been shared by many other schools of psycho-
analysis that have broken away from the Freudian mainstream over the
last century. From the social psychoanalysis of Karen Horney to the inter-
personal psychoanalysis of Harry Stack Sullivan to the self psychology of
Heinz Kohut to the current hodge-podge of relational/intersubjective
schools – parented by Greenberg and Mitchell (1983), and by Atwood and
Stolorow (1984), among others – dozens of dissident theorists have fol-
lowed Jung in rejecting the drive-discharge model of Freud’s reductionistic,
hedonistic, libido theory but, unlike Jung, have also thrown out the baby
with the bathwater, by denying the centrality and even the existence of
inner conflict (which they equate or conflate with drive theory). In its stead
they have invoked various forms of interpersonally generated trauma,
conceptualized in terms of toxic cultural influences, empathic failures, not-
good-enough parenting, insecure maternal patterns of attachment, and
frank abuse.

So in my passionate defense of drive theory, I wasn’t really arguing
against Polly – though as an anima-figure she did give me more than enough
provocation! – but against the relational/intersubjectivists who attack what
Polly and I and Freud and Jung have in common: a theory of universal
forms of intrapsychic conflict, generated from within the individual and
inherent in human nature. Every relational/intersubjective theorist I know
of denies the existence of such universal internally generated conflicts, and
yet each claims to offer an integration of intrapsychic and interpersonal
perspectives. Such a claim is easy to make because it is impossible to talk
about psychological experience at all without using the intrapsychic per-
spective. But intersubjective theorists don’t value the intrapsychic perspec-
tive nor do they have a clearly defined place for it in their theory, so their
claim of integration begins to look like a pretence, a strategy to discredit the
intrapsychic model for the one-sidedness of its drive theory (not integrated
like their theory). Unfortunately, this strategy has been so effective that in
the American Psychoanalytic Association – once a bastion of Freudian
orthodoxy – there is today no longer anything remotely approaching a
consensus about the importance of intrapsychic conflict. I didn’t quite see
this coming in 1996 but my passion in the imaginary dialogue shows me
that I felt it coming.

The danger is that if psychoanalysis abandons its focus on inner conflict
as the cause of mental illness and central problem of human existence, it
will lose its moral compass. In fact, it is only through the consciousness of
inner conflict that human beings can ever develop a moral compass – discern
the difference between right and wrong\(^3\) – so it is the only way we can ever
hope to take responsibility for the suffering and evil (karma) we create
through our actions. The intrapsychic/inner conflict model has always understood this taking of responsibility as integral and essential to the psychoanalytic process. It sees suffering and evil as produced primarily by unconscious conflict in which we are driven from within by disowned desires and impulses of which we keep ourselves unaware by projecting them out into others. Healing is produced by self-awareness, becoming fully conscious of these disowned desires and impulses, which allows us to reclaim our projections – stop blaming others – and assume responsibility and moral accountability for them. The process of recognizing and accepting what we really want/need/crave and why we want/need/crave it gives us the knowledge of good and evil – of the conflicting loving and destructive tendencies embodied in our wants/needs/cravings – and puts us in a position where we have a choice (free will) about whether and how to put these wants/needs/cravings into action.

The main failing of the relational/intersubjective model is that it has no place for the taking of responsibility through the consciousness of inner conflict. The patient is supposed to change from a pattern of destructive relationships to a pattern of more loving relationship through the healing impact of the therapist–patient relationship but without anyone needing to become aware of and take responsibility for any destructive inner tendencies, because destructive tendencies (and loving tendencies for that matter) are not seen as being “inner.” They are seen as co-created “intersubjective” products of the relational interaction. How the change from destructive relationships to loving relationships could ever be sustained without the patient experiencing an internal change from a pattern of more destructive inner tendencies to a pattern of more loving inner tendencies is unclear.

What is clear is that a theory that ignores or denies destructiveness within the individual but sees it as located exclusively in traumatic relationships is an open invitation, dangerous to therapists as well as patients, to blame the suffering and evil we create through our actions on relational influences beyond our control.

This serious limitation notwithstanding, I believe that the intersubjective perspective is indispensable and that a true integration with the intrapsychic perspective is possible, using a model of inner conflict that emphasizes emotions rather than drives. I conceptualize this integrative model as follows: The It and the I (id and ego) are two conflicting levels of experience, the biological and the personal, the body/brain and the self. In a state of inner conflict we have disturbing unconscious emotions or affects – the biological level – that are threatening to become conscious feelings – the personal level – but that are unacceptable to our conscious self so we have to
repress them, disown them. Healing the soul (Jung’s individuation) means resolving this inner conflict, reconnecting with our disowned unconscious emotions – getting in touch with them as fully conscious feelings, attitudes, and desires that we accept as part of ourselves, part of being human. But we can do this emotional reconnecting only in a relational context, by accessing a higher level of transpersonal experience, the I that stands above (superego). Related to Jung’s transcendant function (Young-Eisendrath, 2004, pp. 177–220), the I that stands above is the level of self-reflective consciousness that gives us the experience of a private Self, and at the same time an intersubjective awareness that is empathically attuned to others, able to feel how we are affected by the affects of others and they by ours, able to notice repeating patterns of pressured affective engagement in ourselves and others, and able to discern the meanings and values embodied in these affective interactions – including conflicting good-and-evil moral meanings and values – by getting in touch with them as distilled conscious feelings.

By integrating these three levels of experience – the biological \( It \), the personal I, and the transpersonal I that stands above – the process of becoming conscious brings body, mind, and spirit together and transforms the biological into the personal. “Where \( It \) was, there shall I become.” In emotional terms the transformation is from a condition of being disturbingly driven by affect – the psychophysiological force (drive) of emotion that impels toward action – to a condition of equanimity informed by feeling, the distilled awareness of emotion that entails acceptance of self and other, and a freedom to act, but without any urgent need for action. The archetype for this transformation of affect into feeling – of an unconscious, amoral, causal \( It \) into a conscious, moral, intentional, intersubjective I – is Pinocchio: Getting in touch with our disturbing emotions, making the unconscious conscious, transforms us from biological puppets into fully human beings.

The value of thinking in terms of emotions rather than drives or relationships is that emotions are inherently integrative. They have the universality, the driven-ness, and the conflict-generating power of drives so they are the perfect fit for an intrapsychic model focusing on inner conflict and its resolution. At the same time they are inherently and quintessentially intersubjective – the primary language of human communication and engagement through which we can feel our interconnectedness (both loving and destructive) – so they are also the perfect fit for a relational model focusing on healing and traumatizing interactions. Simply put, it is impossible to have a full experience of emotion without having an intersubjective awareness of the universality of internally generated inner conflict.
Polly, these days, seems to be thinking along much the same lines, judging from her discussion of complexes and archetypes in a recent book (Young-Eisendrath, 2004, p. 157):

(C)omplexes, derived from universal emotional conditions of being human, are driving forces in generating and regenerating images of self and others, through distortions and delusions of fear and desire, dominance and submission. ‘Archetypes’ are innate tendencies to form coherent emotionally charged images in states of arousal. The perceptual and emotional systems are organized by archetypes around which we form our emotional habit patterns [complexes].

In her writing, Polly does not put as much explicit emphasis as I do on “getting in touch with feelings” as the path to healing – transcending the complexes, while accepting them as part of the self – but I would be shocked if she disagreed with me, and then I might have to write a whole new imaginary dialogue.

NOTES

1. When the book was published in paperback (Frattaroli, 2002), it was retitled, Healing the Soul in the Age of the Brain: Why Medication Isn’t Enough.
2. Writing this now in 2007, I am pleased at how much Polly and I have mellowed. struck by the ways my theorizing and Polly’s have changed since I first wrote this article in January 1996.
3. As in Freud’s myth of the primal horde discussed above, and as in the biblical myth of Adam and Eve eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Frattaroli, 2002, pp. 22–24).
4. This corresponds roughly to Jung’s distinction between “emotion” and “feeling” in his first Tavistock lecture (Jung, 1935).

REFERENCES

Me and my anima


The case of Joan: classical, archetypal, and developmental approaches

In the following pages, three experienced and accomplished Jungian analysts comment on where they would focus, what they would do, and what they imagine to be the course of treatment for “Joan.” Joan is a pseudonym for a patient whose printed case material each analyst received and read closely before writing a response. Each received the same case report, summarized from the actual records of a forty-four-year-old female patient at the Renfrew Center for Eating Disorders, a private hospital in the Philadelphia area. Renfrew generously made available this material, which had previously been used in the public domain at a national conference on eating disorders.

Each analyst was asked to see things primarily from the perspective of her or his “school,” each one being a prominent representative of that approach. Dr. Beebe writes from the classical approach, Dr. McNeely from the archetypal, and Dr. Gordon from the developmental. The analysts did not consult with each other on the case. As you read their responses, you may note how they highlight the model sketched out by Andrew Samuels in the Chapter 1 in which he weighs the importance of the archetype, Self, and the development of personality as well as the clinical issues of the transference field, symbolic experience of Self, and the phenomenology of imagery for each of the Jungian schools. What he has sketched as an interpretive model for the three schools of analytical psychology (see chapter 1, pp. 8–11) works very well in understanding the interpretations of these authors. It must be remembered that none of the three analysts ever met the patient and, consequently, their essays should not be seen as comparing therapeutic practice. Rather, they are designed to illustrate different approaches to a real case. Apart from a few necessary instructions for thinking about the case, the following is all the information the authors received.

Joan

Referred to Renfrew by her primary-care physician because he was concerned that she had an eating disorder, Joan weighed 144 pounds at 5’ 6” at
the time of admission to the hospital. She was bingeing and vomiting at least three times a day.

Six weeks prior to admission, Joan was extremely depressed and anxious. She said “I’d like to jump in a river.” She also reported waking in the early morning hours, full of anxiety. She reported hitting herself in the head or stomach or biting her fingers in episodes of emotional pain.

During the admissions interview, Joan expressed a desire to “work with the feelings I’ve been stuffing down.” She described herself as “really fat” and worried that her husband would leave her, wondering why he had even married her. Recently she had become more acutely aware of memories of incest with her father, something she had known continuously, never having successfully addressed it. She wanted to address it in treatment now. She also expressed the desire to eat properly, to stop her bingeing/purging addiction, and to improve her communications with her husband of four months.

Joan lives with her third husband, “Sam” (all names used in this report are pseudonyms), whom she married just four months before entering the hospital. She had become friends with Sam and then lived with him for two years prior to marriage. The couple currently live with Joan’s daughter Amy, age twenty-six, and Sam’s son David, age fifteen. David’s mother died of diabetes when he was three years old. David is a source of conflict in their marriage because he gets into trouble at school and threatens to leave home.

Joan is employed full-time as a cashier and food service attendant in a local convenience store where she has multiple duties and responsibilities. In addition to her work, she has recently organized a women’s self-help group for eating disorders and is very enthusiastic about it. Her long-term goal is to become an addictions counselor. She has plans to begin studies when she finishes treatment.

While Joan was at Renfrew, her mother, aged eighty-one, became seriously ill with kidney failure. Even so, Joan found it difficult to discuss her anger at her mother’s failure to protect her from an abusive father in the past. Joan’s mother lived with her briefly, but Joan found it so stressful that she advised her mother to return to her home, which, being in a different state, was distant from her.

At the time of admission, Joan complained of heavy menstrual bleeding, usually every three weeks. Although she has a gynecologist, she had not scheduled an examination with him, claiming that she didn’t consider her condition to be “serious enough” to warrant a doctor’s help. Often when she was ill or injured, Joan would hesitate to take time off work and/or to seek the medical help she needed.

At the age of eighteen, Joan left home to marry her first husband. She had one daughter, Amy, in this marriage. Joan described the marriage as
“painful and abusive.” Amy has a history of chronic depression and has been diagnosed as having bipolar disorder. Joan left the marriage after two years. In her second marriage she had two more children, a son, Jack (now seventeen), and a daughter, Lynn (now twenty-one). Both Amy and Lynn were sexually abused by Joan’s second husband, for which Joan feels very guilty. “I wish I could have protected my daughters, but I just didn’t see the signs.”

When Joan was five months pregnant with Jack, she took in a foster child named Johnnie, sixteen months old and afflicted with cerebral palsy. Eventually she adopted him.

Her second husband was unfaithful and abusive, one day abandoning the family without explanation. Because Joan was unemployed and unprepared for this sudden loss, she lost everything at the time: her home and all of her children except Lynn. Joan and Lynn lived in and out of a shelter for a year. During this time, Joan acquired a position as a waitress and prepared to reunite her family.

When she met Sam, her current husband, she found it extremely difficult to trust him, but things have ultimately worked out well.

Joan grew up in a four-room wooden house in rural Arkansas (USA). Her parents and only sibling, a sister eleven years older, lived at home. Her father was a “sanitary engineer” and was strict and emotionally distant. Most of the time, food was scarce and comfort was unavailable. Joan recalls her father being absorbed in repairing his automobile when he was at home and commented “it was more important to him than we were.” Her mother was “always depressed” and very obese. Joan recalls feeling ashamed of her mother, who weighed over 300 pounds.

Joan reported that she had been sexually abused by her father, beginning in early childhood. She usually slept in the same bedroom with her mother and father, while her older sister slept in another. Her father would fondle her genitals in the morning before he left for work and when Joan complained to her mother, her mother did nothing. She also had some memories of being urged to fondle her mother’s breasts during this time when they shared a bedroom. In general, Joan describes her childhood as “unsafe and full of fear.”

JOHN BEEBE

A classical approach

The first thing I would ask myself in approaching the case of “Joan” is what I think I know about the patient. That is, I will have to discover what my
own more conscious fantasies and expectations are, then inquire, more deeply, as to what my unconscious may have already done with the imminence of her upon my psychological scene. And, because I am about to function as Joan’s psychotherapist, I shall be looking for what I can relate to naturally in her – what I can immediately gravitate to in her from my own center.

Let’s start with a shared interest. Reading the case, I was not feeling anything in particular, beyond a certain drabness, until I noticed that Joan is “employed full-time as a cashier and food service attendant.” Somehow this detail grabbed me. I have a long-standing interest in the ways in which food is implicated in the activities of our culture, and particularly in how food may serve as a medium for interpersonal communication. I enjoy getting to know people who sell, prepare, and serve food. And I love to eat, and even to diet, which gives me a new relation to the pleasures of food selection.

In the “classical” approach, the analyst’s lead is the Self’s; that is, one trusts one’s psyche to provide the libido – the energy – for relating to the patient and brackets off considerations of “narcissism” or “appropriateness,” letting fantasy toward the patient run its course until a pattern is established which can then be scrutinized. The classical Jungian tradition of analysis of the transference is by way of permitting the countertransference of the analyst its say, and this the analyst does primarily by attending to spontaneous reactions to the client, and only secondarily subjecting them to evaluative self-analysis. It is this approach I am following here.

That Joan has an eating disorder had started to turn me off, but that she works in a food-related employment piques my interest in her: perhaps she values food positively, or at least can relate positively to my instinctive interest in food, and this might form the basis of a spontaneous connection between us – provide a sort of glue, based on a shared mystery, a secret shared pleasure. (At a more thought-out level, I recognize Joan’s perhaps affirmative connection to food as the potentially creative side of her neurosis: the resourcefulness that accompanies her oral problem, the “purposiveness,” in Jung’s sense, that would give her symptoms meaning.)

I find myself also taken with the statement Joan made during the admission interview, expressing her desire to “work with the feelings I’ve been stuffing down.” I like the way her mind moved to this metaphor – although I recognize she may have been echoing the rhetoric of her self-help group for eating disorders. On the hopeful side, it was she who formed the group, and her having done so is another sign of her resourcefulness in the face of her adverse and regressive “oral” symptomatology. I think I like Joan’s energy; I feel that it augurs well for the psychotherapy. It’s important, in the classical approach, that the analyst be able to find something to
like in the patient, or else one has to conclude that the energy won’t be there in the analysis to affirm the emerging selfhood of the client. In that event, the client would be far better off – and safer – in another analyst’s hands.

To my reading of Joan’s case, it is a particular plus that her memories of incest have become more available to her recently. The classical analyst “likes” signs that the personal self is taken seriously, as something to be honored and not violated – for this little “s” self is the core of integrity upon which analytical psychotherapy will build in reaching out to the wider Self to integrate the personality. (This honored personal core is sometimes referred to in the psychoanalytic self psychology that has so many resemblances to the classical Jungian approach as the “self that knows what’s good for itself.”) It is as if Joan’s sense of the worth of her self is heightened just now and her imagination is working, ready to tackle the violations of integrity that have compromised its functioning in the past. Perhaps this is part of the honeymoon glow from marrying Sam.

I imagine Sam to be a positive figure for her, yet when she reports that she wonders why he’d even married her, I think she is expressing her difficulty accepting that she deserves the caring of another. In more classical Jungian language, Sam – with whom “things have worked out well” – would represent, or evoke within Joan, the image of the caring animus, the inner “husband” of her life resources. He would open her up to the possibilities of a more focused connection with herself, aimed at taking better care of the person she is.

At this point I would begin to criticize the fantasy I have so far simply allowed. I am trained to reflect on the assumptions I have been making: such reflexio¹ is a critical next step in the classical Jungian handling of countertransference fantasy if inappropriate action is to be avoided (CW 8, p. 117). I notice that the fantasy that has developed so far imagines Joan at a positive turning point in her life, having married Sam. It has given me hope that a therapy undertaken at this time will be more fruitful than the long history of dysfunctional living and repeated disappointment in relations with others would seem to predict. I have to admit to myself that in taking up the positive, I have, in terms of Jung’s theory of psychological types, revealed my own characteristic attitude toward a new situation. A classical Jungian would not fail to note that I have moved toward the case in accord with my extraverted intuitive nature – that is, sensing the long shot possibility at the expense of a more realistic focus upon the client’s limitations, which are everywhere underscored in the facts of the bleak case history. Nevertheless, I trust my intuition and feel ready to go out on a limb and tell myself that, despite appearances, this is a therapy that can work.

Joan, however, will soon be a real person talking to me in my office. I wonder how much to share with her of my experience reading the intake
summary. Usually, I like to begin a therapy by telling the patient what I know already and by letting my own reactions to what I have heard and read about the case come through. But should I tell Joan about my liking for food or speak of my respect for what sounds healthy in her marriage to Sam? Jung is clear that he gave himself permission to tell a number of patients how he felt about them, as early as the first session. He found it particularly important to share his unbidden reactions, since in his view these were governed by the unconscious itself. “[M]y reaction is the only thing with which I as an individual can legitimately confront my patient” (CW 16, p. 5). So, early self-disclosure would be an option for me in building the therapeutic relationship with Joan. But even as my fantasy runs toward how to create a relationship to this new client, I begin to recognize a certain seductiveness in the way I have imagined an easy merger of our natures around a shared, unambivalent aspiration for her betterment, as if there could be no problem between us in the psychotherapeutic collaboration.

It dawns on me, as I examine my initial fantasy more critically, how much my connection to her – so far – is on a narcissistic basis. I have no fantasy as to what she is really like. Am I already behaving like the incestuous father, who must have related to her almost exclusively through his own needs and preoccupations? I recall what a long time it took Joan to trust Sam. I realize that Joan will not trust me if I make a series of moves to “merge” with her – even (or especially) if she initially complies with them. Probably she would defend against my extraverted enthusiasm with increasing messages of discouragement. Even if I succeeded in becoming a good object to her – that is, someone whom she perceives as ideally positioned to foster the emergence of a potentially healthy self in her – there is no evidence that Joan will be unambivalent about linking herself with such a good object. From the number of self-defeating choices that pervade her reported history, I suspect that Joan may suffer from what I have elsewhere termed “primary ambivalence toward the Self,” and I realize that I am going to have to make room for her ambivalence toward people who might be able to help her to thrive if I am going to function effectively as her “selfobject” (Beebe, 1988).

Interpolating from the history both of parental neglect and abuse and, later, of self-destructive behaviors, it is likely that in her own fantasy life part of her is still identified with parental figures who did not always want what was best for her and that she therefore will find it hard to embrace wholeheartedly a program for self-improvement. Further, even if she has already decided that she wants to be helped, this choice could only be accompanied by an uncertainty as to whether any caretaker she might find could fully share her purpose. I know, therefore, that I will be tested to see if I can be a good doctor who doesn’t put his own needs ahead of hers.
I also realize that, although Joan has the goal of becoming a therapist and will sometimes enjoy seeing how I go about doing my work, she is more than just another adult caretaker in the making, who might learn by identifying with me in an apprentice mode. As a mentor, I could talk to her continuously, instructing the therapist in her as I would do with a junior colleague in supervision. With Joan, I think such an approach would backfire. There is a far more fundamental need to be cared for that shows through her history, which particularly suggests maternal abandonment. I could not indefinitely adopt the role of even a good father without recapitulating this maternal abandonment: after a period of compliance with my guidance of her conscious efforts toward self-betterment, Joan would likely begin to get severely depressed.

Probably she would not ask for relief of the depression within the therapy sessions themselves, but would signal her need more indirectly, possibly through canceled appointments or intercurrent illnesses of a physical nature. I have noted that she has characteristically had difficulty asking for help directly. (She did not think her heavy menstrual bleeding was serious enough to warrant a doctor’s visit.) It may be hard to get to the abandoned child in Joan. I will have to be careful not to ally so directly with the seemingly adult part of Joan that the child in her continues to starve and to feel abandoned. Were I to ignore the child, she would be forced to ask for help in symptomatic ways, including perhaps a return to the suicidal behaviors mentioned in her history.

For a therapist working in the classical Jungian tradition, the habit of trusting the psyche to shape an attitude toward a client means allowing one’s clinical fantasy to develop its own tension of opposites. If one lets the natural ambivalence about how to approach a treatment emerge, one avoids the danger of a one-sided countertransference stance. Here, my initial identification with the good father role gives way, spontaneously, to a maternal anxiety. This tension of opposites is a sign of the analyst’s self-regulation, which will operate reliably if the analyst has been analyzed sufficiently to be comfortable in allowing the compensatory function of the unconscious to do its work, and if the analyst has learned to bear the conflicts that emerge. Thus, even when one starts in fantasy, as I did, to shape a stance toward Joan that would transcend her deep mother problem by encouraging a “flight into health” through merger with a progressive analyst-father, the clinical rumination, if allowed to proceed, will eventually turn to a maternal anxiety for the abandoned child that would result.

Finding myself now thinking about Joan’s mother problem, I begin to focus more consciously on the signs of the wounded child. I immediately see, along classical Jungian lines, the prospective meaning – the value – of
the child image. Could the child be the way to the maturity that I sense is possible for Joan? Joan’s desire to jump in a river, the closest to archetypal imagery we are given, could be heard as her desire to reenter the intrauterine condition, to be reborn in the mother’s bloodstream, through what Jung calls the “night sea journey.” Perhaps I can help her realize this ambition in the therapy through an immersion in the unconscious. This would mean attention to her dreams and fantasies, but not in too verbal a mode, which would again be meeting her prematurely at the level of the father and the patriarchal order of words.

Here I have made use of the classical Jungian method of amplification in attending to Joan’s stated wish to drown herself, taking this alarming threat as an archetypal motif, scanning it, with the image taken less literally and more symbolically, for a clue to what her own psyche may think is necessary to heal her. But again the clinician in me rises up in opposition to the archetypalist: I realize that her immersion in the river, even if indicative of a baptism into a new being, is more likely to be accomplished if I accept a period of regression in which a less organized, maybe less verbal, Joan appears as a precursor of her transformation. I may have to contain her through a period in the therapy in which she can’t say much. It occurs to me that she might like to draw, or at least be shown where I keep crayons and paper so that a way of communicating in a fluid medium while she is “underwater” in the unconscious is made available to her. Above all, I can’t expect her to be conscious of what she’s doing in therapy. She may for a long time need just to be safely there in my restrained presence. An underappreciated strength of the classical Jungian position – exemplified by Jung himself, who maintained his strong grounding in psychiatry alongside his interest in “religious” healing through traditional symbolism – is its ability to straddle clinical and symbolic modes in the service of fostering a patient’s recovery.

Whatever the process that eventually turns out to help Joan most, I know that I will have to respect my own nature in following it: classical Jungian analysis conceives itself as a dialectical procedure, a meeting of two souls, each of which must be respected if the exchange is truly to be therapeutic. As Jung says, the analyst is “as much ‘in the analysis’ as the patient” (CW 16, p. 72). There is no way for an extraverted analyst like me to participate in a client’s period of maternal regression except interactively. In the classical approach, this can occur in a verbal, face-to-face mode simply by listening to the practical particulars of the patient’s everyday life – her struggles paying her bills, finding the energy to keep the house clean, and dealing with her relatives. It is classically Jungian to take patients where they are. If as therapist I submit to the mundane reality of Joan’s situation
and respond without attempting to make interpretations that force her into a higher symbolic understanding at a psychological level, I may succeed in getting into the healing river with her. There, I will have to stay with the current of her affects, mostly mirroring them back to her and rarely pushing for their illumination. I will have to say very simple things back to her like, “That’s particularly hard,” or “that’s lonely” or “that’s scary,” to go through the river which in her suicidal fantasy she imagined as the way to bring her chronic dysphoria to an end.

As this second wave in my fantasy of what it would be like to work with Joan overtakes me, I realize that I am trying to will myself into becoming the accompanying mother Joan never had. Once again, I am led to reflect on what I have imagined. I realize that by colluding in principle with Joan’s imagined wish for this kind of mother, I have entered another trap, fallen into a subtler failure to accept Joan as my patient than my earlier attempt to be her good father. For it is not possible simply to undo the wounds of the past by compensating for them now with a corrective regressive experience in the present. Indeed, I suddenly get the feeling that Sam, her good husband, may be trying to do just this: he sounds to me very much like a maternal caretaker, who saw his last wife through diabetes and is now carrying Joan through her ambivalence about deserving his help. Or maybe that’s a projection onto him of the maternal role I now fear falling into.

In any case, I realize what I am going to have to do is harder than being Joan’s good-enough mother. It is to help Joan grieve over the fact that she didn’t have this kind of mother and, in a definite sense, never will – certainly not at the developmental stage when a mother like that would have been most needed. I have to let Joan mourn the lack of that needed mother, and rage at the lack of the needed father too.

Suddenly I see the way (and now it feels like the only way) to work analytically with this wounded woman. I will make a space in which she can tell me, or not, how it has felt to be her – as a person whose parents were inadequate to the task of taking care of her needs – and in which she can begin to articulate how she proposes to go about being her own mother and father. At this point I feel suddenly released from my own fantasies and ready to hear from Joan’s psyche in an unprejudiced way. This emergence of a new attitude out of a tension of opposite, incomplete solutions was called the transcendent function by Jung (CW 8, pp. 67–91) and it is this function the classical analyst relies upon in developing a sound approach to a client. The appearance of the transcendent function is signaled by a release of creative energy for the therapeutic work itself.

Sooner or later, Joan will tell me a dream. Without a need to make that dream a transcending symbolic solution to all her difficulties, or the occasion
to foster a regression into a less conscious state in which I can nurture her back to greater psychic health, I may be able to hear it as the authentic statement of Joan’s psychic position toward the person she has been and the possibility of the person she may yet be. My job will be to hear that dream, to take it in. It will be the authentic vision of who she is, not the fantasies I can’t help bringing to the lacuna in the case report, which is only a record of successive abandonments and partial restitutions, and leaves out the vision of the patient’s own psyche, which can only be shared in a trusting relationship when Joan herself is ready. That vision, more than any fantasy of mine, will shape the actual therapy. In classical Jungian analysis, the treatment plan is dictated by the patient’s psyche. Any real planning for Joan’s treatment will have to be shaped by us on the basis of what her dream suggests is possible, and I would expect the dream to create an unconscious role for me in her life which will have a most inductive effect on my unconscious attitude toward the treatment and a major effect, therefore, on the treatment planning. In the absence of that dream, I can only supply a very approximate guess as to the course of treatment with Joan.

I imagine that I will offer Joan once-a-week psychotherapy, explaining that this is a place where she may come to say what she would like to about her life. I might explain that I have no fixed way of working, but that I, too, will say what I want to say as we go along and also that I am open to her comments and questions about what we are doing as we proceed. I would let her sit either on the chair facing mine or (in my office, the only other option) on the two-seater couch set at right angles to me. Note that my expectation is that she will be sitting up. For the time being, I probably would not show her the drawer in the little table on the other side of the couch from me that holds paper and crayons nor would I suggest that she might like to lie down on the little couch, as I feel either of those behaviors, upon reflection, would be to encourage a regression I have not established is fully in her interest. Equally, I would not make too much of the fact that I listen to dreams and fantasies as well as to more consciously produced communications and associations, because this could commit me to making more interpretive commentary than I might like to get into at this early stage. Mostly, I will try to make room for this woman to tell me what she wants to and for me to respond out of my sense of what I would really like to say in return.

I would predict that Joan spends most of the first hour communicating her shame at having to seek treatment for herself once again, and that she guesses that it’s just a case of “like mother like daughter,” she just can’t lick being fat. And I think I would say that it sounds as if, along with the self-hate, she has a lot of energy toward doing something to get past this symptom – even that it seems to be her task at this time to solve all of the problems her
mother left behind. I would try to convey that I could accept Joan’s sense of having inherited the weight problem, even though she is not literally as fat as her mother was. I would probably add that I know what it feels like to be engaged with food and that there are worse things to be occupied with. If she were to ask me what I mean, I would say that a struggle with food can be creative, in addition to being a pathological problem. I would hope in this way to provide a kind of inclusive context for ongoing discussion at the very beginning, indicating that my office could be a place of creative ambivalence.

I would expect Joan to feel held by this approach, and to engage in a committed way with the work. I expect treatment to go on for a number of years. I imagine at the start that there would be many tests of my ability to accept her ambivalence toward treatment, mostly in the form of suddenly canceled appointments following the more “integrative” sessions (on the model of binge eating and purging after). My main response would be to continue to “be there,” to accept the cancellations calmly and to say to her at the next meeting, I think it’s clear that you are still trying to figure out if there is anything nourishing in the therapy.

Gradually, as she begins to understand her ambivalence, she would, I imagine, come more regularly. Then it might be possible to identify more specifically the ways in which I seem to her like an unresponsive mother or like a frightening, intimate, too-good father. I might be able to facilitate some recognition of how she needs to distance herself from me when I act like an overly enthusiastic father and how, when I assume the role of a more distant mother, it plunges her into a sense of despair over felt abandonment. In this way, we might “work through,” over a very long time, the transference to earlier selfobjects.

But I would also be watching for moments when I seem to her to be interesting in a new way, for those would be times in which I am incarnating the person she might be in the process of becoming. I would particularly look for stretches of more relaxed “meeting” between us, in which I feel naturally accepted for being the therapist I am and I can glimpse a part of her that hasn’t lived much anywhere else. At those times she might look like a “new face” in a movie, and I would be experiencing the unique dimension of her personhood. In such moments I would not be afraid to laugh with her or to respond with enthusiasm toward her developing sense of psychological life.

I will not know for a long time in this therapy whether I am taking care of the mirroring needs of the very young one- or two-year-old self or supplying a measure of Oedipal (and therefore erotic) appreciation to a five-year-old self who can also feel safe that I will not preempt its sexual development to
gratify my own need for intimacy. In short, I will not know if, in the transference, I am an appropriately interested mother or father, and I will not be surprised if instead I turn out to be neither, but rather a kind of transference brother, a fellow sufferer enjoying a respite from the arduousness of adulthood, and a model for the animus that will relate to some creative aspect of herself. For at those moments Joan and I would be experiencing the Self in its function as what Edward Edinger (1973, p. 40) calls an “organ of acceptance.” These would be times at which we are able to transcend ambivalence toward the Self in favor of simple gratitude for the possibilities of being human. It is my belief that such moments will provide the glue for the many years we will be working together, which will doubtless include periods when Joan will feel suicidal and need my support to stay motivated to live, stretches when I will be angry at her for her stubbornness or lack of movement, and times when she will feel enraged by my limitations in understanding, and accepting, the inevitable slowness of her path to healing.

Letting fantasy help to structure the treatment planning, as a classical Jungian analyst does, inevitably means experiencing the problem of opposites, and in practical terms, a refusal to embrace either artificially curtailed forms of treatment, such as time-limited brief psychotherapy, or rigorous prescriptions to guarantee depth, such as insistence on multiple-sessions-a-week on the couch. In classical Jungian analysis, the frequency is dictated by the analyst’s experience of the tension between too little and too much. Probably with Joan I would not increase the frequency of sessions, as that would upset the balance between promising too much and offering enough. For the work to have sufficient integrity, I would feel compelled to hold this tension; and so I would resist trying to force a deepening of the work. What would increase would be my depth of commitment to Joan and my availability to her regardless of the level of her distress.

Jung says that the doctor “is equally a part of the psychic process of treatment and therefore equally exposed to the transforming influences” (CW 16, p. 72). I would anticipate that my own relation to food would become more conscious during the period of my work with Joan. For Joan to complete her analysis with me, I will have to make a space in myself to examine my own ambivalence toward food, perhaps getting in touch with a part of myself that is suspicious, controlling, and devouring in relation to sources of nurture. This self-analysis might free Joan from the necessity of having to carry that for me as an eternal patient.

I hope Joan will realize her goal of becoming an effective counselor to people with eating disorders. I imagine her becoming a pillar of her particular self-help food community, maybe even starting a business like a health food
store. As she becomes less dependent on Sam and thus less the carrier of the wounded anima for him, I imagine Sam will eventually have a serious depression, but that Joan will see him through it, and that he will begin to get in better conscious touch with the needy side of himself. I predict she will have made reparative connections with all her children by the end of her treatment and that she will value her contacts with them and discover that she, too, can be nurturing.

NOTE

1. “Reflexio is a turning inwards, with the result that, instead of an instinctive action, there ensues a succession of derivative contents or states which may be termed reflection or deliberation. Thus in place of the compulsive act there appears a certain degree of freedom, and in place of predictability a relative unpredictability as to the effect of the impulse” (CW 8, p. 117).

REFERENCES


DELDON ANNE McNEELY

An archetypal approach

Here I am asked to demonstrate how one person applies an archetypal orientation. At the risk of oversimplification, I would isolate three definitive marks of that orientation as I see it playing out in my clinical work. One is that I regard the patient’s relationship to the archetypal material selected by the psyche as having priority over transference considerations. This is not to underestimate the essential value of intimate relatedness as a transforming crucible, but to acknowledge that the therapeutic relationship is one arena of several in which the archetypes can be met face to face. Whether the patient invests in symptom, struggle, social functioning, dreams, and so on, I am inclined to see myself in a role of fellow-explorer and witness, unless the role of representative of some powerful inner figure is clearly projected onto me.
Two, the range of behavior that I consider “human” and soulful rather than pathological is wider than that of many of my colleagues of non-archetypal approaches. And when pathology is obvious, my first intention is to explore and understand the meaning of the pathology for the patient’s individuation. I am dismayed at how quickly medications, hospitalizations, and direction are dispensed in today’s psychological milieu, and appalled by the pressure that even I feel from every corner to do something to fix the situation, promise redemption, resolve the conflict, end the impasse, take away the pain, by some heroic intrusion on a natural process, as if there are no inner resources to be encouraged and fanned to life in the patient. I stake my purpose on the wisdom of the psyche, and trust that attention to the archetypal sources of distress will enable the psyche to align itself without strong-armed interventions. I encourage focusing on soul-searching rather than improving.

Three, focusing on archetypal themes brings the analytic process through a gamut of possibilities via the imagination from the densest physiological impulses to the most ethereal psychic experiences, without any preconceived order or expectation of stages, except as determined by the flow and direction from within the patient’s psyche. Theoretically we mature through developmental levels, but seldom do we as therapists see a straightforward progression through stages of growth or integration when we are very close to the patient’s world; only with hindsight do we see how seemingly disparate or irrelevant experiences are linked to a larger picture. Archetypes manifest through the instinctual life of the body, its revulsions, impasses, and attractions, as well as through ideational content and spiritual inclinations. I am wary of imposing probables and shoulds into the patient’s psyche.

Archetypal psychology speaks of “psyche” or “soul” with respect for the mysteriousness of human nature, which can never be reduced to simple determinants. In soul is implied a depth of association to life and death that leads beyond our personal histories and connects us with the intensity of the transpersonal – not a transpersonal that is remote, but one which is always present, the other side of everything ordinary. I imagine the analytic journey to be accompanied by Mercurius, whom Jung (CW 13, para. 284) designated “archetype of individuation;” also, I imagine the presence of the goddess of the hearth, Hestia, as the principle of centering and grounding that keeps the process in focus and creates a balance to the hermetic energy.

Leaving the abstract, let us speak about the coagulation of theory in terms of Joan’s story. To some extent, having a bit of history of Joan as we do deprives me of the kind of initial impact that I look forward to with a new patient. For the benefit of new therapists who might be reading this, I want to admit that the looking-forward-to is not entirely comfortable, as
I always experience anxiety before meeting a new patient. The anxiety may last a few minutes or weeks before something in the relationship gels. Initially uncomfortable feelings on the part of either person do not mean that the therapy is unworkable, but only that deep personal material is potentially engaged.

Despite anxiety, I do anticipate the first meeting as an exceptional encounter. First impressions, gleaned through a primal animal scent, bring essential information which is soon enough overridden by words and conscious intents. Later these first glimpses into the interaction can be compared with further data to provide insight into the unconscious dynamics of the relationship, and into my shadow projections – that is, what this other person enables me to see about my own discarded selves.

Now the fact that we readers have this history about Joan has certain advantages, too, even though it diminishes my initial whole-Joan-phenomenon by coloring the encounter with prior information. Only when I meet Joan will I put these already coded impressions from others together with her physiognomic presentation and respond to her voice, gestures, postures, eye contact, odors, dress and ornamentation, and so forth, and only as she eventually unveils herself will I see whether the historical facts we have been given are authentic and relevant.

The difference between meeting the patient for the first time without prior information and meeting the patient within the context of her history is an important one, and is one of the issues that separates the experience of private practice from most agency work. I personally like to work with ambiguity, and as much spontaneity as possible, and do not ordinarily take any history in or before the first session with adult patients. Usually I let the story slowly unfold, trusting that the facts are less important than what has been made of them by the patient’s inner storyteller. This is a point on which analysts differ, and where each must find his or her own comfort zone.

Another thing about the initial meeting: the referral person plays a significant emotional role. The patient transfers a preconception of being received to the first professional contact; whether that first person contacted is conceived of as savior, confessor, judge, healer, parent, or servant, the “fit” between the actual reception and the patient’s image of therapy strongly colors the beginning work. Sometimes such a strong attachment is made by the patient to a professional person who has seen the patient first, that the fear and grief about leaving that person must be acknowledged and dealt with before anything further can be done.

All of this has bearing on Joan. What has her referring physician inferred about therapy, and what is her attachment to that physician? What is her image of psychotherapy, and what does she expect of me and of herself?
Will I work with her during her hospitalization, and will I be able to continue seeing her as an outpatient, or will she then have to see a new therapist? Joan’s leaving the hospital with its twenty-four-hour-a-day in utero containment may involve a period of grief or separation anxiety to which is added the experience of loss of the first therapist. In some unfortunate treatment settings, the follow-up after inpatient treatment is scanty and takes little notice of these very powerful dynamics. Patients then experience abandonment. In any case, I would recommend intense aftercare, including long-term therapy, even after successful treatment as an inpatient.

Before making recommendations, however, let me note my initial reactions to the verbal portrait we’ve been given of Joan. My first impression is that Joan possesses such a stalwart spirit and an embodiment of hope that I find myself strongly in her corner, wishing her the best. After much pain and failure she actualizes her hope with a new attempt at healing, a new marriage, a new career. I respect her steadfast commitment to life, to Eros, which she demonstrates by taking the initiative to start a self-help group, to want to care for others, to continue to expect to change things for the better, even while feeling hopelessly suicidal at times. I expect to meet a strong, earthy woman, full of vitality, much of that vibrance perhaps beyond her awareness and maybe very different from her self-perceptions. If she is able to choose long-term therapy, my positive response to Joan will lubricate our work. Still, as a countertransference attitude, this positive feeling must be objectified. I cannot let my respect and admiration color my behavior so overtly as to give her a false sense of security or an impression of my seeming manipulative or condescending, nor do I wish to create in her unnecessary dependence upon me, or to expect too much of her too soon, or to covertly promise too much, or to be blind to her darker aspects.

Regarding the dark, I wonder what appeals to her about “jumping into a river,” a transforming image of quite different quality than, say, strangling herself with a rope, or blowing herself to bits. Is she so hot and pliable that she needs to be plunged into water to cool and harden, or does she yearn to be dissolved into some greater flowing substance, swallowed, returned to the amniotic container? Perhaps I can plunge with her through some combination of curiosity and compassion to learn what her fantasies of transformation would be, to see what essential ingredients of Joan would survive a dissolution. Joan’s image, an invocation of the alchemical process of solutio, deserves serious care. The fantasy of death by water on ego’s terms carries a wish from the Self for renewal, for a spiritual baptism. In analysis we will explore this wish rather than concretize it as “nothing more than” a suicidal impulse. But the dangers of coming too close to Joan!
Would she allow me to collaborate with her in this exploration? Would she swallow me in and vomit me out in disgust?

Behind the initial impressions await crowds of questions like this, the answers to which I expect to learn if Joan comes to trust me. I welcome my curiosity as evidence that her story has touched me, but I will refrain from asking these questions. I will usually allow Joan to decide what we will discuss, and in what order. Once the content is chosen I may become active in eliciting more associations, pursuing and amplifying themes, confronting inconsistencies, and so on, but I like to make it clear early in the work that the patient takes primary responsibility for the stuff of therapy if she can possibly do so.

Meanwhile, those questions crowd around. Will Joan reject me as she is rejecting her new husband (through projective identification, i.e. setting him up to leave her)? Is there something too dangerous in Joan to be able to hold onto what she loves? The feminine principle seems vividly present in Joan in all of its primary ambivalence, and not refined into some harmonious self-image (such as nurturant mother, artistic medium, sex-goddess, devoted wife, inspiratrice, etc.). Can she include under her warm, earthy cloak her husband’s grieving son, or will her unconscious sadism feast on a vulnerable young male? For, as the bulimic symptom demonstrates, the need to gather into herself and the need to expel from herself co-exist in contention, a theme that seems to have been with her since she struggled to survive in the hungry family of origin.

I am curious about that early family life, and the mysteries performed in those small bedrooms of her infancy and childhood. What was given to and what received from the silent, frustrated parents unable to fill the hunger in each other? What forces kept Joan’s parents together, kept father rising daily and going to his arduous job, kept mother alive for eighty-plus years? I want to know mother’s story, too. Was she desperate for touch, trying to elicit some gratification from her baby? If we examine our fantasies and cultural myths truthfully we cannot deny the sensual pleasure to be derived from closeness to the child’s body; it is not denial that protects adults from exploiting children sexually in the face of such pleasure, but the capacity to contain and redirect the desires. What prevented these parents from managing their sensuality? What anxieties lay drowned beneath mother’s fat globules, and why were her anxieties not allayed with her man? The man, pouring all of his attention into the machine, avoided some essential contact with his women in the daylight; a machine is predictable, will not bleed, gain weight, run away, insist, or dissolve in tears, but will stand firm to his ministrations and attempts at mastery. We are given a picture of this couple, seemingly trapped in mutual disappointment and resignation, with a life task to send two reasonably hopeful girls out into the world. Why couldn’t
the two adults sleep together and comfort each other, enjoy lust, give mutual attention? Were they afraid of having more children? Were they frustrated in some way by sexual inadequacy? Was one or both too frightened of the intimacy of being seen and known? Did they find the natural irritations and anger of everyday accommodation to another too frightening? Were they impeded by family myths and ancestral ghosts in the form of crippling self-images and unreasonable constraints?

We can only speculate about what went wrong in that little house which could have glowed with human warmth and laughter, but instead took a dark turn toward secrecy, scarcity, perversity, and fear. I try to imagine the atmosphere in that little house, and Joan’s response to it. I do this because it is interesting and I am curious, but also because the information will be helpful when she inevitably tries to recreate the atmosphere in our relationship, as some part of her seems to be doing in her relationship with Sam. My sense of the ambience in that household is so sad and cold, but the confusion in our professional field about incest and false memories underlines how careful one must be about allowing the patient to expose her interpretations about her early life, and not suggesting how it was with pointed questions or inferences.

Living in such a circumscribed world as those four did certainly must have played a powerful role in shaping Joan’s images and expectations of life, men, motherhood. However, it did not determine what Joan would become, as her psyche made its selections and expressed its inclinations. She was able to take from that world some essential satisfaction, emerging with a body whose desire for intimacy and generativity propelled her out of the house and into a life rich with experience. I think of the feminine principle in her as prodding her to such instinctual interests, for instance, as enjoying emotion in relatedness, mating with a man, creating a baby, giving birth to some generative project, contributing to some communal or esthetic enterprise; and I imagine the masculine principle in her as engaging the world, determined that these interests become articulated and actualized beyond the plane of fantasy. At eighteen Joan demonstrated sufficient impetus from her masculine principle, or animus, to assert her independence from her parents and to find a partner to help her expand and differentiate her image of masculinity from the father complex. Unfortunately, as is often the case in women deprived of the experience of a wholesome father who encourages self-love and good judgment in his daughter, her way out was not to become self-sufficient, but to enter a different dependency situation, probably projecting the good and powerful father onto her young husband.

Joan’s first two choices of partners reflect a lack of judgment and an unconscious attraction to the kind of dangerous atmosphere she had left
behind. Only now, in mid-life, does she seem to have acquired – not by early preparation and good models, but by experience, trial, error, and suffering – a strength within herself which I think of as masculine: that is, the strength to assert her choices, to make realistic plans, to criticize and be willing to detach herself from wrong judgments, to seek out and think through beneficent experiences rather than letting herself follow only her heart’s desires and intuitive choices. These functions begin to balance her strong feminine need for nurturance, attachment, and emotional intensity. Joan may now be more capable of internalizing the tensions between what attracts her to a man initially and what benefits her in the long run; and she may be more able to resolve those tensions intrapsychically instead of acting them out in relationship to actual men. I should add that not all archetypal psychologists find the gender differentiation of psychological functions useful. Some Jungians of all schools feel that the anima/animus concept is more disruptive than heuristic, for reasons beyond my scope to elucidate here. But for me the concept of feminine and masculine principles is valuable in helping me organize my perceptions of personality.

Joan may have acquired some healthy animus qualities by this time in her life, but as a young adult her life was colored more by the mother-complex as she lived and moved in a soup of concerns with dependency which overpowered discerning the personality characteristics of her husbands, or finding her niche in the world of work and independence, or developing her mind and talents. Imagine a twenty-eight-year-old pregnant woman with two young children and a troublesome husband taking on a fourth, handicapped child. What on earth was she trying to do? I can only guess it was something psychically related to weighing over 300 pounds, expressing something akin to her mother’s hunger … nurturing gone wild, nurturing taken to such excess that inevitably it must collapse, and then comes the other side: she loses it all and becomes the helpless victim. Her children are removed and she has to depend on the state to sustain herself and one child. Such powerful nurturant instincts reveal creative energy which, if submitted to processes of reflection, can serve and gratify Joan and others touched by her.

Joan’s story evokes so many images of ravenous hunger that I wonder how I will react to such stimulation over a period of exposure. Surely I can expect, in addition to my initial admiration of its heroic flavor, a counter-transference that is breast-dominated – whether by a need to care for, or by a tendency toward stingy withholding remains to be seen. I should watch for both these reactions, and also for the invitation from Joan to be pulled in as her adversary against perceived wrongs by the men in her life. Now that she has the protection of a husband and a therapist, I would expect her to begin to feel safe enough to allow her young needs to be felt, and that
unfulfilled need for a mother to align with her against the exploitative principle (whether in mother or father, but certainly now incorporated into her own character structure) warrants repetition. Although she was strong enough to extricate herself from two arduous marriages, it sounds as if she did not meet her husbands’ aggression with much potency of her own. Now she meets Sam with more self-determination, even though it seems to frighten her. I want to allow her to feel the strength of her need to make mother her savior without playing that out with her and prolonging unnecessarily that image as reality. I imagine holding and keeping in check the starving, devouring, exploitative parent, while the sacred space of the therapeutic vessel creates an opportunity for the generous, full mother to flourish in Joan.

So many alimentary images evoke and want a timeless quality that promises to allow all necessary functions of introjection and absorption to mature according to their proper schedules. Ideally I would want unlimited time with Joan, because my experience of working with such fundamental contradictions as her life exemplifies is that, despite good motivation, change is very slow and tenuous. On the level of the digestive system we meet primitive monsters of the brainstem and basic cell structures, where insight is virtually useless, so that the same ground must be taken and retaken from insidiously monstrous greed. By this I mean that the same issues and incidents must be talked about again and again, the same affects expressed, the same misunderstandings unraveled in the relationship with the therapist more than once. I would hope she could be seen daily as an inpatient until the suicidal purging was able to be contained and curtailed. Then, as an outpatient ideally I would plan to see her for one to three hours per week for several years. Provided her strength and motivation met my initial expectations, I would expect a good prognosis with this schedule.

Under the present circumstances she may not be able to afford the usual fee. This we would have to discuss thoroughly, for working out a feasible financial contract is an essential factor of the therapeutic process, setting the scene for the adult-to-adult nature of a relationship which is at the same time allowed to be infantile and regressive. In her case the financial issue could become a way of falling into the starving-mother complex with one of us feeling deprived, if money is not dealt with straightforwardly. I want Joan to consider our work together as valuable and mutually purposive, requiring of her an input of energy, financial and emotional, which I will meet with a like input of psychological sustenance and reliability, and ideally, some wisdom about the psyche which will be useful to her. If we cannot establish such a timeless mother-world in which she has frequent, reliable access to a safe, permissive therapy setting, I would have to consider
a more guarded prognosis in terms of substantial change. In that case I would direct Joan to set up for herself a strong support system, including, for example, her self-help group, perhaps an educational program with access to college counselors, perhaps a twelve-step program, perhaps brief marital or family counseling, and periodic follow-ups with me or someone else in which I would attempt to support her continued interest in the meaning of her problems. The periodic follow-ups ideally would continue as long as we both deem necessary.

But suppose that an unlimited duration of treatment is possible. I know of no substitute for the kind of self-reflection that is possible only with the intimate support established by enduring contact. Anyone who has experienced this therapeutically knows the indescribable moments of transformation. Transformative happenings (which I can only call “moments” though years may be represented by the moment) hold an integration that may be most easily conveyed in images – chemical images, as the thickening of a sauce or fusion of metals or moment of crystallization; physical images, as the coming together of coordination in learning to drive a machine or a potter’s wheel; mental images of “getting” the meaning behind the formula, or having the foreign language become automatic. Something like this happens in therapy when a place of readiness is reached, but it does not happen overnight. It is not the flash of insight of a breakthrough or peak experience, but is something quiet and abiding. As a therapist I have my personal image for fostering this happening, which is to follow the “aha’s” which reflect the mobility and excitement of Mercurius, while remaining steadily settled before the warm hearth of Hestia, where all the flashes of brilliance come to the integrity of repose.

In Jung’s theory, the language to be mastered is the communication between the conscious ego and its archetypal source in the Self, the archetype of wholeness that is being’s circumference, source, and power, and manifests as an experience of being contained, centered, or guided. Natural adaptation to society requires defensive postures that cannot be felt consciously and cannot be unloosened quickly, postures which diminish the ego’s awareness of its archetypal source and keep us searching for completion in the world of conscious events. Complexes outside the ego’s conscious sphere of influence, however, do maintain their numinous connection with the Self, which is why they have such power over us and cannot be “controlled” by the ego’s will-power. Therapies which rely on ego-strength, as all short-term and cognitive therapies do, ignore this fact that is the foundation of depth psychology. Patients may accept suggestions and interpretations in a desire for health, but eventually these cognitions are reabsorbed by the dominant complexes, unless a dialectical relationship with
the complex occurs which allows it to be accepted more or less comfortably into ego-awareness. Eating disorders reflect complexes which dominate the ego and are often not able to be contained by will-power alone. In discovering the archetypal source of the complex we hope to find the key to transformation. What gods or demons in the patient drive the hunger, who is represented in the irresistible food, who withholds a sense of safety, satiety, and fulfillment? What is being compensated, and what avoided?

In the short-term therapies, patient and therapist do not stay in relationship long enough to get to the problems of trust which are the inevitable fate of any long relationship and which reflect the power of autonomous complexes to undermine our love and determination. The honeymoon of complete trust eventually must give way to doubt, and then transformation processes begin. Romantic relationships falter at this point, and the personality’s true colors come forth. Similarly, in therapy, the hardest and most potentially rewarding work begins when the patient begins to question the value of the work, or the integrity of the therapist.

Let us assume that Joan has elected to participate in unlimited psychotherapy. In addition to noting my first impressions, I will want to try to establish a sense of how she perceives her situation at the moment. Of what feelings is she most aware? To what are her attention and affect being drawn? Is she able to think symbolically, and is she able to feel symbolically? The former requires an intellectual capacity to abstract an essence or universal quality from the concrete event, and is a minimal requirement for depth psychotherapy, obviously. The capacity to feel symbolically is more nebulous: to be able to hold within the accessible psyche a gratifying image which enables one to postpone impulsive, immediate satisfaction of one’s tensions and desires is an asset but not a requirement for depth psychotherapy. In fact, it is often one of the weak or absent capacities that we hope will come to fruition in successful psychotherapy. In psyche are included not only mental contents and visual images, but physiological and transcendental contents and experiences. Jung referred to these as the psychoid events, those experiences on the edge of consciousness at the level of instinctual and spiritual awarenesses. Imagining is not just visual, but also kinesthetic and auditory.

Freudian, neo-Freudian, and neo-Jungian psychoanalytic theorists have given exquisite attention to the developing infant in attempting to understand how this capacity for symbolic gratification becomes part of a human being’s psychological equipment, for all communal life depends on the ability of most of its members to postpone physiological gratification through symbolism. The infant who negotiates successfully the substitution of a transitional object for the incomplete and inconstant mother has
acquired one of the magical tools which will make the journey of individuation possible. However, patients seeking individuation often come to us without having ever developed this capacity for symbolizing feeling, this tool or ability which will allow them to relativize and objectify their emotional needs. In such cases we hope to recreate in the therapy vessel the archetypal context in which can occur the leap of trust that allows a relatively undifferentiated psyche to anticipate and await gratification with some degree of self-reflection. This theme can be found in countless fairytales in the form of the hero’s or heroine’s convoluted journey toward patience and self-containment until the time for just the appropriate action is propitious.

I predict Joan to be a person who will remain long in the non-symbolic mother-world, and who will have some difficulty in translating her symptoms into psychological meanings, but who will bring an enlivening energy to her work which will gradually become more symbolic and open to creative uses of unconscious material. If she remembers dreams, can learn to do active imagination, can put her feelings into some form of symbolic process – imagining, drawing, painting, dancing, writing, or translating into music – then these psychic conduits will become rituals to channel the mythic world into the significant emotional events of everyday life and ordinary relationships. Imbued with meaning and the primal dimensions of archetypal events, everyday life and ordinary relationships become filled with spirit, passion is allowed to enter everyday life instead of stagnating in emotional impasses, and there is no reason to hide from reality behind fears and inhibited desires. We look forward, then, to encounters with both material and spiritual worlds for whatever those encounters offer, for richer, for poorer, till death do us part.

Inevitably an interplay between levels of integration occurs throughout life and within the analytic session. Patient and therapist both dip into early infantile, child, and adolescent states if the process is moving. Also, even patients with fragile integrity may move into highly differentiated or enlightened states, which could pass unnoticed if we are conditioned to expect less of that person. It is important, then, that the therapist see and recognize these enlightened states by being open to them. I am afraid that if we define or diagnose too well, we may be closed to such recognitions. Consequently, I look at each session as a potential adventure, and try not to be bogged down in expectations and predictions based on diagnoses and prognoses. Sometimes the adventure feels more like being hindered by leaden weights or buried in earth … hardly open to the influence of Mercurius the Holy Journeys. Still, a journey it is, and subject to change at any bend in the road.
In her family of origin Joan learned an attitude of abuse toward herself, probably through a contemptuous relationship between masculine and feminine principles modeled in the family, which now manifests in a cavalier attitude toward the unusual menstrual bleeding, as well as in her forcing her body to compete with its own digestive processes. Such obstinate refusal to submit to the fundamental processes of nutrition reflects a deep fury toward her body and its wants. In whatever way the body’s wants are imaged, whether as the devouring mother, poisonous breast, insatiably greedy child, implacable father, we want to discover and bring to light that image. I reject the notion that there is a universal dynamic underlying all bulimias (such as anger toward father). Such an assumption is no more valid than saying that a particular dream symbol has the same meaning for everyone. While there would appear to the observer to be a conflict between uncontrollable hunger and a repudiation of that impulse to devour, we cannot assume what the bulimic’s underlying conflict consists of until her images tell us about her relationship to the symptom.

It is fashionable to treat the eating disorders with antidepressants and antianxiety drugs. I am wary of medications, which may interfere with the coming to light of the images, our clues to the archetypal meaning underlying the symptoms, those very meanings which will unlock the compulsive nature of the symptoms. Some anxiety is required for the individuation process to unfold and for the kind of plodding, trial-and-error work of plowing over the same soul-sod repeatedly until it is pulverized to the point where something new can be planted. But repetition is two-faced. How do we know when we are in a pattern of futile cyclical compulsion, and when inching our way to individuation? Here therapy furthers self-reflection that enables a patient to ask the right question, examine the dream, notice the inner experience, or single out the authentic voice, that tells that ground is being broken, however slowly. Despite the evidence of self-contempt in Joan’s symptoms and her disgust at her body’s demands, a counter-movement toward self-care is bringing about constructive changes in Joan. I would hope that both the disgust and the self-care will have time to be explored, and that those seemingly dualistic alternatives can be reconciled.

Therapy feels most successful to me when it ends by mutual agreement of patient and therapist at a point of completion of some significant integration of complex contents. Ideally, there is a consideration of ending, perhaps dreams that confirm the decision, and an opportunity to review the process, particularly the relationship which has imparted its mark on therapist and patient to be remembered as a connection of soul.
NOTES

1. In addition to theoretical discussion in Chapter 6 (above), see also Hillman (1975, pp. 170–195).
2. Images of alchemical operations are elucidated in many sources. One comprehensive overview is given in Edinger (1985).

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ROSEMARY GORDON

A developmental approach

When I first read Joan’s history, as described by the Renfrew Center, I felt shocked by the bleakness of her story. Her whole life seemed to have been devoid of any experience of love, support, concern, or of somebody or anybody who might have been able to hold her, contain her, or encourage her to value herself, to care for herself and to protect herself. Such a case history can provoke despair, pessimism, pity, and discouragement.

Yet there were just one or two features in her history that were like points of light blinking like small stars in a very dark space. Their very presence provokes a question. To what extent is Joan really only the victim of fate; or is she, or has she been, also, the maker of her fate?

Before I attempt to deal with such questions I want to digress briefly in order to survey both theory and clinical practice that characterize the developmental school. I will also try to describe the use I make of it, though restricting myself to only a few points.

Andrew Samuels (1985) in his book Jung and the Post-Jungians described how the various analytical psychologists became differentiated into three schools, the “classical,” the “archetypal,” and the “developmental.” Until then we used to think of a London versus a Zurich school, which gave it a tribal, chauvinistic, or even jingoistic air. Samuels introduced a more meaningful classification, based primarily on the predominance or the neglect of one or other of Jung’s theoretical concepts or clinical practices. When I found myself placed by him into the developmental school I had really no difficulty in recognizing and accepting this attribution.
Now, ten years later, I want to examine whether I am still thinking and working as a “developmental” Jungian analyst, and whether I still value this approach. In other words whether I still believe:

1. That development is, could or should be, a life-long process, beginning from birth – or even from before birth – and hopefully continuing to the very end of life (Fordham’s seminal work and the recent researches by Daniel Stern have led us to recognize that individuation does indeed start unbelievably early).

2. That it is helpful and growth-producing for a person – or a person’s therapist – to be in touch with and take account of the important events, developmental stages, and experiences in his or her life and personal history.

3. That men and women: (i) have physical bodies and therefore have physical or sensory experiences; (ii) are social beings with emotional and social needs, having been thrust into the emotional and social context of parents, families, and communities; and (iii) experience an inner world of internalized personages and relationships and of images and phantasies that carry both remembered and also innovative, unfamiliar, or numinous features.

4. That exploration and use of the transference and the countertransference is central to analytic work, because through it are set in motion valuable bridging processes – bridgings between oneself and the other, bridgings between the different parts and tendencies within the psyche, and bridging between the basic desire for fusion or union and the opposing wish for identity and separateness; furthermore, that it is through the transference that events or conflicts experienced in the past can become a “present past,” experienced and lived now, but perhaps in a somewhat new and different way; that as for the analyst’s countertransference, this may help to recover what had seemed lost, and it may even assist in its potential transformation; but, finally and importantly, that transference and countertransference can serve to potentiate the evolution of the symbolizing function.

Now to return to the case of Joan. There have been many adverse conditions in her history, much early damage, and clearly her images and symptoms belonged to a pre-Oedipal stage. But signs of a nascent capacity to experience and to communicate through metaphors and symbols, and a potential identification with the wounded healer – all this triggered in me interest and some optimism. It led me to sense that the outcome of her development and therapy may show that men and women are not inevitably passive bystanders of their fate. They are not necessarily just an arena in which biological, instinctual, or even archetypal forces disport themselves.
I believe I feel comfortable in the developmental school because due value is given there to both analysis and synthesis and to the psychological processes of both differentiation and integration.

Taking a cool clinical look at Joan, I believe that she is a depressive person with quite marked masochistic tendencies which are often enacted in a compulsive way. Again and again she has managed to get herself into situations in which she is exposed to conditions that are revealingly similar to some of her earlier painful childhood experiences. This creates the suspicion that there is in her an unconscious need to repeat what has been; that she can’t let go of the past. Is it that she dare not risk meeting the new? Her unconscious repetition compulsion is neatly disguised and overcompensated by her behavior and her conscious thoughts: she appears to move swiftly and frequently from one sexual partner to another and from one childbirth to the next one and from one job or occupation to another.

There seems to be in Joan, as a result of a nature–nurture combination, a predisposition to depression and to eating disorders. She has described her mother as being “always depressed” and weighing a quite unbelievable 300 pounds; and her own eldest daughter, Amy, has been diagnosed as having a “bipolar disorder.”

Apparently both parents, father and mother, have abused her. Her father, although strict and emotionally distant, abused her sexually from when she was about five years old onwards, while her mother wanted Joan to “fondle her breasts.” In other words all the potentially pleasant, nourishing, and enriching stuffs, experiences, and feelings were forced on her, rather than offered as gifts; they were not allowed to develop naturally and organically out of meaningful, relevant, and emotionally matching relationships. It is easy to empathize and to believe that she remembers her childhood as “unsafe and full of fears.”

When Joan was admitted to Renfrew she was bulimic, “bingeing and vomiting (purging) at least three times a day.” Her bulimia, I think, is undoubtedly linked to a powerful body image distortion. She weighed a normal 144 pounds, being 5’6” high, but she thinks of herself as fat; this suggests to me that there is an unconscious identification with her obese, her grossly overweight, mother. This must be quite particularly painful, given that she is likely to experience a near-explosive cocktail of ambivalence in relation to her mother. She probably longed for this mother to transform herself into a loving, caring one, but primarily and more realistically, she feels an intense hatred and distrust for her who, instead of protecting her against her father’s abuse, had actually organized their living arrangements for it to happen, once her older sister had left and escaped from their parents’ manipulation and collusive betrayal.
Just knowing about her history and before I have actually seen her or worked with her tempts me to suspect that her bingeing and vomiting is a caricaturing dramatization, an enactment of what her parents have done to her. After all, mother forced her to attend to her breast, the breast that is associated with food, that is, with milk and the oral pleasures that are linked to sucking. And father forced on her a premature experience of the excitement and pleasures linked to and derived from the genitals.

Thus what could and should be potentially satisfying and fulfilling is lost, is perverted, if the stimulations of the body organs are forced upon one, and are out of one’s own control. Has Joan’s compulsive bingeing not just this very effect of making her feel humiliated if not depersonalized, turning pleasure into intense displeasure?

The bulimic person’s body experience, it seems to me, is thrust from states of feeling that his or her inside is uncomfortably overfull to states of feeling the insides as a gaping emptiness. In Joan’s case what she vomits and expels represents, symbolically, I suspect, mother’s unwanted milk and father’s unwanted semen.

The powerlessness and the victim role that Joan had experienced as a child, particularly in relation to her parents, could perhaps be understood as having been transmuted in the adult Joan into compulsions and addictions which then continued to make her feel helpless and impotent.

The fact that Joan had failed to “see the signs” when her second husband sexually abused her two small daughters shows how very deeply she had repressed and split off her own experience of abuse from her father. Indeed very complex and ambivalent feelings must have become associated with the theme of father–daughter incest, which then left her insensitive, blind, and deaf and cut off from her children; and possibly here, too, is some sort of identification with her own mother.

Joan’s masochistic tendencies seem to have taken her into two marriages in and through which she repeated and relived all the hurts and dramas of her childhood. Her first two husbands were cruel, abusive, unfaithful, and ruthless; the second one abandoned her and the three children suddenly without preparation, warning, or explanation. When she came to Renfrew she was in her third marriage, but there was yet no information and no way of knowing how that one might develop.

She also reported to Renfrew that she would, at times, when particularly anxious and in emotional pain, hit herself either on the head or in the stomach. I wonder if this might not show that there is something of a split in her ego consciousness, because by hitting herself she gives vent not only to her masochism, that is her addiction to pain, but also to her sadism, for this activity involves not only a victim, but also a perpetrator.
Adopting another baby, a damaged baby, a baby with cerebral palsy while she was in her third pregnancy strikes me as another acting out of masochism, although I just wonder whether this could perhaps also be understood as expressing an unconscious striving toward an almost heroic caring and healing.

This brings me back to my initial impression that in spite of the general adverse features of her relationships in childhood and also later, there were some glimmers of light. I am thinking of the fact that she had “recently organized a women’s self-help group for eating disorders,” or that after having “lost everything” when her second husband had deserted her, she managed in the end to find a job as a “cashier and food service attendant” and succeeded in keeping it. But even more encouraging for any possible psychotherapeutic venture are some signs that Joan may be capable of using and thinking and expressing herself in and through metaphors and symbols, as when she asked at Renfrew that she wanted to be helped to “work with the feelings I’ve been stuffing down.” Her long-term goal to become an addiction counselor also supports my hunch, my vague suspicion, that there is in her, linked to her experience of pain, distrust, and impotence, an opposite force, a drive to heal herself and others.

Thus, as I studied and immersed myself longer and more deeply into the descriptions of Joan’s history and her presenting problems, my original gloomy forebodings were shot through by some shafts of light; that is, I could see one or two possibly hopeful signs that encouraged me to think that some analytic work might be possible and prove to be helpful.

Let me now suppose or guess how I might proceed, given my theoretical and clinical experience and point of view, and given what I have by now learned about Joan.

Having seen Joan for an initial interview and assessment I might decide to offer to take her on for analytic psychotherapy. I might have liked her; I might have seen her as a woman who had been badly damaged, and who had a very poor sense of her own value and who was very unsure of who she is and what she is; yet I would have sensed an unexpected but deeply buried core of toughness and tenacity. This impression would have led me to feel that she and I might be able to establish enough rapport between us to weather the storms as well as the periods of becalmment, of hatred and love, of feelings of persecution and feelings of trust, of longing for and of angry rejection of dependence, closeness, intimacy.

I would also have realized that we would have to begin very slowly the analytic work, that is, the exploration of her conscious and unconscious experiences, of her history, her memories, her fantasies, and her dreams, and also of the present-day frustrations, satisfactions, events, conflicts, hopes, and
fears. Above all it would be most important to respect her privacy and her boundaries and avoid anything that could rouse the suspicion that I might try to intrude with my own thoughts and speculations by making and giving interpretations. Joan having been so much abused, both sexually and as a person, my function as her therapist would be to guide her, slowly, toward her own possible insights. Consequently whatever I said to her would have to be said in the form of a question, except, of course, when I might want to express and tell her something about my own feelings and reactions.

Expressing myself in the form of questions rather than in statements, which I consider to be particularly important in working with Joan, is actually something I tend to use with most of my patients, because questioning involves the patient in taking an active part in the analytic work rather than remain a passive recipient of whatever the therapist produces. In other words the patient must examine whether or not what has been offered seems to fit and make some sense; and if distortions have crept in, they can give a clue and reveal what is happening in the patient–therapist relationship and/or what kind of intrapsychic complex dominates the functioning of perception, thinking, feeling, and intuition.

On taking Joan into therapy I would certainly suggest a face-to-face encounter. The couch would be quite inappropriate for someone so fettered and abused by both parents. Should she, at a much later date, having worked through the traumas of her childhood – and her two marriages – and become herself interested and absorbed in the deeply unconscious inner world inside her, the world of fantasies and symbols, then a move to the couch might be entertained and tried. But the idea of such a change would then need to come from her, by being verbalized, or by the occasional, apparently inadvertent, glance at the couch.

As regards the frequency of her analytic sessions, I would, to start with, see her twice a week. One has to strike a fine balance, in making decisions: a fine balance between on the one hand containing her and making the depression bearable, and on the other hand precipitating the collapse of her defenses and the external structures she has managed to make and keep. I am thinking of work, family, children, and the third marriage. But I would also keep in mind that she is liable to addictions: admittedly addiction to therapy or her therapist may be less harmful than her bulimic addictions, but in the long run such addiction may sap the transformative potential of the therapy.

As in all analytic therapy, the most important function is the transference and countertransference, that is, everything felt, believed, projected, and introjected that happens between patient and therapist. As I have said elsewhere, “Transference is a ‘lived bridge’ between the I and the other,
between past, present and future, between the unconscious that is the split-off parts of the psyche on the one hand, and between the conscious and the rational on the other hand” (Gordon, 1993, p. 235). In other words the transference creates “a present past.” Through the process of projection the persons and personages, real, historical, fantasized, or archetypal, that had furnished the patient’s inner world in the past, are put onto or into the therapist. Thus, through the transference the fears, hopes, longings, moods and feelings that had been experienced but were then lost – repressed, denied – are re-evoked, rediscovered, and re-experienced.

Were I to read Joan’s case notes, I would, in real life, now want to see the patient myself and so explore my own reactions, intuitive understanding, and expectations. I would try to suspend my memories of the assessor’s report, in order to make myself empty enough to receive my own impressions of her. For we know there are no unbiased, pure, and neutral observations; every assessor’s interest and personal characteristics inevitably affect his or her view of a patient, quite apart from the fact that a person will react and bring along different parts of him- or herself to different interviewers. If I were to be Joan’s psychotherapist then I would have to get to know and to experience her as early and as uninfluencedly as possible.

I would now start to wonder what sort of Joan I would meet in our first interview. She is forty-four years old. Amy, her first child from her first marriage, is twenty-six years old. So Joan was eighteen years old when she first got married. I imagine her to be slightly plump and of low average height.

I expect that her approach and attitude to me in this our first contact would show conflict and ambivalence. She wants to be helped and cared for, but she wouldn’t easily be able to trust me: to trust that I wouldn’t abuse her need for help. She resents it if and when she recognizes that she depends on someone else – on me, the therapist in this situation. She is actually ashamed of her neediness and fears that she might be considered a nuisance, a nuisance who does not really merit professional attention. (I am thinking here of her hesitation to consult her gynecologist when she suffered from heavy menstrual bleeding, and that she hesitated to take time off from work. Of course, fear of losing her job or the cost of medical attention may be other reasons, other considerations to take into account.)

If I suspected that these internal contradictions prevented her from using this first encounter and making some sort of contact with me, leaving her excessively tense and anxious and unable to speak or look, then I would try to convey to her that I understood something of this inner turmoil. I would also suspect that Joan probably knew that I might be her therapist, which meant that she would see me regularly for quite a long time. Knowing this might be reassuring; but it might also make her more reluctant to speak to
me because she might fear that whatever she told me I would remember, I would hold on to it; and if that happened then she would not be able to rebury it, to forget it, to repress it once more, or to deny it; for I would then be able to push it back into consciousness and confront her with those memories and feelings that she had – and still has – experienced as being too painful, too shameful or too guilt-laden.

Before ending this first meeting I would discuss with Joan some of the practical arrangements – number of sessions per week, the times and dates I would offer her, fees, length of sessions, holidays, etc. But finally I would ask her if she did want to embark on this therapeutic venture, and embark on it with me.

Her masochistic tendencies and her compulsion to repeat the early abuse from both her parents could also hinder, or even sabotage, the analytic work. Masochism can indeed obstruct therapy because it carries with it a denial of one’s own responsibilities and the experience of guilt. Nor can discomfort and/or pain act as incentive to change, to develop, to grow, since pain and discomfort are in fact sought out and desired. And if masochism is actually the object of a repetition compulsion – as it is in Joan – then the therapy’s effectiveness is likely to be obstructed. As I have already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the presence of a repetition compulsion points to a person’s need to hold on to the past, the familiar – however bad or painful this past has been – rather than step into the new, the relatively unknown. “The devil you know is better than the devil you don’t know” is a folksy word of advice or wisdom one hears occasionally.

I can imagine that on meeting Joan I might come to feel that, in spite of the rather pessimistic case notes, in spite of the severe damage she has suffered in early childhood and later, and in spite of the various psychopathological features in her make-up – in spite of all this, I might feel inclined to offer her psychotherapy. In fact, I might find myself actually liking her. I might see in her something touching, perhaps because she gives the impression of a vulnerability against which she has not erected impenetrable defenses. It is true she seems to look at one with a watchful suspiciousness, yet I sense that there is inside her a stubborn tenacity which I would find encouraging.

Obviously she would not be easy to work with; I would expect crises and rages and also periods of clinging to me and anger and despair when the inevitable occasions of separation loom, for instance, at weekends and holidays. But I might be persuaded – or seduced? – to trust that her tenacity could and would in the end rescue her and our work together in her therapy.

But what might prove to be even more important and encouraging are the various signs that there is in her a quite active archetypal image of the
wounded healer; she might be drawn to identify herself with this intrapsychic
personage and let herself be guided or inspired by it. The adoption of a
brain-damaged infant, her ambition to become an addiction counselor, and
having already succeeded in setting up a women’s self-help group for
eating disorders – all this suggests to me that a wounded healer archetype is
present and functions; this bodes well, I think, for a psychotherapeutic
venture.

I expect that Joan’s feelings for me, that is, her transference, would swing
wildly and frequently between hate and love, between a demand for total
availability, total provisioning, and total rejection of anything I offer her, or
between almost blind trust and deep distrust. Particularly at the beginning
of our work together she would not be able to trust me, would not be able
to believe that I would willingly give her something good and nourishing,
such as my caring for her, or my being there for her, or my interpretations to
help her find meaning – all this without demanding in return her submission
to me or the surrender of her selfhood, of her own sensuous pleasures, of
her instinctive needs.

In view of her experiences of abuse – abuse of her body, her feelings, or
her identity – I realize that I would have to be particularly careful in doing
or saying anything that could trigger further the projection onto me of the
abusing parents.

But having to restrain myself and thwart my wish to make her a gift of
some of my insights, my understanding, my discoveries of some of her
unconscious forces or personalities – all this would at times leave me angry,
frustrated, and impatient. Even in retrospect I would not always know
whether these almost hostile reactions to Joan issued from a counter-
transference illusion or from a countertransference syntony (in which case
they would inform me via projective identification of what was experienced
unconsciously by Joan). But at other times I might feel myself as if infected
by sadness and despair and a fear that I was useless and that nothing could
get better. When that particular mood invaded me I would experience a sort
of impotent compassion for Joan that would make me imagine myself
stroking her cheeks and reassuring her that there was value in her, that she
had already achieved much, and that she could become more attractive and
lovable. Like many bulimic patients, Joan has very little self-respect and
fears that she might rouse in people disgust and repulsion. The fact that her
self-attacks are so intense and pervasive might tempt one to counter them
occasionally with some simple and straightforward reassurance. Such
improved self-valuation might help her when she had to confront and deal
with some of the impulses and experiences which, I suspect, exist and are
active inside Joan, but had been relegated to the shadow – impulses and
experiences such as, for instance, anger, hatred and resentment, or fantasies of violence, of murder, of revenge, or even of furtive sexual pleasure.

One would obviously have to work hard with Joan on the bulimia and on the theme of the conversion of and interdependence and interaction of body and psyche, and on the displacement of genital experience to oral experience and on the whole symbolism that is involved here. Joan herself seemed to be ready to tackle this, to judge by the comment she made in her Renfrew interview when she expressed a desire to “work with the feelings I’ve been stuffing down.” This remark would be particularly significant when I had to decide on whether to take Joan into analytic psychotherapy.

There seems to be an inverse correlation between the tendency to develop psychosomatic symptoms or even actual illness and the capacity to symbolize. Awareness of this fact would determine one’s therapeutic strategy and would be particularly important for work with Joan. So far there is little known of Joan’s early infancy, of her pre-Oedipal impulses and phantasies. Her experiences from age five onwards when she felt – and was – abused by her parents were obviously so painful, so intense, so frightening and conflictual that their darkness, their shadow obscured earlier as well as later events in her life. I suspect that some of these events would be revealed in and through the transference and countertransference. And in and through the transference–countertransference we might haul up not only memories of what happened to her, but we might also facilitate the reexperiencing, here and now, of the affects that accompanied those events. It is in this re-experiencing in the new, the present-day context, and the present-day relationships that change and healing may happen. And the present-day relationship to her analyst might help increase trust, trust in the “other” and trust in herself, in her own resources and capacities. And it might help release her from the dark and sinister parts of her own psycho-history in which she had felt trapped and condemned to repeat it again and again.

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The goal in psychotherapy is exactly the same as in Buddhism.
(C. G. Jung)

The most conspicuous difference between Buddhism and Western psychology is perhaps found in their respective treatments of the concept of “self.” In Western psychology, the existence of a “self” is generally affirmed; Buddhism denies the existence of an enduring “self” and substitutes instead the concept of \textit{anatman}, “no-self.”
(Masao Abe)

C. G. Jung was the first psychoanalyst to pay close and serious attention to Buddhism and to write commentary on his own careful readings of Buddhist texts. In 1992, Meckel and Moore published a comprehensive collection of the English translations of Jung’s commentaries – beginning with Jung’s 1939 “Foreword” to Suzuki’s \textit{Introduction to Zen Buddhism} (Meckel and Moore, 1992, pp. 11–30). Jung wrote about and commented on writings from Japanese, Tibetan, and Chinese sources. Bringing in both original insights and important questions, Jung’s essays formed an early backdrop for various conversations to develop between Western psychology and Buddhist practices.

My own training to become a Jungian psychoanalyst began in 1979, eight years after I had formally become a student of Zen Buddhism. I came to my study of psychology in general, and to Jung’s psychology in particular, with a background in Buddhist thought and practice. The interaction between the two disciplines has formed a core aspect of my development as a human being and a psychoanalyst for several decades now. While this interaction has been extraordinarily useful, it hasn’t always been easy or clear.

Considerable perplexity has arisen for anyone interested in the dialogue between these disciplines over the past five decades. Perhaps most troubling has been confusion about language and terms – especially concepts such as ego, self, consciousness, and unconscious – and distortions in history or fact. Both traditions have subtle and complex theories about conscious and unconscious subjective life and it has been very difficult to determine where they overlap and depart from each other. At times, we have been steeped
in so much befuddlement as not to be able to make sense of encounters between practitioners from these two traditions. For instance, when the renowned contemporary Zen master, Shin’ichi Hisamatsu visited Jung in Zurich in 1958, specifically to have a conversation with him about “the state of psychoanalysis today” (Young-Eisendrath and Muramoto, 2002, p. 111), Hisamatsu believed that Jung was the founder of psychoanalysis. When Hisamatsu said as much, Jung did not dissuade him. More important, Hisamatsu asked Jung, “From what you have said [in this conversation] about the collective unconscious, might I infer that one can be liberated from it?” To the utter surprise of everyone present (and everyone since), Jung replied, “Yes!” To which, Hisamatsu responded, “What we in Buddhism, and especially in Zen, usually call the ‘common self’ corresponds exactly to what you call the ‘collective unconscious.’ Only through liberation from the collective unconscious, namely, the common self, the authentic self emerges.” (Young-Eisendrath and Muramoto, 2002, p. 116)

What this exchange really means is anyone’s guess. Muramoto’s translation and helpful commentary on this meeting attempt to clear up as many ambiguities as possible, but still many remain. Undoubtedly, this is why Jung refused to give his permission to have the transcript published, although ultimately it came into print. After you have read this chapter, I hope you will return to this opening passage and decide for yourself whether you believe that Jung actually thought that we can liberate ourselves from the collective unconscious or if he was so frustrated and confused that he blurted out a response that he would have preferred not to.

In this past decade, many publications and conferences have offered discriminating insights and new commentaries that have, I believe, brought the conversation between Jung’s psychology and Buddhism to a new level of clarity and usefulness. Collections of essays such as Meckel and Moore (1992), Molino (1998), Young-Eisendrath and Muramoto (2002) and Safran (2003) have contributed significant new findings and voices – especially from Western psychoanalysts who are also long-term Buddhist practitioners – that permit us now to move beyond simple comparisons and contrasts and muddled reasoning. In addition, books by individuals who are both Jungian analysts (or Jungian therapists) and committed Buddhist practitioners – such as Odajnyk (1993), Young-Eisendrath (1997), Glaser (2005), and Preece (2006) – have been invaluable in making precise suggestions about how to use Jung and Buddhism in doing clinical work and understanding personal development.

In this chapter I offer my own analysis of how Jung’s psychology and Buddhism can work together in helping us better understand the transformation of human suffering and the nature of subjectivity and intersubjectivity.
These topics bring me to a contemporary inquiry into archetype, complex, karma, self, and no-self, especially in regard to the practice of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. Finally, I will close with a few remarks about Jung’s apparently negative feelings about Westerners practicing Buddhism.

Complex and karma

For the past couple of decades, I have been interested in the ways in which Jung’s theory of psychological complexes and the Buddha’s teachings on karma relate to and illuminate each other. Let me first discuss the ways in which I understand and use Jung’s concept of a complex, and then I will turn to the Buddha’s teaching about karma.

Although Jung’s early ideas about the affectively charged complex were influenced by the pioneering work of French psychologist Pierre Janet, Jung’s later (post-1944) theory of a psychological complex drew more on the nascent fields of evolutionary biology and ethology. Whereas the early theory emphasizes personal meaning, as opposed to collective meaning, the later theory emphasizes the situational factors that provoke an enactment or discharge of a complex.

Drawing on Jung’s later theory, I regard a complex as an emotional habit to see, think, feel, and act (including speak) in a predictable way under triggering circumstances. At the affective core of every complex is an archetype, according to Jung’s later theory. I would define archetype to mean a universal predisposition to form a coherent image (a mental image that affects how we “see” the world and others, as well as how we fantasize ourselves in relation to others) in certain emotionally aroused states.

The Great Mother and Terrible Mother – depicted in myth, fairytale, and iconography throughout the world – are two obvious examples of such commanding archetypal images. These images are connected to the fact that a human childhood is a long, conflicted dependency in which both the child and caregivers experience an ambivalent mix of feelings and actions. All children habituate to emotionally charged attachment relationships that organize especially around pleasurable, gratifying themes (Great Mother) and painful, rejecting or overwhelming ones (Terrible Mother). Because of our long and risky dependency, human beings everywhere are predisposed to shape highly positive and negative images, and then to impose and project those images onto actual caregivers and others who are in authoritative, intimate, or provident roles throughout life.

And so, I regard archetypes as universal constraints on human experience that arise from: (1) our attachment systems, including relationships; (2) the ubiquitous characteristics of human subjectivity; and (3) the predictable
features of our birth, ageing, and eventual demise. Archetypes curtail our subjective freedom, just as our biology and instincts limit our objective freedom. In my view, Jung’s later (post-1944) theory of complex and archetype opened the way to linking archetypal theory with the motivational and perceptual systems of emotions, as they respond to the set-up and limits of our species, especially the life of the mind.

Each individual has a specific and particular exposure to the conditions in which archetypal images are organized – based on caregivers and their personalities, trauma, culture, society, physical health, and many other factors. Any psychological complex that forms around the core of an archetype will express not only mental images that promote a sort of internal theater, but also the actions, feelings, language, and so on that accompany that archetype from its beginnings as a complex. Over time, our complexes gather steam and become better defended, with attitudes and desires of their own – conscious, unconscious, and partly conscious.

The human personality is a gathering of such loosely associated autonomous complexes (e.g. Mother, Father, Child, Shadow, Ego). According to Jung, then, people are naturally and normally dissociated in their experiences of themselves and others. Our personalities are discontinuous and hard to manage. We frequently defend ourselves through projection, finding our worst problems and habits in others. Rather than being regulated by conscious cortical thought, we are more often motivated by emotional self-states. Any complex can capture conscious awareness, and drive our actions, sensations, and internal images, but the ego complex – about which I’ll say more later – is most often connected to conscious perception. Each complex contains both “subject” and “object” positions or poles, bringing with it an unconscious internal drama or theater in which others are unknowingly invited or directed to play out certain scenes or dynamics. And so, complexes are interactive emotional scripts: projection-makers as well as internal fantasy-makers.

For instance, if I have a depressed, restless, low-energy Mother complex, I may have learned to respond by cheering up the (M)other. And so, I am quick to see others – especially my co-worker, spouse, or child – as hopelessly lost in their bad feelings or restlessness, in need of my plumping them up. On the other hand, I may reverse this dynamic and identify with the Mother (object) pole of the complex and demand that someone else play the Cheerful Child to my Depressed Mother.

These complexes are neither factually true, nor are they unrelated to the facts of our growing up. They blend the internal responses, fantasies, and reactivities of a child with the actual events and interactions that happened to that child. No one – even after a very effective analysis or psychotherapy – can know exactly what is fact and what is emotional fiction in these
complexes, and yet, the complexes are “true” in the way that they are commanding involuntary dynamics that recur in an individual’s personality, identity, and relationships.

In working with Jung’s theory of complex and archetype in individual and couples psychotherapy and analysis, I begin by helping people become aware of how they repetitively recreate internal and external relational themes with themselves and others. Usually, we focus initially on the dynamics that act as impasses or roadblocks – presented as symptoms and sufferings when people enter psychotherapy. Eventually we discover other more subtle – perhaps more creative or nurturing or darker – complexes.

Whether we investigate these themes in transference, countertransference, and dreams in individual therapy or we study repetitive interactions in couples therapy, my patient and I eventually come to see the internal theater of the mind as it is played out through habits. It is not very hard to hear the “scripts” or predictable phrases, to witness the gestures and body sensations, to feel the feelings, and to discover the internal fantasies that mark each complex with its particular psychological meanings and causes. It’s much more difficult to know what to do next.

In working with complexes in therapy, I first and foremost want both of us – patient and therapist – to be open-minded witnesses to the internal voices, images, and body sensations. In order to become alert to being triggered by a complex, we have to see and feel it somewhat mindfully, reflectively. If we do not know that we are captured by an emotional habit, we have no freedom at all; we simply play it out. It seems to be reality. If we condemn our habits too quickly, we feel humiliated or trapped in shame, guilt, or self-pity.

After some reliable self-awareness is in place, my next job is to help my patient become compassionate with herself for having and being this complex. I want her to understand in some comprehensible way what already happened, or seemed to have happened, to her that resulted in her forming this habit: that its script or directives respond, in some way, to the original happening. The complex made sense in some earlier context and was adaptive to circumstances, just as the intrusively cheerful or officious attitude of a grown-up woman makes sense when we uncover her desire to cheer up her frequently depressed low-energy mother.

At this point in a treatment, a patient has enough knowledge and insight to have the option of acting differently and/or acknowledging and repairing any relational or other damage done. Typically, though, he is resistant or afraid to make a change. Usually there is a period of time – sometimes quite lengthy in an individual psychotherapy or analysis – when he and I go round and round the same complexes that emerge within our therapy sessions. The
patient seems stuck or stymied even though he may be quite conscious of what he enacts and why. Inevitably, he eventually becomes aware of his deep desire to rid himself of his complex and/or for me to erase it. From the time he entered therapy, he had secretly hoped that his insight or my “magic” would remove the difficult habits of his mind. Instead, he finds that he must work with these habits himself, becoming familiar with the ways he is unconsciously drawn into enactments in order to be able not to identify with or condemn these emotional configurations.

Repeatedly we embrace the reluctant recognition that our habits stay with us. Our only freedom consists in our becoming an increasingly more objective observer of their triggering effects and finding the hidden meaning within them – which may be creative or insightful or not. Instead of treating a complex as an imperative to act, we regard it as subjective experience. We allow the feelings, thoughts, images, and body sensations to pass through us without acting. We reflect on their meaning rather than act it out.

My Jungian therapeutic method for working with psychological complexes, as just described, is infused with my Buddhist understanding of karma. The Buddha specifically transformed the Indian theory of karma from a theory of predestination into a theory of intentional action. Most scholars would say that the Buddha’s major teaching on “karma” is that our intentional actions have consequences which come back to haunt us on all levels of our lives. But karma is more than a law of cause and effect because it underpins many teachings in Buddhist ethics. It accounts for how our deliberate actions lead not only to the structure of our moral character – for better and worse – but affect our relationships with people and other beings.

The Buddha taught that intention or volition is the most important component of our actions and that our behavior is secondary, although still significant. Perhaps most important for our discussion, the Buddha clearly showed that human character is not fixed, but is malleable and so, can be changed. The way to change our character is through our intentions and actions. Becoming mindful – observant in a precise and relaxed way – we are able to know our intentions and see the potential consequences of our actions before we engage in them.

Like a good psychoanalyst, the Buddha believed that the meaning of a person’s action cannot be known merely by seeing the manifest behavior; to know the meaning requires a knowledge of the intention behind the action (Nagapriya, 2004, pp. 41–42). For example, you may help a sick friend because you feel genuine empathy and compassion or to accrue recognition or special favors. Your action looks the same in either case, but the karma resulting would be different. In the first case, your intentions would be
“skillful” and in the second, “unskillful,” in Buddhist language. Skillful intentions come from understanding, generosity, and compassion and lead to insight and wisdom. Unskillful ones are rooted in confusion, craving, and hatred and lead to suffering and ignorance. Learning to discriminate unskillful from skillful desires, and acting on the skillful, is foundational for practicing Buddhist ethics.

In ordinary life, however, most of our motives are mixed. The Buddha very much recognized unconscious motivations and the ways in which we can deny and rationalize our desires. If a person wants to become skillful and observes some harmful (to self or other) long-term effects from his actions, even though he is unaware of having negative motives, then he should consult with another person whom he respects on the Buddhist path. In other words, the Buddha taught that a person “should not feel embarrassed or ashamed to reveal his mistakes to people he respected, for if he started hiding his mistakes from them, he would soon start hiding them from himself” (Thanissaro, 2006, p. 44).

Choice and intention are not always obvious, according to the Buddha: just because we are unaware or fail to consider our motivations does not automatically mean that we have no choice. Lack of awareness is itself a habit that we perpetuate if we do nothing about it. Within the Buddha’s teachings on karma there are subtle and practical applications that interface readily with the psychoanalytic idea of unconscious or preconscious motivation or desire. Also, there are similarities with psychoanalytic ideas about personal responsibility: we may or may not be responsible for actions that are unconsciously motivated, according to the Buddha. Once we have some knowledge of our motivations, only then do we become responsible.

Jung’s theory of a psychological complex with an archetypal core is remarkably similar to one aspect of the Buddha’s teaching about karma, relating to “volitional dispositions.” The character or personality that makes us unique individuals expresses the sum total of our dispositions:

Our volitional dispositions are our tendencies to act, speak, and think in a particular way. They are what determine our habits and thus what make us distinctive. They constitute those aspects of our character which others are constantly praising or complaining about. Depending on our particular moral make-up, some of these habits will be skilful, others unskilful. Owing to their relative continuity, we tend to think that these habits are enduring and unchanging, but this is a mistake that prevents us reforming them and realizing our potential. (Nagapriya, 2004, p. 51)

When a person comes in for psychotherapy, she will generally complain about her own and others’ dispositions. From a Buddhist perspective, she’s
talking about unskillful habits and from a Jungian perspective, she’s concerned with psychological complexes.

In the course of an effective treatment, I see myself as working especially with the karma that has accrued in my patients’ lives from emotional habits and patterns that developed in the relational set-up or trauma of their early life. From a Buddhist perspective, I am helping them change their intentions from unskillful to skillful, and in some cases, helping them stop re-enacting patterns that are deeply harmful by showing them how to be mindfully aware of the aggregated subjective experience of a complex. I never mention to my patients these Buddhist influences, unless the patients are themselves practitioners of Buddhism and come with their own questions involving Buddhist ideas or methods. And yet, this background supports my own hopefulness about helping people transform their suffering.

Among the many contributions that Jung has made to contemporary psychotherapy practices, I find his theory of complexes to be central. Not only does he clarify the normal dissociated and discontinuous nature of personality, but he also gives a roadmap for tracing the destructive emotional dynamics of human relationships. Often these are the dynamics that have brought an individual for therapeutic help. Working with the Buddha’s teaching on karma helps me keep a bigger picture in mind – in terms of moral development, character, and compassion – in assisting my patients in becoming more aware and responsible in relating to their complexes. Perhaps the most important of these is the ego complex.

A Buddhist Jungian account of self and ego

The human self, as I would define it, is our experience of being a limited continuous individual subject with a separation between “inside” and “outside.” As humans, we have the distinct impression that we are “in here” in a body, while the world is “out there,” outside the body. These are sense impressions that are strongly reinforced by society, culture, and language, after the age of about eighteen months. You may believe that the self is palpable and real, but as the Buddha discovered more than 2,500 years ago, if you look for evidence that it exists, you can’t find it. We cannot see, hear, smell, taste, touch, or cognize it – and that is why even psychologists and psychoanalysts (who use the term all the time) cannot agree on a definition of it. My definition above is one I have taken years to work out. Being a Buddhist, I am especially careful in defining the self because I have discovered what a fiction it is. Being a Jungian, I am aware all the same what an important fiction it is.
From the perspective of both disciplines, I want to reformulate the way we think and talk about the self. To begin, I regard the human self as an action of a person that arises in relation to something the person senses or experiences as “other.” The self is not something we are, but something we do. In both Buddhism and Jung’s psychology it would clarify a lot of confusion to remember that self and person are not identical: the person is the objective body–mind being that exists in a public domain and the self is the subjective function that produces the experience of being an embodied individual with certain traits and capacities. Persons do selves. Perceptually, we unify our subjectivity over time and space, separating ourselves out from the flow of experience. It takes quite a lot of effort to do this, and from time to time, we let go of that effort and fall apart (being out of our bodies, losing track of time, not knowing who we are). Mostly, though, we maintain the self unconsciously through micro-movements in our perceptions. We are not born with this function, but with the potential to develop it: the archetype of self.

Around eighteen months, the toddler begins to announce the effects of this archetype in protesting “No!” and naming “me, mine.” The “terrible two’s” are the birth of the ego complex at the core of which is the archetype of self – a universal predisposition to form a coherent image and impression of being an individual subject. Everywhere, the human self has ubiquitous subjective characteristics: (1) coherence within a body, connected to a body-image; (2) continuity over time in a life story; (3) agency or authorship of action; and (4) attachment routines expressed in bonding, separation anxiety, and grief.

As I see it, the archetype of the self is awakened by the onset of the secondary or self-conscious emotions that appear between eighteen months and two years of age. The primary emotions – sadness, joy, curiosity, disgust, and fear – are present at birth in human infants, as they are in all mammals, but the secondary emotions – shame, guilt, embarrassment, envy, jealousy, pride, conceit, self-pity – are not clearly evident until about eighteen months of age.

When they emerge, they motivate the development of an ego complex: an emotional habit to see, think, feel, and act as a particular embodied individual subject who seems unified. Our ability to sustain this complex in time and space depends on many brain and body states, as well as relational supports, context, language, and culture. We all develop our ego in relation to others. Different societies and cultures sponsor ego complexes with more or less individuality, more or less separate identity, and different values. And yet, everywhere human beings experience coherence, continuity, agency, and attachment routines, in connection with individual identity or they are anomalous.
When we think, act and feel as continuous and separate, without being aware of doing so, we are generating the self automatically and unself-consciously, like driving a car without noticing it. When we are conscious of ourselves – in states of guilt, shame, pride, jealousy, envy – we become conscious of our ego: this is who I am and how I am in relation to someone or something else. At such times we are drawn into our self-conscious reactivity, defenses, and self-protection.

The Buddha had many useful things to teach about the parameters of the self in our experience:

The Buddha refused to say whether the self exists or not, but he gave a detailed description of how the mind develops the idea of self as a strategy based on craving. In our desire for happiness, we repeatedly engage in what the Buddha calls “I-making” and “my-making,” trying to exercise control over pleasure and pain... The sense of “I” that leads you to be generous and principled in your actions is an “I” worth making, worth mastering as a skill. (Thanissaro, 2006, p. 46)

The Buddha also emphasized that self-protectiveness and self-consciousness draw us into problematic self-focus. He advised the following strategy for reducing the unhappiness caused by self-concern:

[D]eflect judgments of good and bad away from your sense of self, where they can tie you down with conceit and guilt. Instead, you focus directly on the actions themselves, where the judgments can allow you to learn from your mistakes. (Thanissaro, 2006, p. 44)

Developing self-awareness of our own intentions, and discovering the effects of our mental habits, require moving beyond a positive or negative self-focus.

From decades of research on “flow experience,” conducted by Csikszentimihalyi (e.g. 1991, 1992, 2000) and his associates, we know that self-consciousness interrupts high concentration states and interferes with equanimity or relaxation. High concentration and equanimity produce what Csikszentimihalyi has dubbed “optimal experience” in which we feel better and learn faster. Flow experience is readily found in activities such as lovemaking, rock-climbing, chess-playing, and meditating (among others). This research shows that getting caught up in the ego complex – with its rationalizations, identity, and defenses – interrupts mindfulness (concentration and relaxation) and the subjective awareness that helps us learn about our mental habits. In helping people cultivate awareness through psychotherapy or mindfulness practices, it’s useful to keep self-conscious emotions and the ego complex at minimal interference levels.
As both Jung and the Buddha point out, there are skillful and unskillful uses of the self and the ego complex. From a Jungian perspective, the archetype of the self functions over a lifetime to motivate us toward greater integration: increased recognition of unconscious complexes, increased self-acceptance as we become more responsible for what we actually do and say, and more compassionate toward ourselves. This archetype imprints us with a tendency to perceive ourselves as a unified subject, while our unconscious complexes have a will of their own, pushing in different directions away from integration, toward unknown or even unknowable motivations or desires. As Jung pointed out repeatedly, if we confuse the integration of the self (the human personality) with increased control by the ego complex over the personality, we are in trouble: we become inflated with omnipotent striving or grandiosity. On the other hand, if we don’t have a strong enough ego function, we are in trouble in a different way, leaning towards psychosis and identifications with non-ego complexes. The goal of “individuation” – a lifetime process of becoming a self-aware person – is a compassionate relationship between the ego complex and other complexes. Said in a different way, we eventually become mindful caretakers of all of our complexes, always open to thoughtful reflection on our motives and desires, no matter how alien or dark they may be.

Although Jung’s theory of an archetypal self has been used by him and his followers to promote a model of an enduring essential self (atman in Sanskrit) or soul, this theory also lends itself to a non-essentialist theory of self, as I have illustrated here and elsewhere (e.g. Young-Eisendrath and Hall, 1991; Young-Eisendrath, 1997; Young-Eisendrath and Muramoto, 2002; Young-Eisendrath, 2004). From a Jungian Buddhist perspective, the human self is neither a single enduring essence nor a teleology. It is better characterized as an emergent property of a particular embodied individual subject. In such a non-essentialist view, there is no underlying essence or predetermined template for that individual. Rather there are the normal human constraints (archetypes), situational factors, and interdependent arisings of relationships and conditions that confront a person with ever-changing possibilities for integration and awareness. This non-essentialist approach leaves room for theorizing a no-self (anatman in Sanskrit) as a subjectivity different from self.

A psychotherapeutic perspective on no-self

In a paper by the contemporary Japanese Zen teacher, social activist and humanist, Masao Abe it is argued that Jung’s psychology of self is fundamentally different from Zen practice because the former depends on

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theories that affirm a belief in an essential and enduring self, whereas Zen disconfirms such a self. (In this paper, Abe is using Zen as a synonym for Buddhism.) For example, Abe says:

In Jung, the ego is no longer identical with the whole of the individual but is a limited substance . . . If this relativization . . . is strengthened . . . it could help open the way to the realization of No-self. But in Jung, instead . . . the position of self as the total personality based on the collective unconscious is strongly maintained.

(Meckel and Moore, 1992, pp. 128–140)

As I have shown (Young-Eisendrath and Hall, 1991), however, it is possible to understand Jung’s theory of an archetypal self without assuming that the self is an essence or enduring totality. If the self is understood as a function or emergent property of a person, and not a thing, then Jung’s other concepts – such as complex, individuation, unus mundus (oneness aspect of experience), and the collective unconscious (unconscious interpersonal environment shared with others) – can also be interpreted within a constructivist psychology that is epistemologically consistent with Buddhist theories and practices.

While Abe maintains that “there is no suggestion of the realization of the No-self in Jung,” I respectfully disagree. In Jung’s letters, and in some of his commentary on Buddhist texts, he occasionally reveals insights from no-self. Most notably, at the end of his memoir Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung remarks on himself:

When Lao-tzu says: ‘All are clear, I alone am clouded,’ he is expressing what I now feel in advanced old age . . . Yet, there is so much that fills me: plants, animals, clouds, day and night, and the eternal in man. The more uncertain I have felt about myself, the more there has grown up in me a feeling of kinship with all things. In fact it seems to me as if that alienation which so long separated me from the world has become transferred into my own inner world, and has revealed to me an unexpected unfamiliarity with myself. (1961, p. 359)

As Abe (Meckel and Moore, 1992, p. 133) says, a clear realization of no-self in Zen “would reflect . . . the non-substantiality of the unconscious self as well as the conscious ego.” I believe that the above passage reflects such a realization. But what is so important about the no-self, anyway?

Answering that question becomes immediately difficult when we use language to describe no-self. In speaking about the self, as I said, we can get into a muddle, but speaking about no-self is even more difficult and dangerous because people readily confuse no-self with no ego or with a nihilistic type of emptiness. Neither of these has a place in Buddhism or is consistent with the phenomenology of no-self.
No-self, in the individual subject, refers to the absence of the felt boundaries of subjectivity at the level of the archetypal self (coherence, continuity, agency and attachment), in the presence of conscious mindful awareness. Buddhist meditative practices are designed to help us focus on such an absence—instances when there are no lacks, gaps, inside–outside, or restlessness that could be regarded as “self” or “other.” At these times, the knower–known or observer–observed are one. Buddhism encourages us to become familiar with no-self phenomena and to study them with mindfulness—not to make them separate or holy, but to see what they teach us. These practices are skillful only when they produce greater compassion and wisdom, not special feelings of spiritual achievement. The Pali term Anatta (or Anatman in Sanskrit) refers to the interbeing or interdependent aspect of reality. Everything (including us) and every moment are dependent on a context that includes others. Because of our strong tendencies to create a separate self (and sustain it through an ego complex) we fail to perceive Anatta under most circumstances of our ordinary lives.

While no-self is hard to describe, it is not so hard to cultivate. The Buddha taught no-self as a practical guide to mindfulness. An earlier quote from Thanissaro talked about the Buddha’s recommendation to deflect judgments of good and bad away from the self and only toward our actions and their consequences. The Buddha instructed even his seven-year-old son to stay away from negative absorptions with the self through shame, guilt, jealousy, envy, and the like. Instead of the self, the Buddha emphasized the power of our actions. Allowing self-conscious emotions to fade, while returning mindfully to a focus on our actions, opens a new perspective.

First and foremost, it forces you to be honest about your intentions and about the effects of your actions. Honesty here is a simple principle: you don’t add any after-the-fact rationalizations to cover up what you actually did nor do you try to subtract from the actual facts through denial. Because you’re applying this honesty to areas where the normal reaction is to be embarrassed about or afraid of the truth, it’s more than a simple registering of the facts. It also requires moral integrity. (Thanissaro 2006, p. 44)

This is an excellent account of the kind of reflectivity we like to cultivate in our clinical consulting rooms. Then, both therapist and patient gain practice in observing their subjectivity and intersubjectivity without anxiety or remorse: becoming calm and alert witnesses of fantasies, desires, intentions, and actions. To be more reliable observers of our actions and intentions, we must develop an attitude that avoids excessive self-consciousness.

At a fundamental level, teachings on no-self help with this. It is our nature, as Buddhists remind us, to be perpetually dissatisfied, even annoyed.
or irritated, when the world, others, and the circumstances of our lives do not go as we need them to, or believe that they should. When we are thrown off our center or out of our comfort zone we want to blame someone: ourselves or someone else. Sometimes, we find that there is no one to blame. This brings relief. For example, you are out for your evening walk and a hard object drops down, out of nowhere, hitting your shoulder. You spin around: Who threw that stick at me? Then, you look up and see clearly that a loose branch has fallen down onto you. Instantly, you relax. There is no one to blame, no one to be angry with.

We can feel a similar relief when we see ourselves from our inherent interdependence, webbed in relationships. Looking back over generations or even at a dynamic between people at a particular moment, we may see that the threads of connection and pain are complex enough to mediate against finding someone (self or other) to blame. Buddhist ethical and meditative practices that focus our attention on no-self and no-blame are designed to help us notice and enter into such a state. Recognizing no-self and no-blame, we begin to clarify how and why we “do self,” separating ourselves out from the flow of experience. Then we discover gradually how to be both interdependent and responsible, drawing on both no-self and self. Eventually, we are no longer driven by our ego complex or constantly tripped up by negative (or positive) self-concern.

In long-term therapy, there are many occasions when a therapist and a patient happen upon no-self moments. Sometimes these are moments when the connection between the therapeutic couple is palpable and complete. Then, there seems to be a unity in the room – two people who are not exactly one, but not two. We feel the grace and relaxation of our interbeing. More often, though, no-self comes in with a shock, surprise, or awe.

I live and practice psychotherapy and analysis in a fairly unpopulated rural area, near a small town, where there is always the possibility that my patients may hear some gossip (true or false) about me. When a patient begins a session by saying “Well, I’ve heard something about you that I need to talk about,” I feel a stab of anxiety. We are suddenly outside of our normal proceedings and something is happening that neither of us can control. Often, the intruding story or ideas have been heard innocently enough: at the checkout counter at the drugstore, in line to buy movie tickets, at the local gym. No one is to blame for putting the information on the airwaves. It is no one’s fault. Patient and therapist are faced with something that neither of us planned, something that has come in from left field to disrupt our usual frame. My interest in, and gratitude for, what these moments teach has been very much enhanced by my Buddhist practice.
Both parties may want to “blame” because the intrusion is unwelcome and seems to come from an unconscious source in one or both. There is great value, however, in recognizing that sometimes things happen to us (for instance, the check doesn’t get delivered in the mail, the electricity goes off, the key to the office doesn’t work) that show us directly that we are not in control. And yet, we need each other to transform the difficulty into new insight or growth. If therapist and patient can navigate these unintended no-blame disruptions with a deep respect for the mutuality of their relationship and the relief of not blaming, then they will learn something about trusting interbeing (instead of the ego) at times of upset and pain.

Relational psychoanalysis – practiced by Jungians, intersubjectivists, interpersonalists, and object relations analysts – stresses a two-person or interdependent psychology. I believe that Buddhist teachings and practices of no-self will enhance our ability to develop concepts and apply methods that go beyond our habits of speaking of one mind, one brain or one person in our therapeutic work. I have found Jung’s psychology to be congenial with my own attempts to use no-self in reaching new insights about intersubjective reality.

**Jung’s apparent negativity about Buddhism for Westerners**

Now that I have demonstrated some ways in which I use Buddhist teachings and ideas to expand my understanding and application of Jungian psychology and psychoanalysis, I want to close by remarking on the negative claims that Jung sometimes made about Westerners practicing Buddhism. Occasionally, still, these kinds of statements are raised as criticism about blending Jung and Buddhism. But for someone like myself who has been practicing Buddhism with Western teachers for more than three decades, Jung’s perspectives seem antiquated and out of touch with reality. For example, in his introduction to D. T. Suzuki’s text, Jung says:

> Anyone who has really tried to understand Buddhist doctrine – even if only to the extent of giving up certain Western prejudices – will begin to suspect treacherous depths beneath the bizarre surface of individual satori experiences . . .

(Meckel and Moore, 1992, p. 14)

And:

Great as is the value of Zen Buddhism for understanding the religious transformation process, its use among Western people is very problematical. The mental education necessary for Zen is lacking in the West. Who among us
would place such implicit trust in a superior Master and his incomprehensible ways? (Meckel and Moore, 1992, p. 23)

While I heartily admire Jung for his courage in opening the dialogue between Western psychology and Buddhism, he was uninformed about the real teachings behind what he was reading. There was no way that he could have known that Buddhism on the whole, and Zen in particular, lives very close to our experiences. Its methods are designed to make us acutely mindful of the reality we share and inhabit, not to take us to numinous experiences or set us apart from others.

Although there have been many muddles of language and fact as Buddhism has come to the West, there also has been a relatively smooth transition of teachings, rituals and practices from ancient foreign cultures to modern Western societies in a period of less than fifty years. That seems remarkably short to me. I believe that Western psychology and psychotherapy have played an important role in this transition by providing a fertile ground in which the seeds of Buddhism took root.

And finally, there are no “superior Masters” in whom to place our trust on the Buddhist path. Beginning with the Buddha himself, all teachers attempt to help their students become “a lamp unto yourself,” as the Buddha is reported to have said. Buddhism directs our careful attention to the nature of the world in which we live: that everyone is distressed or suffering in some way; that all phenomena are impermanent and subject to change; and that nothing exists independently or apart from anything else. As we see the deep implications of this reality, we begin to look at ourselves, our relationships and our planet in a more compassionate and responsible way.

NOTES

REFERENCES
Jung and Buddhism: refining the dialogue

We often employ symbolic thinking in our quest to represent some of the mystery and power that we feel in the world around us. Such symbol-making can be unconscious as well as conscious, and finds especially congenial vehicles for its expression and artistic elaboration in dreams, myths, and storytelling. Hence it is no surprise that literature in general, and in particular those literary genres that are closest to the fantasy structures of myths and dreams – that is, folktale and epic – yield themselves easily and successfully to symbolic readings.

Psychology and anthropology (with its offshoot in folklore) are the two disciplines that have most systematically offered us both theories and methodologies for making sense of the elaborate symbol systems that individuals and societies employ for their visions of what is most vital in life. I hope to demonstrate how the archetypal theory of Jungian psychology, supported with insights derived from folklore and anthropology, can illuminate a significant aspect of one of the cornerstones of the Western literary tradition, Homer’s *Odyssey*.

Much of the distinctive complexity of this epic poem is generated by the moral ambiguity of its hero, Odysseus, commonly acknowledged by critics but never fully explained. I believe that this quality in the hero strikes us and disturbs us deeply because it draws its energy from a major universal archetype, that of the Trickster.

Of all Carl Gustav Jung’s contributions to the world of ideas, his theory of archetypes of the collective unconscious is doubtless the best known and most important to both psychologists and lay people. The concept of the archetype has undergone many redefinitions since Jung first introduced it, including several by Jung himself. His conception at times suggests something akin to Plato’s ideal forms (*CW* 9.1, paras. 5 and 149), entities that exist beyond the world of particular sensory phenomena and offer perfect and timeless paradigms to which individual items can be referred. At
other times, he distinguishes clearly between these more abstract and “irrepresentable” archetypes “as such” and the multiple archetypal images and ideas that belong to individuals and which, we may infer, can represent the experiences of a particular time and place (CW 8, para. 417). Recent Jungian scholarship, to avoid the high degree of abstraction and separation implied by some of Jung’s formulations, has continued to emphasize the archetypes’ immanence in the individual unconscious and their responsiveness to specific social-historical contexts (Wehr, 1987, esp. pp. 93–97; and for an overview of critiques of archetype theory, Samuels, 1985, pp. 24–47). Archetypes are best conceived of as patterns of energy with image-making potential, and may be compared to the innate releasing mechanisms discovered by ethologists to be part of the physiological structure and thus the biological inheritance of the animal brain (Storr, 1973, p. 43; Stevens, 1990, pp. 37 and 59, following Tinbergen, 1963). It is this potential for organizing perception around certain key ideas and images, and infusing such perception with exceptional energy, that makes archetypes highly important for the interpretation of literature. Literary artists instinctively mold their narratives around characters, situations, and dramatic sequences that carry a high “payload” of emotional or spiritual impact. We may well say, in fact, that the greatest creators of literature are those who have the best combination of intuition for invoking major archetypes and skill in manipulating them effectively.

Homer’s Odyssey has captivated the minds of listeners and readers for millennia, and much of its power is due to its archetypes. Let me pass by the Devouring and Swallowing Monsters (Cyclops, Laestrygonians, Charybdis), the Powerful Hindering/Helpful Witches (Calypso, Circe), the driving force of Homecoming, the Descent to the Underworld, the Wise Old Man (Tiresias), and the Reunions of Son and Father, and center my attention on the singular hero who experiences all of these and gives the poem its name. Odysseus is, undoubtedly, a strange kind of epic hero, as was well noted by W. B. Stanford (1963) in two chapters of his important book, The Ulysses Theme, called “The son of Autolycus” and “The untypical hero.” Stanford’s intuition was excellent as he detailed many negative and ambivalent attributes of this untypical hero; but he made no attempt to connect the complex figure that emerged from his analysis to any larger pattern or explanatory theory, a deficit which the present chapter seeks to remedy.

My own preference is to connect Odysseus by lineage to the archetypal trickster figure of world mythology, a claim which no scholar seems yet to have pursued in its full implications. The one fleeting identification of Odysseus as a trickster that I have found in Jungian literature comes from Anthony Storr (1973, pp. 33–34), introducing the concept of archetype in
the second chapter of his introductory study. Storr invokes Odysseus in the course of giving an excellent explanation of how the archetype is a “flexible matrix” that will allow different cultures to place their distinctive or local stamp on a universal figure. Citing the example of the Hero Archetype he points out that in English culture the hero will be a model of self-control, a “perfect gentle knight,” whereas in another culture, such as Greek, the hero will be a master of guile and deception, a trickster like Odysseus.

In my view, Storr’s interpretation of Greek heroes in general, and of Odysseus in particular, needs a slight correction. First, it is wrong to imply that because guile is an admirable trait for the Greeks it is a natural expectation that their heroes will be paradigms of wiliness. Greek literature and mythology consistently present Odysseus as an exception to the heroic norm, which is clearly embodied in the more or less “perfect knights” like Achilles, Diomedes, Ajax, and the Trojan Hector. Second, and more to the point, Storr has missed what I see as the true archetypal nature of Odysseus: he is not the universal hero archetype colored locally, in Greek terms, as a trickster, but is rather a particular Greek embodiment of Jung’s universal trickster archetype itself. In the creation of the Odyssey, I shall argue, a figure of trickster lineage has been adapted to the needs of traditional heroic epic, which required that certain negative qualities be muted while others be transformed to a more “civilized” form. The result is a composite figure – Stanford’s “untypical hero” – who balances with some unsteadiness between an aristocratic Trojan War hero and an unreliable leader with a dangerous shadow side.

II

As one of the few truly universal figures in world mythology, the trickster deserves a theory that can adequately explain his omnipresence and significance. Jung conceived the trickster as an archetype embodying the unsocialized, infantile, and unacceptable aspects of the self. This figure symbolizes the psychological infancy of the individual and is in some sense his “Shadow.” The anthropologist Paul Radin’s (1956) description of Wakdjunkaga, trickster of the Winnebago Sioux and perhaps the most fully documented trickster in North American mythology, is as follows:

Trickster is at one and the same time creator and destroyer, giver and negator, he who dupes others and is always duped himself. He wills nothing consciously. At all times he is constrained to behave as he does from impulses over which he has no control. He knows neither good nor evil yet he is responsible for both. He possesses no values, social or moral, is at the mercy of his passions and appetites, yet through his actions all values come into being.

(Radin, 1956, p. xxiii)
In other words, trickster represents an archaic level of consciousness, an “animal” or primitive self given to intense expressions of libido, gluttony, and physical abuse. His presence is seen in perhaps its purest form in the Native American tricksters Wakdjunkaga, Raven, and Coyote (who still lives on in Hollywood’s Roadrunner and Coyote cartoons), and in the African figures of Ananse, Eshu, and Legba. Although in essence mischief-makers, these trickster gods are at the same time great benefactors, and in Native American mythology the trickster is often the main culture-hero.

The major trickster gods of archaic Europe are Loki, Hermes, and Prometheus. Because they were reworked several times over in various literary genres, they have attained more complex personalities than the Native American or the African tricksters. The Norse Loki, for instance, begins as one of the enemy giants ( jotnar) who has been “adopted” by the gods ( aesir) and seems happily integrated into the society of Asgard. He affords Thor companionship and aid on his adventures, his playfulness frequently entertains the gods, and his cleverness helps them as often as he causes them distress through his trickery. On the other hand, as “father of monsters,” a role apparently influenced by the Medieval learned tradition (Roothe, 1861, pp. 162–175), Loki is the source of the greatest threats to the stability of the gods’ world. And ultimately this dark side prevails as he evolves downward into a rather diabolical figure, a pattern which may well be due to the distorting influence of Christianity, which had an interest in “satanizing” Loki (Davidson, 1964, p. 176; Roothe, 1861, pp. 82–88).

In extant records of Greek mythology, the two divine trickster-figures, Prometheus and Hermes, lack the emphatically troublemaking character we see in Wakdjunkaga or Loki. The Greek attitude toward both is consistently positive. Prometheus is a great founder of culture, the bringer of fire and subsequent technologies, whose trickiness is exercised only at the expense of Zeus and on behalf of humankind. Hermes, in spite of his fundamental association with thievery and stealth – Brown (1947) emphasizes how the two concepts are closely related, as seen in the cognate English words “steal” and “stealth” (both expressed by the Greek root klept-) – is most commonly felt as a benign presence in human affairs. It seems almost paradoxical that a “god of thieves” should be one of the most genuinely popular of all Greek deities. Clearly, for the Greeks, his numerous “helper” attributes outweighed his negative trickster associations.

To understand how the heterogeneous mixture of attributes seen in these various divinities not only coexists in one figure but can cohere so successfully as to be a universal mythological presence, it may be fruitful to combine Jungian archetypal theory with other theories, developed from anthropological, folkloric, and religious perspectives, that say more about
the texture of sociocultural reality and its spiritual needs. An idealist or essentialist model like Jung’s, applied simplistically, runs the risk of reductionism, assigning all cross-cultural manifestations to a common underlying essence and thereby undervaluing the distinctiveness and value of their local adaptation. The best application of Jung’s archetypal theory will follow Storr’s vision of a mold flexible enough to permit context and local culture to refract the original image into its specific and distinctive variants, which should be the true objects of our study.

Thus we can combine the truth of Jung’s psychological archetypes with anthropologist Laura Makarius’s (1965) view that sees trickster as the spirit of the possibility of violating taboos, functioning in social contexts as a highly valued positive, liberating, life-enhancing spirit. Closely related is folklorist Barbara Babcock’s (1975) interpretation of trickster as a spirit of necessary disorder, the “tolerated margin of mess” needed to keep off the entropy that is always threatened by too much order and too much control. The joy of release and freedom from the confines of order becomes trickster’s gift of laughter. By his parodies of social forms and structures, his inversion of roles, hierarchies, and values, trickster offers us the excitement of seeing that any established social pattern has ultimately no necessity; that all finalities are in doubt, and all possibilities are open. Or, as Jesuit scholar Robert Pelton (1980) puts it:

more than just a symbol of liminal man, the trickster is a symbol of the liminal state itself and of its permanent accessibility as a source of recreative power . . . He can disregard truth, or better still, the social requirement that words and deeds be in some sort of rough harmony, just as he can overlook the requirements of biology, economics, family loyalty, and even metaphysical possibility. He can show disrespect for sacred powers, sacred beings, and the center of sacredness itself, the High God, not so much in defiance as in a new ordering of their limits. (Pelton, 1980, p. 35)

This composite and complex portrait allows us better to understand the strange need the Norse gods have for Loki’s entertaining, provocative company, even though he harms them constantly and will become their ultimate betrayer, reverting to the side of his fellow giants and monsters in the final battle at Ragnarok. It allows us to understand why the tricksters of Amerindian and African mythology are simultaneously figures of fun, even ridicule, and of great reverence. And it may help us understand why Greek mythology needed not only to split the archetype but to split it on each of two levels, represented by the archaic Titan-benefactor Prometheus and the young Olympian god Hermes. Each divinity is in turn divided: Prometheus is fundamentally helpful but his alter ego Epimetheus carries his negative
Table 12.1 Characteristics of the trickster: a comparative chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wakdjunkaga Ananse</th>
<th>Loki</th>
<th>Prometheus</th>
<th>Hermes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unsocialized spirit of anarchy and mischief; violates rules; reverses social values</td>
<td>mischief, both harmless and serious (Balder’s death); changes sides</td>
<td>defies Zeus and the Olympian order</td>
<td>mischief against fellow gods; kills Argos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>receives and gives hurt; paradoxical double nature</td>
<td>offends and is punished (lips sewn, tied to rock, snake drips venom)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>culture-creator: benefactor and facilitator; inventor of important “firsts,” both positive and negative shape-change and disguise</td>
<td>helps gods against giants, helps build Asgard, steals back Thor’s hammer; gives birth to Sleipnir, Hel, Midgard Serpent takes form of salmon, hawk, fly, giantess, etc.</td>
<td>gives fire and technology; makes first humans; invents sacrifice; brings Pandora’s ills to men</td>
<td>invents lyre, firesticks, sandals; helps Odysseus and Priam; friendliest god; helps thieves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primitive level of body functions; involvement with anus and phallus</td>
<td>seducer of goddesses</td>
<td>[creates seductress Pandora]</td>
<td>disguises cattle-prints and footprints; appears to Priam in disguise phallic aspect in herm; seduces nymphs; patron (with Aphrodite) of seduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>steals</td>
<td>steals Sif’s hair, Freya’s necklace, etc.</td>
<td>steals fire from gods</td>
<td>patron of thieves; steals cattle; gives Pandora “thieving” ethos lies to Apollo; gives Pandora “lies and cajoling speeches” “common Hermes,” proverbial phrase expressing greedy impulse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tells lies</td>
<td>constantly lies</td>
<td>cheats Zeus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>greedy</td>
<td>gluttonous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
aspects, as Kerényi points out (in Radin, 1956, pp. 180–181); and Hermes carries both positive and negative aspects in simultaneous contradiction, being a god of good luck and a god of thieves.

The classic statement in Greek myth of Hermes’ contradictory capacities is the story told in the Homeric Hymn “To Hermes” of the infant Hermes who steals Apollo’s cattle and then skillfully reverses their tracks (by making them march backwards), invents sandals (a gift to humans) to cover up his own tracks, and then cleverly lies to Apollo. The newborn god is already proficient in the violation of rules, boundaries, signs, and truthful speech, much like the human hero Odysseus. We might therefore expect Odysseus’ patron deity to be Hermes, rather than Athena, as in the *Odyssey*. In the following pages, then, my aim is to argue that Homer’s *Odyssey* represents a deliberate attempt to re-fashion an earlier Greek tradition and to replace Hermes, in this role, with Athena.

First, let us conclude this section on the mythological trickster by summing up the archetypal figure by arranging representative characters from a few well-studied mythologies in Table 12.1. The left-hand column lists qualities that define the trickster as seen in native North American and African mythology. Corresponding attributes are noted for three major figures from European mythology, the Norse Loki and the Greek Prometheus and Hermes. The specific details listed will be meaningful to readers who know these traditions.

### III

The scholars whose work we have reviewed and attempted to synthesize have analyzed trickster tales and myths. But the goal of my investigation is the understanding of a trickster-like presence intruded, as it were, into a different genre with a different purpose, heroic epic. My specific concern is with the process by which mythological material is bent to the purposes of literature, in the hope of identifying what is changed and what is kept, and the reasons why. Obviously these reasons have to do with the nature of the genre that is appropriating the mythology.

Let us return to the difference between Homer’s Odysseus and other heroic figures of Greek epic and legend, and delve more deeply. Achilles, Ajax, Herakles, Perseus, Theseus, Jason, and the like, face enormous human and super-human obstacles and win through by courage and strength, sometimes abetted by a little clever maneuvering and a magical or divine helper. Odysseus, by contrast, is the very embodiment of clever maneuvering, abetted by a little courage and strength. He also has significant divine help, usually in the form of Athena, traditionally labeled the goddess of wisdom.
but more accurately the goddess of cunning intelligence – the Greek word is *metis*, which is the name both of the quality *and* of the Titaness mother whom Zeus swallowed to bring about the birth of Athena from his head. If the protecting deity is the daughter of Cunning and embodies the quality of cunning, small wonder that Odysseus wins his successes by his innate cunning resourcefulness.

But anyone familiar with ancient Greek thought will note that cunning resourcefulness is a talent widely admired throughout Greek culture (Vernant and Detienne, 1978) and not one that belongs exclusively or primarily to a trickster. Why then should Odysseus’ embodiment of this quality make him not merely an “untypical” hero but specifically a trickster and the refraction of an archetype? There are two reasons. The first is the way he combines cunning resourcefulness with significant traces of other essential trickster qualities. The second is his connection to Hermes.

To unravel Odysseus’ link to Hermes, we must go back to the figure of Athena and see her as a kind of positive alternative to the highly ambivalent Hermes. She is the perfect “good” goddess, too above-board and thoroughly respectable to be the patron of a trickster. I think it likely that this goddess is only a later adjunct to Odysseus’ career as a clever strategist, and is in essence a replacement. Odysseus’ grandfather was Autolykos, whose “speaking name” means “the Very Wolf”; and his grandfather’s father – a parentage deliberately suppressed in the key passage in Book 19 on Odysseus’ origins – was Hermes, the god of thievery and stealth. In *Odyssey* 19, lines 396–398, we learn that Autolykos got his tricky disposition from Hermes, “who accompanied him with kindly intent,” but Homer omits to say what Greek tradition elsewhere says clearly: that the father of Autolykos – and therefore Odysseus’ great-grandfather – was Hermes.

If we look outside of Homer’s literary working over (or “cover-up”) of tradition, and go to some fragments of the equally early poet Hesiod (frags. 64, 66, 67) and combine them with other details from such sources as the Homeric hymn to Hermes and the late writers Apollodorus (I.9.16) and Pausanias (ii.3.4, vi.26.5, vii.27.1), we can put together the following composite picture. Hermes was the trickster-god whose chief attributes included: craftiness and theft (especially cattle-stealing); disguise, invisibility and shape-changing; clever and useful inventions; fertility, the protection of flocks, and luck and the ever-present potential to be helpful to human society (when he wasn’t helping thieves); a phallic representation in sculpture; and finally the more general but crucially important principle of mobility and exchange between zones – as patron deity of transactions and interchange he is the god of travelers, crossroads, traders, and interpreters (the Greek verb made from Hermes’ name, *hermeneuein*, means “to translate

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between languages,” hence modern hermeneutics means interpretation). 5

Also as god of special and liminal space his statue stood in public places and at entryways to private homes, presumably for his protective powers in general and protection against thieves in particular.

Hermes had a son called Autolykos who inherited the more negative of his father’s qualities but none of the more positive ones. He was a cattle thief who succeeded by virtue of his ability to make things invisible, and he was widely disliked as a deceiver and, more specifically, as someone who deceitfully manipulated oaths in order to get the better of people with whom he dealt.

His grandson, Odysseus, inherited these negative “Autolykan” qualities – as well as his negative Autolykan name, which suggests “causer of pain/grief (odyne)” – but in a milder form, mixed with some of the more positive qualities of his great-grandfather Hermes. Inheriting Autolykos’ skill at “stealth and oath” (19.396), Odysseus knows well how cleverly oaths can be administered, and in the Odyssey shows himself extremely wary as he applies the strongest possible oaths to bind others from deceiving him. He is greedy and mistrustful, fearing that others will steal from him. On the other hand Odysseus’ shape-changing, although in one case magically imposed by Athena, is not normally magical but reduced to a human and realistic level: he is an absolute master of disguise, the only Greek hero who is famous for it. His craftiness is usually positive whereas his grandfather’s was negative; thus it endows him with a resourcefulness that saves his men from danger again and again. And yet it may on occasion – as befits a trickster – flip over and lead to wholesale destruction of these same men, as almost happens in the adventures with the Cyclops and the Winds of Aeolus, and finally does happen in the Laestrygonian episode.

Odysseus’ ability to meet and mediate new situations and people, along with his constant mobility and search for the next encounter, remind us of Hermes as god of travelers, crossroads, and the good luck that attends such interchange; and his eventual restoration to his kingdom is described as a return to legitimacy and good order under a beneficent ruler. But the several reminders that Odysseus once ruled Ithaca as a benign and beloved king contrast oddly with his powerful capacity for causing pain, loss, and/or death to a surprisingly large number of people. He brings death to his crew after they eat the Cattle of the Sun God, and to the one hundred and eight Suitors of Penelope, who are seen as parallel to the crew (both are called “fools who perished by their own reckless behavior”); he causes the helpful Phaeacians who bring him home the loss of their ship; he causes the Cyclops great pain and the loss of an eye; and in the final book of the poem he subjects his father to unnecessary mental torment before dropping his disguise and

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revealing that he is the long-lost son returned. This last episode has struck some critics as so irrational that they have assumed it was not composed by Homer but is part of a spurious late addition to the poem. But according to the views we have been developing, this gratuitous pain-giving is exactly right for a trickster and is a legitimate part of Odysseus’ archetypal legacy.

In this scene of Odysseus’ seemingly irrational desire to play callously with his father’s feelings, we find an interesting play on significant names. He introduces himself as a stranger named Eperitos, which could mean “object of contention or strife.” This fits well in its negative connotation with his real name Odysseus, which is the object of significant etymological play in Book 19, where it is derived from Autolykos’ career as “causer of resentment to many people.” “I therefore name this grandchild Odysseus,” he says, underscoring the name’s etymological transparency as “man of resentment” (19.407–9). The very form of the verb from which the name Odysseus is derived is suggestive in its indeterminacy: it may have an active or a middle-passive meaning, denoting either the man who actively hates or he who is recipient of others’ hatred (see Stanford, 1952, p. 209; Clay, 1983, pp. 59–62; and Russo et al., 1992, p. 97).

There are other negative trickster qualities that do not seem apparent in Odysseus, but may be brought to the surface with a little searching. He seems, for example, to lack the requisite lechery and gluttony, the phallic qualities and human–animal dualism that often characterize the mythological trickster. But note that lechery or sexuality can be discerned in his involvements with Circe and Calypso and his evident sexual appeal to Nausicaa. Gluttony may be seen in the recurrent theme that symbolically identifies this hero with a belly (Greek gaster), and is also represented by the widespread use of excessive or transgressive eating throughout the Odyssey.6

We have, then, in Homer’s Odysseus a figure containing many contradictions: savior and destroyer of people; devoted son who nonetheless causes his father gratuitous pain; intrepid hero who nevertheless sends others out to face the danger first (in both the Lotus Eaters episode and the Circe episode, and in the Laestrygonian episode he causes the loss of eleven of his twelve ships by sending them to dangerous moorings within range of these cannibalistic giants’ weapons, while keeping his own flagship moored safely outside of range); a man praised by Athena and Zeus for exceptional piety, who nevertheless can ask a friend for poison for his arrowtips and is denied it on the grounds that it would offend the gods to resort to such unheroic tactics. A hero of contradictions indeed.

And overarching the whole structure of the epic is the apparent contradiction between the centrifugal and the centripetal impulses of the poem: Odysseus’ constant tendency to seek out new encounters and wander
further from home, in conflict with his avowed purpose of returning home
to the wife and child he is so eager to see again. Stanford (1963, pp. 50–51,
180–183, 211–240) notes that this contradiction is successfully, almost
miraculously balanced in the Odyssey so that it is not strongly felt as a
contradiction; but in later literature in the Odyssean tradition it tends to
simplify itself into one direction or the other. The Ulysses of Dante’s Inferno,
for example, surrenders to the pure, centrifugal impulse, and destroys himself
and his crew while declaring grandly “You were not born to live as animals,
but to follow virtue and knowledge”: “fatti non foste a viver come bruti, / ma
per seguir virtute e conoscenza” (Inferno 26, lines 119–120). The only
works complex enough to be able to re-mount the edifice in its full con-
tradictory grandeur, centripetal and centrifugal at once, Stanford shows, are
Kazantzakis’ Odyssey and Joyce’s Ulysses.

IV

My reading of the Odyssey shows that Homer’s Odysseus, the hero of
Bronze Age epic tradition, masks a more shadowy figure, Odysseus the
descendant of the trickster god Hermes. Homer surely had some awareness
of his hero’s complexity, and seems to have consciously striven to elevate
him to epic standards. Siberian epics can have shaman heroes and folktales
can have trickster heroes, but heroic epic must have mortal heroes who are
warriors and kings, successful adventurers and leaders of men. Homer
therefore had to avoid direct association of Odysseus with his great-
grandfather Hermes and any outright portrayal of this Trojan War hero as a
scaled-down human version of a divine trickster (whereas in the Iliad he
could frequently portray Achilles directly appealing to his goddess mother
Thetis for help, because the divine lineage did not imply unheroic qualities).
A new divine protector for Odysseus had to be found, and the goddess Athena
was the perfect choice.

While a thoroughly respectable goddess with no trace of trickster ambiva-
ience about her, Athena is the goddess of metis, the cunning intelligence
that overcomes obstacles in ingenious fashion, an intelligence broadly based
and widely admired in Greek culture, and not confined merely to the
ambivalently helpful/harmful cunning of the trickster. The study of metis
by Detienne and Vernant offers a nice distinction between the positive metis
of Athena and Hephaistos, one of strategy and craftsmanship, and the
ambivalent metis of Hermes and Aphrodite, one of thieves and lovers. It is
the patronage of Athena, replacing that of Hermes, that allows Odysseus to
be a favorite in Olympus (as seen in the divine councils of Odyssey Books 1
and 5) while still retaining a distinct trace of that irregularity or impropriety
that gives away his trickster genealogy. In Book 10, for example, Odysseus returns to the god of the winds Aeolus to ask him to collect and tie up the winds again for him, because his men have ruined his homecoming by letting the winds out of Aeolus’ bag. Aeolus rejects his request and sends him away angrily, calling him “most shameful of men, a man hated by the blessed gods.” And he adds, “Go, since you come here hateful to the immortals” (10.72–75) – a characterization that the action of the poem itself does not bear out. We catch the scent here of a tradition that Homer has partially suppressed.

In Book 13 when the disguised Athena is lied to by a clever Odysseus who is not clever enough to know whom he is trying to fool, she is amused, and says “this is why I can never abandon you, you are always so fluent and fixed-minded and tenacious” (331–332). With the final two adjectives her praise emphasizes not his tricky cleverness but his prudence and careful planning – qualities of Athena not of Hermes. When Homer gives us the one scene (Book 10) where Odysseus and Hermes actually do meet, there is no shock of recognition as there should have been between a man and the god who tradition said was his grandfather’s father. Homer has again done a successful make-over. Hermes in this scene gives Odysseus a charm that will protect him from Circe. The protection that confers immunity from her magic comes from a little plant that Hermes plucks from the ground in front of them, the moly plant that is “black at the root and white at the flower” (304). As it joins opposites in a successful, organic union, so it has the power to prevent the unnatural splitting of man’s mixed nature into the extreme polarity of human and bestial, and will be the effective counter-charm to Circe’s magic. Thus Hermes as the god who controls shape-change and crossing over will use his power to preserve Odysseus his great-grandson from undergoing those transitions adversely. This is a short and undramatic scene, but we have seen that it has a great deal compressed into it and can be unraveled only by knowledge that we are dealing with a classic trickster god who is extending his characteristic magical protection to a favorite mortal descendant. The archaic folk tradition preceding Homer’s creation of the Odyssey by centuries would have understood Hermes the trickster god to be the divine patron of Odysseus; Athena at that time had no connection with this disreputable hero. But in the creation of heroic epic poetry to be sung at a royal court, new paradigms were needed that embodied the more dignified ethos that went with Trojan War legends and their claims to ground the present in a glorious past, and so to ground present-day heroes in prestigious divine lineages and connect them with divine protectors. Thus Odysseus lost his special connection to his great-grandfather Hermes, the god of tricky inventiveness, and gained in his
place, as a kind of foster parent, Athena the “good” goddess of civilizing intelligence.

Despite Homer’s careful re-shaping of tradition, Odysseus’ very name, and the contradictions inherent in his character and actions, reveal the archetype underneath the mortal hero. He is a more fascinating, more mysterious figure than anyone else in Greek heroic tradition precisely because the trickster archetype is more unfathomable, its paradoxes more ultimately irreconcilable, than the archetypes of hero, warrior or king. The vision afforded us by Jung’s theory of archetypes thus permits us to begin to understand the limitless appeal of Homer’s extraordinary epic.

NOTES

1. Iliad iv. 339–348, the earliest portrait of Odysseus, presents him as a dubious representative of the hero archetype. Agamemnon, reviewing his chieftains, specifically praises Diomedes as his perfect knight and condemns Odysseus as a crafty fellow forever seeking personal advantage and reluctant to face the dangers of battle. Odysseus’ fullest portrayal after Homeric epic (late eighth century) is in Sophocles’ two plays Ajax and Philoctetes (second half of the fifth century). In the first he is a cunning and skillful adversary, a pragmatic hero contrasted with a self-destructive one (Ajax), but not without some measure of nobility – in other words, more or less the same complex figure we know from Homer. In the second play, however, he has devolved into a creature of pure guile and opportunism, as if the trickster component has largely taken over and tilted the balance decisively toward the negative or “shadow” side. By the fourth century, in the supposedly spurious Platonic dialogue Hippias Minor, the opening discussion turns on the contrast commonly perceived between the two heroes, Achilles being brave, simple, and true and Odysseus wily and false.


3. Detailed discussion of these African trickster deities can be found in Pelton (1980); see also Gates (1988), who describes their assimilation into African-American literature.

4. Studies of Hermes that attempt to establish an original, primitive core for this complex deity’s multiple characteristics have been consistently unconvincing. Arguments for an original Hermes as god of the stone-heap (herma) or as Master of the Animals (Chittenden, 1947) were successfully refuted by Herter (1976). See also Kahn (1979, pp. 9–19) for a review of earlier theories with further bibliography.

5. The more closely we look at the earliest representations of Hermes in early Greek literature, the more details we see that suit his status as that most mysterious, multiform, and elusive of divinities, the archetypal trickster. For example, of all the gods named in early Greek poetry (Homer, Hesiod, and the Homeric Hymns), where standard descriptive epithets are the norm for human and divine characters, Hermes is the only god whose epithets remain largely opaque and resistant to the interpretations of the most brilliant and ingenious modern
linguists. He has six commonly used epithets. Of these only two have clear, undisputed meanings, *chrysorrapis* ("golden-wanded") and *Kyllenios* ("of Cyllene"). The familiar *Argeiphontes*, conventionally translated as "slayer of Argos," has been seriously contested recently by three eminent philologists, none of whom thinks it means "slayer of Argos." Of the remaining three, we have no clear sense of the real meaning of *diaktoros*, *eriounios*, or *akaketa*. In addition there is the mysterious and untranslatable *sokos*, used of him only once at *Iliad* 20.72. Passing from authors of the archaic period to the later classical period, we find Hermes given the adjective *dolios* ("tricky") by Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and much later, in Pausanias (7.21.1) we find reference to a cult of "Hermes dolios."

6. Pucci (1987, pp. 157–172, 181–187) traces a suggestive thematic pattern in both Homeric epics whereby "heart" (*thymos*) is emblematic of the *Iliad's* emphasis on courage, and "belly" (*gaster*) is emblematic of the *Odyssey's* emphasis on instinct, hunger, and sexual need. Simon (1974) sees the *Odyssey's* plot structured by an unconscious fantasy of male sibling rivalry, progressing from an oral stage (in which eating takes excessive forms) to an Oedipal stage (the competition for Penelope).

7. Several interesting details in the epics suggest the usurpation by Athena of attributes originally and more properly belonging to Hermes. Both gods use the cap of invisibility, and the sandals that speed divine travel. Stanford (1965), commenting on *Odyssey* 1.96 ff. actually suggests that Homer has here transferred to Athena one of the main characteristics of Hermes, the divine sandals that carry him over land and sea. Their interchangeability as helpful divinities is also apparent in the two Olympian councils of Books 1 and 5, in which Athena and Hermes are dispatched in parallel fashion as conveyors of Zeus' benign dispensation for Odysseus. A similar equation of the two may be implied elsewhere in myth, e.g. by their shared role in equipping the hero Perseus for his successful encounter with the Gorgon (Apollodorus 2.4.2–3). In his *Odyssey* commentary (Hainsworth *et al.*, 1988), J. B. Hainsworth at 6.329 and 8.7 characterizes Athena as "the symbol of fortune and success," qualities that scholars of Greek tradition normally reserve specifically for Hermes, e.g. Burkert (1985, pp. 158–159).

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The first literary criticism written from a psychoanalytic perspective appeared in 1907, just over one hundred years ago. Very few people even noticed the centenary. Psychoanalytic criticism is no longer as topical as it was in the 1950s or 1960s. Many think that it has run its course; that all that can and needs to be said from such a perspective has already been said. Other more recent approaches have nudged it to the margins of debate. The ninth volume of the recent *Cambridge History of Literary Criticism*, which covers ‘Twentieth-Century Historical, Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives’ (Knellwolf and Norris, 2007) accords only one chapter to ‘Psychoanalytic Approaches’ – one out of thirty chapters, of which only a few pages deal with Jungian criticism and Hillman is not even mentioned. And this more or less accurately reflects the place of Jungian criticism in the broader history of the discipline. In this chapter I want to look at some possible reasons why Jungian criticism lost its place in literary and critical debate. I also want to outline some reasons for thinking that it was at one stage ahead of its time, and to ponder on issues that might need attention if it is ever to take a more prominent place in broader critical debate.

There had been both biographical and even psychological studies of literary texts before 1907, but most of these are better described as pathographical studies, that is, they were primarily concerned with social and moral categories (e.g. degeneracy) rather than psychological processes per se (Wright, 1984, pp. 38–39). Freud’s (1907) “Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘Gradiva’” which consists of an analysis of a work by a minor German novelist, marks the first time that a literary text was examined with the objective of exploring its specifically psychological implications. And *The Artist*, a slim but equally ground-breaking work by the young Otto Rank (1907), is the first monograph to consider the urge to create not only from a psychoanalytic perspective but also to suggest that this urge is both healthy and positive. Other studies soon followed, including Franz Riklin’s (1908)
“Wishfulfillment and Symbolism in Fairy Tales,” Rank’s (1909), The Myth of the Birth of the Hero, and Ernest Jones’s (1910) “The Oedipus Complex as an Explanation of Hamlet’s Mystery.” For the first time, literary texts were being understood not in relation to a given tradition, whether literary, social, or moral, but in terms pertinent to a theory about psychological processes. In three short years, the foundations of psychoanalytic literary criticism had been laid and a new chapter in the history of literary and cultural criticism had been opened.

Interestingly, it was during these same years that the differences between Freud and Jung first emerged. They arose from a radical change that came about in Jung’s dominating interests. Between 1900 and 1909, Jung was an earnest experimental psychiatrist. But from 1909, when he began to immerse himself in the study of mythology, the young psychiatrist set in motion a process in the course of which he was to gradually reinvent himself as an equally earnest textual critic. Most of Jung’s mature ideas were formulated in response to various kinds of texts. Admittedly, his interest very often lay in the imagery harbored in these texts, but the imagery that fascinated him was always embedded in a narrative. Psychology of the Unconscious (1911–12) consists of an extended analysis of the fantasies of Miss Frank Miller, as these had been recorded in a professional journal published five years earlier (Miller, 1906). A large part of Psychological Types (1921) is based on his interpretation of either philosophical or literary works. Jung’s writings on the East and on Christianity (e.g. 1954, 1937, 1952b), and his extensive studies of Western alchemy are entirely derived from his interpretation of texts (1967, 1968, 1970). Answer to Job (1952b) is based on the biblical text. Remarkably few of Jung’s mature publications are based on case studies, and some of those that are might be equally accurately regarded as “textual”: for example, “A Study in the Process of Individuation” (1934). Indeed, according to Joseph Henderson, by 1934 “his seminars no longer contained case material” (Bair, 2003, p. 395). Jung would repeatedly insist that he was an empiricist, for example, in a letter of 1935, “I am first and foremost an empiricist” (1973/76, I, p. 195), or in his later “Reply to Martin Buber” (1952a, pp. 666–668). Nevertheless, he developed his ideas about the workings of the unconscious mind not from a statistical analysis of his patients’ dreams, but from his wide-ranging but very selective reading. Almost all the evidence for his major ideas comes from various kinds of texts. Analytical psychology emerged from his attempt to understand the psychological implications of the texts that caught his imagination. Both ironically and paradoxically, however, Jung himself was never able to recognize the extent to which his therapeutic theory is a textual theory.
Jungian literary criticism first emerged in the 1920s and has enjoyed a somewhat unsteady history. This chapter explores the history and nature of Jungian criticism. It has three objectives. The first is to take another look at Jung’s only essays in specifically literary and art criticism in order to demonstrate that they are considerably more prescient than is usually recognized. The second is to understand why Jung’s legacy, which has so much potential, plays such a minimal role in broader literary discussion today. And the third is to suggest some ways in which Jungian studies might have to move if they are to play a greater part in contemporary debate. The section headings are borrowed from the title of Gauguin’s profoundly moving late masterpiece, now in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts. Although this title is usually given as three questions (“Where Do We Come From? What Are We? Where Are We Going?”), the words are clearly painted in the upper left of the painting and have no question marks. I have preferred to retain the ambivalence. The first section (“where do we come from”) explores the theoretical implications of Jung’s own essays in literary criticism. The second (“what are we”) provides a short history of Jungian literary criticism to date – of its achievements and of its failures. And the third (“where are we going”) briefly indicates a few of the major challenges facing the Jungian community.

“Where we come from”: Jung and literary criticism

Freud was quick to see how psychoanalysis could be applied to a literary work. In marked contrast, Jung was surprisingly slow to apply his ideas to works of literature. His first attempt to do so did not come until more than ten years after his break with Freud. “On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry”, a lecture he delivered in 1922, consists of a series of random ideas related to the application of analytical psychology to literature. It differs from all earlier criticism indebted to Freud in that it is neither rooted in individual psychology, nor is its argument causative. A symbol, Jung insists, pertains to the domain of the unknown, the collective unconscious (CW 15, p. 80): it “[conjures] up the forms in which the age is most lacking” (CW 15, p. 82). It was another eight years before he elaborated on these views. In “Psychology and Literature” (1930), Jung expands on his distinction between two modes of artistic creation: between “psychological” works, whose psychological implications are fully explained by the author, and “visionary” works that are not under the author’s conscious control, but have been dictated by an “alien will” (CW 15, p. 84) and thus, somewhat confusingly, “demand” a psychological commentary (CW 15, p. 91). He has no interest in the former; he does not think that analytical psychology
can add anything to an understanding of such works. It is only “visionary” works, which arise from the “timeless depths” of the psyche and “[burst] asunder our human standards of value and aesthetic form” (CW 15, p. 90) that merit psychological interpretation. Two years later, he wrote an essay on James Joyce’s *Ulysses* (CW 15, pp. 109–134). Utterly exasperated by the novel, he first indulges in a series of *ex cathedra* assertions about both novel and novelist and then, as if to excuse himself, turns to his own responses to the text, upon which he comments more interestingly than on either. Soon after finishing it, he wrote an article on Picasso for the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (CW 15, pp. 135–141), in which he comments on the same absence of “feeling” as he had found in Joyce’s work.

These four essays (CW 15, pp. 65–141) either reiterate distinctions that Jung had made elsewhere (e.g. between the personal and the collective, or his useful distinction between a sign and a symbol) or are implicit from his other work (e.g. the psychological and the visionary). They consider how these ideas might be applicable to literature and painting. But they contribute nothing to our understanding of *any* of the very few texts that he cites; in the case of his monologue on *Ulysses* or his essay on Picasso all one can do is either wince or laugh at his grotesque blustering. There are many excellent and illuminating accounts of them. The most recent is also the best: Susan Rowland’s analysis and commentary on them serve as an introduction to her equally insightful analysis of *Jung as a Writer* (Rowland, 2005, pp. 1–23).

Even so, I consider these essays by Jung to be deeply problematic. In the first place, I am shocked by their tasteless language. Remember that Joyce and Picasso were both very much alive at the time. All authors and other artists have to submit their work to the prejudices of reviewers, and sometimes reviewers can be both arrogantly and gratuitously offensive. But Jung was not writing as a reviewer; he was writing in his capacity as a *trained psychiatrist* and his language is singularly inappropriate for a professional doctor. He describes *Ulysses* as a “tapeworm” and Picasso as being marked by a tendency to react to “a profound psychic disturbance” with “a schizoid syndrome”. Such glib assertions do not help one to understand either the novel or the painter’s work; I am not at all surprised that they occasioned some indignant responses (Bair, 2003, pp. 402–408). Secondly, I remain unconvinced by his distinction between “psychological” and “visionary” works. His insistence that works as *radically different* as Dante’s *Divine Comedy*, Colonna’s *Hypnerotomachia*, Blake’s poetry and paintings, Hoffman’s “Golden Pot/Bowl”, Melville’s *Moby-Dick*, Wagner’s great operas, Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra*, and Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes stories are all “visionary” (see CW 15, pp. 88, 91) seems to me no more
than a woolly and irritatingly pretentious justification for his personal interest in them. Anything that interests a Jungian critic is deemed “visionary,” a claim that harbors the tacit and arrogant implication that it would be a waste of time to explicate merely “psychological” works, as all other critics presumably do. And thirdly, none of Jung’s four essays illustrate (as Freud’s Gradiva does) any obvious methodology. In short, they do not say anything useful about any of the texts to which he refers; they do not even indicate how others might employ his ideas to better purpose. They merely illustrate that Jung had become the first exponent of “instant Jung,” in other words, of the tendency to reduce a complex subject to a series of sometimes intriguing, but often pompous and always infuriatingly woolly generalizations – today one might call them “sound-bites” – couched in the language of analytical psychology.

Nonetheless, these embarrassing examples of “instant Jung” also harbor some remarkably prescient intuitions. As criticism, they may stand among Jung’s least successful work. But, as so often happened whenever he turned his attention to an issue, even these appalling essays reveal some invaluable and still “topical” theoretical insights.

To understand these in context, we have to recall Freud’s earlier essay on Gradiva. Exactly as any other critic or reader might have done, Freud takes the events of Jensen’s novel at face value, events which he reads entirely in relation to the central character. In other words, his starting point is the surface narrative of the text as presented by the author. All that Freud does is to interpret the hero’s fascination with Gradiva in psychoanalytic terms. A great deal of what he writes is in fact implicit in the text, but a few key issues do not appear to be. Although the elegant cogency of Freud’s argument ensured that his Gradiva became enormously influential, it is worth noting that post-Freudian criticism has questioned the justification for Freud’s insistence that the hero was suffering from a repressed complex that centers on his relation with women (Lotringer, 1977; cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1972). The focus of Ernest Jones’s celebrated reading of Hamlet adopts an almost identical method to that of Freud. He knew A. C. Bradley’s Shakespearean Tragedy (1904), famous for his insistence on uncovering the hero’s “tragic flaw.” In similar fashion, Jones assumes that understanding Hamlet the Prince will explain Hamlet the play. Marie Bonaparte thought it more useful to psychoanalyse the author rather than the work: her case study was Edgar Allan Poe (Bonaparte, 1933). In other words, early psychoanalytic literary criticism is considerably less ground-breaking than early enthusiasts liked to claim. It remains deeply rooted in late nineteenth-century pathographical studies: indeed, Freud even describes his own later essay on Leonardo as a pathographical study (Freud, 1910, p. 130).
Although Freud’s beautifully argued study was to become enormously influential, it nonetheless rests on two extraordinarily naive critical assumptions: (1) that a part can explain the whole (e.g. the character, the work; the smile, the *Mona Lisa*); and (2) that a fictional character can be read as if it were flesh and blood (and this, of course, is to confuse art and reality). Jung did not write as well as Freud, and his ideas were remarkably slow to win adherents. But when considered in the light of some of his more mature views, his four early exercises in literary and art criticism can be seen to harbor at least six concerns that make one wonder why more attention was not accorded either to Jung or to early Jungian criticism. For all six concerns continue to be of central significance to the broader discipline of literary criticism today.

(1) *Not dogma but working hypothesis*

Jung reproaches Freud for a “rigid dogmatism” which “has ensured that the method and the doctrine – in themselves two very different things – are regarded by the public as identical” (*CW* 15, p. 70). By extension, Jung *liked to think* that he was more consistently aware of the distinction between method and theoretical claims. He does not take preconceived ideas to a product. He writes: “I leave theory aside as much as possible” (1931, *CW* 16, p. 148). Indeed, he can be surprisingly modest about what he does: for example, “I have no theory about dreams, I do not know how dreams arise. And I am not at all sure that my way of handling dreams even deserves the name of a ‘method’” (1929, *CW* 16, p. 42). This may provide a clue as to why he liked the Sherlock Holmes stories so much. In “A Scandal in Bohemia,” Holmes says: “It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts” (Conan Doyle, 1891a, p. 11). Jung might well have written the same. Freud had taught his followers to assume that they alone knew the underlying meaning of a dream (and this, of course, is a variant of the arrogance that lies behind Jung’s insistence on being interested only in “visionary” works). In contrast, every time that Jung was confronted by a patient’s dream, he would remind himself that he had no idea what it was about. And he would begin by considering the dream without any preconceived ideas: “*I take the dream for what it is,*” he insists (1937, *CW* 11, p. 26; italics in original).

Moreover, Jung never considered his theories definitive. “The ‘reality of the psyche’ is my working hypothesis, and my principal activity consists in collecting factual material to describe and explain it. I have set up neither a
system nor a general theory, but have merely formulated auxiliary concepts to serve me as tools, as is customary in every branch of science” (1952, CW 18, p. 666). Like a great many pioneers in other disciplines, Jung was a somewhat larger than life figure and he may have dominated and sometimes bullied his group of followers. But there is nothing in any of his published work to suggest that he regarded his claims as a definitive vision to which he expected others to adhere. The editors of his Collected Works did him an immeasurable disservice when they decided to divide his work by theme. The thematic division draws attention to his views about a wide range of issues, as if the editors’ concern was to ensure that Jungians knew the master’s opinion on each of these. Had the writings been ordered chronologically, as Freud’s were, all Jung’s hesitations and reformulations would have been self-evident.² He was constantly revising his thoughts, even into his eighties. Jung the man had many weaknesses and Jung the scholar is an infuriating blend of startling insight and poorly anchored assertion. But in one thing he was always consistent: he considered his work as work in progress; he was always revising it, reformulating it, extending it. In the pithy phrase he used in a letter written in 1946, “I proclaim no cut-and-dried doctrine and I abhor “blind adherents” (1973/76, I, p. 405). He would have expected his followers to take his work in directions that he could not foresee.

Responsibility for making Jung’s approach into a somewhat mechanical method rests not with him, but with those of his followers who have distilled his ideas into countless “introductions to Jung.” Jungian criticism is not based on a dogma; its purpose is not to forward a Jungian mission or agenda, nor to reiterate an old claim (whether about individuation or the trickster) in relation to yet another text. It is a loose kind of method, perhaps better defined only as an “approach,” an approach that respects the facts of the product, whether dream or text. Hence Jung’s somewhat naive conviction that he was an “empiricist.” And because every text is different, every text must be approached differently. Jungian criticism begins not with theory, but with the “facts” of the text.

What concerns Jung is the possibility that some texts (visionary works) harbor a resonance that comes from deeper than the personal unconscious of the author. In the best of his work, Jung does not try to “reduce” a complex work to one or more reductive claims. In his essay on Ulysses (whatever the truth of its reason for being written, which is still not certain) he was constrained by length. But whenever he was free to set his own agenda, he delighted in every detail of the whole work. When he decided to analyze the few pages of Miss Frank Miller’s fantasies, he found that he
needed two thick volumes to do them justice. The transcription of his seminar on Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra* required two even longer volumes. Jung is interested in how every piece contributes to the nature of the puzzle he has set himself to solve.

As a result, Jungian criticism requires space; that is, a very generous word limit. Good Jungian criticism is based on what, in literary studies, is often called close reading. It begins with a question: “What psychological factor (whether image or complex of concerns) could have been responsible for this text?” In “The Boscombe Valley Mystery”, the famous detective reminds Watson: “You know my method. It is founded upon the observance of trifles” (Conan Doyle, 1891b, p. 126). So, too, was all of Jung’s best work. When he has time and/or space at his disposal, Jung does not indulge in “instant Jung.” He is interested in the complexity of the complex. And his investigation both respects and takes on the structure of the work he is investigating. Ideally, Jungian criticism should take account of every possible detail.

(2) Not surface but depth

Jungians often think that by identifying a surface narrative as an archetypal pattern they are plunging into its depths. But Jung did not do this. In his essay on *Ulysses*, Jung does not stamp the structure of Homer’s *Odyssey* onto *Ulysses* and shout “Eureka!” as Joseph Campbell was to do later (Campbell, 1993). He regards it as a given. He shows little or no interest in what happens at the surface. He is not interested in any one character more than another. He does not take a main character and ask “Which figure in mythology does he most resemble?” He does not stick his own terms onto any of the characters: for example, he does not describe Molly Bloom, or Gerty MacDowell, or Bella Cohen as anima-figures or even as aspects of the anima. He is interested only in the problem posed by the underbelly of the text. He is interested in the nature of the dominant concerns of the psyche that could produce the work in question. Nor is he interested in the author as an individual; he is only interested in the author as a representative type of the age in which he lives. This is why he can make such tasteless assertions about the creative imagination of two of the greatest artists of the twentieth century. He simply does not consider the author as an individual who might be wounded by his “diagnosis.” His charge that both Joyce and Picasso suffer from a lack of “feeling” is a self-evident projection of his own lack of interest in either the writer or the artist as an individual. His sole focus is on the complexity of the archetypal tendencies of the creative imagination that produced the work.
(3) Not hero but text

The third point is in fact implicit in the second, but nonetheless merits separate expansion. Freud might have thought that by stamping psychoanalytical assumptions onto Norbert Hanold (the hero of Jensen’s *Gradiva*) he was illustrating the wider applicability of his theory. Ernest Jones (1910) might have thought that if you can explain the Prince, you can explain the play. But Jung is not interested in the psychology of the individual hero. He does not think that if we can grasp the character of the hero correctly, the rest of the work will fall into place. It will not; it cannot. A character cannot explain the text as a whole; no episode can ever stand for the whole. There is, so to speak, always a great deal more to *Hamlet* the play than can be explained by any account of the Prince, and this is true of all literary works. In his essay on *Ulysses*, Jung does not privilege either Dedalus or Bloom. Jungian criticism may involve foregrounding a central figure, whether the obvious hero or a minor figure who serves as the effective protagonist (Dawson, 2004), but it must always avoid trying to analyze this figure as if it were a real person. A textual character is composed of language and exists only as part of a text. Textual characters do not have a psychological profile of their own. They embody a psychological dilemma, but this dilemma pertains to the work as a whole. The objective of Jungian criticism is to explicate “the psychology of the work of art” (*CW* 15, p. 93); that is, through a close reading of every detail to explore the possible psychological implications of the text as a whole.

(4) The social significance of art

Fourthly, Jung is never interested in the product as an expression of the individual psyche; his focus is always on the collective. Before he began to emphasize the archetypal, he was already interested in the question of how a work reflects the *society of the time in which it was created*. In this sense, he was thirty or more years ahead of his time. Somewhat paradoxically, while new criticism, which flourished c. 1925–1965, was advocating an approach to literature that focused only on the literary, Jung – tentatively but nonetheless firmly – was advancing a theory about “the social significance of art” (my italics). In this sense, paradoxical as this must seem, a central concern of Jungian criticism is an important precursor of the very theories (i.e. emphatically social theories) that regard it with such impatience today. It should have been able to develop alongside them. It did not, because very few Jungian critics of the 1960s and 1970s were sufficiently interested in this aspect of Jung’s legacy to understand how much they had to contribute to this new debate.
In Jung’s view, great art “conjures up the forms in which the age is most lacking” (CW 15, p. 82, cf. pp. 97–98). In other words, it compensates a cultural imbalance. It is true that Jung was not the best advocate for his own theory. He was not sufficiently interested in either society or politics to have very articulate views on these. When he writes on society, it is almost always in his “instant Jung” mode: woolly assertions that often intrigue but always irritate. On such issues he tended to think in grand but simplistic and stereotypical clichés. Even so, his theory may merit more attention than it has received. Jung was certainly awake to the latitude of different ways in which compensation can manifest itself: from veiled mirror to violent opposite. Indeed, he admits to one form of it in an amusing piece of self-disparagement in his essay on Ulysses: “Everything abusive we can say about Ulysses bears witness to its peculiar quality, for our abuse springs from the resentment of the unmodern man” (CW 15, p. 119). The “unmodern man” (and he is clearly referring to himself) is unsettled by whatever is new and for which he has no easy key. In this way, Jung anticipates some of the work of Walter Benjamin and other members of the Frankfurt School: for example, Benjamin’s well-known cameo on the Angelus Novus of Paul Klee. Benjamin finishes his description of the angel in this way: “But a storm is blowing from Paradise and has got caught in his wings; it is so strong that the angel can no longer close them. This storm drives him irresistibly into the future, to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows toward the sky. What we call progress is this storm.” (Benjamin, 1940, p. 392). Jung understood the ambivalent face of modernity that both challenges and changes us even as we face the challenge no less – indeed, perhaps even more deeply – than Benjamin, who is still a central figure in both critical and cultural debate.

Jung is interested in Ulysses not because he thinks it is a great work of literature, but because “its author is glorified by some and damned by others. He stands in the crossfire of discussion and is thus a phenomenon which the psychologist should not ignore” (CW 15, p. 115). And he is interested in Picasso because twenty-eight thousand people have visited an exhibition of his work and he too is thus “a sign of the times” (CW 15, p. 139). In other words, he is interested in the spell that each of them exercised on their contemporaries and considers this to be a phenomenon worth investigating. In this interest, he anticipated the development of cultural studies by thirty years. He understood that art works through the affective charge with which it is perceived and that the nature of this affect reflects a significant aspect not only of the work, but also of society. Jung deserves far wider recognition for seeing this possibility for research, but it must be added that he himself never went beyond woolly generalizations in
this respect: there is a pressing need for those interested in this dimension of Jung’s thinking to avoid this pitfall.

(5) A historico-cultural theory

Fifthly, Jung has a theory of both literature and culture that is every bit as original as, and far more persuasive than that of Freud. He identifies great art with works that he regards as belonging to the “visionary” mode. Such art, Jung maintains, is always symbolic, in the sense that it is the best possible expression of something whose implications the individual artist does not fully grasp. Thus far, he is in line with German Romantic literary theory, but Jung goes beyond this. For example, in his essay on Ulysses, he points out the tension between modernity, which is international, and a mentality that infuses the novel and reflects “the Catholic Middle Ages” with which he believes every reader necessarily identifies, and is therefore also “universal” (CW 15, p. 121); in other words, he hypothesizes the co-existence of conflicting cultural tendencies in every individual, each of which seems to pertain to a different stratum of the psyche. In Jung’s view, we cannot wrestle with the contemporary without also wrestling with all the conflicting tensions that make up the past, because all the different tensions of the past are still with us.

And thus we have to wrestle with all these different tensions of the past in order to understand the complexity of the collective problem of modern man. On the one hand, because it is collective, this problem has a deeply spiritual aspect; on the other, because it is rooted in personal experience, it is also a reminder of our roots in the complexity of the human-all-too-human. Jungians tend to foreground the former, often giving an impression that they have no interest in the latter. But it is of course the latter that reflects the degree to which we are rooted in reality.

(6) Reader-response/personal myth

The sixth valuable point to be gleaned from Jung’s exercises in literary criticism is that he is the first critic to think about a text in relation to how he as a reader is affected by it. He understands cultural products in terms of the psychological tensions that every individual carries within him. And these psychological tensions inevitably reflect deep-rooted social and cultural tensions: to understand the deeper psychological implications of a text is also to understand the nature of society and its own culture. The writer or artist may or may not be struggling to understand these implications, Jung implies, but we, the reader, the viewer, or audience have to do so.
Classical Freudian criticism assumes it is revealing something that is implicit in the text. Jung was not so insistent. He recognizes that he is a hermeneut, an interpreter. He tries to understand this. He is a reader-response critic \textit{avant la lettre}. He is aware that every reader participates in the reading process and rewrites the work to suit his own predilections. His need to establish his position vis-à-vis Freud reminds one of the words of William Blake, “I must Create a System, or be enslav’d by another Mans” (Erdman, 1988, p. 153). To be a Jungian is not to follow Jung; it is to pursue your own “personal myth” through your own reading and your own experience with as much ardor and self-awareness as Jung did his (cf. Jung, 1961, pp. 3, 177).

Even if Jung had \textit{only} written his four essays in specifically literary and cultural criticism, they would provide the foundation for a literary and cultural theory that is every bit as substantial, as multifaceted and challenging as many others that occupy center stage in contemporary discussion today. These essays were written between 1920 and 1932: they were well ahead of their time. No literary critic writing during these years produced work with such broad-ranging, prescient and coherent theoretical implications. The textual theory implicit in these essays maps \textit{many of the concerns that are still at the center of contemporary debate today} – three-quarters of a century later. There are good reasons for thinking that Jungian criticism had “potential.” It still has, but only if Jungians begin to respond more creatively to the theory in which they are interested.

Of course, there is a great deal more to Jungian criticism than what I have been able to outline here. Some might be surprised that I have not focused on the old chestnuts (Freud’s insistence on sexuality; Jung’s insistence on the archetypal). Too much has already been written on these for it to be worth me expanding on here. What I have tried to do is outline the methodological concerns of what distinguishes Jung’s only forays into \textit{specifically} literary criticism. His ideas developed considerably between the 1930s and the 1960s. Even so, these six points are \textit{the historical foundation of all Jungian literary criticism}. And what is astonishing is that they are still “topical” today. Jungian literary criticism should have been able to hold a place in the mainstream of literary discussion.

So why didn’t it? In order to understand this, we must consider the history of Jungian literary and other cultural criticism.\footnote{3}

\textbf{“What are we”: a short history of Jungian criticism}

The history of Jungian criticism can be divided into three more or less equal periods of approximately thirty years.
The first period covers the years 1920–1950, which coincides with the years in which Freudian literary criticism was beginning to be noticed outside psychoanalytic circles. With hindsight, it is astonishing to note how little interest there was during these years in applying Jung’s ideas to literature. It was almost fifteen years after Jung’s *Psychology of the Unconscious* (1911–12) before Maud Bodkin wrote her pioneering article “Literary Criticism and the Study of the Unconscious” (Bodkin, 1927). Her best-known study is *Archetypal Patterns in Poetry*, which was published by Oxford University Press (Bodkin, 1934). It makes a persuasive case for reading poetry in terms of the power of its implicit archetypal imagery. But it made little or no impact and, sadly, the reason for this may have less to do with its intrinsic worth than the fact that Bodkin was neither an analyst nor an academic. Professionals are often reluctant to consider the merits of work produced by amateurs. Another pioneering critic was Geneviève W. Foster (1945), whose article “The Archetypal Imagery of T. S. Eliot” was published in the *PMLA*, then as now the most widely distributed academic literary journal in the United States. And this in turn inspired Elizabeth Drew to produce the first successful book-length application of Jung’s ideas to the work of a single writer, which was published by Charles Scribner (Drew, 1949). In other words, whilst there were not many Jungian literary critics writing during these early years, they were placing their work with prestigious publishers.

These and a handful of other studies were the forerunners of a new phase in the history of Jungian criticism that begins after the Second World War. Jung was now in his seventies. Although he was still as prickly, domineering and intolerant as ever, a surprising number of intellectuals representing a wide range of disciplines either entered into correspondence with him, or visited him, including the historian Arnold Toynbee, the poet and critic Herbert Read, and even Jacques Lacan, who visited Jung c. 1954 (see Kirsch, 2000, p. 158). By 1955, when he turned eighty, he had become “The Wise Old Man” of Zurich (cover story, *Time* magazine, February 14, 1955).

The second period of Jungian criticism spans the years 1950–1980. These years marked a sea-change in the discipline of literary criticism and as this upheaval provides the context within which Jungian criticism first claimed a modest place in academic debate, it is worth outlining it, however cursorily. From the 1930s, new criticism (which was concerned with the resonance and ambivalence of words and with the different ways in which the relations between them create meaning) exercised a powerful hold on academic literary debate. It had not the slightest interest in the philosophical, personal, social, or political implications of the texts it examined. It was not long before impatience with its limitations combined with a determination
to investigate a wider range of concerns. By the mid-1960s, both new criticism as well as studies indebted to F. R. Leavis, 1932, 1948 who insisted that the formal considerations of new criticism be allied to moral seriousness, were being determinedly challenged by a fresh wave of literary theorists writing from very different points of view. For example, the works of Marxist theorists (e.g. Benjamin, 1936; Althusser, 1965; Adorno, 1970), were brought to the center of academic debate by literary theorists such as Raymond Williams (1958, 1977), Pierre Macherey (1966), and Frederic Jameson (1971, 1981). The reductive assertions of structuralism gave way with surprising, and possibly misplaced hurry to the heady abstractions of poststructuralism and postmodernism (e.g. Foucault, 1961, 1966; Derrida, 1967a, 1967b; Deleuze and Guattari, 1972; Lyotard, 1979), and they were propelled to the center of literary discussion by literary critics such as Roland Barthes (1953, 1970, 1973, 1977), Jonathan Culler (1975, 1983), and David Carroll (1987). The works of post-Freudian analyst Jacques Lacan (e.g. Lacan, 1966), which gave a new lease of life to Freudian theory, were introduced to academic debate by critics such as Muller and Richardson (1982, 1988), Shoshana Felman (1982), and Jane Gallop (1982, 1985). And these are only a few of a great many different perspectives: either old theories that had been revitalized (e.g. a wave of new feminisms, both continental and Anglo-American, or Russian formalism) or other recent developments (e.g. reader-response theory).

The effect was far-reaching. Modernist esthetics and an elitist humanism were sent packing. Literary criticism was no longer exclusively concerned with *soi-disant* literary concerns. It had become committed to exploring extra-textual concerns, whether psychological, social, political, philosophical, theoretical, or ideological. Literary and cultural theory had moved into a new phase of its ongoing evolution. The word “implications” had changed its meaning. Critics were writing about the relation of individuals to the state or about constructs of identity, gender, and power. These were the revolutionary conditions in which Jungian criticism claimed its shortlived place in intellectual debate.

The first major work of Jungian literary theory was by Morris H. Philipson. *An Outline of Jungian Aesthetics*, published in 1963 by Northwestern University Press. It is a thoughtful, level-headed, and lucid work that sought to rationalize Jung’s ideas for Jungian criticism. Why was it not more successful? Partly because it was ahead of its time: in 1963 it could not possibly have anticipated the degree to which literary debate would change over the following five years, and partly because other Jungian literary critics did not refer to it with sufficient conviction to stir scholars of other
persuasions to read Philipson’s argument and so better understand the rationale behind Jungian criticism.

Several Jungian analysts were writing about literature during these years. Possibly the most important of these is Marie-Louise von Franz who, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, lectured at the C. G. Jung Institute in Zurich on a wide range of topics, including myth, fairy tales, literature, and alchemy. These lectures were carefully transcribed by her adoring students and were eventually published (e.g. von Franz, 1958–59, 1959, 1959–60, 1961–62, 1966). Her applications of Jung’s theories to works of literature are classics of their kind. Her analysis of The Golden Ass, by Apuleius (1966) and of The Little Prince, by Saint-Exupéry (1959–1960), first published in 1970, are amongst the most compelling examples of this phase in Jungian literary criticism. P. W. Martin stood at the other end of the Jungian spectrum: he was a pioneer of group dreamwork, of which von Franz heartily disapproved. Even so, his stimulating and broad-ranging comparative study of the work of Jung, T. S. Eliot, and Toynbee offers another ground-breaking example of Jungian criticism of a different kind (Martin, 1955). June Singer’s brilliant study of William Blake, originally submitted as her dissertation at the Jung Institute, was cited by several Blake scholars for over two decades (Singer, 1970). And there were also several academic critics who were producing equally solid and innovative work: for example, James Baird’s illuminating study of Melville (Baird, 1956), Theodora Ward’s subtle analysis of Emily Dickinson (Ward, 1961), or Martin Bickman’s study of American Romanticism (Bickman, 1980).

The enormous changes that swept through literary criticism in the post-war years coincide with equally dramatic changes in Jungian analytical theory between the mid-1950s and 1980 (Samuels, 1985; Kirsch, 2000). Even so, the only major post-Jungian theorist to have had a dramatic impact outside the field of clinical practice was James Hillman. Between 1975 and 1985 he radically “re-visioned” Jungian psychology and, for a few years, it looked as if his ideas might re-orient Jung’s legacy (see esp. Hillman, 1972, 1975a, 1975b, 1979, 1981). Many of his concerns of the late 1970s and early 1980s (e.g. his insistence on collective and cultural psychology, his “therapy of ideas”) were far more in tune with the broader academic tendencies of the time than those of more traditional Jungians. So, too, was his invaluable reminder to “stick with the image,” and his interest in phenomenology gave considerable intellectual weight to his argument. It is no wonder that his work gave a new boost to post-Jungian literary studies.

Between 1955 and 1980 it looked as if Jungian literary criticism had assured itself of a modest but permanent place in academic debate. A great many
doctoral students were applying either analytical or archetypal psychology to literature. A small but ardent number of literary scholars were interested in Jung’s legacy, and their studies were being published by leading academic journals and presses. His theories were referred to quite widely in general debate within the discipline, especially by myth critics and by those interested in the work of Northrop Frye. But as so often happens, the height of its success in the late 1970s coincided with the seeds of its collapse. From about 1980, it began to witness a gradual loss of relevance, not because there was a conspiracy directed against it, but because it failed to understand the nature and degree of the changes brought about by literary theory.

All critical approaches can become mechanical. From as early as the 1950s, the more progressive literary critics had begun to scorn simplistic applications of all methodologies. Phrases like “vulgar Marxism” and “vulgar Freudianism” became widely used. Curiously, but revealingly, one almost never came across references to “vulgar Jungianism,” for the all too obvious but very worrying reason that as an approach it has only intermittently and tentatively developed beyond this. Every model can all too easily become a laughably reductive straitjacket and the Jungian model is no exception. We can readily excuse the naivety of some early Jungian criticism, because it was pioneering work. But by 1980, academic criticism had turned a corner. There was no place for such naivety. When we look at the difference between Freudian approaches to literature written in the early 1960s and those written forty years later, we see an enormous change in references, in argument, and in concerns. The same cannot be said with any great conviction of Jungian literary criticism.

The third period of Jungian criticism (1980–2007) is marked by two disturbingly opposite tendencies. On the one hand, popular interest in Jung has continued to expand, and is signaled by the apparently endless stream of “introductions to Jung” that continue to pour on to the market (e.g. Snowden, 2005; Tacey, 2006). On the other, broader academic and literary discussion makes fewer and fewer references either to Jung or to his legacy, or even to criticism inspired by his work. Interest in Jung and his legacy continues to grow, but in a sadly diluted form (cf. Kirsch, 2000, pp. 246, 254). But Jung has no part in mainstream academic debate today. The general perception is that his ideas are outdated; that they had become irrelevant by the late 1970s, if not before. And responsibility for this rests not with his detractors, but with all those Jungian critics, perhaps especially of the 1970s, who failed to recognize the range of issues implicit in Jung’s own exercises in literary theory.

By 1980, there were very few critics applying traditional Freudian theory to literature. If Freud continued to be central to critical debate in these
years, it was because of the energy of post-Freudian criticism. But what were the post-Jungian literary critics doing? The best of them were earnestly trying to catch up on what the previous generation had missed: familiarity with contemporary literary theory. The first major turning point was perhaps the 1986 Hofstra conference (Barnaby and d’Acierno, 1990): everyone who attended must have hoped that Jungian criticism would enter a new phase. It didn’t. The vocabulary of Jungian theory began to change, but Jungian criticism during these same years, and very often from the same academics, was sadly disappointing. The newly absorbed theory did remarkably little to change critical practice. Theory is theory; it can move in unpredictable directions, but the acid test of every theory is always critical practice: it offers a more certain measure of intrinsic worth.

Several analysts continued to produce studies of literary works, or films, or accounts of Jung and his influence on literature, but now they tended to be lightweight (e.g. Edinger, 1990; Clay, 2000). Academic criticism was often little better. In the course of her long and distinguished career at Hunter College, Bettina Knapp produced a succession of studies on an awesome range of issues, not only French and English literature, but also on theatre, music, women’s writing, exile, and so on. Almost all her work was deeply influenced by Jung (e.g. Knapp, 1957, 1969, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1998, 2003). No one did more to keep Jungian criticism on the map and the range of her interests ensured her considerable respect in the broader academic world. Her work represents some of the best and certainly the most wide-ranging Jungian criticism of its time. No one has demonstrated so ably the range of issues to which a Jungian perspective can fruitfully contribute. But it also illustrates some all too obvious limitations: a tendency to suddenly stamp unquestioned and unjustified Jungian claims on to otherwise standard readings of the works she examines.

Part of the problem stems from the constraints of academic writing. If we only have 6,000–7,000 words at our disposal (the standard length of a journal article in the discipline), it is not easy to do justice to the whole of a complex text. Such conditions all too understandably engender “instant Jung.” Still my favorite example of this tendency is an article on Proust’s masterpiece, famous for being one of the longest and most complex multi-volume novels ever written. It tries to tackle the issue of “Problematic Individuation in A la recherche du temps perdu” in less than 2,500 words. “Is there a Wise Old Man figure in A la recherche du temps perdu?” asks its inspired author. After briefly considering Swann, he decides that M. de Charlus is “the best candidate for the role of the Wise Old Man in the protagonist’s life” (Brady, 1982, p. 23). It is difficult to believe that such a mechanical and facile application of Jung’s ideas could be published in a
reputable journal. Even archetypal literary criticism (i.e. literary criticism influenced by Hillman rather than Jung) which arose largely in order to move beyond insistent assertions about “individuation,” quickly became as mechanical and predictable as more traditional Jungian approaches. The insistence on “soul” has seen to it that archetypal criticism today is no more influential in the academy than more traditional criticism indebted to Jung. One set of labels had replaced another.

Jungian criticism written during the last quarter of a century continues to produce, and therefore continues to be associated with, “instant Jung.” Take a text. Read the surface narrative. Stamp an archetypal pattern on to it. Assume its significance. Indulge in some woolly generalizations. Case closed. It too often settles for imposing a Jungian or post-Jungian slant and vocabulary on to otherwise very standard readings of the narratives discussed. Each critic begins the work again with either Jung or Hillman. And, very often their theories are taken as self-evident truths. Their assertions go unquestioned. Their focus of concerns is adopted, with the inevitable result that their conclusions are replicated. Far too much Jungian criticism has become an exercise in endless reiteration about the collective unconscious or the shadow or individuation or the trickster or soul or whatever. There is too little genuine evolution of concerns. Jungian criticism has become reductive and distressingly predictable. Indeed, in its gentle but insistent repetition of either Jung’s or Hillman’s claims, it has all the hallmarks of a fundamentalism. Sadly, there are good reasons why contemporary academic debate has little patience with Jung. Although today Jungian critics are perhaps more acutely aware of the hurdles they face than ever before, they have still not begun to explore the full range of issues that Jung first mapped in his specifically literary essays.

Thankfully, this is at last beginning to happen. The last twenty-five years have also witnessed a succession of isolated Jungian studies that are recharting the concerns of Jungian criticism. And what characterizes them is their astonishing diversity. The best Jungian criticism is not monolithic. Indeed, it is possibly more genuinely polyphonic than any of the theoretical approaches that are at the center of discussion today. For example, Christine Gallant’s study of the function of mythmaking in William Blake (Gallant, 1978), or her later study, Tabooed Jung: Marginality as Power, which made a solid case for the re-inclusion of Jung in contemporary debate (Gallant, 1996), or David Tacey’s study of Patrick White, one of Australia’s major writers, which foregrounds the relation of a text to its cultural context (Tacey, 1988), or Roger Brooke’s landmark studies of Jung and phenomenology (Brooke, 1991, 1999), or Susan Rowland’s ground-breaking fusion of Jungian practice with contemporary literary theory (Rowland, 1999,
2005), or Paul Bishop’s illuminating scholarly commentary on Jung’s *Answer to Job* (Bishop, 2002), or my own attempt to explore beneath the surface narratives of four nineteenth-century novels and read them from a fresh perspective (Dawson, 2004). I should also mention an increasing interest in Jungian approaches to film (e.g. Fredericksen, 1979, 2005; Denitto, 1985; Izod, 1992, 2001). In many ways, Jungian criticism is in better health than it has been for more than a generation.

And if Jungian textual criticism can be dated from *The Psychology of the Unconscious* (1911–12), its own centenary is only five short years away. Jungian and post-Jungian criticism has good reason to celebrate. In recent years, a continuing and perhaps increasing interest in Jung’s legacy is evident in many parts of the world. In 2003, the International Association of Jungian Studies (IAJS) was founded, to serve as a forum in which analysts and academics can meet. It held its first very successful conference in the summer of 2006. And most importantly, driving all new developments, Jungian theory has never been so dynamic: it has at last understood the importance of keeping abreast of contemporary literary theory. Amongst those responsible for this are Christopher Hauke, who has produced a superb study of *Jung and the Postmodern* (Hauke, 2000), and Susan Rowland, who has done perhaps more than anyone else in recent years to bring Jungian theory to a wider academic readership (e.g. Rowland, 1999).

**“Where are we going”: the challenge facing Jungian criticism**

Even so, one must be cautious. The current success is real, but limited. Old habits die hard, and none seems to be more difficult to erase than the absurd notion that the best way to keep Jung’s legacy alive is to reiterate his findings. Jung was a pioneer. One can excuse him for coming back to a relatively small range of concerns: he had to substantiate his claims, provide wide-ranging evidence. But are his followers to forever investigate the same concerns? Are they always to appeal to the same kind of evidence? Are they always going to come to the same conclusions? What, in short, are the objectives of a Jungian approach to a literary text today? To further corroborate his claims? To demonstrate that either a part or the whole of a text is related to an ancient myth? Or to show how something already exhaustively explored in Jungian psychology (e.g. the psychology of the trickster or the *puer aeternus*) can be applied to *yet another* text or to *yet another* writer? In short, is its objective merely to attach the most obvious Jungian label to any interaction, or episode, or even a text as a whole? In other words, does “Jungian” mean simply applying ideas developed by Jung to one or more literary texts? If so, to what purpose?
In this final section, I want to signpost (that is all there is space for here) some major challenges facing Jungian criticism. The first has to do with the problem of archetypes; the others flow from the range of issues implicit in Jung’s own essays in literary and cultural criticism.

David Tacey has suggested that “the main sticking point” for academic resistance to Jung is his theory of the archetype (Casement and Tacey, 2006, pp. 222–223). If this is so, one can hardly wonder at it. Jung was less than honest when he tried to demonstrate the validity of archetypes (e.g. Giegerich, 1984). Should we be surprised if so many doubt both the validity and the value of his theory? The existence of archetypes is not a self-evident fact. It needs more persuasive justification. Some corroboration is beginning to come from cognitive psychology, which is welcome news indeed. But it should not allow us to deceive ourselves: Jungian theory is a literary theory. And thus unless Jungian criticism comes up with equally persuasive new arguments of its own, the debate surrounding archetypes may pass from analytical to cognitive psychology without it enriching either Jungian practice or criticism.

Perhaps the most obvious problem about Jungian archetypes is the frequency with which any reference to them is accompanied by a sleight of hand. Although Jung very often paid lip service to the view that archetypes have no fixed meaning, he almost always assumed a fixed meaning when it came to interpretation: x signals y, period. In other words, a tension exists between the theory and the practice. And one of the reasons why this occurs is because he was forever returning to the same evidence.

Jung’s reading was admirably wide-ranging, but eclectic. He became well-versed in ancient mythology. He was drawn to works that dealt with individual speculations about the nature of either reality or imaginal experience, or works in which he found such a concern (e.g. Plotinus or alchemical texts). Jung was a textual critic whose theories are based on a very selective and, some would say, curious choice of texts. There is nothing particularly astonishing about this; it is not a problem. The problem exists because almost half a century after his death, whether implicitly or explicitly, both Jungian theory and Jungian criticism are still grounded in this relatively specialized series of texts. Indeed, for all its divergences from some of Jung’s basic positions, archetypal psychology is even more firmly rooted in exactly the same reading as interested Jung. Are we really to believe that all contemporary psychic experience and all other literary texts are to be interpreted in the light of Jung’s interpretations of the relatively small and eclectic sample of texts that happened to catch his imagination? To insist on this is self-evidently not only reductive, but also circular. It smacks of “dogma,” in the sense used by Jung when he reproaches Freud for confusing method and dogma. Such a tendency cannot generate either good psychology or good literary criticism.
Analytical psychology is based on a theory of archetypal images, which in turn is related to a theory about patterns of interaction encountered in world mythology. And yet very few recent or contemporary scholars of myth take Jung’s ideas seriously. Carl Kerényi and Robert Segal are exceptions (e.g. Kerényi, 1960; Segal, 1999, 2004); but Lowell Edmunds and Eric Csapo are perhaps more typical of their academic speciality. Both have edited books about different theories of myth; both include chapters on Freud; neither has any time for Jung (Edmunds, 1989). Although Csapo mentions Campbell’s theory of myth, as outlined in *Hero of a Thousand Faces* (Campbell, 1949) he does so only to dismiss it as reductive (Csapo, 2005, p. 202). If a major aspect of Jungian theory is inseparable from a theory of myth, then a very large part of its academic credibility stands or falls on whether its theory of myth is persuasive or not. One of the most pressing challenges facing Jungian criticism is to formulate a theory of myth that can be respected by a sufficient number of scholars of myth to allow it to enter wider debate.

Jung was convinced that there is no essential difference between the fantasy of one era and another. As he writes in 1949: “I have never been able to discover the slightest difference between incestuous Greek fantasy and modern fantasy” (1973/76, I, p. 526). As a sweeping generalization, there may be a grain of truth in this. But as clinical theory, it is highly suspect and it certainly cannot hold true for literature. The cultures that gave rise to the great myths of the ancient world have little or nothing in common with our own. There is already a world of difference between an ancient Egyptian or Babylonian myth and a sophisticated literary adaptation of a myth by Ovid or an apparently original fairytale by Apuleius. And, irrespective of how many parallels any individual might like to note, there is an even greater difference between Hellenistic expressions of cultural concerns and our own concerns today, two thousand years later. Jung was so interested in myth that he noted only the parallels; he never explored the differences – in spite of them being implicit in his own theory of cultural evolution.

It is time to return to the six points that I identified earlier as the historical foundation of all subsequent Jungian criticism. Disturbingly few of the many thousands of Jungian essays written and published over the last seventy years show a sustained awareness of more than one of these six points:

1. **Not dogma but working hypothesis:** perhaps most conspicuously, Jungian criticism has all too often treated Jung’s “working hypothesis” as a dogma. And because its vocabulary has many affinities with the language of religious discussion (e.g. individuation, realization of the self, or soul-making), this leaves it wide open to the charge that it masks a form of freemasonry.
The figure of Jung continues to cast a disturbingly long shadow. Although contemporary Jungians may be far more aware than ever before of his various biases – personal, professional, and scholarly – the fact remains that they are still in thrall to what he said or wrote. As a result, the most obvious challenge facing Jungian criticism is to emerge from his shadow.

2. Not surface but depth: At the heart of Jungian criticism is a paradox: How can one “take the [text] for what it is” (cf. Jung, 1937, p. 26) and yet do more than color an otherwise standard reading of it with Jungian claims? Jung had an enormous respect for the texts he examined, but his interest was always in trying to uncover the unconscious dynamics responsible for them. In other words, in all his textual criticism, his concern was with trying to identify and understand a hypothetical sub-text or ur-text that might have determined the surface narrative. A great deal of Jungian criticism is still content to explore the surface narrative, usually by way of an extended synopsis interrupted at specific moments by a Jungian commentary. This is what Freud did in his Gradiva; Jung was always more interested in the underbelly.

A related problem has been that Jungians tend to base their arguments on isolated incident or detail rather than on the work as a whole. So do other approaches, of course, and largely because of the constraints imposed by journal publishing, but this tendency may be more prejudicial to Jungian criticism than to other approaches: it can all too easily lead to “instant Jung.”

3. Not hero but text: Jungian criticism has often been more centrally concerned with the psychology of a central protagonist than with “the psychology of the work of art.” This is what Freud did in Gradiva; Jung was always more interested in the psychological implications of the text. And whilst an interest in the hero might, if I may borrow from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (chapter 6), provide an intriguing analysis of the grin, it will tell us nothing about the cat.

4. The social significance of art: Jungian criticism was singularly late in recognizing the importance of “the social significance of art” that is so central to Jung’s own exercises in literary criticism. Happily, in the last thirty years, a number of influential studies either of Jung’s social and political views or of their implications have gradually appeared – from Odajnyk (1976), through Samuels (1993, 2001), to Singer and Kimbles (2004) – that have begun to correct this. And yet although most of the leading Jungian literary scholars today are very much aware of the need to tackle this aspect of literary texts, the issues are usually so complex as to require far more space than is usually accorded them.
5. A historico-cultural theory: As his essay on *Ulysses* makes clear, Jung was very much aware of the degree to which all earlier cultures (whether the “Heroic Period” of ancient Greece or “the Catholic Middle Ages”) radically affect all later products; they have all contributed to the shaping of the tensions that inhabit modern consciousness. And, by extension, so too have periods to which he made little or only passing mention; for example, the collapse of the Carolingian Empire, the religious wars of the seventeenth century, eighteenth-century Austrian–Prussian rivalry, or, more obviously, the great age of German nationalism and unification have all generated tensions that are still present in the modern German psyche.

In short, Jungian theory rests on a grasp of the historical development of culture as it manifests itself not only in its social and political upheavals, but also in all its cultural products – and on how all of these find expression not only in unconscious fantasies, but also in literary texts. For this reason, Jungian criticism needs to move beyond the formulaic clichés in which references to the past are so often couched (e.g. sweeping generalizations about the Enlightenment) in order to better understand, and so be in a position to better demonstrate the nature of these tensions as archetypal processes. Most Jungian criticism has been singularly unconnected to any broader theory about the evolution of either literature or culture. And, given the importance of this aspect of Jungian theory generally, one of the most pressing challenges facing Jungian studies is to evolve such a theory.

6. Reader-response/personal myth: Possibly the single most intriguing aspect of Jung’s essay on *Ulysses* is that he is interested in how the text affected him. He was aware of the degree to which our reading is not only determined by typological characteristics, but how it works on us at a depth of our unconscious to which few have access. For Jung, reading a text is not about decoding an objective narrative, but about trying to uncover the individual and collective significance of all the various subjective responses that it generates. We read not only to better understand the psychological implications of a text, but also, and equally importantly, to explore our own “personal myth” – not in the cloying language of so much contemporary writing (Jungian and non-Jungian alike), but in a more searching, more rigorous, and more intellectually purposeful fashion.

Implicit in these pages is one further challenge: to avoid the temptation of being all too predictable. For the most striking characteristic of all Jung’s best textual criticism is that his argument is always unexpected. It shakes our easy assumptions and forces us to reconsider the work from a perspective
we had not considered. Even during the years that he collaborated with
Freud, Jung was never one to merely apply the older man’s ideas to whatever
captured his interest. Following his break with Freud, he was very much his
own man: truculently independent and driven; always investigating the
unforeseen and always arriving at the most unexpected conclusions. Jung was
not a disciple. Whatever he chose to write about, he found new things to say.
He found new ways of thinking about dreams and waking fantasies. The
argument of *Psychology of the Unconscious* is convoluted (Jung was no
stylist), but it is always surprising. The argument of *Answer to Job* is similarly
unexpected; the thesis underlying his work on alchemy may be less conten-
tious, but it is equally surprising. Jung did not take as his starting point any
standard reading of a particular text and then stamp it with Jungian ter-
minology. He always tried to peer into its underbelly, to reach beneath its
surface structure of literal concerns to uncover unexpected tensions and
dynamics. The primary characteristic of Jung’s own criticism is that its
conclusions are radically unexpected. By extension, *Jungian criticism should
never be predictable*: it has to do more than stick Jungian labels on to
otherwise standard readings of a text.

It has long been recognized that the concerns of Jungian theory have a
great deal in common with those of many other critical approaches that
are still central to contemporary debate (see, for example, Barnaby and
d’Acierno, 1990; Rowland, 1999). But it also rests on *very* different premises
from all other approaches, including other psychoanalytical approaches. It
has to mine these better if it is to deliver readings that are *fundamentally*
different from those of other approaches – different not just because they
cite a myth or an archetypal pattern, but because they cast *the entirety of the
text* at issue in a radically unexpected light – as did all of Jung’s best work.
In short, if Jungian criticism could only better deal with its shortcomings
and better harness its innumerable strengths, there is no reason why it
should not have a more prominent place in contemporary debate.

**NOTES**

1. One of Paul Gauguin’s most famous paintings. Created in Tahiti, it is currently
   housed in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Mass., USA.
2. Jung’s currently unpublished works (i.e. those that were *not* included in the
   standard “Bollingen Series” of Jung’s *Collected Works*) are currently being
   prepared for publication by the Philemon Foundation. The general editor is Sonu
   Shamdasani. It has estimated that this currently little-known material will fill
   some thirty volumes, and take about thirty years to complete. It intends then to
   produce a new translation of the *Collected Works*. It is still uncertain what the
   editorial policy will be regarding the ordering of these texts.
3. All Jungian critics owe a debt of gratitude to Jos Van Meurs and John Kidd for their invaluable annotated critical bibliography of Jungian criticism written in English up to 1980 (Meurs, 1988). In 1992, Richard Sugg edited an equally useful anthology of some of the best work in the field. More recently, Marcia Nichols has produced a continuation of the Meurs bibliography, from 1980 to 2000, but it has no annotations and the selection is disturbingly arbitrary (Nichols, 2004, pp. 263–295).

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Jung sometimes described the relationship between the ego and the unconscious as a power struggle (CW 9.1, paras. 522–523; CW 7, paras. 342 and 381). In this struggle, when an unconscious complex takes over the ego, there is “possession” (see Sandner and Beebe, 1984, p. 310; CW 7, p. 224). When the ego takes over from the unconscious certain attributes that belong to the Self, there is “inflation” (CW 7, pp. 228–229). Jung compared the progressive transformation of this power struggle in the individuation process to a sequence of political regimes. He calls the initial unconscious unity of the psyche a “tyranny of the unconscious.” The situation in which the ego is predominant he compares to “a tyrannical one-party system.” And when the ego and the unconscious “negotiate” on the basis of “equal rights,” the relation resembles a “parliamentary democracy” (CW 18, p. 621).

This apt political metaphor for the individuation process points to a larger issue, the contribution of Jungian psychology to the study of politics. This chapter explores three topics: (1) the relationship between “the political development and the psychological development of the person” (Samuels, 1993, p. 4); (2) the relationship between the psychological development of the person and democracy (Odajnyk, 1976, pp. 182–187); and (3) the prospects for Jungian psychopolitical analysis. The writings on the first two topics fall into two categories. The first revolves around Jung’s own political thought, including several of Jung’s writings that deal directly with politics: Essays on Contemporary Events, The Undiscovered Self. Among the outstanding analyses of Jung’s political thought are those by Odajnyk (1976), D’Lugin (1981), and Samuels (1993, esp. Chs. 12, 13). The second category of scholarship applies Jung’s psychological theories to the study of politics. Applications include those by Jungian analysts: Mindell (1995), Gambini (1997, 2000), Samuels (2001), Stevens (1989), Singer and Kimbles (2004), Bernstein (1989), and Stewart (1992); and by political scientists: Steiner (1983), Alschuler (1992, 1996, 2007).
The present chapter belongs to the second category and focuses on the relationship between the psychological and political development of the person. Relying on theories of the psyche by Jung and the post-Jungians, it first describes the individuation process, the psychological development of the person. Next is a comparison of this process to what the Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire, defined as the process of “conscientization,” an excellent formulation of the political development of the person. To anticipate the conclusions from this comparison, there are solid grounds for believing that individuation supports, though does not determine, conscientization. If conscientization contributes to democracy, then individuation provides a psychological basis for democracy.

A critique of Jung’s political thought

This chapter belongs to the second category of scholarship rather than the first because, as a political scientist, I am troubled by Jung’s political thought. Here, in brief, are three of the reasons based on Jung’s last major writing on politics, The Undiscovered Self (CW 10).

1. The overstatement of the psychological causes of political phenomena (pp. 60–61). According to Jung, political problems have mainly psychological causes and solutions (p. 45). Referring to the Cold War, Jung states that the splitting of opposites in the psyche caused the division of the world into the opposing mass movements of the East and the West (pp. 53, 55, and 124–125). As for the solution to these same problems, Jung states that the individual’s spontaneous religious experience will keep the individual “from dissolving into the crowd” (p. 48). Healing the split in the human psyche comes from the withdrawal of shadow projections (pp. 55–56). In recognizing our shadow we become immune to “moral and mental infection” (p. 125) that account for mass movements and the world political division.

2. The overemphasis on the reality of the psyche (inner) and the de-emphasis on the reality of politics (outer). Jung views political conflicts as mainly the outer manifestation of (inner) psychic conflicts (Franz, 1976, p. x). He states that the only carrier of life is the individual personality and that society and the State are ideas that can claim reality only as conglomerations of individuals (p. 42).

3. Pathologizing politics. Jung considers political mass movements to result from the pathological split between the conscious and the unconscious. He asserts that when human beings lose contact with their instinctual nature, consciousness and the unconscious must come into conflict. This
split becomes pathological when consciousness is unable to suppress the instinctual side. He explains, “The accumulation of individuals who have got into this critical state starts off a mass movement purporting to be the champion of the suppressed” (p. 45).

What I find troubling about these three arguments is that Jung focuses exclusively on the role of the individual, either the individual in mass movements or the individual political leader. He seems unable to grasp the ways in which the political system operates both in generating and managing social conflicts. Further, it is troubling to find Jung categorizing mass political movements as pathological when such movements also include the American, French, and Russian revolutions, not to mention those movements that ended the Soviet empire. There is a one-sidedness in Jung’s political thought, emphasizing the pathological over the normal and the individual over the systemic political behavior. A more holistic application of Jungian psychology to the study of politics transcends these opposites.

The psychological development of the person: individuation

My aim in this section is to describe individuation, according to Jungian psychology, preparing the way for a comparison with the political development of the person (in the following section). To begin, individuation includes the expansion of ego consciousness, almost in a quantitative sense of “increments of consciousness.” Asking “consciousness of what?” we encounter qualitative differences in the stages of individuation. Self-awareness marks the second stage of individuation while awareness of powers in the psyche greater than oneself marks the third.

My description of individuation adopts a typical Jungian view that there are three stages (Whitmont, 1978, p. 266; Edinger, 1972, p. 186). The first is “the emergence of ego consciousness” from the unconscious unity of the psyche, followed by the stage of “the alienation of the ego.” The third, “the relativization of the ego,” moves toward conscious wholeness (Sandner and Beebe, 1984, p. 298). Wholeness results from healing splits (dissociations, split-off complexes), connecting the ego–Self axis, and transcending the psychic opposites. Many potentially useful analogies and images can elucidate these stages. Jung, himself, often likens individuation to the stages in the alchemical transformation of base metals into the “uncommon gold.” Jacobi compares individuation to a recurring “night sea journey” of the soul (Jacobi, 1967, pp. 68–70). Whitmont (1978, pp. 93 and 309) refers to the image of a “labyrinthine spiral” with the Self at the center and the ego revolving around it, ascending through recurring phases in the direction of wholeness.
An image, very suitable for our purposes, incorporates many elements used by others. This is the image of a diamond (figure 14.1) in which the individuation process proceeds from left to right, from the initial point of “unconscious unity” through “ego alienation” in the middle, toward the point, “conscious wholeness.” The upper line traces the path of consciousness while the lower line traces the path of the unconscious. The vertical distance between the lines represents the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious, the ego–Self axis.

It is as if Neumann had this diamond image in mind when he described the individuation process:

We speak of an ego–self axis because the processes occurring between the systems of consciousness and the unconscious and their corresponding centers seem to show that the two systems and their centers, the ego and the self, move toward and away from each other. The filiation of the ego means the establishment of the ego–self axis and a “distancing” of the ego from the self, which reaches its high point in the first half of life, when the systems divide and the ego is apparently autonomous. In the individuation of the second part of life the movement is reversed and the ego comes closer to the self again. But aside from this reversal due to age, the ego–self axis is normally in flux; every change in consciousness is at the same time a change in the ego–self axis.

(Neumann, 1966, p. 85)

In the diamond image two vertical dotted lines separate the individuation process into three stages. The pattern for the first half of life may be gender-specific to males or culture-specific to Westerners.

Two key concepts already mentioned require clarification. The Self may be understood both as the archetypal urge to integrate the conscious and unconscious parts of the psyche and the archetypal image of the integrated personality. The ego–Self axis is Neumann’s term for describing the two-way communication between the ego and the Self that is essential for personality integration. A succession of one’s prayers alternating with one’s dreams exemplifies this two-way communication.
Stage one: the emergence of ego consciousness

The ego begins to emerge from the matrix of the unconscious during infancy. An urge to individuation establishes an initial tension of opposites: between the primary unity (identity) of ego with the Self, and the separation of ego from the Self. An infant’s sense of omnipotence (primary inflation) stems from this ego–Self identity. The lack of differentiation, between inner and outer, results in a magical rapport with persons and objects, a “knowing” what they feel and think. Jung likens this latter experience to *participation mystique*, what most psychoanalysts now call projective identification (Samuels, 1986, p. 152). The gradual dissolution of the original ego–Self identity produces increments of consciousness (Edinger, 1972, pp. 21 and 23). The ego complex begins to form, involving a sense of “continuity of body and mind in relation to space, time, and causality” and a sense of unity by means of memory and rationality (Whitmont, 1978, p. 232). As the ego emerges from the unconscious it becomes the center of personal identity and personal choices.

The emergence of ego consciousness necessarily involves a polarization of opposites as the ego makes choices between what is good and bad in reference to the value system of society, as mediated by the parents. Edinger summarizes this:

> Duality, dissociation and repression have been born in the human psyche simultaneously with the birth of consciousness ... The innate and necessary stages of psychic development require a polarization of the opposites, conscious vs. unconscious, spirit vs. nature. (Edinger, 1972, p. 20)

In more clinical terms, dissociation is a normal unconscious process of splitting the psyche into complexes, each personified and carrying an image and an emotion. Splitting occurs because the image and emotion are incompatible with habitual attitudes of consciousness. Jung believes that the feeling-toned complexes are “living units of the unconscious psyche” that give the psyche its structure (CW 8, pp. 96, 101, 104). The ego shapes its identity by aligning itself with what is compatible with habitual attitudes, and by splitting off and repressing that which is incompatible (Sandner and Beebe, 1984, p. 299).

Sandner and Beebe also describe the role of complexes within the overall process of individuation. The nucleus of every complex is connected to the Self, the center of the collective unconscious. The Self produces complexes, splits them off, and reintegrates them in a new way. In doing so the Self guides individuation away from an original state of unconscious unity toward a state of conscious wholeness (Sandner and Beebe, 1984, p. 298; see also Alschuler, 1995).
Stage two: the alienation of the ego

The task in the first half of life is to consolidate one’s ego identity and to construct a persona as an adaptation to the external standards of society, the workplace, and the family. According to Whitmont, innate dispositions that do not correspond to society’s standards split off from the ego’s image of itself and form the shadow. In this way, ego, persona, and shadow develop in step with each other under the influence of societal and parental values (Whitmont, 1978, p. 247). This splitting and formation of unconscious complexes, as noted earlier, are necessary aspects of the individuation process. In the second stage of individuation this splitting reaches its limit, as shown in the “diamond image,” where the vertical distance separating ego consciousness from the unconscious is greatest. One-sidedness of the personality, so often mentioned by Jung, refers to this extreme separation and takes its toll in the midlife crisis that may be experienced as meaninglessness, despair, emptiness, and a lack of purpose. This stems from the ego’s alienation (disconnection) from the Self (the unconscious). As Edinger tells us, the connection between the ego and the Self is essential for psychic health, giving the ego foundation, security, energy, meaning, and purpose (Edinger, 1972, p. 43). For Edinger, problems of alienation between ego and parental figures, between ego and shadow, and between ego and animus (or anima) are forms of alienation between ego and Self (Edinger, 1972, p. 39).

The ego generally endures its alienation in a cycle of inflation and depression, producing increments of consciousness. In the inflated phase, the ego experiences power, responsibility, high self-esteem, and superiority, all of which enable the maturing ego to carry out the tasks of the first half of life. In the depressive phase, the ego experiences guilt, low self-esteem, and inferiority, all of which counterbalance inflation and prepare the ego for a greater awareness of the Self (Edinger, 1972, pp. 15, 36, 40, 42, 48, 50, 52, 56).

Stage three: the relativization of the ego

The qualitative change marking the third stage of individuation is a partial consciousness of the ego–Self axis. This change has been prepared in the stage of ego alienation where inflation and depression alternate in cycles (Edinger, 1972, p. 103). The diamond diagram shows the reconnection of the ego to the Self in the reduced distance between the top and bottom lines. The solid vertical line represents the partially conscious ego–Self axis.

In this stage of individuation the ego integrates many unconscious complexes and acquires a “religious attitude.” These experiences will be described
in turn. The emerging ego in the first stage of individuation begins its awareness of the opposites and makes its choices in accordance with social values in order to form an acceptable self-image. Unacceptable aspects of the personality are repressed, falling into the unconscious and forming the complexes. In the stage of alienation the ego separates even further from the unconscious through dissociation, resulting in the continued growth of complexes and the ego’s one-sidedness. Activated complexes are met through projection and, of course, in dreams (CW 8, p. 97). While the first two stages of individuation involve the formation of complexes and projections, the third stage involves the withdrawal of projections through the integration of complexes. In Perry’s words:

Only when one’s self-image has developed to a sufficient degree can one be in a position to perceive other people’s selves as they actually are. If one is not in this happier state, one is inclined to experience people through the veil of one’s own imagery, in positive and negative emotional projections . . .

(Perry, 1970, p. 6)

The growth of consciousness, through the withdrawal of projections, removes this “veil” and permits genuine human relationships (Perry, 1970, p. 7).

Another qualitative change in the third stage of individuation is the development of a “religious attitude,” so called because of a realization that there is an autonomous inner power superior to the ego, namely, the Self (Edinger, 1972, p. 97). The ego then experiences itself as the center of consciousness, but no longer as the center of the entire personality (conscious and unconscious). The ego’s awareness of its subordination to the Self constitutes its “relativization.” The ego–Self axis, which was always unconscious before, sometimes even disconnected, now is reconnected and partially conscious. When this occurs suddenly, following a period of depression, it may feel like a religious experience (Edinger, 1972, p. 69, also pp. 48–52). To conclude, individuation is the movement from the initial condition of unconscious unity toward the goal of conscious wholeness.

The political development of the person: conscientization

This section presents an example of the “political development of the person,” a concept offered by Samuels (1993, p. 53), and compares it to the individuation process (see Alschuler, 1992). One should keep in mind the question: does the psychological development of the person contribute to the political development of the person?
An excellent formulation of “the political development of the person,” in my view, is Paulo Freire’s concept of “conscientization” (Freire, 1972 and 1974). This Brazilian educator formulated his theories out of the adult literacy programs he directed in South America, North America, and Africa since the 1960s. Through these programs Freire sought to further the humanization of oppressed peoples by raising their political consciousness (Freire, 1972, p. 28). The goal of humanization is in many ways compatible with the goal of wholeness in the individuation process. Now we should ask, “raising political consciousness of what?” Confronted by poverty, violent repression, economic exploitation, and social injustice, the task of oppressed peoples is to raise their consciousness of the problems of oppression. Conscientization progresses through three stages, each characterized by the way in which a person (1) names the problems, (2) reflects on the causes of the problems, and (3) acts to resolve the problems of oppression (Smith, 1976, p. 42).

**Stage one: magical consciousness**

Freire calls this stage “magical” because people feel powerless before an awful reality and an awe-inspiring powerful, irresistible force that changes or maintains things according to its will. A person with magical consciousness will name problems in terms of physical survival, including poor health and poverty, or will simply deny that these conditions constitute “problems” since they are seen as normal facts of existence. When one reflects on the causes of these problems, one attributes responsibility to factors beyond one’s control: supernatural powers such as fate, God, or political authority ... or simplistically, to natural conditions (e.g. one is poor because the land is poor). Since the causes are uncontrollable, one considers it futile to act on such problems, hence one’s resignation to “fate” while waiting for “luck” to change.

**Comparison.** When comparing “magical consciousness” to the “stage of ego emergence,” we should remember that conscientization is an adult process. In adults, nevertheless, there are vestiges from earlier stages of individuation. The residual ego–Self identity (Edinger, 1972, p. 6) blurs the distinction between inner and outer, between willing and causation. The ego–Self identity also produces archetypal projections onto people and events, endowing them with a numinous quality. The autonomous and emotional nature of these projections evokes fear and fatalism (Whitmont, 1978, p. 273), for spontaneously they overwhelm the ego independently of its will. Authority figures, including political and religious leaders, as carriers of these projections, will have an aura of supernatural power.
Stage two: naive consciousness

In contrast with the conforming nature of magical consciousness, naive consciousness is reforming. At this stage people readily name problems, but only in terms of “problem” individuals. Individual oppressors are named because they deviate from the social norms and rules to which they are expected to adhere. A lawyer may cheat a client or a boss may fail to provide medical assistance for sick employees, for example. Alternatively, the “problem” individuals named may be the oppressed themselves, who fail to live up to the oppressor’s expectations. They may believe that they do not work as hard as the “norm” requires or that they are not smart enough to perform well. At this stage one has at best a fragmented understanding of the causes. One is unable to understand the actions of individual oppressors and the problems of oppressed persons as consequences of the normal functioning of an oppressive and unjust social system. Thus, when one reflects on the causes of problems, one tends to blame oneself in accordance with the oppressor’s ideology that one has internalized as one’s own. Or, if one names as a problem an individual oppressor’s violation of a norm, one will understand the oppressor’s evil or selfish intentions as the causes.

Acting at this stage corresponds to the manner of naming. Those who blame themselves for not living up to the oppressor’s expectations will reform themselves and attempt to become more like the oppressor (e.g. imitate the oppressor’s manner of dress, speech, work). Having internalized the ideology of those who oppress, including beliefs in one’s own inferiority and the benevolence of the oppressors, one may view one’s peers pejoratively as inferiors, leading to “horizontal aggression” against them. Or, if one has identified individual oppressors as the problem, one will seek to restrain or remove them and to restore the rules to their normal functioning.

Comparison. In the individuation process, at the “stage of ego alienation,” no power appears greater than one’s will-power. Those who identify with this will-power experience psychological inflation, enabling them to undertake the tasks of the first half of life. At the “naive stage” of conscientization, problems appear to derive from the will of individuals, since one is unable to understand the “system” of oppression. When oppressed people blame an oppressor’s ill will for a problem, they assert their own will-power to oppose the oppressor. The oppressed construct a persona that corresponds to the value standards in the ideology of those who oppress. This ideology deems as “good” all that resembles the oppressor and as “bad” all the inherent traits of the oppressed people. Also at the naive stage are the oppressed people who, in accordance with the oppressors’ ideology they have internalized, view themselves as inferior and hold themselves
responsible for their problems. This corresponds to the depressive phase of the cycle alternating with inflation at the stage of ego alienation. Individual will-power is essential, yet unavailable to the depressive who experiences guilt and inferiority.

**Stage three: critical consciousness**

At this stage individuals understand the workings of the socio-political system, enabling them to see instances of oppression as the normal functioning of an unjust and oppressive system. Individuals *name* as problems the failure of their self-affirmation (collective), sometimes expressed in terms of their ethnic or gender identity. They tend to view these as community problems rather than as personal problems. In addition, individuals may *name* the socio-political system as the problem. “They see specific rules, events, relationships, and procedures as merely examples of systemic institutionalized injustice” (Smith, 1976, p. 63). When *reflecting* on the causes, oppressed people understand how they collude to make the unjust system work (by believing the oppressors’ ideology and by aggressing other oppressed people, for example). Becoming demystified, they reject the oppressors’ ideology and develop a more realistic view of themselves, their peers, and the oppressors. While recognizing weaknesses in themselves and their peers, they abandon self-pity in favor of empathy, solidarity, and collective (ethnic) self-esteem. All the while recognizing evil in individual oppressors, they understand that the problem involves a history of vested interests and political power (Smith, 1976, p. 63).

At the critical stage, *acting* takes two forms: self-actualization and transformation of the system. Collaboration, cooperation, and collective self-reliance replace aggression against one’s peers (other oppressed people). Personal and collective (ethnic) identity fill the void left by the oppressors’ ideology that has been rejected. Collective actions to transform the socio-political system replace isolated actions against individual oppressors. These actions aim at creating a society where truly human relationships are possible. In summary, conscientization describes the movement of political consciousness from dehumanization to humanization while the objective conditions of oppression, derived from the socio-political system, are gradually eliminated, a goal never fully attained.

**Comparison.** The “relativization of the ego” in the third stage of individuation, as we have seen, means that the ego becomes aware of its subordination to the Self. This change of attitude is so basic that it is often compared to a religious conversion. Similarly, at the critical stage of conscientization, the oppressed become aware of the roles they play within a socio-political
system that serves the interests of those who oppress. This sudden political
awakening comes for some oppressed people as “revolutionary conscious-
ness.” The Self and the political system occupy analogous places in two
processes of personal development: psychological and political. In these
processes both the ego and the oppressed person are able to exert some
influence on this superior power. At the critical stage, however, this influ-
ence is far more extensive, capable of making the system less oppressive,
guided by rules and institutions that reduce injustice and exploitation.

In both processes, the major transformations just described depend on a
prior “demystification” of the ego. The alienated ego lives in a one-sided
world largely experienced through the veil of one’s emotional projections
(Perry, 1970, p. 6). The initial task in the third stage of individuation is the
withdrawal of projections, especially the shadow. Similarly, in the stage of
critical consciousness, oppressed people become aware of the oppressors’
ideology through which the oppressed have internalized their own infer-
iority (low self-worth and powerlessness) and the superiority (prestige and
power) of the oppressors. As long as this ideological mystification prevails,
critical consciousness cannot emerge, for the oppressed person will lack the
self-esteem and the trust necessary for collective political action. And, as
long as the ego remains one-sided and mystified, it will not acquire the ego-
strength required to “negotiate” with the Self on the basis of “equal rights”
(CW 18, p. 621; also CW 9.i, p. 288).

Psychological and political development of the person:
implications for democracy

From this extended comparison I conclude that individuation supports
conscientization in a movement toward their respective goals, wholeness,
and humanization. Despite the striking parallels, neither process can be
reduced to the other. Although both processes involve empowerment in
the intra-psychic and the inter-personal worlds, they differ in emphasis.
Conscientization stresses the empowerment of the oppressed in relation to
society, with support from the intra-psychic world. Individuation, in con-
trast, emphasizes the empowerment of the ego in relation to the Self, with
consequences for the inter-personal world. More precisely, Samuels sum-
marizes Jung:

The self is supreme, but it is the function and fate of ego-consciousness per-
petually to challenge that supremacy. And what is more the self needs the ego
to make that challenge. The ego must try to dominate the psyche and the self
must try to make the ego give up that attempt. (Samuels, 1986, p. 58)
The relationship between these two processes is a topic that I would like to approach by asking how individuation might influence democracy. My line of reasoning builds upon the conclusion that individuation supports conscientization. If conscientization contributes to democracy, then individuation contributes indirectly to democracy.

In the stage of “critical consciousness,” conscientization empowers the oppressed classes. Their collective self-affirmation and self-reliance, solidarity, and understanding of systemic causes enable them to form political organizations and transform the political system in order to further their interests. The empowerment of subordinate classes, according to a recent political theory, is the sine qua non of democracy (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, pp. 270 and 282). This conclusion is based on comparative historical evidence from Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

If the struggle for democracy is a struggle for power, it is contingent on the complex conditions of subordinate class organization, on the chances of forging alliances, on the reactions of dominant interests to the threats and opportunities of democratization, on the role of the state, and on transnational structures of power. (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992, pp. 77–78)

The empowerment of subordinate classes depends on their ideological and organizational autonomy (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992, p. 50). In the process of conscientization, as we have seen, those at the stage of “critical consciousness” both reject the oppressors’ ideology and become collectively self-reliant. Leaving aside other conditions for democracy presented in this theory, already there appears to be a causal linkage between individuation, conscientization, and democracy. This tentative conclusion suggests, once more, the relevance of Jungian psychology to the study of politics.

Conclusion: the prospects for Jungian psychopolitical analysis

My attempt to relate individuation, conscientization, and democracy is an example of Jungian psychopolitical analysis. Jung pioneered this field, defined by the intersection of the inner world of the psyche and the outer world of politics. My analysis suggests ways in which Jungian (not only Jung’s) psychological theories may be applied fruitfully to the study of politics. While writing this conclusion, I asked myself at what stage of conscientization would Jung be located. The reasons for my uneasiness with Jung’s political thought were clarified: Jung would be at the stage of “naive consciousness.” Throughout his political essays Jung focuses on the role of the individual, either the individual in mass movements or the individual political leader. This is characteristic of “naive consciousness.” Jung names
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as political problems charismatic leaders who impose dictatorships, reflects on the causes as their psychological disturbances, and acts in verbal opposition to these leaders. When Jung turns to individuals in mass movements, he names the problem as their vulnerability to psychic infection and their submersion in a mass movement. Jung reflects on the causes as one-sidedness and the loss of individualism, and acts by promoting a religious attitude in individuals as a protection against psychic infection. In other words, as is typical of the stage of naive consciousness, Jung emphasizes the individual, either the oppressor or the oppressed.

Jung insisted that in psychoanalysis patients could progress no further than analysts had progressed in their psychological development (CW 16, para. 545). Applying this same idea to political analysis, I contend that students of politics will progress no further than political analysts have in their own political development. Considering Jung as a political analyst, he reached only the stage of “naive consciousness.” In view of Jung’s limitations, I encourage students of politics now engaging in Jungian psychopolitical analysis to turn away from Jung’s own political thought and toward the rich resources of Jungian psychological theory.

NOTES

1. In fact, the cycle of complex formation and integration extends as well to the third stage.
2. Elsewhere I have elaborated Freire’s ideas and integrated them with the Jungian theory of complexes (Alschuler, 1992, 2007, Ch. 2). For a new formulation of the political development of the person, based on the Jungian concept of the tension of opposites, see Alschuler, 2007, Ch. 4.
3. An earlier attempt to link Jungian psychology to democracy is that of Odajnyk (1976, Ch. 10).

REFERENCES


Jung and politics


Why Jung on religion?

Jung noted that for centuries the symbols, rituals, and dogmas of religions, east and west, gathered the psychic energy of individuals and nations alike into traditions that bore witness to life’s meaning and acted as underground springs nourishing different civilizations. What religious symbols symbolize, however, is the God who escapes human definitions. With the shock of the world wars and brutal inhumanity, for many people in the twentieth century, the collective containers of religious symbolism no longer channeled their psychic energy.

As a result, many felt uprooted from religious traditions and the symbolic life that put them in daily touch with a sense of transcendent meaning at the center of life. Now in the opening years of the twenty-first century religion again takes a dominant place in the clash of civilizations, thus underlining Jung’s perception of the inescapable importance of religious experience that channels psychic energy into individual and communal forms. Called or not, Jung holds, God will be present, and if not God, then what we substitute in that central place.

Afraid of becoming unanchored, we create religious, political, and sexual fundamentalisms to keep us close to the reality the religious symbols once conveyed, but at the price of persecuting those who disagree with us as. Or we can just drift far away from the life-giving waters of religious experience, confined to humdrum carrying on, without joy or purpose. Then we feel afflicted by a deadening malaise, unable to effect healing measures against rising crime, ecological deprecation, and mental illness. A sense of hopelessness seeps in, like a rotting damp. These sufferings, as Jung sees them, can be traced to the failure to secure any reliable connection to psychic reality that religion once supplied through its various symbol systems, and hence a failure to channel psychic energy toward the reality to which religions point. For the individual, this misplaced energy can lead to neurosis or psychosis; in society, it can lead to horrors such as genocide, holocaust and
gulags. It can give rise to ideologies whose potential good is soured by the bullying of adherents into frightened compliance.

In contrast to these terrible consequences of the failure to connect to a transcendent reality is the emergence of a new discipline, that of depth psychology, which is a relatively new collective way of exploring and acknowledging the fact that the nature of our access to God has fundamentally changed. The individual psyche, which is a part of the collective psyche, is now a medium through which we can experience the divine. Jung saw the purpose of his analytical psychology as helping us re-establish connection to the truths contained in religious symbols by finding their equivalents in our own psychic experience (CW 12, paras. 13, 14, 15).

### Immediate experience and psychic reality

The discipline of depth psychology enables us to study the importance of our immediate experience of the divine which comes to us through dream, symptom, autonomous fantasy, all the moments of primordial communication (CW 11, paras. 6, 31, 37; Ulanov and Ulanov, 1975, Chapter 1). People have had, and continue to have, revelatory experiences of God. But in earlier times such encounters were contained by the mainstream of religious tradition and translated into the terms of familiar and accepted religious ritual and doctrine. In our time, Jung believes, these various systems have lost their power for a great many people (see Ulanov, 1971, Chapter 6). For them religious symbols no longer function effectively as communicators of divine presence. Individual men and women are left alone, quite on their own, to face the blast of divine otherness in whatever form it takes. How are we to respond to such a summons? How are we to find a way to build a relationship to the divine? Jung responds to this challenge by marking the emergence into collective discourse of the new vocabulary of psychic reality.

By psychic reality, Jung means our experience of our own unconscious, that is to say, of all those processes of instinct, imagery, affect, and energy that go on in us, between us, among us, without our knowledge, all the time, from birth until death, and maybe, he speculated, even after death (Jung, 1963, Chapter 11; see also Jaffe, 1989, pp. 109–113). Coming into conscious relation with the unconscious, knowing that it is there in us and that it affects all that we think and do, alone and together, in small groups and as nations, radically changes every aspect of life.

By observing the effects of unconscious motivations on our thoughts and actions, our ego – the center of our conscious sense of I-ness, of identity – is introduced to another world with different laws that govern its operations.
In our dreams, time and space collapse into an ever-present now. We can be our five-year-old self at the same time in the dream that we are our present age, and find ourselves in a distant land that is also our familiar backyard. Our slips of the tongue, where wrong words jump out of our mouths as if propelled by some secret power, our projections onto people, places, and social causes, where we feel gripped by outsized emotions and compulsions to act, our moments of creative living where we perceive freshly, bring a new attitude into being, craft original projects, attest to the constant presence of unconscious mental processes. Something is there that we did not know was there. Something is happening inside us and we must come to terms with it.

If we pay attention to this unconscious dimension of mental life, it will gather itself into a presence that will become increasingly familiar. For example, just recording our dreams over a period of time will show us recurrent motifs, personages, and images that seem to demand a response from us, as if to engage us in conversation around central themes or conflicts. These dominant patterns impress us as if they came from an other objectively there inside us. Jung calls this ordering force in the unconscious the Self.

The Self exists in us as a predisposition to be oriented around a center. It is the archetype of the center, a primordial image similar to images that have fascinated disparate societies throughout history. It is, like all the archetypes, part of the deepest layers of our unconscious which Jung calls “collective” or “objective” to indicate that they exceed our personal experience. We experience the Self existing within our subjectivity, but it is not our property, nor have we originated it; it possesses its own independent life.

For example, some aboriginal tribes in Australia pay homage to Oneness. They know its presence in themselves yet they speak of it not as my Oneness or our Oneness but as the Oneness at the heart of all life. When we respond to the predisposition of the Self we, each of us, experience it as the center of our own psyche and more, of life itself. Our particular pictures of the Self will draw on images from our personal biography, what in the jargon of depth psychologists we call “objects” – the internalized remnants of our earliest relationships with caregivers and other significant people. And what we do in this theater of relations will depend on how we have been conditioned by collective images of the center dominant in our particular culture and era, including especially our religious education or lack thereof. But our images of the Self will not be limited to these personal and cultural influences. They will also include such primordial universal themes as may confront us from the deep layers of our own unconscious life.
The Self is neither wholly conscious nor unconscious but orders our whole psyche, with itself as the mid-point or axis around which everything else revolves. We experience it as the source of life for the whole psyche, which means it comes into relationship with our center of consciousness in the ego as a bigger or more authoritative presence than we have known before (CW 9.ii, paras. 9 and 57). If in our ego-life—what we ordinarily call “life,” the ideas and feelings and culture of which we are strongly aware—we cooperate with the approaches of the Self, it feels as if we are connecting with a process of a centering, not only for our deepest self but for something that extends well beyond us, beyond our psyche into the center of reality. If we remain unconscious, or actively resist the signs the Self sends us, we experience the process as altogether ego-defeating, crushing our plans and purposes with its large-scale aims.

**Ego and Self, the gap and God-images**

A gap always remains between ego and Self, for they speak different languages. One is known, the other unknown. One is personal, the other impersonal. One uses feelings and words; the other, instincts, affects, and images. One offers a sense of belonging to community, the other a sense of belonging to the ages. They never merge completely, except in illness (as in mania or an inflated state, for example), but merely approach each other as if coming from two quite different worlds, and yet, even so, they are still somehow intimately related. The gap between them can be a place of madness where the ego loses its foothold in reality by falling into identification with unconscious energies, or where the unconscious can be so invaded by conscious ambition and expediency that it seems to withdraw from contact forever, leaving the ego functioning mechanically: juiceless and joyless.

If we really become aware of and accept the gap between ego and Self, it transforms itself into a space of conversation between the worlds. We experience the connecting within us and in all aspects of our lives. A sense of engagement follows that leads us into a life at once exciting and reverent. For it is precisely in that gap that we discover our images for God. Such images point in two directions: to the purposiveness hidden in our ego-life, and across the gap into the unknown God (Ulanov and Ulanov, 1991/1999, Chapter 2).

Jung talks about God-images as inseparable from those images of the Self that express its function as center, source, point of origin, and container. Empirically, Self and God-images are indistinguishable (CW 8, para. 231). This has led Jung’s theological critics to accuse him of reductionism, and of
bring down the transcendent God to become a mere factor in the psyche. But Jung defends himself hotly by attacking the argument as nonsense (CW 11, paras. 13–21; Jung, 1975, p. 377). Can we ever experience anything except through the medium of the psyche? The psyche exists. We cannot get around it. It influences everything we see or know of “objective” reality with our own individual colorations, of physical constitution, family, culture, history, symbol system. Of course our images of God reflect such conditioning.

But do our God-images tell us something else? Yes, Jung answers. They are the pictures through which we glimpse the Almighty whom we experience as a Subject addressing us (Ulanov, 1986/2002, pp. 164, 178). Who knows what God is objectively? How can we ever tell? Only through our own experience and through other people’s experiences of God reported throughout history. The unconscious is not itself God, but it is a medium through which we sense God speaks (CW 10, para. 565). We can feel that God addresses us through images from the deep unconscious just as much as through the witness of historical events, other people, scriptures, and worshipping communities.

The transcendent God speaks to us through our God-images which bring God near to us clothed in human or other accessible terms that we can grasp. Yet, at the same time no finite image encompasses the infinite God, and hence our images get smashed for no human construction can take in the incomprehensible divine. The images, when they arrive, may evoke in us a negative feeling of such power that we feel invaded and overrun by an alien force, or a positive feeling of being healed or blessed by a life-changing vision.

Jung thus provides another method of interpretation of religious tradition. When we acknowledge psychic reality, we must add the psychological interpretation of religious materials. Jung’s ideas provide a method for investigating recurrent archetypal symbols that specific religious rituals or doctrines embody and employ, by means of linking them to equivalent experiences in our psyches. He applies this method to Eastern as well as Western religious traditions (CW 11). This method no more reduces revelation to psychology than other methods of, for example, historical or literary or sociological criticism reduce God to historical event, literary metaphor, or sociological sampling.

Jung’s contribution to religion brings unconscious psychic reality into relation with our conscious avowals of faith. He explicitly states that a major function of his psychology is to make connections between the truths contained in traditional religious symbols and our psychic experience. Religious life involves us in ongoing, scrupulous attention to what makes
itself known in those moments of numinous experience that occur when ego
and Self address each other. Understood abstractly Jung uses the word Self
to describe this structural center of the psyche that transcends our ego.
Experienced immediately, Self images present as images of the center of
reality that Jung calls God as a most excellent name. Jung goes back and
forth using the word Self and using the name God, stating that Self and God
images are in practice indistinguishable.

We do not control such primordial moments, but rather place our con-
fidence in their meaning for our life. Trustful observance forms the essence
of the attitude Jung calls religious (CW 11, paras. 2, 6, 8, 9). Our ego acts
as both receiver and transmitter of what the Self reveals (Jung, 1973 [22
December 1942], p. 326), which does not mean that we always simply fall
in placidly and passively with what comes to us. The conversation with the
divine can grow noisy indeed. Like Jonah we may protest our fate, or like
Abraham defending Sodom, we can try to argue Yahweh out of his pledge
of destruction. Our proper ego attitude in the face of God is a willing
engagement. A process of sustained communication develops, out of which
both ego and Self emerge as more significant and conscious partners. No
one else can engage in this process for us. In immediate confrontation with
the mysterious Other who seizes our consciousness grows the root of our
personal self and our heartfelt connection to the meaning of reality.

**Official religion**

Religious dogma and creeds, for Jung, stand in vivid contrast to such
immediate experiences, and he always values the latter over the former.
Jung does see great value in dogma and creed as long as we do not substitute
them for direct experience of the divine. Dogma and creed function as
shared dreams of humanity and offer us valuable protection against the
searing nature of firsthand knowledge of the ultimate. They offer us dif-
ferent ways to house our individual experiences of these puzzling or dis-
turbing numinous events. Like Nicholas von der Flue, we may find refuge in
the doctrine of the trinity as the means of translating into bearable form a
theophany so powerful that the experience was said to have changed his
saintly face forever, into a frightening visage (CW 11, para. 474; Jung, 1975
[June 1957], p. 377).

By connecting our immediate psychic encounters with the numinous to the
collective knowledge of God contained in humanity’s creeds and dogmas, we
fulfill what Jung emphasized as the root meaning of religion (CW 11, para. 8;
Jung, 1975 [12 February 1959], pp. 482, 484). Citing Augustine’s use of
*religare* meaning to bind or connect, Jung says we bind ourselves to that
careful and scrupulous observation of the numinous dynamic factors contained in manifestations of the unconscious until their meaning is understood, and that we bind our individual experience back into the common possession of religious tradition. Such collective teachings protect us from too great a blast of the Almighty by offering us the containers of humanity’s collective symbols. To the ongoing life of inherited symbols we contribute our own personal instances of what they represent, thus helping to keep tradition from ossifying. If we do not live the tradition in this way, it falls into disuse, becoming a mere relic. We may give it lip-service, but it no longer quickens our hearts. In our personal experience of the timeless tradition, we are lifted beyond ourselves to partake of the mysteries while at the same time living our ordinary ego-lives: paying taxes, voting, making meals, cleaning out closets, fetching the children from school, holding down jobs.

Bound up in tradition in lively ways, we participate in our own special groups and join the whole of humanity. Our numinous experience, now shared, brings us into the community to digest whatever the experience represents. Not only are we part of the human family, but our unconscious flows together with everyone else’s and we join its attempts to create a new basis of community. Our immediate experiences of the divine revivify tradition and remind us that our shared life together depends upon a very deep source.

Religion also binds us to the pivotal numinous experiences that mark our lives because they establish our idiosyncratic roots in transcendence. According to Jung, forgetting such experiences, or worse, perjuring them by acting as if they make no difference, exposes us to the risk of insanity. Encounters with the holy are like flames. They must be shared, to keep light alive, or they will burn us up or burn us out. The religious life is one of increased alertness, of keen watchfulness of what goes on between this mysterious Thee and me (Jung, 1973 [10 September 1943], p. 338).

For Jung, religion is inescapable. We may reject it, revile it, revise it, but we cannot get rid of it. This early discovery by Jung has been reaffirmed recently in the research of Rizzuto (1979). When he was accused of being a mystic, Jung objected that he did not invent this idea of Homo religiosus but only put it into words. His vast clinical experience with people afflicted with neurosis or psychosis impressed upon him the fact that half of his patients fell ill because they had lost the meaning of life (CW 11, para. 497). Healing means revivifying connection to the transcendent, bringing with it the ability to get up and walk to our fate instead of being dragged there by a neurosis. Thus Jung saw the numinous even in pathology; it expresses how we have fallen out of the Tao, the center of life. Recovery requires remythologization (Ulanov, 1971, pp. 127, 136).
Religious instinct and society

Our instinct for religion consists in our being endowed with and conscious of relation to deity (CW 12, para. 11). If we repress or suppress this instinct, we can fall ill just as surely as we do when we interfere with our physical appetite for food, or with our sexual instinct (Ulanov, 1994/2005). Many of the substance-abuse disorders to which we fall prey can be traced, au fond to displacement onto chocolate, cocaine, valium, liquor, or whatever, of our appetitive need for connection to the power and source of our being. This displacement operates in all of our addictions, even the ones that surprise us, such as to a lover or to a child, to becoming pregnant, or to health or diet routines, to money or power, to a political cause or a psychological theory, even to a religious discipline. The energy that is our instinct for religion must go somewhere. If it is not directed to the ultimate, it will turn manic or make idols out of finite goods. Jung reminds us “It is not a matter of indifference whether one calls something a ‘mania’ or a ‘god’… When the god is not acknowledged, ego mania develops and out of this mania comes sickness” (CW 13, para. 55).

Religious instinct also possesses a social function. Our connection to transpersonal authority keeps us from being swept away into mass movements (CW 10, paras. 506, 508). It offers a point of reference outside family, class conventions, cultural mores, even the long reach into our private lives of totalitarian governments. When we feel seen and known by God, however we may express this, we can find the power to stand against the pressures of collectivities for the sake of truth, soul, faith. This capacity of individuals offers a bulwark against movements that can dominate and destroy human society. Having such a reference point beyond personal whims and needs, and beyond dependence on others’ approval, makes us sturdy citizens capable of contributing to group life in fresh and sustained ways. Knowing a connection to the source of life, we feel a mysterious binding force in our own authority as persons, which we come to respect in our neighbor as much as in ourselves. Being a person who matters combats any loss of confidence and hope in our society to facilitate an environment where we all can thrive.

In clinical situations, acknowledging the force of religious instinct may save us from abysmal humiliation and depression. When the majority of the world’s people are starving, it is morally embarrassing to be afflicted with obsession over one’s weight. To see the larger context of this suffering – that it stems from misdirection of soul hunger, twisting the hunger for connection to ultimate purpose – can release a person from self-revilement in order to pay trustful attention to what the Self is engineering (Ulanov, 1996, chapters 2, 3).
The religious instinct may lurk in any of our disturbances, from the extreme of homicidal urges to get even with those who threaten and hurt us unbearably to the seemingly mild but actually lethal affliction of the chronic boredom that results from the suffocation of our inner life. In every case, an impulse toward the ultimate, toward expression of what really matters, mixes in with early childhood hurt and distorted relations with other people. Our energy to live from and toward the center has lost its way, or we have lost touch with it. We are out of sorts. We need help. Part of the help, in Jung’s view, means feeling emboldened enough to risk immediate experience of the numinous (Jung, 1973 [26 May 1945], p. 41).

**Individuation**

In our experience of the numinous, according to Jung, what we feel is its effects on our ego (CW 17, para. 300). We feel summoned by something beyond ourselves to become all of ourselves. We sense the Self, “heavy as lead,” calling us out of unconscious identification with social convention (the persona or “mask” we adopt for social functioning), pushing us to recognize even those parts of ourselves that we would rather deny and disown, those that lie in what Jung calls the shadow (CW 17, para 303). If we open to our shadow, we know at first-hand the agony of St. Paul when he says “the good I would, I do not, and the evil I would not, that I do.” Becoming ourselves also means encompassing what ordinarily we think of as opposite to us, to claim as part of us a departure point so different from our conscious gender identity that it symbolizes itself in our dreams, for example, as figures of the opposite sex. Jung calls these figures the anima in man and the animus in women. To be wholly who we are means including as part of our ego identity what these contrasexual parts bring into our consciousness (Ulanov and Ulanov, 1994). They open us sexually as well as spiritually to conversation with the Self, and through it to the reality the Self symbolizes.

This is not individualism. For the Self brings with it a bigger center. Jung says:

> the self is like a crowd ... being oneself, one is also like many. One cannot individuate without being with other human beings ... Being an individual is always a link in a chain ... how little you can exist ... without responsibilities and duties and the relation of other people to yourself ... The Self ... plants us in otherness – of other people, and of the transcendent. (Jung, 1988, v. 1, p. 102)

Awareness of the Self shifts our focus from the private to the shared, or to put it more accurately, to the inevitable mixture of the public in the private, of the collective in the individual, of the universal in the idiosyncratic.
The task of individuation makes us appreciate the world around us with renewed interest and gratitude. We see that we are continually offered objects with which to find and release our own particular personality. We come to understand that we are objects with whom others can create and unfold their lives. Issues of injustice and oppression are thus brought right into our hearts, as we recognize that in addition to all the rest of the deprivations they effect, they can keep the heart from loving and unfolding, whether in ourselves or in our neighbor, and most often in both of us. Under these conditions, we feel pushed to discover, however sneakily, who has more and who less, who does what to whom, and how we can take revenge. “More” for us now seems possible only as a result of someone else’s “less” (Ulanov and Ulanov, 1982/1998).

If, however, we are embarked on our own individuation, we gain a whole new sense of community. We recognize how much we need each other to accomplish the tasks of facing our shadows, of encountering otherness as embodied in the opposite sex, of gathering the courage to respond wholeheartedly to the summons of the Self. We connect with each other at a new depth, equivalent to what Jung calls kinship.

**The archetypal and the body**

Awareness of the Self deeply affects the clinical situation. Analyst and analysand are rearranged around the call to answer the Self. In the midst of working with the most vexing problems urges to suicide and homicide, depression and anxiety, schizoid splitting, narcissistic wounding and borderline fragmenting, and the ways these psychic conditions complicate our relating with spouse, parent, or child, interfere with our jobs, and can reduce us to despair – analyst and analysand look directly to see what the Self is bringing through all these difficulties.

Jung defines the personal layer of the unconscious as a gathering of complexes, clusters of energy, affect, and image that reflect the conditioning of our early life. There, drawn well down into us, we find all those who have had formative effects on us, parents, friends, lovers, of whatever age or place in our lives. Our complexes show the influence of our cultural milieu, the colorations of class, race, sex, religion, politics, education. At the heart of each complex an archetypal image dwells. Engaging that image takes us through the personal unconscious into a still deeper layer that Jung calls the objective psyche. The archetypes compose its contents, and deep analysis means identifying and dealing with the particular sets of primordial images that operate in us.
My mother complex, for instance, will show the influence of my own mother’s conscious and unconscious personality, her style of relating to me and making the world available to me. The cultural images of motherhood from my childhood, and the particular archetypal image of Mother that arises from the objective psyche will also shape the mother complex in me. If I see my mother as malign and depriving, I may condemn Western society for generating a culture that is antagonistic to all women who do not conform to the stereotype of the sacrificial mother. I may also then find within me fantasy and dream images of an ideal mother whose abundant goodness compensates for my negative experience of motherhood. Another person who has suffered at the hands of a negative mother, but who fell into self-blame instead of blaming her parent, may instead confront images of a dread witch or a stone-making gorgon sent by the unconscious to convince the ego that the problem is not hers – but, rather, that it stems from the witch-like constellation that surrounds her mother (Ulanov and Ulanov, 1987, Chapter 2).

How are we to bring together conscious suffering and unconscious compensations for it? How are we to make sense of the ancient truth that parents visit their sins on their children? How are we to reconcile our suffering with the understanding that our parents did their best given their own problems and illnesses? We enter a larger space of human meditation on the hardships of life, but we are not simply victims. Life is addressing us here; it wants to be lived in us and through us. We feel this on a deep body level. Our spirit quickens.

Jung talks about the instinctual and spiritual poles that characterize every archetype (CW 8, paras. 417–420). One definition of the archetype – my favorite – is our instinct’s image of itself (CW 8, para. 277). Instinct is the body-originating energy, life-energy. The image is a portrait of how we experience it. And so every archetype has a spiritual facet which explains the “incorrigibly plural” quality of human beings’ numinous experiences, to borrow Louis MacNeice’s wonderful phrase (see B. Ulanov, 1992, and Ulanov and Ulanov, 1994, for examples). Some of us feel the spirit touch us through the Great Mother archetype. Others feel it through feminine wisdom figures; still others through a wondrous child, a compelling quest, and so forth. The unconscious is not creedal, but compensatory. It dishes up the images needed to balance our conscious one-sidedness so that we can include all sides as we become ourselves.

In investigating our God-images, we must examine their personal and archetypal bases. Personal factors will include details from our special upbringing and culture. Archetypal aspects will show which of the fund of

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primordial images have been constellated in us. Our God-image may be communism because our parents were devout revolutionaries. Our image of the divine may be scripture-based – the Yahweh who woos his people, sews garments for them when they are naked, and designs ephods for them to wear when they lead worship. Whatever they are, our God-images express our uniqueness and through their idiosyncratic qualities we feel the God beyond touching us in the flesh. The body has specific form, it means boundedness, not generality or shifting shadows. The body is life in the concrete. Our body restricts us to a certain place and time and thus permits us to focus on what is right here, in front of us. We are thus protected from “the elemental quality of cosmic indistinctness.” The body is “the guarantee of consciousness, and consciousness is the instrument by which the meaning is created” (Jung, 1988, v. 1, pp. 349–350). Our bodies ground us and keep us from floating off into timelessness in the archetype:

You cease to think and are acted upon as though carried by a great river with no end. You are suddenly eternal ... liberated from sitting up and paying attention, doubting, and concentrating upon things ... you don’t want to disturb it by asking foolish questions, it is too nice. (Jung, 1988, v. 1, p. 240)

We need both body and spirit or we forfeit both. We possess both or neither. For there to be life in the spirit, we need life in the body. For contact with the unconscious, we need consciousness. Otherwise the unconscious, like the waves of the ocean, wells up, comes forward, builds toward a climax, and then pulls downward, retreats, and disintegrates. For something to happen, consciousness must interfere, “grasp the treasure,” make something of what is offered (Jung, 1988, p. 237). We need the ego as the center of consciousness to know the Self as the center of the conscious and the unconscious psyche. We need to enter the conversation that fills the gap between them. That process of conversation constructs the Self that claims us, and builds up an ego that becomes decentered.

If we fail to engage in that process, our ego can easily be taken over by archetypal contents, as we see to our horror in any kind of religious or political fanaticism. Under such pressures, we rush out against others, compelled by the force of the archetypal. Convinced we alone possess the truth, we know no bounds in dealing with others who may disagree with, or even defy, us; segregating, maligning, oppressing, imprisoning, murdering others are crimes we can commit in the name of our twisted version of truth and salvation.

If we do engage in ego-Self conversation we come to know archetypal images inhabiting our very own bodies. This feels like energy, sometimes in greater amounts than we think we can handle. Then our bodies stretch,
both physically and psychologically, into new postures and new attitudes of acceptance and celebration. We might, for example, finally lay to rest a lifelong addiction to a substance, or a drink, or a special kind of food. We might find our blood-pressure lowering after many years. We might find back pain dispersing, or our power to endure it increasing. We might feel ushered into sexual ecstasy for the first time after many years. We might feel in touch with something infinite.

God-images and evil

To enter conversation with our God-image is not an easy task. The partial nature of this dialogue, its basis in small individual experience and its all too limited human perspective soon become only too clear. The conversation begins to crumble. We realize with unerring certainty that we are not reaching God or the transcendent, or whatever we choose to call it. We cannot cross the gap: we can only receive what comes from the other side, from the mysterious center of reality that our all-too-human symbols point to.

Attempting to engage our God-image in serious conversation and meditation is to face its inadequacy to cover the complexity of human life. For example, Jung asks, “What about evil? The suffering of the innocent?” Jung is distinguished among depth psychologists for his attempts to answer these questions (CW 11). They are not questions we can avoid. Terrible things happen all around us, to ourselves and others. We lose our minds. Human rights disappear. Bodies are born crippled and we are maimed. Storms and floods destroy our world. We murder each other. How can there be a just, powerful, and merciful God when so much suffering exists?

Jung’s answer places evil, finally, in God. God’s nature is complex and bears its own shadow. It needs human beings, with their focused body-based consciousness, to incarnate these opposites of divine life and thus help in their transformation. In considering the book of Job, Jung surmises that Yahweh suffers from unconsciousness, himself forgetting to consult his own divine omniscience. Job’s protests against his unmerited suffering make Yahweh aware of his own dealings with Satan and finally he can answer Job by becoming Christ, who takes the sufferings of human beings into his own life and pays for them himself.

Jung considers the Christ figure the most complete Self symbol we have known in human history, but he is aware that the Christian myth must be lived onward still farther (Jung, 1963, pp. 337–338). Christ, unlike the rest of us, is without sin. Evil splits off into the opposing figure of the Devil or the Antichrist. Christianity, Jung says, thus leaves no place for the evil side
of the human person (CW 8, para. 232). For him, the doctrine of evil as the privation of good fails to recognize the existence of evil as a force to be contended with. The doctrine of God as the *summum bonum* lifts God to impossible heights, while crushing humans under the weight of sin.

Critics of Jung question his reading of the Christ figure as separated from evil. In fact, they say, Christ lives his whole life on the frontiers of evil. Christ is no stranger to evil and sin. His birth as an outcast, his occasioning Herod’s murder of innocent babies, his facing the demons of mental illness, righteous rule-keeping, scapegoating judgments, abandonment by his friends and neighbors, and his own fate of suffering betrayal, abandonment, and death depict wickedness always upon him (B. Ulanov, 1992, Chapter 5).

Jung works out a solution that is the fruit of his engagement with his own God-image. He sees God as both good and evil. We serve God, according to Jung, by accepting the opposing elements in ourselves – conscious and unconscious, ego and shadow, persona and anima or animus, finally ego and Self. These opposites are best symbolized by masculine and feminine. Jung brings into religious discussion the body-based sexuality and contrasexuality of the human person (CW 12, para. 192). This inclusion goes a long way toward recovering the inescapable importance of the feminine mode of being, so long neglected in patriarchal history (see CW 11, paras. 107, 619–620, 625; and Ulanov, 1971, pp. 291–292). By struggling to integrate the opposites, we incarnate God’s struggle. The solutions we achieve, however small, contribute to divine life. Thus we participate in Christ’s suffering and serve God by becoming the selves God created us to be. We fulfill our vocation, redeeming our own pain from meaninglessness and participating in the life of God.

The transcendent function and synchronicity

Through Jung’s solution to the problem of evil, we come to understand his theory of the transcendent function. Jung enters the conversation of opposites, lets each side have its say, endures the struggle between the opposing points of view, suffers the anguish of being strung out between them, and greets the resolving symbol with gratitude. The psyche, says Jung, arrives at a third point of view that includes the essence of each conflicting perspective while at the same time combining them into a new symbol. We must enter this process and cooperate with it if we are to be fully – and ethically – engaged in living, says Jung (CW 8, paras. 181–183 and Jung 1963, paras. 753–755). It is not enough just to appreciate the transcendent function and marvel at the new symbols that arise with it. We must live them, use them,
bind them back into personal and communal life if we are to submit to a religious attitude. The transcendent function is the process through which the new comes about in us. This is a costly undertaking, for we feel our egos losing their grip on secure frames of reference. When the new begins to show itself, we pause, look, contemplate, in order to integrate into a new level of unity parts of ourselves and of life outside us that were hitherto unknown to us (Ulanov and Ulanov, 1991/1999, 1997/2004, Chapter 13).

The religious attitude, therefore, involves sacrifice (CW 11, para. 390). We offer up our identification with our ego’s point of view. We surrender what we identify with as “mine” or “ours,” sacrificing our ego-claims without expectation of payment. We do this because we recognize a higher claim, that of the Self. It offers itself to us, making its own sacrifice of relinquishing its status as the all and the vast, to take up residence in the stuff of our everyday lives. The conversation between ego and Self becomes our daily meditation.

When this happens, reality seems to reform itself. Odd coincidences of events that are not causally related occur, impressing us with their large and immediate meaning: what Jung called synchronicity (CW 8, para. 840). Outer and inner events collide in significant ways that open us to perceive what Jung calls the unus mundus, a wholeness where matter and psyche are revealed to be but two aspects of the same reality. Clinically, I have seen striking examples of this. A man struggled in conversation with a childhood terror of being locked in a dark attic as punishment for crying out too often to his parents when he was put to bed at night. Eventually, he reached the key to unlock a compulsive fetish that he now saw had functioned as the symbol to bridge the gap between his adult personality and his abject childhood terror in the locked attic. When this new attitude emerged out of his struggling back and forth with the fascination of the fetish, on the one hand, and his conscious humiliation and wish to rid himself of this compulsion, on the other, an outer event synchronistically occurred. The attic room in the house of his childhood was struck by lightning and destroyed — only the attic part of the house!

Jung’s theory links such outer and inner happenings through his theory of the archetype as psychoid, as possessed of the body and spirit poles (CW 8, paras. 368 ff., 380). When we engage in the conversation between the ego point of view and the Self’s, we touch both poles of the Self archetype, which open us to what is going on all the time in the interweaving of physical and spiritual events. When our conversation grows deep enough to show us that the Self not only is a center of the psyche but symbolizes the center of all of the life, we become open to the interdependent reality of the
whole, not only of all that is human, but of all other animate and inanimate life (Aziz, 1990, pp. 85, 111, 137, 167).

Method

Jung gives us a method to approach religious teachings of all kinds, which he demonstrates by his attention not only to materials of the Judeo-Christian tradition, but also to those of alchemy, Zen Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, and Hinduism, to elements of African and Native American religions, and to the mythologies of many times and cultures (CW 11, 12, 13). We must ask, How does a given teaching reflect the conversation of ego and Self? What dogmas and rituals from the ego side collect and contain immediate numinous experiences that give rise to Self symbols? What are the dominant Self symbols that point to a reality beyond the psyche? What are the main archetypal images employed to do such symbol-forming activity? Is the dominant archetype the transformation of father and son, as in the Christian eucharist, or is it the transformation of mother and daughter, as in the ancient Eleusinian mysteries? Jung saw alchemy, for example, as taking up the problem of the spiritualization of matter which Christianity did not adequately solve (Jung, 1975, p. 401). In alchemy the Self symbol is the lapis or “stone,” which, unlike the Christ symbol, combines good and evil, and matter and spirit; it is the end-purpose of all the alchemical operations which symbolize all our attitudes.

Jung has left methods that are practical and spiritual, hard-headed and open-hearted, to connect with the archaic roots of our religion, whatever it may be, and with the necessary clinical methods to include our experience of the numinous in the enterprise of healing.

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